Tweet
TWO YEARS SINCE THE FIVE-DAY WAR
Andrei ARESHEV
en.fondsk.ruEurasia
14.08.2010
The International Association of Ossetian Communities held rallies in
several European cities on the eve of the anniversary of Georgia's
aggression against South Ossetia. In Brussels, Strasbourg, Berlin,
and Ankara, protesters demanded the recognition of South Ossetia's
independence, official condemnations of the Georgian policy, and
the release of Ossetian prisoners. Representatives of the Ossetian
communities in Europe, the administration of South Ossetia, and
several European public organizations must be credited with serious
efforts to convince Europe not to view the situation exclusively
through the prism of Georgia's arguments. In particular, Ossetian
activists translated into English and French an array of historical
documents showing how the Republic of South Ossetia was crushed by the
Menshevist Georgia in 1920 and published a number of vivid accounts
of the drama suffered by South Ossetia during the 2008 Georgian attack.
An international conference titled "Two years Later: Lessons, Realia,
and the Future. Europeans' perspective on the Five Day War in South
Ossetia" convened on the eve of the tragic 08.08.08 anniversary. The
discussions at the forum largely revolved around the reflection of
the Five Day War in global media and the forecasts for the Caucasian
region. Representatives of European NGOs gave intriguing talks and
occasionally expressed views quite critical of Georgia, but the easily
unveiled truth is that the international politics decision-making
behind the facade of the "public democracy" is concentrated in the
hands of a handful of individuals.
Two years ago Russia faced massive media and diplomatic pressure
over its response to Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia. The
pressure is still on and will likely persist, meaning that we are to
witness a new series of debates and disagreements in the future.
For the most part, Europe's perception of the August, 2008 war between
Georgia and South Ossetia remains unchanged. The EU still supports
Georgia and regards Russia's reaction as at least unwarranted. Due
to various circumstances, the Georgian theme in Russia's relations
with the US and the EU has receded from public discourse but its
reanimation can be expected any moment, for example if the US and/or
Israel strike Iran and the attack triggers major military provocations
in the Caucasus. Europe continues denying South Ossetia the recognition
of its independence and treats it as a province of Georgia. The
later is a US ally in the Caucasus, and Italian journalist Giulietto
Chiesa even believes that - as a result of the recent Gaza crisis -
the Israeli aircrafts based in Turkey can be relocated to Georgia.
The August, 2008 developments marked a crucial phase of the collapse of
the already inefficient system of the instruments of international law,
predictably giving military force an ever greater role in international
relations. In fact, commonly accepted legal mechanisms of preventing
conflicts between ethnic groups or countries are hardly worth talking
about since the passing of the notorious verdict on the Kosovo
independence by the International Court of Justice. The resolution
of ethnic conflicts has irreversibly drifted from the sphere of law
to the sphere of current politics, and the arrangement exposes the
international security architecture to fundamental risks.
>>From the outset, there was no hope that the Russian diplomacy would -
on the UN level, for example - convince the international community
to condemn Saakashvili's aggression or to impose an embargo on
weaponry supplies to his regime. Russia's objections notwithstanding,
Europe is eager to integrate Georgia - as well as Ukraine - into
NATO. The Russian diplomacy's failure to make the world realize that
Saakashvili's regime was responsible for unleashing the war in South
Ossetia1 did not come as a surprise - no doubt, double standards will
dominate the global politics in the foreseeable future. This is the
reason why the Russian administration chose to de jure cement the
new status quo in the Caucasian region, regardless of how the step
angered Western (British and other) thinktanks. The anger surfaced
at the forum in Strasbourg...
Evidently, Tbilisi is seeking to maximally drag the US and the EU into
the Caucasian affairs. Notably, the EU with its initiatives like the
Eastern Partnership and association agreements is a background player
in the Caucasian region compared to the US and Russia.
