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TURKEY'S SOFT POWER SUCCESSES
by Wendy Kristianasen
Le Monde Diplomatique (France)
http://mondediplo.com/2010/02/05turkey
Fe b 9 2010
Turkey wants to expand its influence throughout its surrounding
region, creating a peaceful, stable environment in which its economy
can prosper. And as the country struggles internally to demilitarise
and democratise, there is broad support for the AKP government's bold
aims abroad
Ahmet Davutoglu's vision is wide. He wants peace and security for the
wider region around Turkey and believes Ankara is well-placed as a
member of the G20 and Nato to make it happen. He is the architect of
Turkey's new policy, which relies on zero problems with neighbours,
and soft power. He was chief foreign policy adviser to the prime
minister from the start of the Justice and Development (AK) Party
government, which came to power in a landslide general election on
3 November 2002. In May 2009 he became foreign minister.
He says Turkey is well-poised to play a mediating role in various
conflicts, with strong ties with different religious and ethnic
groups where there are Turkish speakers. That means the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East. His vision of security for
all and peace means more than mediation; it means "high-level political
dialogue, economic interdependency and a multicultural character".
Davutoglu is not a politician, but an academic, and not even a member
of parliament, so free of ties to constituents. And he has not just
thought out an innovative foreign policy, he has implemented it. His
achievements: "Sixty one agreements signed with Syria; 48 with
Iraq; visa requirements lifted with eight neighbours; resolution
of Lebanon's problem with Syria [over presidential succession];
two protocols signed with Armenia." He has also attempted mediation
between Israel and the Palestinians. He conducted the talks between
Syria and Israel in 2007-8: "We came close, not to peace, but to
agreement; but then Israel's attack on Gaza [in December 2008] put
an end to all that work. Gaza wasn't an issue in our negotiations
but it was a negative context... When Israel has a vision of peace
we will be ready to listen: this is an issue of principle."
This new foreign policy has won widespread popular support among a
population divided internally by unresolved questions of identity:
secular Turks worry about Islamisation and resent AKP patronage that
excludes them (especially in the state sector).
At the same time, this is a crucial moment as Turkey sends its military
back to the barracks and exposes the dark secrets of its "deep state"
- in particular shadowy elements within the military (which toppled
four governments between 1960 and 1998) that are accused, inter alia,
of coup attempts against the AKP government.
These include a plot to assassinate the deputy prime minister, Bulent
Arinc, on 19 December 2009. The findings promise for the first time to
"touch the untouchables" within the army (1). This has been happening
within the framework of the ongoing Ergenekon trial. In January a flood
of media revelations provided yet greater details of coup attempts
(including a document exposing the so-called Balyoz or Sledgehammer
operation) (2).
There's a new dynamic As the shades are lifted from Turkey's recent
history, and the country demilitarises, the way is now open to real
democratisation. Much needs to be done, including constitutional and
other reform (not least to allow the military to be prosecuted in
civilian courts). But the pace of change is undeniable; new elites
are emerging, with a growing, vibrant middle class (even if disparity
in income levels has widened).
The energy is echoed abroad. Rising above a core divide over identity
and internal direction, Turks can agree on a foreign policy that is
coherent and promises economic gain and security, and expresses a
clear sense of how Turkey sees itself in the world.
As Ihsan Bal, professor at the Police Academy, pointed out: "There's a
new dynamic, and it's driven by the people. The West is missing that
point." It started in 2003, when the US had wanted to use Turkey as
a front for its invasion of Iraq. "And it was the people - the MPs
and their constituents - who said no."
You would expect Turks to worry about the effects of the global
financial crisis, and unemployment (near to 15%; probably 30% among
the young) but they discuss Gaza instead. A year ago 5,000waved
flags to greet their prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on his
return from the World Economic Forum in Davos. He had just stormed
out of a televised debate, on 29 January 2009, with Shimon Peres,
the Israeli president. Erdogan told Peres: "You are killing people",
and the moderator refused to allow him to rebut Peres' justification of
the war on Gaza (3). Turks care about Palestine. They appreciate that
Erdogan's feelings are genuine and respond to his charisma, ordinary
origins, and the always present family of this populist prime minister.
The Davos incident made Erdogan an instant hero among Arabs and
Muslims. The US seemed not too unhappy about the outburst, although it
wishes that Turkey would show sympathy for Fatah, and not just Hamas,
to help unblock the frozen peace process. A number of Turks feel that
government support of Hamas (including inviting its leader Khalid
Mesha'al to Ankara) should have paid a dividend - say the release of
the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, captured on 25 June 2006 and held
under Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip. Davutoglu's people reply
that this misses the point.
