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THE RUSSIAN BASE IN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN'S S-300S
Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet
Aug 19 2010
NY
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrives in Yerevan today on a
three-day visit, for a "non-official" CSTO summit and, it's expected,
to sign a new deal with Armenia extending Russia's military presence
there. The deal would amend the lease Russia has with Armenia for use
of the 102nd base in Gyumri for an additional 24 years, which would
allow Russian troops to stay in Armenia until 2044. (Russia apparently
is thinking long-term these days; it also this year signed an agreement
with Ukraine allowing use of the naval base at Sevastopol until 2042.)
Connected with this, somehow, is the news that Russia will (maybe)
be selling S-300 air defense systems to Azerbaijan. This development
was reported by a Russian newspaper three weeks ago and has yet to be
authoritatively confirmed or denied by any of the relevant parties. So
speculation continues, and there are various theories. One common
belief is that it's a sop to Azerbaijan to allay their fears over
Russia's strengthening presence in Armenia.
Another school of thought is that it was to scare Armenia into
accepting the base lease extension. From EurasiaNet colleague Shahin
Abbasov:
Moscow may have an interest in emphasizing that interest [by Baku to
buy the S-300] to Azerbaijan's long-time foe, Armenia, one political
analyst believes. The timing of the July 29 Vedomosti article about the
alleged S-300 sale roughly coincided with news about an expected August
19 deal with Armenia for a 49-year lease on Russia's Gyumri base there.
"Both issues appeared simultaneously and I do not have any doubts
that they are linked," commented Ilgar Mammadov, a co-founder of the
pro-opposition Respublikaci Alternative movement.
"[T]here are forces in Armenia which criticize and object to these
plans. Thus, to make the Armenian public agree to this agreement, the
Kremlin leaked information concerning plans to sell the air-defense
systems to Azerbaijan, and, generally, about the strengthening of
its military cooperation with Baku," Mammadov argued.
Or, of course, it could be a combination of both of these, and it ends
up being win-win for Russia: they get money from selling the S-300s to
Azerbaijan and long-term influence in the south Caucasus via Armenia.
But who comes out better in the deal, Armenia or Azerbaijan? It seems
pretty clear that Azerbaijan does. The Armenian government claims
that the deal will help protect them:
The new wording of the agreement stipulates that the Russian military
base, together with the Armenian armed forces, will not only protect
Russia's interests, but will also ensure Armenia's security. To this
end, Russia will supply Armenia with weapons and modern military
equipment...
Armenian politicians have welcomed the extension. Secretary of the
ruling Republican Party of Armenia Eduard Sharmazanov told local
media that extending the presence of the base will help maintain the
regional balance of power.
But plenty of skeptics doubt that, if Azerbaijan were to attack to try
to regain Armenian-controlled Nagorno Karabakh, that Russia would do
much to help out. In addition to the fact that the CSTO's credibility
is badly weakened after it failed to do anything to protect Kyrgyzstan
during its recent crisis, legally the situation with Karabakh is
tricky, as well, according to Armenian expert Hovannes Nikogosyan:
Yerevan is convinced that the agreement would contribute to the
regional stability.
There is a minor legal problem however. According to the treaty
between Russia and Armenia (and the CSTO charter) the sides will
de facto protect each other in the case of an aggression. The new
protocol that awaits signing at the moment says Russia will "protect
Armenia's security". Armenia did not annex the territory of Karabakh -
it only extended security guarantees to the province - and legally
the term "Armenia's security" seems to apply exclusively to the
territory of Armenia proper. The problem is that neither the March,
2008 incident nor Azerbaijan's sabotage offensive against Karabakh
last May were explicitly condemned by Armenia as infringements upon
its own security. Russia will have no legal right to intervene in
Karabakh unless Yerevan states officially that Azerbaijan's offensive
against Karabakh would be treated as a threat to Armenia's security.
And while Russia continues to point out that the S-300 is merely a
defensive weapon, this is obviously a canard. While, yes, a good air
defense system protects you from an unprovoked air attack, it also
protects you from a counterattack. So if Azerbaijan were to attack
Armenia, and Armenia were to counterattack -- like anyone would expect
them to -- then Azerbaijan would be able to far better defend itself
against that counterattack. And that puts Azerbaijan in a much better
offensive position.
But all this depends on Azerbaijan getting the S-300. So we'll see.