The immediate parties to the conflict - Georgia on one side and South
Ossetia plus Abkhazia on the other - are equally committed to the view
that a fair resolution can only be brokered with the help of external
forces. Georgia is inviting the US and the EU while Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are summoning Russia. The Geneva consultations produced no
breakthrough, nor will they as long as their agenda is focused on
formulating a legally binding agreement on avoiding the use of force.
Georgia rejects the deal out of hand claiming that it can only sign
an agreement of the kind directly with Russia. Geopolitical reckoning
and vague expectations that the strategic balance in the region will
tilt prevail over the intentions to build a common European security
architecture.
The current - and, alas, temporary - dip in the intensity of
anti-Russian rhetoric may well be a prologue to a new round of pressure
on Moscow. Things can get worse if the US adopts a hawkish stance
(for example, due to the advent of a new US Administration or the
triumph of Republicans in the coming Congress elections). Then we are
sure to encounter a full-scale revival of all of the recent critical
stereotypes. A "gentle" version of essentially the same evolution
will likely materialize in the form of the reset which has already
drawn Moscow closer to Washington on Iran and several other issues.
>>From the perspective of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia as the
country interested in maintaining its influence over the region in
the long term should extend to them guarantees of their security,
which they bought dearly and cast irreversibly in the legal form of an
independent statehood. Abkhazia and South Ossetia hope that, led by
its own geopolitical interests, Russia will create an alliance with
them and will never revert to its defeatist 1990ies policies2. The
projection is that Russia's strategic stance in dealing with Georgia
will be consequent and will not be affected by minute plans to reach
a deal with Georgia at the cost of sacrificing the gains of the Five
Day War.
The struggle between Russia and the West over the Caucasus will
continue despite the pledged reset. The visits of US Vice President J.
Biden to Tbilisi and of US Secretary of State H. Clinton - to Baku,
Yerevan, and Tbilisi (a year later), along with a whole range of
other developments, showed clearly that the intensity of the rivalry
between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow over the Caucasian region is
not going to subside. The US has no intention to leave South Caucasus
to Russia, and the EU will not become the champion in the region in
the nearest future due to the following reasons:
1) The EU mediation lacks a unified underlying policy.
2) The EU is overly burdened with its own problems.
3) The EU would not risk tilting the balance in the Caucasus at the
cost of antagonizing Moscow over relatively minor issues.
4) The EU will likely opt for an auxiliary role in implementing a
new US strategy aimed at maximally pushing the Caucasian republics -
especially Abkhazia - off Russia's orbit.
5) There is no clarity concerning the future Eurointegration of
Georgia and other Caucasian republics3
At the same time, South Ossetia and Abkhazia hope to eventually
establish normal relations with the EU and to start moving towards
Eurointegration, though the latter task ranks lower on their lists of
priorities than cultivating the relations with Russia as the guarantor
of their security. Brussel's position will render meaningless any
talk about the region's European future as a means of addressing
its conflicts given that the EU believes that Georgia should retain
its Soviet-era borders. In the mid-term, the situation around South
Ossetia is bound to be a zero-sum game in which gains on one side
are tantamount to losses on the other.
The interpretations of the events that took place in Abkhazia two years
ago and the visions of Georgia's relations with its former autonomous
parts will at various levels remain a sphere of ideological strife. A
lot depends on the clarity and coherence of the positions of Moscow,
South Ossetia, and also of the Ossetian communities which are growing
increasingly visible in Europe and other parts of the world.
In this context, the rallies which convened early this August instill
a measure of optimism.
_________________________ (1) A. Kurtov. South Caucasus: Expectations
and Reality // Russia-Armenia: Opportunities to Deepen the Strategic
Partnership.