Yet when the AKP came to power in 2002, it continued Turkey's previous
close relations with Israel, as the mediating effort with Syria
showed. The context changed with the invasion of Gaza. Later the
next year, in October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from scheduled
military exercises and postponed them indefinitely. This January,
Israel was forced to apologise for its deputy foreign minister Danny
Ayalon's treatment of the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv. Ahmet Oguz
Celikkol, summoned to hear complaints about a Turkish TV drama seen
as anti-semitic, was forced to sit on a low sofa without a handshake
or the ritual Turkish flag while Ayalon explained to local TV stations
that the humiliation was intentional.
What does this mean for future relations between the two countries?
Meliha Altunisik, professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University, said that after the Gaza war "any government would have
had to moderate its policy. Plus, Israel is growing more isolated
under its present government and with Obama in power: its strategic
position is declining". Many Turks point out that Turkey is now more
important to Israel than vice versa, even as a marketplace. However,
they do not foresee more than a downscaling of relations: neither
Turks nor Arabs want Turkey to burn its bridges.
'One of us has made it' Altunisik said of the Arab world: "People in
the region look to Turkey to play a constructive role. The economy
is key. But Erdogan is personally popular: I even found women in
Damascus who are learning Turkish on his account." It started in
2003 when Turkey stood up to the US and refused to allow the country
to be used as a launchpad for the Iraq war. "There was the feeling
that one of us has made it." She says that with Iran there is still
competition. "Turkey has been trying to steal its thunder by its
open support of Gaza, engagement of Syria with Israel, and resolving
Lebanon's presidential crisis." With the new aim of solving problems
through cooperation, the benefits are multiple. "Just in the Middle
East, there is the straight benefit of developing relations with the
Arabs; plus the extra benefit that brings over Iran; plus the economic
benefit; plus stability. This provides a win-win possibility. It's
a new language. And it's important."
Iran is one of the few foreign-policy topics on which Turks disagree.
Yavuz Baydar, political correspondent at the pro-government English
language daily Today's Zaman, said: "No cause for concern; what goes
on between Erdogan and Ahmadinejad is just two men of the street with
the same body language. They are cautious of each other." But many
feel attempts to mediate on Iran's nuclear capability are dangerous,
pointless, or naïve. The disagreement reflects the difficulty of
deciphering Iranian ambitions. There is also the fear of an explosive
situation on the doorstep.
Among Arab countries, Syria has captured the Turkish imagination: in
university foreign affairs departments the staff talk of their latest
trips to Damascus. Considering the old, bad relations (Syrian support
for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), its claim to Hatay (Alexandretta)
(4), cross-water problems), today's social and economic relations
seem miraculous. In Iraq, economic and social relations, and Turkish
help in bringing Sunni groups to the negotiating table, have created a
stable environment that contrasts with the instability of recent years
in the Kurdish north, marked by PKK separatist activity and Turkish
incursions (see Crossing the line). Business is booming in Africa,
especially Libya and Sudan (scene of another prime ministerial gaffe)
(5); Turkey's non-combatant role in Afghanistan (with 1,750 troops)
is approved of.
It is not just the Muslim world: there's Russia, Serbia, Georgia,
Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, with two protocols signed on 10 October 2009
calling for diplomatic ties and the opening of borders.
What about the suggestion in the western press that Turkey's turn to
the east and south is a symptom of renewed Ottoman longings? (6). The
idea doesn't register among Turks today. Temel Iskit, a former diplomat
and Turkey's first director general for EU affairs in the 1980s,
says that the idea is a "way of saying Turkey has lost interest
in joining Europe and is going Islamic. These criticisms come from
countries that don't want Turkey inside the EU and the pro-Israel US
press. I think they are neither true nor sincere." Iskit is one of
the many disaffected who supported the CHP (Republican People's Party,
the secular centre-left party that goes back to Ataturk's single party
state) but have lost confidence in the party under its current leader,
Deniz Baykal. "After a lifetime of having publicly to defend all
the old taboos on Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurds, I revised my opinions,
and decided to speak out."
Turkey has always had a central geopolitical place, explained Iskit.
But because of its youth and struggle for independence, and then the
cold war, it was always on the defensive. "What has changed is that
Turkey has begun to democratise. That happened with agreement to fulfil
the Copenhagen criteria, engaged before the AKP came to power, and the
army's agreement to stop meddling in politics. This democratisation
has led to a new spirit of â~@¨co-operation and compromise."