From: A. Papazian
Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet
Aug 19 2010
NY
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrives in Yerevan today on a
three-day visit, for a "non-official" CSTO summit and, it's expected,
to sign a new deal with Armenia extending Russia's military presence
there. The deal would amend the lease Russia has with Armenia for use
of the 102nd base in Gyumri for an additional 24 years, which would
allow Russian troops to stay in Armenia until 2044. (Russia apparently
is thinking long-term these days; it also this year signed an agreement
with Ukraine allowing use of the naval base at Sevastopol until 2042.)
Connected with this, somehow, is the news that Russia will (maybe)
be selling S-300 air defense systems to Azerbaijan. This development
was reported by a Russian newspaper three weeks ago and has yet to be
authoritatively confirmed or denied by any of the relevant parties. So
speculation continues, and there are various theories. One common
belief is that it's a sop to Azerbaijan to allay their fears over
Russia's strengthening presence in Armenia.
Another school of thought is that it was to scare Armenia into
accepting the base lease extension. From EurasiaNet colleague Shahin
Abbasov:
Moscow may have an interest in emphasizing that interest [by Baku to
buy the S-300] to Azerbaijan's long-time foe, Armenia, one political
analyst believes. The timing of the July 29 Vedomosti article about the
alleged S-300 sale roughly coincided with news about an expected August
19 deal with Armenia for a 49-year lease on Russia's Gyumri base there.
"Both issues appeared simultaneously and I do not have any doubts
that they are linked," commented Ilgar Mammadov, a co-founder of the
pro-opposition Respublikaci Alternative movement.
"[T]here are forces in Armenia which criticize and object to these
plans. Thus, to make the Armenian public agree to this agreement, the
Kremlin leaked information concerning plans to sell the air-defense
systems to Azerbaijan, and, generally, about the strengthening of
its military cooperation with Baku," Mammadov argued.
Or, of course, it could be a combination of both of these, and it ends
up being win-win for Russia: they get money from selling the S-300s to
Azerbaijan and long-term influence in the south Caucasus via Armenia.
But who comes out better in the deal, Armenia or Azerbaijan? It seems
pretty clear that Azerbaijan does. The Armenian government claims
that the deal will help protect them:
The new wording of the agreement stipulates that the Russian military
base, together with the Armenian armed forces, will not only protect
Russia's interests, but will also ensure Armenia's security. To this
end, Russia will supply Armenia with weapons and modern military
equipment...
Armenian politicians have welcomed the extension. Secretary of the
ruling Republican Party of Armenia Eduard Sharmazanov told local
media that extending the presence of the base will help maintain the
regional balance of power.
But plenty of skeptics doubt that, if Azerbaijan were to attack to try
to regain Armenian-controlled Nagorno Karabakh, that Russia would do
much to help out. In addition to the fact that the CSTO's credibility
is badly weakened after it failed to do anything to protect Kyrgyzstan
during its recent crisis, legally the situation with Karabakh is
tricky, as well, according to Armenian expert Hovannes Nikogosyan:
Yerevan is convinced that the agreement would contribute to the
regional stability.
There is a minor legal problem however. According to the treaty
between Russia and Armenia (and the CSTO charter) the sides will
de facto protect each other in the case of an aggression. The new
protocol that awaits signing at the moment says Russia will "protect
Armenia's security". Armenia did not annex the territory of Karabakh -
it only extended security guarantees to the province - and legally
the term "Armenia's security" seems to apply exclusively to the
territory of Armenia proper. The problem is that neither the March,
2008 incident nor Azerbaijan's sabotage offensive against Karabakh
last May were explicitly condemned by Armenia as infringements upon
its own security. Russia will have no legal right to intervene in
Karabakh unless Yerevan states officially that Azerbaijan's offensive
against Karabakh would be treated as a threat to Armenia's security.
And while Russia continues to point out that the S-300 is merely a
defensive weapon, this is obviously a canard. While, yes, a good air
defense system protects you from an unprovoked air attack, it also
protects you from a counterattack. So if Azerbaijan were to attack
Armenia, and Armenia were to counterattack -- like anyone would expect
them to -- then Azerbaijan would be able to far better defend itself
against that counterattack. And that puts Azerbaijan in a much better
offensive position.
But all this depends on Azerbaijan getting the S-300. So we'll see.
From: A. Papazian