Moscow, RISI, 2010, p. 56
(2) Tbilisi was the first to resort to military force in dealing with
its defiant autonomies, but at the initial phase of the conflict the
Soviet - and later the post-Soviet - Georgian leadership met with no
response whatsoever from Moscow
(3) E. Ponomareva. Abkazia and South Ossetia: the
Future of Their Relations with Georgia. Part III //
http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2638
From: A. Papazian
Andrei ARESHEV
en.fondsk.ruEurasia
14.08.2010
The International Association of Ossetian Communities held rallies in
several European cities on the eve of the anniversary of Georgia's
aggression against South Ossetia. In Brussels, Strasbourg, Berlin,
and Ankara, protesters demanded the recognition of South Ossetia's
independence, official condemnations of the Georgian policy, and
the release of Ossetian prisoners. Representatives of the Ossetian
communities in Europe, the administration of South Ossetia, and
several European public organizations must be credited with serious
efforts to convince Europe not to view the situation exclusively
through the prism of Georgia's arguments. In particular, Ossetian
activists translated into English and French an array of historical
documents showing how the Republic of South Ossetia was crushed by the
Menshevist Georgia in 1920 and published a number of vivid accounts
of the drama suffered by South Ossetia during the 2008 Georgian attack.
An international conference titled "Two years Later: Lessons, Realia,
and the Future. Europeans' perspective on the Five Day War in South
Ossetia" convened on the eve of the tragic 08.08.08 anniversary. The
discussions at the forum largely revolved around the reflection of
the Five Day War in global media and the forecasts for the Caucasian
region. Representatives of European NGOs gave intriguing talks and
occasionally expressed views quite critical of Georgia, but the easily
unveiled truth is that the international politics decision-making
behind the facade of the "public democracy" is concentrated in the
hands of a handful of individuals.
Two years ago Russia faced massive media and diplomatic pressure
over its response to Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia. The
pressure is still on and will likely persist, meaning that we are to
witness a new series of debates and disagreements in the future.
For the most part, Europe's perception of the August, 2008 war between
Georgia and South Ossetia remains unchanged. The EU still supports
Georgia and regards Russia's reaction as at least unwarranted. Due
to various circumstances, the Georgian theme in Russia's relations
with the US and the EU has receded from public discourse but its
reanimation can be expected any moment, for example if the US and/or
Israel strike Iran and the attack triggers major military provocations
in the Caucasus. Europe continues denying South Ossetia the recognition
of its independence and treats it as a province of Georgia. The
later is a US ally in the Caucasus, and Italian journalist Giulietto
Chiesa even believes that - as a result of the recent Gaza crisis -
the Israeli aircrafts based in Turkey can be relocated to Georgia.
The August, 2008 developments marked a crucial phase of the collapse of
the already inefficient system of the instruments of international law,
predictably giving military force an ever greater role in international
relations. In fact, commonly accepted legal mechanisms of preventing
conflicts between ethnic groups or countries are hardly worth talking
about since the passing of the notorious verdict on the Kosovo
independence by the International Court of Justice. The resolution
of ethnic conflicts has irreversibly drifted from the sphere of law
to the sphere of current politics, and the arrangement exposes the
international security architecture to fundamental risks.
>>From the outset, there was no hope that the Russian diplomacy would -
on the UN level, for example - convince the international community
to condemn Saakashvili's aggression or to impose an embargo on
weaponry supplies to his regime. Russia's objections notwithstanding,
Europe is eager to integrate Georgia - as well as Ukraine - into
NATO. The Russian diplomacy's failure to make the world realize that
Saakashvili's regime was responsible for unleashing the war in South
Ossetia1 did not come as a surprise - no doubt, double standards will
dominate the global politics in the foreseeable future. This is the
reason why the Russian administration chose to de jure cement the
new status quo in the Caucasian region, regardless of how the step
angered Western (British and other) thinktanks. The anger surfaced
at the forum in Strasbourg...
Evidently, Tbilisi is seeking to maximally drag the US and the EU into
the Caucasian affairs. Notably, the EU with its initiatives like the
Eastern Partnership and association agreements is a background player
in the Caucasian region compared to the US and Russia.
