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COMPLICATIONS IN ASTANA AND AT HOME
by David Petrosian
December 13, 2010
The long-awaited summit of the heads of OSCE states took place in
Astana on December 1-2. As we had expected, the summit did not bring
any breakthrough decisions on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
settlement.
In the run-up to the summit, there was unprecedented diplomatic
activity over the negotiating process, the documents and the
obligations of the sides.
On the one hand, that activity was promoted by the Russian foreign
ministry headed by Sergei Lavrov. According to official information,
Moscow apparently made much effort to prepare for the signing of the
document which was to become a breakthrough in the conflict settlement
process. Evidently, the mission of Secretary-General of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolay Bordyuzha in Yerevan (that
mission was unprecedented by its duration - 4 days!) as well as the
visit that the head of the Russian presidential administration Sergei
Naryshkin paid to Yerevan - the mission and the visit took place ahead
of the Astana summit - aimed to back the efforts of the Russian
foreign minister. The penultimate period in that process was
apparently to be put on November 27 during the announced meeting of
the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, again through the
mediation of Lavrov.
However, the mission of N. Bordyuzha and S. Naryshkin was not
crowned with success, and the meeting in Astrakhan did not take place
or was torpedoed by skilful actions of the American side.
In Astana, everything went in quite a rapid and uninteresting
way. The five-party statement on Nagorno Karabakh was already signed
at the beginning of the first day of the summit activities. The
statement was signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Russia, the French Prime minister, and U.S. secretary of state. To all
appearances, the text of the document was coordinated in detail
beforehand and, as far as we know, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
was the last one of the mentioned `five parties' to sign it.
Russia failed to bring its mediation up to the necessary mark,
although over the past two years it managed to organize 7 presidential
meetings and the signing of two declarative documents (in Moscow in
2008 and in Astrakhan in 2010). Thus, on the whole, we believe that
this diplomatic round was won by the West, first of all by the United
States.
Below is what follows from the Astana statement, that in many
respects reiterates the provisions of the document signed by the
presidents of Russia, the U.S. and France in Canada in the summer of
2010.
Yerevan in the person of President Serzh Sargsyan declaratively
agrees:
- to represent Nagorno Karabakh at the negotiations and therefore
it does not give up the policy of R. Kocharian who consented to
Stepanakert's isolation from the participation in the
negotiating process - despite the fact that by a 1994 decision
of the OSCE, Nagorno Karabakh can participate as a fully-fledged
party in the negotiating process conducted within the framework
of the OSCE Minsk Group,
- that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict should be resolved de jure
within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity,
- to the withdrawal of Armenian military units from
Armenian-controlled regions of the `security zone' outside the
boundaries of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region of
Azerbaijani SSR,
- that there is no clarity over issues of lifting the blockade of
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh,
- to the use of the term `occupied territories' when the matter
concerns the regions of the `security zone',
- that the term `land corridor' linking Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh can be used instead of the previously used term `Lachin
corridor'.
Baku in the person of President Ilham Aliyev declaratively
agrees:
- that the term `self-determination' can be used for determining
the status of Nagorno Karabakh,
- that the procedure of `will expression' shall be held in
determining the status.
Both sides also formally agreed that the conflict should be
resolved only by peaceful means, that is, without use of force or
threats to use force.
Yet the undisguised unwillingness of the mediators to implement
the agreement on strengthening the ceasefire regime in the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict zone which was signed in 1995 under the aegis of
OSCE also hinders the conflict settlement and the domination of
the principle of non-use of force. In this context the threat of a
resumption of hostilities in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone
remains quite considerable. Unfortunately, the Astana summit did
not produce any positive changes in that important direction. It
gave another thing instead: the formal consent of the major
external players to prolongation of the frozen situation in the
conflict zones in the territory of the OSCE, including Nagorno
Karabakh.
The response of Yerevan and Stepanakert to the outcome of the
Astana summit was rather lukewarm. In both Armenian capital cities,
the `parties in power' presented the five-party statement as a
document which is, on the whole, advantageous to the Armenian side.
Most likely, a thorough analysis of what happened is still to be made.
The step-down of the Yerevan Mayor Gagik Beglarian and then the
resignation of Justice Minister Gevorg Danielian proved much more
sensational for the president.
