DEVELOPMENTS ROUND IRAN
Sevak Sarukhanyan
"Noravank" Foundation
04 February 2010
At the end of 2009 the instability in Iran caused new demonstrations
and encounters. On December 16, taking advantage of the mass
arrangements connected with the Ashura, the supporters of the Iranian
opposition went out to the manifestations. And the death of ayatollah
Montazeri on December 20 who took opposition stance to the current
spiritual authorities and his funeral ceremony even more urged the
actions of the oppositionists.
The preparedness of the anti-governmental manifestations The
manifestations and encounters which took place in December and January
came to prove the actions of the Iranian opposition were rather well
prepared. The protests which seemed to be spontaneous at first sight
and which passed in almost all the big Iranian cities, undoubtedly,
were arranged from one common centre which is proved by the similar
slogans, the political posters of the same style and methods of the
anti-governmental actions going on in different cities.
Besides the opposition managed to provide the regular provision of
information about the future protests, encounters and victims in
the leading Western mass media, their spreading on the Internet,
particularly through the social networks. As a result the opposition
succeeded in avoiding information blockade, which, most probably,
was arranged not without the help of the third parties.
As for the Iranian authorities they had also been prepared to the
manifestations and encounters. Probably, the arrests which had taken
place for the recent months, tough interrogations during which even
deaths occurred, formed good information base for the Iranian special
services and, as a result, on the very next day of the manifestations
police and security structures carried out arrests of the most
active young oppositionist leaders at their homes thus avoiding more
inconvenient street actions and greater number of victims.
While observing the way the Iranian opposition acts, one can suppose
that it was formed on the following creed: the manifestation may have
a success and force authorities to make serious concessions. Such a
supposition can be made on the assumption of the fact that opposition
leaders M.H. Mousavi, M. Khatami and M. Karubi supported and joined
the demonstrators from the very first day though during the previous
months they had demonstrated rather prudent and careful conduct. The
relatives of Mousavi and Karubi were also actively involved in the
arrangement of the demonstrations. The nephew of the first one was
killed during the encounters. At the same time it should be mentioned
that during the last months M. Mousavi and M. Karubi visited Iranian
regions, most probably, in order to prepare the local active circles
to the coming manifestations.
Most probably, the leaders of the opposition believed that the
organizational works carried out by them for the recent months,
propaganda, the violence used against oppositionists in the Iranian
prisons, which factuality had already been accepted by the authorities,
would boost the tide of public discontent.
Though, despite this and really large-scale manifestations no public
burst took place in the Islamic republic. Putting aside the information
repercussions with which another manifestations stage of the Iranian
political crisis was presented to the international community, the
plans of the Iranian opposition, in our opinion, failed. It can be
expected that the Iranian opposition will try to arrange big protest
actions in spring, during Novruz celebrations and, probably, in summer
at the anniversary of the presidential elections.
Those actions will be necessary to maintain the opposition movement
till 2010 and 2011, when, respectively, the new local authorities'
elections and parliamentary elections will take place.
Steps made by the authorities The Iranian authorities took rather
composed stance during the recent developments. The spiritual leader
of Iran Khamenei made no statement on the days of the encounters.
Only on January 10, during his address in Ghom he made important
statements, three of which were the basic:
Everything was arranged from abroad, the authorities will continue
responding the same way to the unlawful actions using all the available
means, none of the opposition's suggestions would be regarded and the
political crisis will be solved in the way the authorities had chosen.
That way implies "accord with the will of the people, abiding to the
law and the respect to your own history".
The address of Khamenei was more than confident. It is remarkable that
Iranian leader did not even pronounce the names of the main leaders of
the opposition, leaving without the answer their "offer to the dialogue
and overcoming of the crisis", which implied the arrangement of the
new presidential elections. Mousavi's offer was only keenly criticized
by the speaker of the parliament A. Larijani who characterized it as
"an obvious step, which proves the irresponsibility and evasion of
the dialogue". Iranian mass media presented the whole process as
a plot arranged by the powers from abroad and characterized a part
of those who deceased during the encounters as "the fighters of the
terrorist organizations".
In January yet another important event took place in the domestic
political live of Iran: the commander of the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps (IRGC) M.A. Jaafari touched on in details and gave
his estimations.
It should be mentioned that after the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war
the then president of Iran A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani persuaded Iranian
elite that IRGC should stay away from domestic political processes
and not to make statements of political character.
