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ACHILLES' HEEL OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
BYLINE: Vladimir Mukhin
WPS Agency
Dec 13 2010
Russia
NEW FUNCTIONS OF THE CIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION:
ATTEMPT TO BOOST MILITARY COOPERATION?; Incapacitated by its own
inadequacy and recalcitrant Uzbekistan, the CSTO is not out of the
woods yet.
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit ended in
Moscow. The summit invested in the CSTO additional powers in defense
of member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity from both
external and internal enemies. This decision was loudly hailed in
media reports. As it turned out, however, Uzbekistan refused to sign
some crucial documents of the summit and thus invalidated them because
of the decision-making by consensus principle adopted in the CSTO.
This turn of events shows that the CSTO is no closer to being out of
the woods yet.
The impression left by CSTO leaders' triumphant speeches was somewhat
smeared by Uzbekistan whose position turned out to be a proverbial
fly in the ointment. Uzbek President Islam Karimov announced that the
CSTO was first and foremost about defense of its member states from
external enemies and not about participation in domestic squabbles.
When Karimov returned to Tashkent, official Uzbek media outlets gave
a thorough account of his speech in Moscow.
Karimov had spoken at length of the fatality of CSTO's involvement
in internal post-Soviet conflicts. He referred, for instance, to the
Karabakh problem and said that "... Azerbaijan and Armenia have been
unable to reach an agreement these twenty plus years." Recalling
events in Kyrgyzstan this summer, Karimov said, "Had CSTO military
units been there as well, it would have escalated the conflict."
Uzbekistan has always objected to all and any ideas to establish
joint forces of the CSTO. When the Collective Security Council was
meeting in Moscow on June 14, 2009, Karimov flatly refused to sign the
documents on the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces. He said, "There
are latent conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth. Uzbekistan
wants the CSTO out of these conflicts and demands that the documents
on the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces mention it." The Moscow
summit nevertheless gave the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces
the right to interfere in the name of resolution of conflicts.
Karimov objected again, using the same arguments he had used a year
ago. In fact, it was the first CSTO summit this year that the Uzbek
president deigned to attend (he had missed the previous two). Two
years ago Karimov had told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that it
would be nice to merge the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community.
The idea was considered and turned down. Uzbekistan quit the Eurasian
Economic Community then. This time, Uzbekistan all but suspended
membership in the CSTO. Karimov's presence at the summit might be
regarded as a half-hearted effort to have other CSTO countries heed
Tashkent's position.
All attempts to modernize the CSTO notwithstanding, the impression
is that nobody knows how to do it. Even worse, nobody is even certain
of what the principles of its functioning ought to be.
"The CSTO is in a crisis. Not even Uzbekistan's withdrawal will resolve
the crisis... The CSTO has never demonstrated the ability to resolve
any territorial, ethnic, or other conflict in the Commonwealth,"
said Vladimir Popov, an expert in ethnic relations.
Popov recalled CSTO's passiveness in 1990-1993 when Tajikistan was in
the grips of a political crisis fomented by the invasion of gunmen from
Afghanistan. Indeed, it was the Collective Peacekeeping Contingent
of the CIS United Headquarters that repelled the aggression and
established peace in Tajikistan then. "Neither did CSTO forces help
with resolution of the Karabakh or other conflicts in the Caucasus,"
said Popov. Here is a question then: why establish the Fast Response
Collective Forces and invest in them the police powers if it has never
performed these (or any other) functions and is unlikely to start now?
"Enlargement of the spectrum of the tasks the CSTO is empowered
to tackle promotes post-Soviet integration. In a broader sense,
it promotes Russia's geopolitical interests. Uzbekistan wants out,
so let it," said Academy of Geopolitical Problems Vice President
Konstantin Sivkov. "Russia does have allies, which allows it to
promote both military and military-political objectives in the
post-Soviet zone. As for the new functions of the CSTO, they will
abate the danger of new orange revolutions." Sivkov said that Moscow
ought to reconsider its relations with allies and make an emphasis on
benefits in the military-economic relations so as to advance processes
of integration within the CSTO.
Insiders say that some CSTO delegations at the Moscow summit
suggested abandonment of decision-making by consensus. No changes in
the procedures, however, occurred. CSTO chairman-in-office Alexander
Lukashenko of Belarus reiterated after the summit that all decisions
required a consensus. "It is either a consensus or actions on the
basis of bilateral agreements," he said.