A good deal of information points to the gross exaggeration of
several facts relating to the incident which occurred between the
mayor's wife and the presidential administration official Aram
Kandayan during the December 3 concert of Placido Domingo. The same is
true concerning the facts relating to the subsequent showdown between
mayor Beglarian himself and Kandayan. Particularly, to all appearances,
Beglarian did not kidnap Kandayan, nor did he beat him up at Metax
Plant. Nevertheless, following the `news leak' from the presidential
residence and the formation of the relevant public moods, Beglarian
had to hand in his resignation, while after a meeting of party
activists of the Republican Party of Armenia, the press reported that
criminal proceedings had been brought against the already ex-mayor of
Yerevan.
Based on the press reports, we present the current situation in
the following way: most probably, the Armenian presidential
administration's members supporting the pro-Western political
orientation have convinced the president of the necessity to take some
steps in order to give the current regime a more acceptable and
presentable appearance before Washington and Brussels. For this
purpose, it would be a good thing to remove a familiar figure (or two
figures) from the political and, perhaps, business arenas - to remove
those who, to put it mildly, do not enjoy popularity of the public.
They chose the Yerevan mayor who, to be quite frank, did not always
consider the `recommendations' and demands of high-ranking officials
of the presidential administration when carrying out his
administrative and business activities. Then the appropriate pretext
was used, and the `talking heads' on television and officials of
various levels began to speak about the inadmissibility of `such a
conduct' and the non-fulfillment of the requirements of `government
ethics'.
The desired effect seems to have been achieved and such a powerful
man in the system of the `party in power' as Beglarian was removed
from his position. This is a signal that the authorities may start
processes which will lead to the change of some characters and sets in
Armenia's political arena, but they will by no means change the
essence of the regime of the president Serzh Sargsyan. Most likely, in
conducting its foreign policy, the regime will become much more
pointedly oriented towards Washington and Brussels. In our opinion,
this is the main outcome of the resignations of the Yerevan mayor and
the Armenian minister of Justice.
"The Noyan Tapan Highlights", N46 December, 2010
--
David Petrosyan is a political analyst in Yerevan, Armenia, and
writes a regular weekly column in Noyan Tapan. He also provides
weekly analyses to the Armenian service of SBS Radio in Australia,
and written for a variety of Russian language political newspapers.
************************************************** *****************
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The Critical Corner: http://www.groong.org/tcc/
The Literary Groong: http://www.groong.org/tlg/
Review & Outlook: http://www.groong.org/ro/
World News: http://www.groong.org/world/
© Copyright 2010 Armenian News Network/Groong. All Rights Reserved.
From: A. Papazian
by David Petrosian
December 13, 2010
The long-awaited summit of the heads of OSCE states took place in
Astana on December 1-2. As we had expected, the summit did not bring
any breakthrough decisions on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict
settlement.
In the run-up to the summit, there was unprecedented diplomatic
activity over the negotiating process, the documents and the
obligations of the sides.
On the one hand, that activity was promoted by the Russian foreign
ministry headed by Sergei Lavrov. According to official information,
Moscow apparently made much effort to prepare for the signing of the
document which was to become a breakthrough in the conflict settlement
process. Evidently, the mission of Secretary-General of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolay Bordyuzha in Yerevan (that
mission was unprecedented by its duration - 4 days!) as well as the
visit that the head of the Russian presidential administration Sergei
Naryshkin paid to Yerevan - the mission and the visit took place ahead
of the Astana summit - aimed to back the efforts of the Russian
foreign minister. The penultimate period in that process was
apparently to be put on November 27 during the announced meeting of
the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, again through the
mediation of Lavrov.
However, the mission of N. Bordyuzha and S. Naryshkin was not
crowned with success, and the meeting in Astrakhan did not take place
or was torpedoed by skilful actions of the American side.
In Astana, everything went in quite a rapid and uninteresting
way. The five-party statement on Nagorno Karabakh was already signed
at the beginning of the first day of the summit activities. The
statement was signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Russia, the French Prime minister, and U.S. secretary of state. To all
appearances, the text of the document was coordinated in detail
beforehand and, as far as we know, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
was the last one of the mentioned `five parties' to sign it.
Russia failed to bring its mediation up to the necessary mark,
although over the past two years it managed to organize 7 presidential
meetings and the signing of two declarative documents (in Moscow in
2008 and in Astrakhan in 2010). Thus, on the whole, we believe that
this diplomatic round was won by the West, first of all by the United
States.
Below is what follows from the Astana statement, that in many
respects reiterates the provisions of the document signed by the
presidents of Russia, the U.S. and France in Canada in the summer of
2010.
