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TOUGH YEAR AHEAD FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
Hurriyet
Dec 20 2010
Turkey
All indications suggest that 2011 will be a year in which Turkish
foreign policy will face serious challenges.
Gone are the heady days when the Justice and Development Party,
or AKP, administration was said to be forging ahead with proactive
steps designed not just to bring peace and stability to the region
but also to place Turkey on the map as an influential player that
can arbitrate serious international disputes.
Today there is little talk of Turkey's influence, and a lot of talk
about "Turkey straying from the Western fold," thus diminishing the
value of any potential influence it may have had as an important
player as far as its traditional partners and allies are concerned.
The impression one gets instead is of a foreign policy that is
increasingly under siege, a state of affairs that will most likely
force the Turkish government into a "reactive" mode as it tries to
ward off the negative consequences of certain developments in its
relations with the world at large.
Ties with the United States are already suffering from a recent bout
of serious turbulence as a result of the highly active Armenian lobby,
which clearly feels it has a chance to "get Turkey" this time, given
the state of affairs between Ankara and Washington. Those relations
will no doubt continue to remain frosty, relative to plummeting
Turkish-Israeli ties, since the effect this is having on the U.S.
Congress is already tangible.
In a recent phone conversation with Prime Minister Erdogan, President
Obama apparently provided reassurances that ties with Turkey continue
to be of the utmost priority for his country and that anything that
might have been leaked by WikiLeaks would not alter this fact.
In a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Davutoglu,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly gave assurances that
the administration would do its best to ensure the Armenian lobby
does not make any headway in the U.S. Congress this time.
Under normal circumstances this assurance may have counted for
something. Given the state of ties and the number of people "gunning
for Turkey" in the U.S. Congress, the value of Clinton's reported
assurance has yet to be tested.
In the meantime, it is very unlikely the Erdogan government will
revisit efforts to normalize ties with Armenia any time soon, given
that it has painted itself into a corner on this score vis-a-vis
Turkish and Azeri public opinion. In a nutshell, Ankara can not be
seen to be initiating anything new in this respect until progress
is made in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed
enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Had the Erdogan government made headway with Armenia in line with the
protocols it signed with that country in 2009, this would undoubtedly
have taken away the force of some of the anti-Turkish initiatives of
the Armenian diaspora - but this was not to be.
It seems that domestic political considerations weighed heavily on
Prime Minister Erdogan's thoughts in the end, making one wonder why
his government bothered to initiate a normalization process with
Armenia in the first place if it was not going to be able to stand
behind it in the face of inevitable criticism at home.
As for the breakdown in ties with Israel, which are clearly fueling
the animosity towards the AKP government in the West, things do not
appear too promising in this respect either - despite the recent
nicety of Turkey's sending fire-fighting planes to that country to
help fight a devastating forest fire there.
Turkey is determined not to budge until Israel somehow atones for the
murder of nine Turkish activists on the Mavi Marmara. Israel appears
just as determined not to apologize or pay compensation, with Israeli
commentators suggesting - apart from any legal considerations - that
to do so would be a useless concession given what they believe to
be Prime Minister Erdogan's and Foreign Minister Davutoglu' innate
hatred of Israel.
The dispute with Israel is now also showing signs of spilling over into
the Cyprus issue. Israel's demarcation of an economic zone of interest
in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Greek Cypriot administration has
already resulted in fresh diplomatic exchanges between Ankara and Tel
Aviv and has led to angry commentary in the Israeli media as a result.
What makes Turkey's position even more difficult in this respect
is that Israel has also come to similar agreements with Egypt and
Lebanon, much to the annoyance of Ankara, even if the agreement
with Beirut has still to be endorsed by parliament. Turkey tried,
but failed, to stop these countries signing these agreements with
the Greek Cypriot administration.
Meanwhile Turkey's position on Iran continues to cast a shadow
over its ties with not just the U.S. but also Europe. The U.S. and
the European Union are now acting in unison to increase pressure on
Iran with new sanctions - beyond the extent of those foreseen by the
United Nations Security Council. This will clearly increase Ankara's
isolation with respect to Iran since the Erdogan government believes
there is no need to impose any sanctions at all on that country.
