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GAS FROM IRAQI KURDISTAN FOR NABUCCO: TURKISH INTEREST
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5257
15.12.2010
Sergei Sargsyan
In September 2009 Turkey's Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz stated that
Turkey and Iraq discussed possibilities of concluding memorandum on
mutual understanding in the issue of the Iraqi gas supply to Europe
through the territory of Turkey by the planned Nabucco gas pipeline1.
This sounded a bit unexpected, taking into consideration that `gas
from Iraq' implies its production on the territory of Kurdistan Region
which will promote development of its economic independence and
self-sufficiency and, consequently, work for strengthening of that
region as an independent formation and Ankara's negative attitude to
such developments is conditioned not only by historical but also by
geo-political grounds.
That is why it would be logical to assume that the interest of Turkey
in the export of the Iraqi gas through its territory is conditioned
not only by economic but also by political reasons. So what are the
real interests of Turkey and how feasible are those mutual plans of
Ankara and Baghdad on turning Iraqi Kurdistan into one of the main
alternative gas suppliers to the EU?
The explored reserves of gas on the territory of Iraq are about 3.17
trillion m3, and about 90% of them - approximately 2.8 trillion m3 are
in Kurdistan Region. But at present the natural gas is not produced in
Iraq due to the absence of the appropriate capacities and
infrastructure. Though the Iraqi government has eagerly proceeded to
concluding direct contracts and arranging international tenders on
foreign capital formation and involvement of foreign companies in
order to create from zero the gas producing and gas transition
systems.
Thus, in May 2009 Austrian `OMV' Energy Company and Hungarian `MOL'
each acquired 10% of shares of «Pearl Petroleum Company», which
produces Kor Mor and Chemchemal gas fields on the territory of Iraqi
Kurdistan and the expected capacity of which will be about 85 million
m3 of gas per 24 hours by 2015. This implies beginning of export of
the gas to the world markets. This capacity should be at least enough
to start Nabucco pipeline.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that companies which are
ready to invest in oil and gas sector of Iraq are expected to face
many challenges of judicial and political character and it will be
hard to overcome them in the time to come and to make capital
investments more protected.
Firstly, there is no comprehensive judicial and legal base for
mobilization of investments. In particular, framework bill on
hydro-carbons approved by the government of Iraq in February 2007 is
still not passed.
Secondly, there are serious discrepancies between the Central
government of the country and authorities of Kurdistan Region on
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution of Iraq which
concern the regulations of exploring of the resources.
Mainly, the controversy concerns the procedure of concluding
agreements with foreign investors and sharing revenue from the energy
carriers' export.
In accordance with the provisions of article 113 of the Constitution2
Iraqi Kurdistan has acquired a status of federal region with the high
level of autonomy, up to the right to have its own legislation, system
of legislative, executive and judicial authority, its own security
powers and etc.
According to article 107 the central authorities has preserved
exclusive powers to carry out the foreign and national security
policy, arranging trade policy between the districts and provinces of
Iraq, drafting state and investment budgets, planning policy connected
with the water resources of Iraq and etc.
As a result, Kurdistan has started passing regional laws on economic
activity on its territory on stepped-up pace without waiting their
drafting and passing by the federal government. Back in 2006 the
regional law `On Foreign Investments' was passed, and in 2007 - Law on
Hydro-Carbons, according to which foreign investments can be attracted
not only to the hydro-carbon sector of three provinces - Erbil,
Suleimania and Dohuk, but also to the territories round Kirkuk.
In May 2010 central and regional governments concluded an agreement
which judicially vested right of Kurdistan to export oil to the
external market which was done till now unofficially.
At the same time, it is not a secret that because of the oil
smuggling, according to different estimations Iraqi budget loses from
$3 to $5 billion annually. A great part of those losses falls on the
smuggling of oil produced in the north of the country. But a similar
situation with the control of oil producing and refining sectors by
the largest clans (both Kurdish and Arab-Shiite) and state and
partisan structures of the Center and Kurdistan Region brought to the
situation when the status-quo shaped satisfies all to a varying
degree, except, may be, Sunnite Arabs of Iraq, the historical range of
habitation of which has no gas and oil reserves. But a perspective gas
infrastructure which demands mobilization of large foreign investments
will have more financial and corruption transparency. In this case the
profit opportunities from oil smuggling will be brought to nothing.