Kadri Gursel, a columnist on the secularist daily Milliyet, thinks
that Turkey's present foreign policy stance would have come about
under any government. "Our foreign policy assets multiplied with the
economic boom in 2002-3, the process of EU accession, and the end of a
major security concern with the capture of [the PKK leader Abdullah]
Ocalan." Turkey is seeing a natural adjustment to new realities of
the post-cold war and globalisation, which have created a new dynamic.
"But a secular party could not have profited so well: the AKP feels
at home in the Middle East, especially with the Sunnis." Many in
and around the government speak Arabic. But that does not mean an
"eastern axis".
Insurance policy Gursel thinks it's about the economy. "Turkey is
condemned to economic growth based on export because there's no
domestic saving structure."
So it has to find new markets, and that means the Middle East.
"Overall, this has worked," he says. "The government has run the
economy properly and they're business minded, even if they behave in
a rather tribal way and keep the benefits for themselves. Indirectly
it helps their Anatolian base to form a new middle class and this is
an insurance policy towards a stable democracy."
Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi
University, said: "The eastern axis fuss is about the West's inability
to digest a Turkey that is calling its own shots." He pointed out that
the AKP has very good relations with the US. "Turkey wants stability,
a zone of prosperity, security aimed at peace. In contrast to Israel
and Iran." He, too, talked of the continuity in foreign policy:
"The AKP have conceptualised this better than others." He thinks the
question of Turkey's "Westness" is less about its strategic orientation
than about whether it will become a real western country.
"If the EU takes itself out of the equation through its inadequate
understanding of what Turkey does, even though this is in the West's
interest, then most of our foreign relations will be conducted
through the US." In that case, Ozel wonders, will Washington push
the EU harder to move ahead on Turkey's membership? "That would mean
that it rightly sees Turkey as a member of the western alliance with
particular strengths in the Middle East, rather than a Middle East
country allied to the West."
Turks hope that Barack Obama will be better able to do this than
George W Bush. On Obama himself, Yasemin Congar, managing editor of
the Istanbul daily Taraf (7) says: "There is a lot to be said for
his bi-racial, multi-cultural background and knowledge of the Muslim
world. His middle name is Hussein and Turks keep that in mind." The
Obama message of a new dialogue with the Muslim world and respect for
human rights is in tune with Turkey's efforts to democratise and to
find an equitable solution to its Kurdish problem. But his failure to
pressure Israel over the Palestinians, and particularly settlement
activity, and his decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, have
disappointed people. At the same time, they note that Turkey's own
outspoken stance on Israel has gone without criticism, and may not
be unwelcome given Obama's poor relations with the current Israeli
government. However, if Obama is to dispel the anti-Americanism of
recent years, he will need to secure real progress on the Palestinians.
There is deep bitterness about Europe that underlies all talk on
foreign policy. And the opposition's complaint that the government has
failed to pursue EU membership with sufficient enthusiasm has grown
unconvincing since President Sarkozy's rejection of Turkey. Rather,
Turks believe that the country's enhanced standing in the region
means that it will be able to deliver more to the EU party. And if
Turkey is not invited in? Its role in the world will in any case have
been boosted.
Zafar Yavan, secretary-general of Tusiad (Turkish Industrialists'
and Businessmen's Association), the association for big business,
traditionally in the hands of the old secular Istanbul families,
complains that the government has not moved fast enough on the EU,
especially on public procurement and other economic chapters, creating
doubts about its enthusiasm. But he admits that maybe the slowing down
of the pace of convergence is to do with Sarkozy, not Turkey. "The
direction is right, as long as they stay on track. Turkey will make
progress with or without this government. But the AKP's democratic
attempts will remain: it's a one-way process. And the pace of the AKP
and its perseverance is not to be compared with that of any previous
government."
Ayse Celikel, a former CHP minister of justice, has every reason to
oppose the government; she heads an association (Cagdas Yasam Dernegi)
that offers secular education to girls, now under pressure from the
government, with 14 employees detained without charges being made
known. She calls herself "a Kemalist, but an open-minded one". On
foreign policy she recognises that, "with EU adhesion on the back
burner, the government is engaged in a balancing act with openings
to the east and south. And as long as it doesn't go any further away
from Europe, or closer to Iran, okay".
Armagan Kuloglu, a retired general and adviser at a new Ankara
think-tank ORSAM (Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies), is a
self-proclaimed "Ataturkcu" (Ataturk devotee), "though not a Kemalist,
which means defending the Turkish nation as an ethnic base". He
defends the old taboos, and condemns the government initiatives on
Cyprus, the Kurds and Armenia. Yet he too agrees that there has been
no change of axis: "The government just wants good relations with
neighbouring countries, and this is the first opportunity for this."
