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WITHOUT RESOLVING KARABAKH CONFLICT, SOUTH CAUCASUS WILL NEVER BE SECURE, EXPERT
news.az
Feb 5 2010
Azerbaijan
Taleh Ziyadov News.Az interviews Taleh Ziyadov, a doctoral fellow at
the University of Cambridge (UK).
How do you assess the current state of the Karabakh negotiations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
There is a lot of optimism about the current state of affairs in the
peace process. It would be fair to say that Armenia and Azerbaijan
have made a serious progress since 2004. Baku and Yerevan have agreed
on most of the outstanding and difficult issues. Now, we have come
to a point when the parties may need a final push - a push that
could transform the entire region as a whole. So I am too cautiously
optimistic.
Do you think it is realistic to expect any breakthroughs in the peace
process by the end of this year? If yes, what sort of progress could
it be?
Realistically, the only tangible breakthrough that could happen is the
signing of the so-called "Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict". This agreement alone would be
enough to trigger a number of developments, including opening of the
regional communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan, return of
IDPs to their homes, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and so on. Having said that, everything will depend on whether or
not President Aliyev and President Sargsyan will be able to agree on
a mutually acceptable framework document.
During his recent visit to Azerbaijan, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister
Hassan Gashgavi said that the Karabakh conflict could only be resolved
in the regional framework with participation of regional states, and
non-regional actors would not solve the conflict because they pursue
their own interests. To what extent are these comments justified?
It is a positive development that regional states have started to
show greater interest in the Karabakh peace process. Since 1992,
the negotiation process has taken place under the auspices of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE), which
is a regional organization. Hence the involvement of non-regional
actors is within the OSCE Minsk Group framework. Despite its ups
and downs, the process has gone a long way and it achieved a lot in
helping the two sides to move in the right direction.
Also let's not forget that the Karabakh conflict itself is as much
international as it is regional. In many cases, long-lasting conflicts
end up being resolved by the efforts of international community and
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and regional
states play important role in advancing peace prospects. That is
why this conflict has been discussed in other international forums,
including the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC). In short, regional and international efforts are
not mutually exclusive and they often reinforce each other.
As far as the interests of individual states are concerned, I would
say that any state, be it regional or non-regional, has its own
interests and its own agenda. The problem is how to make sure these
interests align so that all parties become vastly interested in the
earlier resolution of the conflict. And it seems like we are slowly
going in that direction.
Do you mean today interests of the regional and international actors
overlap vis-a-vis the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?
Over the past few years we have seen some shifts in the regional and
global politics. The 2008 August war in Georgia was probably one of the
main events that triggered some shifts regionally. Moscow has visibly
become active in trying to facilitate meetings between presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Moscow Declaration was the first outcome
of this process. The US- Russia rapprochement played a positive role
too, so did the warming Turkish-Russian relations. The more interests
of regional and international actors converge in seeing a secure
and stable South Caucasus, the more chances we have in resolving the
Karabakh conflict. Without resolving this conflict, the South Caucasus
will never be secure and predictable. So to answer your question,
I think today there is much less antagonism between these players
and the conflict itself seems to have reached its level of "ripeness".
Recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan blamed the co-chair countries
of the OSCE Minsk Group for not being active enough in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict - referring to the absence of a peace deal
for almost twenty years - and called upon them to intensify their
efforts in finding a solution soon. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs,
on the other hand, state that they have limited mandate and they
cannot apply pressure to Baku and Yerevan to sign an agreement that
they do not want. Which of these two views do you subscribe to?
The issue is probably more complex than "inactivity" of co-chair
states or "limitations" in the mandate of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Finding a mutual solution to any conflict takes time and there are
many factors, both internal and external, that come into play when
the parties sit behind that negotiation table. In addition to the
challenges they face domestically, too often the parties have to
deal with demands and pressures of other players, which may or may
not be interested in the sooner resolution of the conflict. But the
longer the conflict stays unresolved, the more difficult it becomes
to resolve it. Therefore, it is the primary duty of mediators to make
sure that the conflicting parties talk to each other.
Within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents and foreign ministers have conducted countless talks. In
the past, these talks could have produced a peace deal at least twice:
first in 1998 and then again in 1999. But we know what happened: in
1998, the then Armenian President Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign
and the October 1999 shooting in the Armenian parliament buried
all expectations of a possible peace deal being signed at the OSCE
Istanbul meeting in November, 1999.