A second round of talks between the P5+1 group (comprising the
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) and
Iran are set to be held in Istanbul at the end of January. It is
unlikely Turkey will have any say in those talks beyond hosting them,
especially if it continues to argue on behalf of Tehran on issues
such as sanctions.
The other important aspect of Turkey's Iran policy is that it is now
seen by all, as a result of WikiLeaks, that Ankara is not only alone
in the West on this score, but also in the Middle East, where we were
led to believe by AKP executives it was enjoying increasing influence.
It may have influence among the region's radical elements, but it is
now apparent this influence does not extend to the representatives
of the region's established order, who are clearly wary of Iran's
nuclear pretensions and are therefore unlikely to look too warmly on
Turkey's pro-Tehran approach on this issue.
In the meantime, Turkey's almost-severed ties with Israel have
more or less ensured there is no space for Ankara in any effort to
bring about peace in the Middle East, since it is Washington, acting
together with the established elites in the region, that is pushing
the process along.
In the end it all comes back to what Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
was quoted as suggesting months ago - much to the annoyance of Foreign
Minister Davutoglu: namely, a Turkey that has severed ties with Israel,
having lost its neutrality, will be unlikely to find a place at the
table trying to negotiate peace between Israelis and Arabs.
Other serious challenges Ankara is set to face next year will include
the need to find a means to forge ahead in EU membership talks.
Belgium, the EU's most recent term president, attempted to have the
chapter on competition opened but Turkey failed to meet the necessary
criteria to do so.
Obstacles placed on Ankara's path by the Greek Cypriot administration
and France aside, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will be able to
fulfill the criteria of the chapters that it can open. In the meantime
it is clear the Cyrus issue will remain a "Sword of Damocles" as far
as Turkish-EU ties are concerned.
None of this makes for a pretty picture in terms of the inflated
image of a Turkey playing a major role in the world that has been
put forward by the AKP.
From: A. Papazian
Hurriyet
Dec 20 2010
Turkey
All indications suggest that 2011 will be a year in which Turkish
foreign policy will face serious challenges.
Gone are the heady days when the Justice and Development Party,
or AKP, administration was said to be forging ahead with proactive
steps designed not just to bring peace and stability to the region
but also to place Turkey on the map as an influential player that
can arbitrate serious international disputes.
Today there is little talk of Turkey's influence, and a lot of talk
about "Turkey straying from the Western fold," thus diminishing the
value of any potential influence it may have had as an important
player as far as its traditional partners and allies are concerned.
The impression one gets instead is of a foreign policy that is
increasingly under siege, a state of affairs that will most likely
force the Turkish government into a "reactive" mode as it tries to
ward off the negative consequences of certain developments in its
relations with the world at large.
Ties with the United States are already suffering from a recent bout
of serious turbulence as a result of the highly active Armenian lobby,
which clearly feels it has a chance to "get Turkey" this time, given
the state of affairs between Ankara and Washington. Those relations
will no doubt continue to remain frosty, relative to plummeting
Turkish-Israeli ties, since the effect this is having on the U.S.
Congress is already tangible.
In a recent phone conversation with Prime Minister Erdogan, President
Obama apparently provided reassurances that ties with Turkey continue
to be of the utmost priority for his country and that anything that
might have been leaked by WikiLeaks would not alter this fact.
In a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Davutoglu,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly gave assurances that
the administration would do its best to ensure the Armenian lobby
does not make any headway in the U.S. Congress this time.
Under normal circumstances this assurance may have counted for
something. Given the state of ties and the number of people "gunning
for Turkey" in the U.S. Congress, the value of Clinton's reported
assurance has yet to be tested.
In the meantime, it is very unlikely the Erdogan government will
revisit efforts to normalize ties with Armenia any time soon, given
that it has painted itself into a corner on this score vis-a-vis
Turkish and Azeri public opinion. In a nutshell, Ankara can not be
seen to be initiating anything new in this respect until progress
is made in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed
enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Had the Erdogan government made headway with Armenia in line with the
protocols it signed with that country in 2009, this would undoubtedly
have taken away the force of some of the anti-Turkish initiatives of
the Armenian diaspora - but this was not to be.