From: A. Papazian
BYLINE: Vladimir Mukhin
WPS Agency
Dec 13 2010
Russia
NEW FUNCTIONS OF THE CIS COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION:
ATTEMPT TO BOOST MILITARY COOPERATION?; Incapacitated by its own
inadequacy and recalcitrant Uzbekistan, the CSTO is not out of the
woods yet.
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit ended in
Moscow. The summit invested in the CSTO additional powers in defense
of member states' sovereignty and territorial integrity from both
external and internal enemies. This decision was loudly hailed in
media reports. As it turned out, however, Uzbekistan refused to sign
some crucial documents of the summit and thus invalidated them because
of the decision-making by consensus principle adopted in the CSTO.
This turn of events shows that the CSTO is no closer to being out of
the woods yet.
The impression left by CSTO leaders' triumphant speeches was somewhat
smeared by Uzbekistan whose position turned out to be a proverbial
fly in the ointment. Uzbek President Islam Karimov announced that the
CSTO was first and foremost about defense of its member states from
external enemies and not about participation in domestic squabbles.
When Karimov returned to Tashkent, official Uzbek media outlets gave
a thorough account of his speech in Moscow.
Karimov had spoken at length of the fatality of CSTO's involvement
in internal post-Soviet conflicts. He referred, for instance, to the
Karabakh problem and said that "... Azerbaijan and Armenia have been
unable to reach an agreement these twenty plus years." Recalling
events in Kyrgyzstan this summer, Karimov said, "Had CSTO military
units been there as well, it would have escalated the conflict."
Uzbekistan has always objected to all and any ideas to establish
joint forces of the CSTO. When the Collective Security Council was
meeting in Moscow on June 14, 2009, Karimov flatly refused to sign the
documents on the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces. He said, "There
are latent conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth. Uzbekistan
wants the CSTO out of these conflicts and demands that the documents
on the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces mention it." The Moscow
summit nevertheless gave the CSTO Fast Response Collective Forces
the right to interfere in the name of resolution of conflicts.
Karimov objected again, using the same arguments he had used a year
ago. In fact, it was the first CSTO summit this year that the Uzbek
president deigned to attend (he had missed the previous two). Two
years ago Karimov had told Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that it
would be nice to merge the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community.
The idea was considered and turned down. Uzbekistan quit the Eurasian
Economic Community then. This time, Uzbekistan all but suspended
membership in the CSTO. Karimov's presence at the summit might be
regarded as a half-hearted effort to have other CSTO countries heed
Tashkent's position.
All attempts to modernize the CSTO notwithstanding, the impression
is that nobody knows how to do it. Even worse, nobody is even certain
of what the principles of its functioning ought to be.
"The CSTO is in a crisis. Not even Uzbekistan's withdrawal will resolve
the crisis... The CSTO has never demonstrated the ability to resolve
any territorial, ethnic, or other conflict in the Commonwealth,"
said Vladimir Popov, an expert in ethnic relations.
Popov recalled CSTO's passiveness in 1990-1993 when Tajikistan was in
the grips of a political crisis fomented by the invasion of gunmen from
Afghanistan. Indeed, it was the Collective Peacekeeping Contingent
of the CIS United Headquarters that repelled the aggression and
established peace in Tajikistan then. "Neither did CSTO forces help
with resolution of the Karabakh or other conflicts in the Caucasus,"
said Popov. Here is a question then: why establish the Fast Response
Collective Forces and invest in them the police powers if it has never
performed these (or any other) functions and is unlikely to start now?
"Enlargement of the spectrum of the tasks the CSTO is empowered
to tackle promotes post-Soviet integration. In a broader sense,
it promotes Russia's geopolitical interests. Uzbekistan wants out,
so let it," said Academy of Geopolitical Problems Vice President
Konstantin Sivkov. "Russia does have allies, which allows it to
promote both military and military-political objectives in the
post-Soviet zone. As for the new functions of the CSTO, they will
abate the danger of new orange revolutions." Sivkov said that Moscow
ought to reconsider its relations with allies and make an emphasis on
benefits in the military-economic relations so as to advance processes
of integration within the CSTO.
Insiders say that some CSTO delegations at the Moscow summit
suggested abandonment of decision-making by consensus. No changes in
the procedures, however, occurred. CSTO chairman-in-office Alexander
Lukashenko of Belarus reiterated after the summit that all decisions
required a consensus. "It is either a consensus or actions on the
basis of bilateral agreements," he said.
From: A. Papazian