The inherent challenge within the OSCE Minsk Group framework is
the diverging interests of the co-chair countries: France, Russia
and the United States. In 1990s, the gap between their interests was
considerable. In fact, the activities of the OCSE Minsk Group co-chairs
in 1990s resembled the Ivan Krylov's fable about "Swan, Crawfish, and
Pike" where each was pulling a loaded cart in a different direction,
thus, causing it to stand still.
The situation has changed greatly, especially since 2004. Although
the co-chairs may still have different opinions and interests, today
there is a genuine attempt by all to move in one direction. Certainly,
the most important shift in the post-2004 phase of the negotiations
was the introduction of what is often referred to in the negotiation
literature as the "formula to detail" approach. To its credit, the OSCE
Minsk Group's approach has been successful leading to the drafting of
the "Basic Principles". Most of the items in the "Basic Principles"
have already been agreed on, leaving only one or two issue to settle.
As for the OSCE Minsk Group's limited mandate and lack of "tools"
to pressure the conflicting parties, I tend to share the opinion of
an American professor and mediator, David Matz, who believes that
"the parties come to mediators to reach an agreement they cannot
reach themselves" and one of the ways mediators could facilitate
this process is "to apply pressure to the parties to help them move
toward settlement".
After all, making sure the parties adhere to the principles of
international law, under which the OSCE Minsk Group is acting, can
hardly be considered a "pressure". We have seen many examples when a
"friendly encouragement" could produce positive outcomes. The signing
of the Moscow Declaration is a good example. Yerevan did not like the
content of the Moscow Declaration, nonetheless, it signed it. It is
for the same reason why it also signed the Turkish-Armenian protocols.
What do you think will be the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols?
If there is no progress in the Karabakh peace process, the
Turkish-Armenian protocols would most probably sink into oblivion.
Therefore, increasing efforts to achieve a breakthrough in the peace
talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most logical action that
all interested parties should pursue today.
What is the potential of Turkey as a facilitator in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict?
As I stated above, the involvement of regional states in the resolution
of the conflict is a positive step. It is better to have an active
Turkey than a passive one. Turkey and Azerbaijan share common
interests and they are tied to each other on multiple levels. Turkey
is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan and it a growing regional power,
whose influence will continue to increase in the years to come.
Turkey's involvement has alleviated the status of the Karabakh conflict
in the regional and international forums.
How sincere is Turkish PM Erdogan when he talks about normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations being dependent on the resolution of
the Karabakh conflict?
One thing that any Turkish politician, regardless of his or her
political affiliation, has to take into account is the Turkish public.
There is tremendous sympathy among the Turkish public for Azerbaijan
and the Karabakh cause - a fact that no politician can disregard. In
addition, there are strategic, military, political and economic ties
between Ankara and Baku that have been built over the past twenty
years. These ties cannot be sacrificed in exchange for relatively
minor gains. Thus, numerous public statements of Turkish high
ranking officials, including PM Erdogan's, about the link between
the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and the Karabakh conflict should
be taken seriously.
Besides the known position of official Baku that the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement would lead to delaying and complicating the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, there is also a view that this rapprochement
could speed up the resolution of the conflict. Which of these two
views do you favor?
It depends on the sequence... In principle, I do not think Baku is
against the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. In fact, there
have been many attempts in the past to facilitate such normalization
by opening a road that would go from Azerbaijan passing via Karabakh
and Lachin, to Armenia and into Turkey. These proposals have been on
the table with an assumption that the Armenian side would agree to
pull out from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. As a matter of
good will and to start the process, Armenia could have returned one
or two of the occupied territories, which would have led to positive
developments in the whole region. Unfortunately, Yerevan preferred
to keep the status quo. This certainly raises a question whether the
Armenian side is really interested in seeing a breakthrough at all?
So while agreeing that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is important
and could help the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, it can only
happen if the two processes go hand-in-hand. In other words, without
the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, the Turkish-Armenia rapprochement
will be short-lived and incomplete. It would also delay the resolution
of the conflict and increase the possibility of a new war. On the
other hand, if Baku and Yerevan achieve a breakthrough in the talks
this year, it would speed up the Turkish-Armenian normalization
process as well. And that would be really transformational!
Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge
(UK). He is specializing in energy, transportation, and geopolitical
issues in Central Eurasia. His article analyzing the phases of the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until 2009 will be
published in the upcoming issue of the journal of International
Negotiation No. 15 (2010).