Yerevan in the person of President Serzh Sargsyan declaratively
agrees:
- to represent Nagorno Karabakh at the negotiations and therefore
it does not give up the policy of R. Kocharian who consented to
Stepanakert's isolation from the participation in the
negotiating process - despite the fact that by a 1994 decision
of the OSCE, Nagorno Karabakh can participate as a fully-fledged
party in the negotiating process conducted within the framework
of the OSCE Minsk Group,
- that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict should be resolved de jure
within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity,
- to the withdrawal of Armenian military units from
Armenian-controlled regions of the `security zone' outside the
boundaries of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region of
Azerbaijani SSR,
- that there is no clarity over issues of lifting the blockade of
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh,
- to the use of the term `occupied territories' when the matter
concerns the regions of the `security zone',
- that the term `land corridor' linking Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh can be used instead of the previously used term `Lachin
corridor'.
Baku in the person of President Ilham Aliyev declaratively
agrees:
- that the term `self-determination' can be used for determining
the status of Nagorno Karabakh,
- that the procedure of `will expression' shall be held in
determining the status.
Both sides also formally agreed that the conflict should be
resolved only by peaceful means, that is, without use of force or
threats to use force.
Yet the undisguised unwillingness of the mediators to implement
the agreement on strengthening the ceasefire regime in the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict zone which was signed in 1995 under the aegis of
OSCE also hinders the conflict settlement and the domination of
the principle of non-use of force. In this context the threat of a
resumption of hostilities in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone
remains quite considerable. Unfortunately, the Astana summit did
not produce any positive changes in that important direction. It
gave another thing instead: the formal consent of the major
external players to prolongation of the frozen situation in the
conflict zones in the territory of the OSCE, including Nagorno
Karabakh.
The response of Yerevan and Stepanakert to the outcome of the
Astana summit was rather lukewarm. In both Armenian capital cities,
the `parties in power' presented the five-party statement as a
document which is, on the whole, advantageous to the Armenian side.
Most likely, a thorough analysis of what happened is still to be made.
The step-down of the Yerevan Mayor Gagik Beglarian and then the
resignation of Justice Minister Gevorg Danielian proved much more
sensational for the president.
A good deal of information points to the gross exaggeration of
several facts relating to the incident which occurred between the
mayor's wife and the presidential administration official Aram
Kandayan during the December 3 concert of Placido Domingo. The same is
true concerning the facts relating to the subsequent showdown between
mayor Beglarian himself and Kandayan. Particularly, to all appearances,
Beglarian did not kidnap Kandayan, nor did he beat him up at Metax
Plant. Nevertheless, following the `news leak' from the presidential
residence and the formation of the relevant public moods, Beglarian
had to hand in his resignation, while after a meeting of party
activists of the Republican Party of Armenia, the press reported that
criminal proceedings had been brought against the already ex-mayor of
Yerevan.
Based on the press reports, we present the current situation in
the following way: most probably, the Armenian presidential
administration's members supporting the pro-Western political
orientation have convinced the president of the necessity to take some
steps in order to give the current regime a more acceptable and
presentable appearance before Washington and Brussels. For this
purpose, it would be a good thing to remove a familiar figure (or two
figures) from the political and, perhaps, business arenas - to remove
those who, to put it mildly, do not enjoy popularity of the public.
They chose the Yerevan mayor who, to be quite frank, did not always
consider the `recommendations' and demands of high-ranking officials
of the presidential administration when carrying out his
administrative and business activities. Then the appropriate pretext
was used, and the `talking heads' on television and officials of
various levels began to speak about the inadmissibility of `such a
conduct' and the non-fulfillment of the requirements of `government
ethics'.
The desired effect seems to have been achieved and such a powerful
man in the system of the `party in power' as Beglarian was removed
from his position. This is a signal that the authorities may start
processes which will lead to the change of some characters and sets in
Armenia's political arena, but they will by no means change the
essence of the regime of the president Serzh Sargsyan. Most likely, in
conducting its foreign policy, the regime will become much more
pointedly oriented towards Washington and Brussels. In our opinion,
this is the main outcome of the resignations of the Yerevan mayor and
the Armenian minister of Justice.
"The Noyan Tapan Highlights", N46 December, 2010
--
David Petrosyan is a political analyst in Yerevan, Armenia, and
writes a regular weekly column in Noyan Tapan. He also provides
weekly analyses to the Armenian service of SBS Radio in Australia,
and written for a variety of Russian language political newspapers.
************************************************** *****************
The Entertainment Wire: http://www.groong.org/ew/
The Critical Corner: http://www.groong.org/tcc/
The Literary Groong: http://www.groong.org/tlg/
Review & Outlook: http://www.groong.org/ro/
World News: http://www.groong.org/world/
© Copyright 2010 Armenian News Network/Groong. All Rights Reserved.
From: A. Papazian