In M. Ahmadinejad's time who is supposed to be the representative
of the IRGC interests the situation formed at the end of the 80s
has started to change. And on January 13, 2010 the commander of the
IRGC made the statement of purely domestic political character, not
failing to sound harsh estimates concerning the going on processes:
"the main aim of the ongoing processes is to weaken the positions of
the spiritual leader and to turn his power into simply ceremonial which
contradicts to the Islamic nature of our country /.../ Our enemies want
to arrange here velvet revolution, want to impact out authorities and
first of all the spiritual leader /.../, the fact that a part of our
elite has retreated from the values of the revolution is not a new
one. But today our enemies spread doubt and distrust among our people
using that very persons who were involved before ahead by their local
and foreign spies into the economic and political treason. /.../ M.
Khatami intended to overthrow M. Ahmadinejad in order to strike a
blow to the Leader. That will not happen."
The fact that the IRGC became one of the most important actors in
Iran may show that the power is concentrated in hands of radical
conservatives. The continuing arrests, terrorist acts, persecutions
will only bring to the centralization of the political power in
the hands of power structures, which should be used during the most
important event in the political life of Iran - the election of the
new spiritual leader. The most crucial question for Iran is who will
be the next leader of the country after Khamenei.
It should be mentioned that during the recent developments the
oppositionist deputies of the Iranian parliament made more restrained
statements regarding the ongoing processes and encounters, this,
probably, was a result of pressure the authorities imposed on the
representatives of the political powers. The arrests of several of the
oppositionist figures had a restrictive effect on the political powers.
Estimating the political situation in Iran, it can be called a
political crisis without doubt. But the developments in October and
January have come to prove that the actions on the streets and mass
protests cannot solve the complicated discrepancies of the authorities.
Other issues of author
IRAN: YEAR IN REVIEW [28.12.2009] IRANIAN "THINK TANKS" [17.12.2009]
NEW STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME [02.11.2009] DEVELOPMENTS
ROUND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF IRAN [12.10.2009] "NABUCCO" GAS PIPELINE
AND ARMENIA [21.07.2009] PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN IRAN [09.07.2009]
ON REGIONAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS [18.06.2009]
Sevak Sarukhanyan
"Noravank" Foundation
04 February 2010
At the end of 2009 the instability in Iran caused new demonstrations
and encounters. On December 16, taking advantage of the mass
arrangements connected with the Ashura, the supporters of the Iranian
opposition went out to the manifestations. And the death of ayatollah
Montazeri on December 20 who took opposition stance to the current
spiritual authorities and his funeral ceremony even more urged the
actions of the oppositionists.
The preparedness of the anti-governmental manifestations The
manifestations and encounters which took place in December and January
came to prove the actions of the Iranian opposition were rather well
prepared. The protests which seemed to be spontaneous at first sight
and which passed in almost all the big Iranian cities, undoubtedly,
were arranged from one common centre which is proved by the similar
slogans, the political posters of the same style and methods of the
anti-governmental actions going on in different cities.
Besides the opposition managed to provide the regular provision of
information about the future protests, encounters and victims in
the leading Western mass media, their spreading on the Internet,
particularly through the social networks. As a result the opposition
succeeded in avoiding information blockade, which, most probably,
was arranged not without the help of the third parties.
As for the Iranian authorities they had also been prepared to the
manifestations and encounters. Probably, the arrests which had taken
place for the recent months, tough interrogations during which even
deaths occurred, formed good information base for the Iranian special
services and, as a result, on the very next day of the manifestations
police and security structures carried out arrests of the most
active young oppositionist leaders at their homes thus avoiding more
inconvenient street actions and greater number of victims.
While observing the way the Iranian opposition acts, one can suppose
that it was formed on the following creed: the manifestation may have
a success and force authorities to make serious concessions. Such a
supposition can be made on the assumption of the fact that opposition
leaders M.H. Mousavi, M. Khatami and M. Karubi supported and joined
the demonstrators from the very first day though during the previous
months they had demonstrated rather prudent and careful conduct. The
relatives of Mousavi and Karubi were also actively involved in the
arrangement of the demonstrations. The nephew of the first one was
killed during the encounters. At the same time it should be mentioned
that during the last months M. Mousavi and M. Karubi visited Iranian
regions, most probably, in order to prepare the local active circles
to the coming manifestations.