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
news.az
Feb 5 2010
Azerbaijan
Taleh Ziyadov News.Az interviews Taleh Ziyadov, a doctoral fellow at
the University of Cambridge (UK).
How do you assess the current state of the Karabakh negotiations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan?
There is a lot of optimism about the current state of affairs in the
peace process. It would be fair to say that Armenia and Azerbaijan
have made a serious progress since 2004. Baku and Yerevan have agreed
on most of the outstanding and difficult issues. Now, we have come
to a point when the parties may need a final push - a push that
could transform the entire region as a whole. So I am too cautiously
optimistic.
Do you think it is realistic to expect any breakthroughs in the peace
process by the end of this year? If yes, what sort of progress could
it be?
Realistically, the only tangible breakthrough that could happen is the
signing of the so-called "Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict". This agreement alone would be
enough to trigger a number of developments, including opening of the
regional communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan, return of
IDPs to their homes, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and so on. Having said that, everything will depend on whether or
not President Aliyev and President Sargsyan will be able to agree on
a mutually acceptable framework document.
During his recent visit to Azerbaijan, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister
Hassan Gashgavi said that the Karabakh conflict could only be resolved
in the regional framework with participation of regional states, and
non-regional actors would not solve the conflict because they pursue
their own interests. To what extent are these comments justified?
It is a positive development that regional states have started to
show greater interest in the Karabakh peace process. Since 1992,
the negotiation process has taken place under the auspices of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE), which
is a regional organization. Hence the involvement of non-regional
actors is within the OSCE Minsk Group framework. Despite its ups
and downs, the process has gone a long way and it achieved a lot in
helping the two sides to move in the right direction.
Also let's not forget that the Karabakh conflict itself is as much
international as it is regional. In many cases, long-lasting conflicts
end up being resolved by the efforts of international community and
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and regional
states play important role in advancing peace prospects. That is
why this conflict has been discussed in other international forums,
including the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC). In short, regional and international efforts are
not mutually exclusive and they often reinforce each other.
As far as the interests of individual states are concerned, I would
say that any state, be it regional or non-regional, has its own
interests and its own agenda. The problem is how to make sure these
interests align so that all parties become vastly interested in the
earlier resolution of the conflict. And it seems like we are slowly
going in that direction.
Do you mean today interests of the regional and international actors
overlap vis-a-vis the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?
Over the past few years we have seen some shifts in the regional and
global politics. The 2008 August war in Georgia was probably one of the
main events that triggered some shifts regionally. Moscow has visibly
become active in trying to facilitate meetings between presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Moscow Declaration was the first outcome
of this process. The US- Russia rapprochement played a positive role
too, so did the warming Turkish-Russian relations. The more interests
of regional and international actors converge in seeing a secure
and stable South Caucasus, the more chances we have in resolving the
Karabakh conflict. Without resolving this conflict, the South Caucasus
will never be secure and predictable. So to answer your question,
I think today there is much less antagonism between these players
and the conflict itself seems to have reached its level of "ripeness".
Recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan blamed the co-chair countries
of the OSCE Minsk Group for not being active enough in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict - referring to the absence of a peace deal
for almost twenty years - and called upon them to intensify their
efforts in finding a solution soon. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs,
on the other hand, state that they have limited mandate and they
cannot apply pressure to Baku and Yerevan to sign an agreement that
they do not want. Which of these two views do you subscribe to?
The issue is probably more complex than "inactivity" of co-chair
states or "limitations" in the mandate of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Finding a mutual solution to any conflict takes time and there are
many factors, both internal and external, that come into play when
the parties sit behind that negotiation table. In addition to the
challenges they face domestically, too often the parties have to
deal with demands and pressures of other players, which may or may
not be interested in the sooner resolution of the conflict. But the
longer the conflict stays unresolved, the more difficult it becomes
to resolve it. Therefore, it is the primary duty of mediators to make
sure that the conflicting parties talk to each other.
Within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, Armenian and Azerbaijani
presidents and foreign ministers have conducted countless talks. In
the past, these talks could have produced a peace deal at least twice:
first in 1998 and then again in 1999. But we know what happened: in
1998, the then Armenian President Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign
and the October 1999 shooting in the Armenian parliament buried
all expectations of a possible peace deal being signed at the OSCE
Istanbul meeting in November, 1999.