(He doesn't criticise the government's EU policy either, since he
would be happy not to enter.)
Some Turks worry that the AKP government is juggling too much and
may drop something. And is it in danger of overstating Turkey's soft
power potential? Meliha Altunisik says the question is premature and
misses the point. "How foreign policy is conducted is as important as
the end results. We used to be peripheral to all our neighbours. Now
you can't discuss many regions without talking about Turkey."
by Wendy Kristianasen
Le Monde Diplomatique (France)
http://mondediplo.com/2010/02/05turkey
Fe b 9 2010
Turkey wants to expand its influence throughout its surrounding
region, creating a peaceful, stable environment in which its economy
can prosper. And as the country struggles internally to demilitarise
and democratise, there is broad support for the AKP government's bold
aims abroad
Ahmet Davutoglu's vision is wide. He wants peace and security for the
wider region around Turkey and believes Ankara is well-placed as a
member of the G20 and Nato to make it happen. He is the architect of
Turkey's new policy, which relies on zero problems with neighbours,
and soft power. He was chief foreign policy adviser to the prime
minister from the start of the Justice and Development (AK) Party
government, which came to power in a landslide general election on
3 November 2002. In May 2009 he became foreign minister.
He says Turkey is well-poised to play a mediating role in various
conflicts, with strong ties with different religious and ethnic
groups where there are Turkish speakers. That means the Balkans, the
Caucasus, Russia, Cyprus, the Middle East. His vision of security for
all and peace means more than mediation; it means "high-level political
dialogue, economic interdependency and a multicultural character".
Davutoglu is not a politician, but an academic, and not even a member
of parliament, so free of ties to constituents. And he has not just
thought out an innovative foreign policy, he has implemented it. His
achievements: "Sixty one agreements signed with Syria; 48 with
Iraq; visa requirements lifted with eight neighbours; resolution
of Lebanon's problem with Syria [over presidential succession];
two protocols signed with Armenia." He has also attempted mediation
between Israel and the Palestinians. He conducted the talks between
Syria and Israel in 2007-8: "We came close, not to peace, but to
agreement; but then Israel's attack on Gaza [in December 2008] put
an end to all that work. Gaza wasn't an issue in our negotiations
but it was a negative context... When Israel has a vision of peace
we will be ready to listen: this is an issue of principle."
This new foreign policy has won widespread popular support among a
population divided internally by unresolved questions of identity:
secular Turks worry about Islamisation and resent AKP patronage that
excludes them (especially in the state sector).
At the same time, this is a crucial moment as Turkey sends its military
back to the barracks and exposes the dark secrets of its "deep state"
- in particular shadowy elements within the military (which toppled
four governments between 1960 and 1998) that are accused, inter alia,
of coup attempts against the AKP government.
These include a plot to assassinate the deputy prime minister, Bulent
Arinc, on 19 December 2009. The findings promise for the first time to
"touch the untouchables" within the army (1). This has been happening
within the framework of the ongoing Ergenekon trial. In January a flood
of media revelations provided yet greater details of coup attempts
(including a document exposing the so-called Balyoz or Sledgehammer
operation) (2).
There's a new dynamic As the shades are lifted from Turkey's recent
history, and the country demilitarises, the way is now open to real
democratisation. Much needs to be done, including constitutional and
other reform (not least to allow the military to be prosecuted in
civilian courts). But the pace of change is undeniable; new elites
are emerging, with a growing, vibrant middle class (even if disparity
in income levels has widened).
The energy is echoed abroad. Rising above a core divide over identity
and internal direction, Turks can agree on a foreign policy that is
coherent and promises economic gain and security, and expresses a
clear sense of how Turkey sees itself in the world.
As Ihsan Bal, professor at the Police Academy, pointed out: "There's a
new dynamic, and it's driven by the people. The West is missing that
point." It started in 2003, when the US had wanted to use Turkey as
a front for its invasion of Iraq. "And it was the people - the MPs
and their constituents - who said no."
You would expect Turks to worry about the effects of the global
financial crisis, and unemployment (near to 15%; probably 30% among
the young) but they discuss Gaza instead. A year ago 5,000waved
flags to greet their prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on his
return from the World Economic Forum in Davos. He had just stormed
out of a televised debate, on 29 January 2009, with Shimon Peres,
the Israeli president. Erdogan told Peres: "You are killing people",
and the moderator refused to allow him to rebut Peres' justification of
the war on Gaza (3). Turks care about Palestine. They appreciate that
Erdogan's feelings are genuine and respond to his charisma, ordinary
origins, and the always present family of this populist prime minister.