This makes regional government of Kurdistan Region fiercely defend its
interests on the earlier stage of judicial specifying of the profit
share which will stay in the budget of Kurdistan. Besides, the scheme
and level of transparency in the allocation of the revenue from gas
production and export, sooner or later, will be spread to the oil
sector as well. And this will directly affect the interests of the
Kurdish clans and may cause redistribution of the influence between
both them and two leading Kurdish parties of Iraq - Democratic Party
of Kurdistan (leader - the head of Kurdistan Region Masud Barzani) and
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (leader - president of Iraq Jalal
Talabani).
At the same time, the provisions of Constitution, according to which
the revenue from using of the natural resources3 is allocated between
all the people of Iraq on the proportionality principle and which
turns Kurdistan Region into a donor in regard to the rest of the
country, have not been revoked yet. And the availability of judicial
collisions between regional and central governments is very important
in feeding confrontation processes between the ethnic and confessional
groups in the country and they afford extra-features for
implementation of their own interests by the neighboring states and
first of all by Turkey.
But the problems on production and realization of oil, and in future
gas of Northern Iraq, are not restricted to a complex of problems
existing between Kurdistan Region and Center,
The largest oil field which brings most profit to the budget of
Kurdistan Region is near the city of Kirkuk which is a disputed
territory between Kurds, Arabs and Turcomans. The problem originates
from the 20s of the last century when Mosul Villayat was passed from
Turkey to Iraq,
The prospects of creation of an independent Kurdistan in consequence
of the 1991 war or at least formation of an autonomy with high or at
least real level of independence (the one Kurdistan Region has now)
made Ankara stir up its foreign policy in the Iraqi direction.
Not without its pressure the so-called `security zone' in the North of
Iraq included only a part of Iraqi Kurdistan, without cities of Kirkuk
and Khanaqin, i.e. within the cut borders of Kurdish autonomy declared
unilaterally by Saddam Hussein in 1974.
In that very period the support to the ethnic Turkic Turcoman
(Turkmen) minority was build up. The minority numbers, according to
different estimations, from 500 to 2.5 million people and compactly
lives on the territory the so-called `Turcoman belt' - in the region
which divides districts mainly populated by Arabs and Kurds.
Alongside Turkey initiated a `demographic war' - documental
registration of Kurdish population as Turcoman, using as an incentive
distribution of the humanitarian aid by Turkey based on the ethnic
principle. And in 2004 Turkey's attempts to finance the process of
`transition into Turcoman' of the Iraqi Arabs living near Kirkuk were
fixed
Gradual accumulation of political and most probably military and
political potential by Turcomans turned that ethnic minority into one
of the most significant leverages in the hands of Ankara to exert
pressure on Iraqi Kurdistan.
The fact that sooner or later Turkey will claim a right to its former
Mosul Villayat was acknowledged by S. Hussein very well when he
sanctioned dispossession of not only Kurds but also of ethnic Turks
from the oilfields in the north of the country within the framework of
the policy of Arab nationalism4.
Today there are about 100 thousand Turcomans from the 4 million
population of Kurdistan Region, and most of them live in the province
of Erbil. From organizational point of view the Turcomans are united
in a number of social and political organizations and the most
prominent is the Iraqi Turcoman Front which, however does not receive
any support on the elections on all the levels.
Belonging of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, according to
article 140 of the Constitution, should be decided at the local
referendum which had to be held not later than on December 31. 2007.
Due to the fact that in the region of Kirkuk Kurds constituted
majority as a result of active repatriation5 and migratory policy
carried out by Kurdistan Region, the prospects of the results of the
referendum and passing of the district rich with oil to Kurdistan
caused serious concern and strong reaction on behlaf of Anakra which
demanded to postone referendum at least for five years. On January 15,
2007 Turkish prime-minister Recep T. Erdogan openly threatened saying
that referendum in Kirkuk could initiate a regional conflict.
Both his statement: `At present Iraq for us is of greater priority
than membership in the European Union'6, and information in the
Turkish mass media that the 240-thousand army group reinforced with
the armor and artillery was concentrated at Iraqi border come to prove
that such a development is quite probable.
In general Turkey pursues following strategic goals:
Preserving of Kurdistan Region in united Iraq with the hope in future
to strengthen the role of the centre in the business of the region.
Not-allowing de-jure annexation of the oilfield in Kirkuk to Kurdistan Region.
Initiation and support of the controversies, up to incitation of
intra-fraction and intra-clan collisions between the main powers in
Kurdistan - DPK, PUK and KWP.
Creation and support of new political parties and movements which
weaken and split the ranks of the powers traditionally working in
Kurdistan. Formation of `Goran' party (`Changes'), established by a
group of former members of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan which took
away 11% of votes from the PUK at local elections comes to prove that
such a process of party building has already been initiated after the
acquisition of factual independence by Kurdistan Region.
Putting on the agenda the issue of involving gas from Iraqi Kurdistan
to Nabucco project, Turkey not only preventatively lobbies direction
of the gas export through its territory but also pursues a number of
exclusively political aims. Under rather obscure prospects of Nabucco
gas pipeline project implementation in its current configuration, only
putting on the agenda the issue of multi-billion investments can
initiate formation of more advantageous for Turkey stance of Kurdistan
Region on a range of issues - from the relations with the Centre and
Kurdistan Workers' Party to the issue of Kirkuk.
In case if all goes well in the implementation of this economic and
political intervention:
Turkey, in fact, will get another reason - providing guarantees of
uninterrupted functioning of an infrastructure which is of critical
importance for Europe - to carry out operations against the activists
of Kurdistan Workers' Party who may deliver strikes on the pipeline on
both the territory of Turkey and neighbouring Iraq.
It will initiate another aspect in the controversies and force
opposition between both the authorities and clans of Kurdistan Region
and the fighters of KWP, as well as between main parties of Kurdistan
on the issue of distribution of revenue from the gas production and
export.
It will stimulate reduction of separatist moods in Kurdistan Region,
because mobilization of multi-billion investments will be made, most
probably, to a united state of Iraq and not to its separated part,
especially when this separation is fraught with serious escalation of
tension along its borders, up to the initiation of military actions.
By the same reason it will reduce the heat of the struggle for Kirkuk
and will promote preserving of status-quo.
In mid-term perspective Turkey will continue attempts of economic
penetration to Kurdistan Region (at present about 70% of investments
in the Region are of Turkish origin), it will also try to create
political space oriented on Ankara, in particular using as an option,
creation of Turcoman and Arab parties and movements. Model and
techniques of transboundary projection of influence of most active
pro-Turkish part of Turcoman movement on the entire political field of
activity of Turcoman parties and organizations of Kurdistan Region,
most of which are loyal to the regional authorities, may also be
successfully implemented in other districts of Turkish foreign
political interests, in particular in Javakhq, through designing
external management of the entire movement of Meskhetian Turks from
the centers of Akhiskian Turks in Turkey.
Generally, new policy of Turkey in regard to Kurdistan Region lies
within the scope of the active neo-Ottomanism which has become a pivot
of foreign policy of Ankara. It is not without reason that in the
academic circles in Turkey the prospects of annexation of northern
regions of Iraq to Turkey are seriously considered.
1 http://news.mail.ru/economics/2910507/
2Came into effect after the nationwide referendum held on October 15, 2005.
3By the way, besides oil and gas, Kurdistan also has considerable
iron, gold, uranium, wolfram and vanadium reserves.
4According to western and Kurdish sources in the period from 1991 to
1998 200 thousand Kurds and 5 thousand Turkmen were evicted from
there, and 300 thousand Arabs were moved from other provinces of Iraq
to Kirkuk; in Kirkuk province where the martial law was declared only
those Kurds who refused from their national identity were allowed to
stay. In order to reduce the share of Kurdish population, Kurdish
villages near Kirkuk were destroyed and administrative borders of the
province were changed through inclusion of non-Kurd population
centers. http://www.kurdistan.ru/a211.htm
5According to data of the 1957 census (before the beginning of
large-scale military activities in Kurdistan), 48% of population of
Kirkuk were Kurds, 28.2% - Arabs. and 21.4% - Turkmen (`Turcomans').
http://www.kurdistan.ru/a211.htm
6 http://www.Turkey.ru/lenta/all/20070201/2893.html
`Globus Energy and Regional Security', issue 6
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
AZERBAIJAN: SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010]
TWO `STREAMS' FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL
STRUCTURES[21.06.2010]
MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]
GEOPOLITICS OF THE GAS PIPELINES IN THE BLACK SEA-CASPIAN REGION[24.12.2009]
From: A. Papazian
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5257
15.12.2010
Sergei Sargsyan
In September 2009 Turkey's Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz stated that
Turkey and Iraq discussed possibilities of concluding memorandum on
mutual understanding in the issue of the Iraqi gas supply to Europe
through the territory of Turkey by the planned Nabucco gas pipeline1.