The inherent challenge within the OSCE Minsk Group framework is
the diverging interests of the co-chair countries: France, Russia
and the United States. In 1990s, the gap between their interests was
considerable. In fact, the activities of the OCSE Minsk Group co-chairs
in 1990s resembled the Ivan Krylov's fable about "Swan, Crawfish, and
Pike" where each was pulling a loaded cart in a different direction,
thus, causing it to stand still.
The situation has changed greatly, especially since 2004. Although
the co-chairs may still have different opinions and interests, today
there is a genuine attempt by all to move in one direction. Certainly,
the most important shift in the post-2004 phase of the negotiations
was the introduction of what is often referred to in the negotiation
literature as the "formula to detail" approach. To its credit, the OSCE
Minsk Group's approach has been successful leading to the drafting of
the "Basic Principles". Most of the items in the "Basic Principles"
have already been agreed on, leaving only one or two issue to settle.
As for the OSCE Minsk Group's limited mandate and lack of "tools"
to pressure the conflicting parties, I tend to share the opinion of
an American professor and mediator, David Matz, who believes that
"the parties come to mediators to reach an agreement they cannot
reach themselves" and one of the ways mediators could facilitate
this process is "to apply pressure to the parties to help them move
toward settlement".
After all, making sure the parties adhere to the principles of
international law, under which the OSCE Minsk Group is acting, can
hardly be considered a "pressure". We have seen many examples when a
"friendly encouragement" could produce positive outcomes. The signing
of the Moscow Declaration is a good example. Yerevan did not like the
content of the Moscow Declaration, nonetheless, it signed it. It is
for the same reason why it also signed the Turkish-Armenian protocols.
What do you think will be the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols?
If there is no progress in the Karabakh peace process, the
Turkish-Armenian protocols would most probably sink into oblivion.
Therefore, increasing efforts to achieve a breakthrough in the peace
talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most logical action that
all interested parties should pursue today.
What is the potential of Turkey as a facilitator in the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict?
As I stated above, the involvement of regional states in the resolution
of the conflict is a positive step. It is better to have an active
Turkey than a passive one. Turkey and Azerbaijan share common
interests and they are tied to each other on multiple levels. Turkey
is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan and it a growing regional power,
whose influence will continue to increase in the years to come.
Turkey's involvement has alleviated the status of the Karabakh conflict
in the regional and international forums.
How sincere is Turkish PM Erdogan when he talks about normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations being dependent on the resolution of
the Karabakh conflict?
One thing that any Turkish politician, regardless of his or her
political affiliation, has to take into account is the Turkish public.
There is tremendous sympathy among the Turkish public for Azerbaijan
and the Karabakh cause - a fact that no politician can disregard. In
addition, there are strategic, military, political and economic ties
between Ankara and Baku that have been built over the past twenty
years. These ties cannot be sacrificed in exchange for relatively
minor gains. Thus, numerous public statements of Turkish high
ranking officials, including PM Erdogan's, about the link between
the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and the Karabakh conflict should
be taken seriously.
Besides the known position of official Baku that the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement would lead to delaying and complicating the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict, there is also a view that this rapprochement
could speed up the resolution of the conflict. Which of these two
views do you favor?
It depends on the sequence... In principle, I do not think Baku is
against the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. In fact, there
have been many attempts in the past to facilitate such normalization
by opening a road that would go from Azerbaijan passing via Karabakh
and Lachin, to Armenia and into Turkey. These proposals have been on
the table with an assumption that the Armenian side would agree to
pull out from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. As a matter of
good will and to start the process, Armenia could have returned one
or two of the occupied territories, which would have led to positive
developments in the whole region. Unfortunately, Yerevan preferred
to keep the status quo. This certainly raises a question whether the
Armenian side is really interested in seeing a breakthrough at all?
So while agreeing that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is important
and could help the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, it can only
happen if the two processes go hand-in-hand. In other words, without
the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, the Turkish-Armenia rapprochement
will be short-lived and incomplete. It would also delay the resolution
of the conflict and increase the possibility of a new war. On the
other hand, if Baku and Yerevan achieve a breakthrough in the talks
this year, it would speed up the Turkish-Armenian normalization
process as well. And that would be really transformational!
Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge
(UK). He is specializing in energy, transportation, and geopolitical
issues in Central Eurasia. His article analyzing the phases of the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until 2009 will be
published in the upcoming issue of the journal of International
Negotiation No. 15 (2010).
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress