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DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND ROUND IT
Sevak Sarukhanyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5236
09.12.2010
S.Sarukhanyan - the Deputy Director of "Noravank" Foundation, Head
of the Center of Political Studies", Candidate of Political Sciences
Developments which can be observed in the Russian-Iranian relations
in the recent period create new international situation round the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the main feature of that situation can
be the final isolation of Iran. At the same time new changes in the
social and economic sector can be observed in Iran, and those changes
can undermine political stability of the country.
Russian-Iranian relations On September 22 the executive order of the
Russian president D.Medvedev "On carrying out the June 9 resolution
number 1929 of the UN Security Council" was published, according
to which it is prohibited to Russian companies and structures
to provide Iran with S-300 antimissile systems as well as other
defencive and offencive weapons. Though the contract on delivery of
S-300 was concluded back in 2007, Moscow has not made haste taking
into consideration difficult international situation round the Islamic
Republic. After the executive order of the Russian president it became
clear there would be no more supply of weapons to Iran.
Tehran's reaction to the executive order of the Russian president
cannot be considered tough. Till now neither Iran's president
nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs commented on the decision of
Moscow. The only tough comment was made by the head of the Commission
on International Relations and National Security A.Boronjerdi who
promised to sue Russia if the later does not meet its engagements on
the supply of weapons.
The answer of Moscow to the Iranian response was that they grounded
on the provisions stipulated in "Force Majeure" part of the contract
according to which the parties will be exempt of responsibility for
partial or complete non-execution of their respective liabilities due
to contingencies which are of unexpected and objective nature. The UN
Security Council's resolution was considered by the Russian Foreign
Minister S.Lavrov as such a contingency which caused "force majeure".
It can be supposed that still "soft" reaction of Tehran to the
decision of Russia aims not to complicate relations with Moscow
even more. The later obviously demonstrates that it does not mind to
"sacrifice" relations with Tehran if it will help to establish mutual
understanding with Washington on other strategic issues. The decision
of Moscow is also conditioned by the fact that the cooperation with
Tehran and protection of Iranian interests in the international
structures has not consolidated Russian positions in the Islamic
Republic: the attempts of "Gazprom", "Lukoil", "Rosneft", "Beeline"
and other Russian companies to make investments in Iran met resistance
on behalf of the Iranian authorities. The only spheres where Iranian
authorities were benevolent in regard to Russian companies were
military and nuclear spheres and that was in the Iranian interests.
And the refusal of Russia to cooperate in the military sector first
of all struck a blow to Iran.
It is possible that toughening of the stance of Russia in regard to
Iran is directly connected with the Iranian nuclear programme which
has gained in scope recently. Official Tehran already stated that
the third raw of centrifuges necessary for the enrichment of uranium
has been put into circulation in Natanz which can have a military
application. All this have been done under the negative attitude of
Russian authorities. Besides, as the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
A.Nesterenko stated Iran did not inform Russia about its further steps.
In this case Russia's anger in regard to Iran's policy can be
understood. Temporary refusal of the US to use force against Iran
has also influenced the stance of Russia. This is evidenced by
different sources which, besides all, also mention that Washington
managed to persuade Israel from hitting Iran. As V.Koryakin mentions,
making reference to "Al-Hayat" periodical, that was a mission of the
Assistant to the US President and his special envoy to the Middle
East D. Ross. Under such conditions Moscow can be sure that no war
will start in the proximity of its southern borders and due to that
reason it became imposing more definite pressure on Iran thus being
conscious that this will not be used by the third countries in order
to solve their strategic issues.
Most probably, in the months to come an amplification of international
pressure on Iran can be expected and Tehran is preparing to that,
thus facilitating the social and economic burden of the government and
the main signals of it are the price rise and dollar rate appreciation.
Domestic situation in Iran As the events arranged by the opposition
in summer 2010 showed serious changes took place in the domestic
political life of Iran: the former presidential candidate M.Kyarubi
became the leader of the oppositional movement organized by Musavi
last year. Unlike Musavi, Kyarubi made no bones about joining the
demonstrators and making some tough statements in the address of the
incumbent president, among other calling him "illegal president". Most
probably, the last year's stance of Musavi who tried to keep the
opposition away from the revolutionary moods seriously undermined his
positions in the oppositional circles. In the coming one or two years
it will be clear whether Kyarubi can take a position of leader and
unite oppositional powers in order to win the parliamentary elections
or not.
The situation is even more complicated in the ruling circles and this
most probably is conditioned by worsening relations between president
M. Ahmadinejad and spiritual leader A. Khamenei. This can be proved
by the analytical materials published in Iranian state mass media
in which the economic policy of the current government is toughly
criticized. The fact that M.Ahmadinejad brought his relative R.Mashayi
back to the ruling circles comes to prove that Iranian president more
openly acts as power center independent from the spiritual leadership.
Let us remind you that Mashayi was appointed vice-president last year
but spiritual leader Khamenei made president discharge him because
most of the spiritual elite had negative attitude to him, besides there
were serious suspicions that the relative of the Iranian president was
corrupted, This year, despite the negative attitude of the spiritual
elite, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashayi the head of his administration
and widened the circle of his duties up to the vice-president's level.