It seems that domestic political considerations weighed heavily on
Prime Minister Erdogan's thoughts in the end, making one wonder why
his government bothered to initiate a normalization process with
Armenia in the first place if it was not going to be able to stand
behind it in the face of inevitable criticism at home.
As for the breakdown in ties with Israel, which are clearly fueling
the animosity towards the AKP government in the West, things do not
appear too promising in this respect either - despite the recent
nicety of Turkey's sending fire-fighting planes to that country to
help fight a devastating forest fire there.
Turkey is determined not to budge until Israel somehow atones for the
murder of nine Turkish activists on the Mavi Marmara. Israel appears
just as determined not to apologize or pay compensation, with Israeli
commentators suggesting - apart from any legal considerations - that
to do so would be a useless concession given what they believe to
be Prime Minister Erdogan's and Foreign Minister Davutoglu' innate
hatred of Israel.
The dispute with Israel is now also showing signs of spilling over into
the Cyprus issue. Israel's demarcation of an economic zone of interest
in the Eastern Mediterranean with the Greek Cypriot administration has
already resulted in fresh diplomatic exchanges between Ankara and Tel
Aviv and has led to angry commentary in the Israeli media as a result.
What makes Turkey's position even more difficult in this respect
is that Israel has also come to similar agreements with Egypt and
Lebanon, much to the annoyance of Ankara, even if the agreement
with Beirut has still to be endorsed by parliament. Turkey tried,
but failed, to stop these countries signing these agreements with
the Greek Cypriot administration.
Meanwhile Turkey's position on Iran continues to cast a shadow
over its ties with not just the U.S. but also Europe. The U.S. and
the European Union are now acting in unison to increase pressure on
Iran with new sanctions - beyond the extent of those foreseen by the
United Nations Security Council. This will clearly increase Ankara's
isolation with respect to Iran since the Erdogan government believes
there is no need to impose any sanctions at all on that country.
A second round of talks between the P5+1 group (comprising the
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) and
Iran are set to be held in Istanbul at the end of January. It is
unlikely Turkey will have any say in those talks beyond hosting them,
especially if it continues to argue on behalf of Tehran on issues
such as sanctions.
The other important aspect of Turkey's Iran policy is that it is now
seen by all, as a result of WikiLeaks, that Ankara is not only alone
in the West on this score, but also in the Middle East, where we were
led to believe by AKP executives it was enjoying increasing influence.
It may have influence among the region's radical elements, but it is
now apparent this influence does not extend to the representatives
of the region's established order, who are clearly wary of Iran's
nuclear pretensions and are therefore unlikely to look too warmly on
Turkey's pro-Tehran approach on this issue.
In the meantime, Turkey's almost-severed ties with Israel have
more or less ensured there is no space for Ankara in any effort to
bring about peace in the Middle East, since it is Washington, acting
together with the established elites in the region, that is pushing
the process along.
In the end it all comes back to what Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
was quoted as suggesting months ago - much to the annoyance of Foreign
Minister Davutoglu: namely, a Turkey that has severed ties with Israel,
having lost its neutrality, will be unlikely to find a place at the
table trying to negotiate peace between Israelis and Arabs.
Other serious challenges Ankara is set to face next year will include
the need to find a means to forge ahead in EU membership talks.
Belgium, the EU's most recent term president, attempted to have the
chapter on competition opened but Turkey failed to meet the necessary
criteria to do so.
Obstacles placed on Ankara's path by the Greek Cypriot administration
and France aside, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will be able to
fulfill the criteria of the chapters that it can open. In the meantime
it is clear the Cyrus issue will remain a "Sword of Damocles" as far
as Turkish-EU ties are concerned.
None of this makes for a pretty picture in terms of the inflated
image of a Turkey playing a major role in the world that has been
put forward by the AKP.
From: A. Papazian