This sounded a bit unexpected, taking into consideration that `gas
from Iraq' implies its production on the territory of Kurdistan Region
which will promote development of its economic independence and
self-sufficiency and, consequently, work for strengthening of that
region as an independent formation and Ankara's negative attitude to
such developments is conditioned not only by historical but also by
geo-political grounds.
That is why it would be logical to assume that the interest of Turkey
in the export of the Iraqi gas through its territory is conditioned
not only by economic but also by political reasons. So what are the
real interests of Turkey and how feasible are those mutual plans of
Ankara and Baghdad on turning Iraqi Kurdistan into one of the main
alternative gas suppliers to the EU?
The explored reserves of gas on the territory of Iraq are about 3.17
trillion m3, and about 90% of them - approximately 2.8 trillion m3 are
in Kurdistan Region. But at present the natural gas is not produced in
Iraq due to the absence of the appropriate capacities and
infrastructure. Though the Iraqi government has eagerly proceeded to
concluding direct contracts and arranging international tenders on
foreign capital formation and involvement of foreign companies in
order to create from zero the gas producing and gas transition
systems.
Thus, in May 2009 Austrian `OMV' Energy Company and Hungarian `MOL'
each acquired 10% of shares of «Pearl Petroleum Company», which
produces Kor Mor and Chemchemal gas fields on the territory of Iraqi
Kurdistan and the expected capacity of which will be about 85 million
m3 of gas per 24 hours by 2015. This implies beginning of export of
the gas to the world markets. This capacity should be at least enough
to start Nabucco pipeline.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that companies which are
ready to invest in oil and gas sector of Iraq are expected to face
many challenges of judicial and political character and it will be
hard to overcome them in the time to come and to make capital
investments more protected.
Firstly, there is no comprehensive judicial and legal base for
mobilization of investments. In particular, framework bill on
hydro-carbons approved by the government of Iraq in February 2007 is
still not passed.
Secondly, there are serious discrepancies between the Central
government of the country and authorities of Kurdistan Region on
interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution of Iraq which
concern the regulations of exploring of the resources.
Mainly, the controversy concerns the procedure of concluding
agreements with foreign investors and sharing revenue from the energy
carriers' export.
In accordance with the provisions of article 113 of the Constitution2
Iraqi Kurdistan has acquired a status of federal region with the high
level of autonomy, up to the right to have its own legislation, system
of legislative, executive and judicial authority, its own security
powers and etc.
According to article 107 the central authorities has preserved
exclusive powers to carry out the foreign and national security
policy, arranging trade policy between the districts and provinces of
Iraq, drafting state and investment budgets, planning policy connected
with the water resources of Iraq and etc.
As a result, Kurdistan has started passing regional laws on economic
activity on its territory on stepped-up pace without waiting their
drafting and passing by the federal government. Back in 2006 the
regional law `On Foreign Investments' was passed, and in 2007 - Law on
Hydro-Carbons, according to which foreign investments can be attracted
not only to the hydro-carbon sector of three provinces - Erbil,
Suleimania and Dohuk, but also to the territories round Kirkuk.
In May 2010 central and regional governments concluded an agreement
which judicially vested right of Kurdistan to export oil to the
external market which was done till now unofficially.
At the same time, it is not a secret that because of the oil
smuggling, according to different estimations Iraqi budget loses from
$3 to $5 billion annually. A great part of those losses falls on the
smuggling of oil produced in the north of the country. But a similar
situation with the control of oil producing and refining sectors by
the largest clans (both Kurdish and Arab-Shiite) and state and
partisan structures of the Center and Kurdistan Region brought to the
situation when the status-quo shaped satisfies all to a varying
degree, except, may be, Sunnite Arabs of Iraq, the historical range of
habitation of which has no gas and oil reserves. But a perspective gas
infrastructure which demands mobilization of large foreign investments
will have more financial and corruption transparency. In this case the
profit opportunities from oil smuggling will be brought to nothing.
This makes regional government of Kurdistan Region fiercely defend its
interests on the earlier stage of judicial specifying of the profit
share which will stay in the budget of Kurdistan. Besides, the scheme
and level of transparency in the allocation of the revenue from gas
production and export, sooner or later, will be spread to the oil
sector as well. And this will directly affect the interests of the
Kurdish clans and may cause redistribution of the influence between
both them and two leading Kurdish parties of Iraq - Democratic Party
of Kurdistan (leader - the head of Kurdistan Region Masud Barzani) and
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (leader - president of Iraq Jalal
Talabani).
At the same time, the provisions of Constitution, according to which
the revenue from using of the natural resources3 is allocated between
all the people of Iraq on the proportionality principle and which
turns Kurdistan Region into a donor in regard to the rest of the
country, have not been revoked yet. And the availability of judicial
collisions between regional and central governments is very important
in feeding confrontation processes between the ethnic and confessional
groups in the country and they afford extra-features for
implementation of their own interests by the neighboring states and
first of all by Turkey.
But the problems on production and realization of oil, and in future
gas of Northern Iraq, are not restricted to a complex of problems
existing between Kurdistan Region and Center,
The largest oil field which brings most profit to the budget of
Kurdistan Region is near the city of Kirkuk which is a disputed
territory between Kurds, Arabs and Turcomans. The problem originates
from the 20s of the last century when Mosul Villayat was passed from
Turkey to Iraq,
The prospects of creation of an independent Kurdistan in consequence
of the 1991 war or at least formation of an autonomy with high or at
least real level of independence (the one Kurdistan Region has now)
made Ankara stir up its foreign policy in the Iraqi direction.
Not without its pressure the so-called `security zone' in the North of
Iraq included only a part of Iraqi Kurdistan, without cities of Kirkuk
and Khanaqin, i.e. within the cut borders of Kurdish autonomy declared
unilaterally by Saddam Hussein in 1974.
In that very period the support to the ethnic Turkic Turcoman
(Turkmen) minority was build up. The minority numbers, according to
different estimations, from 500 to 2.5 million people and compactly
lives on the territory the so-called `Turcoman belt' - in the region
which divides districts mainly populated by Arabs and Kurds.
Alongside Turkey initiated a `demographic war' - documental
registration of Kurdish population as Turcoman, using as an incentive
distribution of the humanitarian aid by Turkey based on the ethnic
principle. And in 2004 Turkey's attempts to finance the process of
`transition into Turcoman' of the Iraqi Arabs living near Kirkuk were
fixed
Gradual accumulation of political and most probably military and
political potential by Turcomans turned that ethnic minority into one
of the most significant leverages in the hands of Ankara to exert
pressure on Iraqi Kurdistan.
The fact that sooner or later Turkey will claim a right to its former
Mosul Villayat was acknowledged by S. Hussein very well when he
sanctioned dispossession of not only Kurds but also of ethnic Turks
from the oilfields in the north of the country within the framework of
the policy of Arab nationalism4.
Today there are about 100 thousand Turcomans from the 4 million
population of Kurdistan Region, and most of them live in the province
of Erbil. From organizational point of view the Turcomans are united
in a number of social and political organizations and the most
prominent is the Iraqi Turcoman Front which, however does not receive
any support on the elections on all the levels.
Belonging of Kirkuk and other disputed territories, according to
article 140 of the Constitution, should be decided at the local
referendum which had to be held not later than on December 31. 2007.
Due to the fact that in the region of Kirkuk Kurds constituted
majority as a result of active repatriation5 and migratory policy
carried out by Kurdistan Region, the prospects of the results of the
referendum and passing of the district rich with oil to Kurdistan
caused serious concern and strong reaction on behlaf of Anakra which
demanded to postone referendum at least for five years. On January 15,
2007 Turkish prime-minister Recep T. Erdogan openly threatened saying
that referendum in Kirkuk could initiate a regional conflict.
Both his statement: `At present Iraq for us is of greater priority
than membership in the European Union'6, and information in the
Turkish mass media that the 240-thousand army group reinforced with
the armor and artillery was concentrated at Iraqi border come to prove
that such a development is quite probable.
In general Turkey pursues following strategic goals:
Preserving of Kurdistan Region in united Iraq with the hope in future
to strengthen the role of the centre in the business of the region.
Not-allowing de-jure annexation of the oilfield in Kirkuk to Kurdistan Region.