But the main target of the spiritual elite's criticism is the
president's programme of administrative reforms. According to it 144
state organizations and companies must be withdrawn from Tehran and
taken to other regions. It is supposed that due to those measures
the development of the regions will be boosted and the population of
Tehran will be reduced by almost half a million. But the critics of
president's programme believe that president pursues other objects:
president who also wants to move out of Tehran tends to concentrate
round himself all the administrative structures and due to this
make the processes in the country more controllable. In fact it is
talked about creating second Ghum where the temporal authorities of
Iran will be centered and which be controlled by the president and
not by the spiritual leader. It is obvious that "old elite" cannot
like this programme and it criticized toughly president's programme
through the media which is still under its control.
The economic policy of Ahmadinejad has also become a target of
criticism. His annual budget submitted in March implied refusal from
the subsidies stably given to the population. Subsidy assistance
costs Iranian government about $30 billion annually: petrol, gas,
water and electricity prices are subsidized. Though the Iranian
parliament reacted positively to the project but nobody expected that
the president will abolish subsidy assistance at once. The coupons
allotted at the end of September for paying for electricity and gas
caused social shock among the population. It turned out, that for
example, prices for electricity grew 8 times and gas prices 3 times.
The protest of people shifted to the parliament, the disturbance wave
against the policy of the president raised. As for M.Ahmadinejad his
reaction was as follows: this is the price for finding means necessary
for modernization and we have to pay it.
Back at the end of September new blow was cast to the macro-economic
security of Iran: Central Bank of Iran stopped financing stability
of Iranian rial which caused 20 per cent appreciation of dollar. And
though the president was criticized for that either but this step may
be justified by the fact that Iran under the sanctions have to save
its currency reserves which can be necessary for preserving volume
of trade of the Islamic Republic.
Taking into consideration all the aforementioned it should be stated
that political life in Iran has a possibility to stir up later. Its
main actors will be the circles concentrated around the president of
Iran and country's "old elite": the first will tend to consolidate
and the second will try to preserve its positions.
"Globus Energy and Regional Security", issue 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
IRAN: OLD AND NEW ISSUES [18.11.2010] ARMENIAN ENERGY SECURITY AND
ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS[29.10.2010] IRAN AND SANCTIONS[22.07.2010]
DEVELOPMENTS ROUND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF IRAN[01.07.2010] SOME
MAIN ISSUES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND IRAN[24.05.2010]
From: A. Papazian
Sevak Sarukhanyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5236
09.12.2010
S.Sarukhanyan - the Deputy Director of "Noravank" Foundation, Head
of the Center of Political Studies", Candidate of Political Sciences
Developments which can be observed in the Russian-Iranian relations
in the recent period create new international situation round the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the main feature of that situation can
be the final isolation of Iran. At the same time new changes in the
social and economic sector can be observed in Iran, and those changes
can undermine political stability of the country.
Russian-Iranian relations On September 22 the executive order of the
Russian president D.Medvedev "On carrying out the June 9 resolution
number 1929 of the UN Security Council" was published, according
to which it is prohibited to Russian companies and structures
to provide Iran with S-300 antimissile systems as well as other
defencive and offencive weapons. Though the contract on delivery of
S-300 was concluded back in 2007, Moscow has not made haste taking
into consideration difficult international situation round the Islamic
Republic. After the executive order of the Russian president it became
clear there would be no more supply of weapons to Iran.
Tehran's reaction to the executive order of the Russian president
cannot be considered tough. Till now neither Iran's president
nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs commented on the decision of
Moscow. The only tough comment was made by the head of the Commission
on International Relations and National Security A.Boronjerdi who
promised to sue Russia if the later does not meet its engagements on
the supply of weapons.
The answer of Moscow to the Iranian response was that they grounded
on the provisions stipulated in "Force Majeure" part of the contract
according to which the parties will be exempt of responsibility for
partial or complete non-execution of their respective liabilities due
to contingencies which are of unexpected and objective nature. The UN
Security Council's resolution was considered by the Russian Foreign
Minister S.Lavrov as such a contingency which caused "force majeure".
It can be supposed that still "soft" reaction of Tehran to the
decision of Russia aims not to complicate relations with Moscow
even more. The later obviously demonstrates that it does not mind to
"sacrifice" relations with Tehran if it will help to establish mutual
understanding with Washington on other strategic issues. The decision
of Moscow is also conditioned by the fact that the cooperation with
Tehran and protection of Iranian interests in the international
structures has not consolidated Russian positions in the Islamic
Republic: the attempts of "Gazprom", "Lukoil", "Rosneft", "Beeline"
and other Russian companies to make investments in Iran met resistance
on behalf of the Iranian authorities. The only spheres where Iranian
authorities were benevolent in regard to Russian companies were
military and nuclear spheres and that was in the Iranian interests.
And the refusal of Russia to cooperate in the military sector first
of all struck a blow to Iran.
It is possible that toughening of the stance of Russia in regard to
Iran is directly connected with the Iranian nuclear programme which
has gained in scope recently. Official Tehran already stated that
the third raw of centrifuges necessary for the enrichment of uranium
has been put into circulation in Natanz which can have a military
application. All this have been done under the negative attitude of
Russian authorities. Besides, as the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
A.Nesterenko stated Iran did not inform Russia about its further steps.
In this case Russia's anger in regard to Iran's policy can be
understood. Temporary refusal of the US to use force against Iran
has also influenced the stance of Russia. This is evidenced by
different sources which, besides all, also mention that Washington
managed to persuade Israel from hitting Iran. As V.Koryakin mentions,
making reference to "Al-Hayat" periodical, that was a mission of the
Assistant to the US President and his special envoy to the Middle
East D. Ross. Under such conditions Moscow can be sure that no war
will start in the proximity of its southern borders and due to that
reason it became imposing more definite pressure on Iran thus being
conscious that this will not be used by the third countries in order
to solve their strategic issues.
Most probably, in the months to come an amplification of international
pressure on Iran can be expected and Tehran is preparing to that,
thus facilitating the social and economic burden of the government and
the main signals of it are the price rise and dollar rate appreciation.
Domestic situation in Iran As the events arranged by the opposition
in summer 2010 showed serious changes took place in the domestic
political life of Iran: the former presidential candidate M.Kyarubi
became the leader of the oppositional movement organized by Musavi
last year. Unlike Musavi, Kyarubi made no bones about joining the
demonstrators and making some tough statements in the address of the
incumbent president, among other calling him "illegal president". Most
probably, the last year's stance of Musavi who tried to keep the
opposition away from the revolutionary moods seriously undermined his
positions in the oppositional circles. In the coming one or two years
it will be clear whether Kyarubi can take a position of leader and
unite oppositional powers in order to win the parliamentary elections
or not.
The situation is even more complicated in the ruling circles and this
most probably is conditioned by worsening relations between president
M. Ahmadinejad and spiritual leader A. Khamenei. This can be proved
by the analytical materials published in Iranian state mass media
in which the economic policy of the current government is toughly
criticized. The fact that M.Ahmadinejad brought his relative R.Mashayi
back to the ruling circles comes to prove that Iranian president more
openly acts as power center independent from the spiritual leadership.
Let us remind you that Mashayi was appointed vice-president last year
but spiritual leader Khamenei made president discharge him because
most of the spiritual elite had negative attitude to him, besides there
were serious suspicions that the relative of the Iranian president was
corrupted, This year, despite the negative attitude of the spiritual
elite, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashayi the head of his administration
and widened the circle of his duties up to the vice-president's level.
But the main target of the spiritual elite's criticism is the
president's programme of administrative reforms. According to it 144
state organizations and companies must be withdrawn from Tehran and
taken to other regions. It is supposed that due to those measures
the development of the regions will be boosted and the population of
Tehran will be reduced by almost half a million. But the critics of
president's programme believe that president pursues other objects:
president who also wants to move out of Tehran tends to concentrate
round himself all the administrative structures and due to this
make the processes in the country more controllable. In fact it is
talked about creating second Ghum where the temporal authorities of
Iran will be centered and which be controlled by the president and
not by the spiritual leader. It is obvious that "old elite" cannot
like this programme and it criticized toughly president's programme
through the media which is still under its control.
The economic policy of Ahmadinejad has also become a target of
criticism. His annual budget submitted in March implied refusal from
the subsidies stably given to the population. Subsidy assistance
costs Iranian government about $30 billion annually: petrol, gas,
water and electricity prices are subsidized. Though the Iranian
parliament reacted positively to the project but nobody expected that
the president will abolish subsidy assistance at once. The coupons
allotted at the end of September for paying for electricity and gas
caused social shock among the population. It turned out, that for
example, prices for electricity grew 8 times and gas prices 3 times.
The protest of people shifted to the parliament, the disturbance wave
against the policy of the president raised. As for M.Ahmadinejad his
reaction was as follows: this is the price for finding means necessary
for modernization and we have to pay it.
Back at the end of September new blow was cast to the macro-economic
security of Iran: Central Bank of Iran stopped financing stability
of Iranian rial which caused 20 per cent appreciation of dollar. And
though the president was criticized for that either but this step may
be justified by the fact that Iran under the sanctions have to save
its currency reserves which can be necessary for preserving volume
of trade of the Islamic Republic.
Taking into consideration all the aforementioned it should be stated
that political life in Iran has a possibility to stir up later. Its
main actors will be the circles concentrated around the president of
Iran and country's "old elite": the first will tend to consolidate
and the second will try to preserve its positions.
"Globus Energy and Regional Security", issue 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
IRAN: OLD AND NEW ISSUES [18.11.2010] ARMENIAN ENERGY SECURITY AND
ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS[29.10.2010] IRAN AND SANCTIONS[22.07.2010]
DEVELOPMENTS ROUND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF IRAN[01.07.2010] SOME
MAIN ISSUES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND IRAN[24.05.2010]
From: A. Papazian