The immediate parties to the conflict - Georgia on one side and South
Ossetia plus Abkhazia on the other - are equally committed to the view
that a fair resolution can only be brokered with the help of external
forces. Georgia is inviting the US and the EU while Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are summoning Russia. The Geneva consultations produced no
breakthrough, nor will they as long as their agenda is focused on
formulating a legally binding agreement on avoiding the use of force.
Georgia rejects the deal out of hand claiming that it can only sign
an agreement of the kind directly with Russia. Geopolitical reckoning
and vague expectations that the strategic balance in the region will
tilt prevail over the intentions to build a common European security
architecture.
The current - and, alas, temporary - dip in the intensity of
anti-Russian rhetoric may well be a prologue to a new round of pressure
on Moscow. Things can get worse if the US adopts a hawkish stance
(for example, due to the advent of a new US Administration or the
triumph of Republicans in the coming Congress elections). Then we are
sure to encounter a full-scale revival of all of the recent critical
stereotypes. A "gentle" version of essentially the same evolution
will likely materialize in the form of the reset which has already
drawn Moscow closer to Washington on Iran and several other issues.
>>From the perspective of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia as the
country interested in maintaining its influence over the region in
the long term should extend to them guarantees of their security,
which they bought dearly and cast irreversibly in the legal form of an
independent statehood. Abkhazia and South Ossetia hope that, led by
its own geopolitical interests, Russia will create an alliance with
them and will never revert to its defeatist 1990ies policies2. The
projection is that Russia's strategic stance in dealing with Georgia
will be consequent and will not be affected by minute plans to reach
a deal with Georgia at the cost of sacrificing the gains of the Five
Day War.
The struggle between Russia and the West over the Caucasus will
continue despite the pledged reset. The visits of US Vice President J.
Biden to Tbilisi and of US Secretary of State H. Clinton - to Baku,
Yerevan, and Tbilisi (a year later), along with a whole range of
other developments, showed clearly that the intensity of the rivalry
between Washington, Brussels, and Moscow over the Caucasian region is
not going to subside. The US has no intention to leave South Caucasus
to Russia, and the EU will not become the champion in the region in
the nearest future due to the following reasons:
1) The EU mediation lacks a unified underlying policy.
2) The EU is overly burdened with its own problems.
3) The EU would not risk tilting the balance in the Caucasus at the
cost of antagonizing Moscow over relatively minor issues.
4) The EU will likely opt for an auxiliary role in implementing a
new US strategy aimed at maximally pushing the Caucasian republics -
especially Abkhazia - off Russia's orbit.
5) There is no clarity concerning the future Eurointegration of
Georgia and other Caucasian republics3
At the same time, South Ossetia and Abkhazia hope to eventually
establish normal relations with the EU and to start moving towards
Eurointegration, though the latter task ranks lower on their lists of
priorities than cultivating the relations with Russia as the guarantor
of their security. Brussel's position will render meaningless any
talk about the region's European future as a means of addressing
its conflicts given that the EU believes that Georgia should retain
its Soviet-era borders. In the mid-term, the situation around South
Ossetia is bound to be a zero-sum game in which gains on one side
are tantamount to losses on the other.
The interpretations of the events that took place in Abkhazia two years
ago and the visions of Georgia's relations with its former autonomous
parts will at various levels remain a sphere of ideological strife. A
lot depends on the clarity and coherence of the positions of Moscow,
South Ossetia, and also of the Ossetian communities which are growing
increasingly visible in Europe and other parts of the world.
In this context, the rallies which convened early this August instill
a measure of optimism.
_________________________ (1) A. Kurtov. South Caucasus: Expectations
and Reality // Russia-Armenia: Opportunities to Deepen the Strategic
Partnership.
Moscow, RISI, 2010, p. 56
(2) Tbilisi was the first to resort to military force in dealing with
its defiant autonomies, but at the initial phase of the conflict the
Soviet - and later the post-Soviet - Georgian leadership met with no
response whatsoever from Moscow
(3) E. Ponomareva. Abkazia and South Ossetia: the
Future of Their Relations with Georgia. Part III //
http://www.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2638
From: A. Papazian