Initiation and support of the controversies, up to incitation of
intra-fraction and intra-clan collisions between the main powers in
Kurdistan - DPK, PUK and KWP.
Creation and support of new political parties and movements which
weaken and split the ranks of the powers traditionally working in
Kurdistan. Formation of `Goran' party (`Changes'), established by a
group of former members of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan which took
away 11% of votes from the PUK at local elections comes to prove that
such a process of party building has already been initiated after the
acquisition of factual independence by Kurdistan Region.
Putting on the agenda the issue of involving gas from Iraqi Kurdistan
to Nabucco project, Turkey not only preventatively lobbies direction
of the gas export through its territory but also pursues a number of
exclusively political aims. Under rather obscure prospects of Nabucco
gas pipeline project implementation in its current configuration, only
putting on the agenda the issue of multi-billion investments can
initiate formation of more advantageous for Turkey stance of Kurdistan
Region on a range of issues - from the relations with the Centre and
Kurdistan Workers' Party to the issue of Kirkuk.
In case if all goes well in the implementation of this economic and
political intervention:
Turkey, in fact, will get another reason - providing guarantees of
uninterrupted functioning of an infrastructure which is of critical
importance for Europe - to carry out operations against the activists
of Kurdistan Workers' Party who may deliver strikes on the pipeline on
both the territory of Turkey and neighbouring Iraq.
It will initiate another aspect in the controversies and force
opposition between both the authorities and clans of Kurdistan Region
and the fighters of KWP, as well as between main parties of Kurdistan
on the issue of distribution of revenue from the gas production and
export.
It will stimulate reduction of separatist moods in Kurdistan Region,
because mobilization of multi-billion investments will be made, most
probably, to a united state of Iraq and not to its separated part,
especially when this separation is fraught with serious escalation of
tension along its borders, up to the initiation of military actions.
By the same reason it will reduce the heat of the struggle for Kirkuk
and will promote preserving of status-quo.
In mid-term perspective Turkey will continue attempts of economic
penetration to Kurdistan Region (at present about 70% of investments
in the Region are of Turkish origin), it will also try to create
political space oriented on Ankara, in particular using as an option,
creation of Turcoman and Arab parties and movements. Model and
techniques of transboundary projection of influence of most active
pro-Turkish part of Turcoman movement on the entire political field of
activity of Turcoman parties and organizations of Kurdistan Region,
most of which are loyal to the regional authorities, may also be
successfully implemented in other districts of Turkish foreign
political interests, in particular in Javakhq, through designing
external management of the entire movement of Meskhetian Turks from
the centers of Akhiskian Turks in Turkey.
Generally, new policy of Turkey in regard to Kurdistan Region lies
within the scope of the active neo-Ottomanism which has become a pivot
of foreign policy of Ankara. It is not without reason that in the
academic circles in Turkey the prospects of annexation of northern
regions of Iraq to Turkey are seriously considered.
1 http://news.mail.ru/economics/2910507/
2Came into effect after the nationwide referendum held on October 15, 2005.
3By the way, besides oil and gas, Kurdistan also has considerable
iron, gold, uranium, wolfram and vanadium reserves.
4According to western and Kurdish sources in the period from 1991 to
1998 200 thousand Kurds and 5 thousand Turkmen were evicted from
there, and 300 thousand Arabs were moved from other provinces of Iraq
to Kirkuk; in Kirkuk province where the martial law was declared only
those Kurds who refused from their national identity were allowed to
stay. In order to reduce the share of Kurdish population, Kurdish
villages near Kirkuk were destroyed and administrative borders of the
province were changed through inclusion of non-Kurd population
centers. http://www.kurdistan.ru/a211.htm
5According to data of the 1957 census (before the beginning of
large-scale military activities in Kurdistan), 48% of population of
Kirkuk were Kurds, 28.2% - Arabs. and 21.4% - Turkmen (`Turcomans').
http://www.kurdistan.ru/a211.htm
6 http://www.Turkey.ru/lenta/all/20070201/2893.html
`Globus Energy and Regional Security', issue 6
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
AZERBAIJAN: SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010]
TWO `STREAMS' FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL
STRUCTURES[21.06.2010]
MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]
GEOPOLITICS OF THE GAS PIPELINES IN THE BLACK SEA-CASPIAN REGION[24.12.2009]
From: A. Papazian