Most probably, the leaders of the opposition believed that the
organizational works carried out by them for the recent months,
propaganda, the violence used against oppositionists in the Iranian
prisons, which factuality had already been accepted by the authorities,
would boost the tide of public discontent.
Though, despite this and really large-scale manifestations no public
burst took place in the Islamic republic. Putting aside the information
repercussions with which another manifestations stage of the Iranian
political crisis was presented to the international community, the
plans of the Iranian opposition, in our opinion, failed. It can be
expected that the Iranian opposition will try to arrange big protest
actions in spring, during Novruz celebrations and, probably, in summer
at the anniversary of the presidential elections.
Those actions will be necessary to maintain the opposition movement
till 2010 and 2011, when, respectively, the new local authorities'
elections and parliamentary elections will take place.
Steps made by the authorities The Iranian authorities took rather
composed stance during the recent developments. The spiritual leader
of Iran Khamenei made no statement on the days of the encounters.
Only on January 10, during his address in Ghom he made important
statements, three of which were the basic:
Everything was arranged from abroad, the authorities will continue
responding the same way to the unlawful actions using all the available
means, none of the opposition's suggestions would be regarded and the
political crisis will be solved in the way the authorities had chosen.
That way implies "accord with the will of the people, abiding to the
law and the respect to your own history".
The address of Khamenei was more than confident. It is remarkable that
Iranian leader did not even pronounce the names of the main leaders of
the opposition, leaving without the answer their "offer to the dialogue
and overcoming of the crisis", which implied the arrangement of the
new presidential elections. Mousavi's offer was only keenly criticized
by the speaker of the parliament A. Larijani who characterized it as
"an obvious step, which proves the irresponsibility and evasion of
the dialogue". Iranian mass media presented the whole process as
a plot arranged by the powers from abroad and characterized a part
of those who deceased during the encounters as "the fighters of the
terrorist organizations".
In January yet another important event took place in the domestic
political live of Iran: the commander of the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps (IRGC) M.A. Jaafari touched on in details and gave
his estimations.
It should be mentioned that after the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war
the then president of Iran A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani persuaded Iranian
elite that IRGC should stay away from domestic political processes
and not to make statements of political character.
In M. Ahmadinejad's time who is supposed to be the representative
of the IRGC interests the situation formed at the end of the 80s
has started to change. And on January 13, 2010 the commander of the
IRGC made the statement of purely domestic political character, not
failing to sound harsh estimates concerning the going on processes:
"the main aim of the ongoing processes is to weaken the positions of
the spiritual leader and to turn his power into simply ceremonial which
contradicts to the Islamic nature of our country /.../ Our enemies want
to arrange here velvet revolution, want to impact out authorities and
first of all the spiritual leader /.../, the fact that a part of our
elite has retreated from the values of the revolution is not a new
one. But today our enemies spread doubt and distrust among our people
using that very persons who were involved before ahead by their local
and foreign spies into the economic and political treason. /.../ M.
Khatami intended to overthrow M. Ahmadinejad in order to strike a
blow to the Leader. That will not happen."
The fact that the IRGC became one of the most important actors in
Iran may show that the power is concentrated in hands of radical
conservatives. The continuing arrests, terrorist acts, persecutions
will only bring to the centralization of the political power in
the hands of power structures, which should be used during the most
important event in the political life of Iran - the election of the
new spiritual leader. The most crucial question for Iran is who will
be the next leader of the country after Khamenei.
It should be mentioned that during the recent developments the
oppositionist deputies of the Iranian parliament made more restrained
statements regarding the ongoing processes and encounters, this,
probably, was a result of pressure the authorities imposed on the
representatives of the political powers. The arrests of several of the
oppositionist figures had a restrictive effect on the political powers.
Estimating the political situation in Iran, it can be called a
political crisis without doubt. But the developments in October and
January have come to prove that the actions on the streets and mass
protests cannot solve the complicated discrepancies of the authorities.
Other issues of author
IRAN: YEAR IN REVIEW [28.12.2009] IRANIAN "THINK TANKS" [17.12.2009]
NEW STATUS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME [02.11.2009] DEVELOPMENTS
ROUND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMME OF IRAN [12.10.2009] "NABUCCO" GAS PIPELINE
AND ARMENIA [21.07.2009] PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN IRAN [09.07.2009]
ON REGIONAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS [18.06.2009]