The Davos incident made Erdogan an instant hero among Arabs and
Muslims. The US seemed not too unhappy about the outburst, although it
wishes that Turkey would show sympathy for Fatah, and not just Hamas,
to help unblock the frozen peace process. A number of Turks feel that
government support of Hamas (including inviting its leader Khalid
Mesha'al to Ankara) should have paid a dividend - say the release of
the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, captured on 25 June 2006 and held
under Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip. Davutoglu's people reply
that this misses the point.
Yet when the AKP came to power in 2002, it continued Turkey's previous
close relations with Israel, as the mediating effort with Syria
showed. The context changed with the invasion of Gaza. Later the
next year, in October 2009, Turkey excluded Israel from scheduled
military exercises and postponed them indefinitely. This January,
Israel was forced to apologise for its deputy foreign minister Danny
Ayalon's treatment of the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv. Ahmet Oguz
Celikkol, summoned to hear complaints about a Turkish TV drama seen
as anti-semitic, was forced to sit on a low sofa without a handshake
or the ritual Turkish flag while Ayalon explained to local TV stations
that the humiliation was intentional.
What does this mean for future relations between the two countries?
Meliha Altunisik, professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical
University, said that after the Gaza war "any government would have
had to moderate its policy. Plus, Israel is growing more isolated
under its present government and with Obama in power: its strategic
position is declining". Many Turks point out that Turkey is now more
important to Israel than vice versa, even as a marketplace. However,
they do not foresee more than a downscaling of relations: neither
Turks nor Arabs want Turkey to burn its bridges.
'One of us has made it' Altunisik said of the Arab world: "People in
the region look to Turkey to play a constructive role. The economy
is key. But Erdogan is personally popular: I even found women in
Damascus who are learning Turkish on his account." It started in
2003 when Turkey stood up to the US and refused to allow the country
to be used as a launchpad for the Iraq war. "There was the feeling
that one of us has made it." She says that with Iran there is still
competition. "Turkey has been trying to steal its thunder by its
open support of Gaza, engagement of Syria with Israel, and resolving
Lebanon's presidential crisis." With the new aim of solving problems
through cooperation, the benefits are multiple. "Just in the Middle
East, there is the straight benefit of developing relations with the
Arabs; plus the extra benefit that brings over Iran; plus the economic
benefit; plus stability. This provides a win-win possibility. It's
a new language. And it's important."
Iran is one of the few foreign-policy topics on which Turks disagree.
Yavuz Baydar, political correspondent at the pro-government English
language daily Today's Zaman, said: "No cause for concern; what goes
on between Erdogan and Ahmadinejad is just two men of the street with
the same body language. They are cautious of each other." But many
feel attempts to mediate on Iran's nuclear capability are dangerous,
pointless, or naïve. The disagreement reflects the difficulty of
deciphering Iranian ambitions. There is also the fear of an explosive
situation on the doorstep.
Among Arab countries, Syria has captured the Turkish imagination: in
university foreign affairs departments the staff talk of their latest
trips to Damascus. Considering the old, bad relations (Syrian support
for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), its claim to Hatay (Alexandretta)
(4), cross-water problems), today's social and economic relations
seem miraculous. In Iraq, economic and social relations, and Turkish
help in bringing Sunni groups to the negotiating table, have created a
stable environment that contrasts with the instability of recent years
in the Kurdish north, marked by PKK separatist activity and Turkish
incursions (see Crossing the line). Business is booming in Africa,
especially Libya and Sudan (scene of another prime ministerial gaffe)
(5); Turkey's non-combatant role in Afghanistan (with 1,750 troops)
is approved of.
It is not just the Muslim world: there's Russia, Serbia, Georgia,
Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, with two protocols signed on 10 October 2009
calling for diplomatic ties and the opening of borders.
What about the suggestion in the western press that Turkey's turn to
the east and south is a symptom of renewed Ottoman longings? (6). The
idea doesn't register among Turks today. Temel Iskit, a former diplomat
and Turkey's first director general for EU affairs in the 1980s,
says that the idea is a "way of saying Turkey has lost interest
in joining Europe and is going Islamic. These criticisms come from
countries that don't want Turkey inside the EU and the pro-Israel US
press. I think they are neither true nor sincere." Iskit is one of
the many disaffected who supported the CHP (Republican People's Party,
the secular centre-left party that goes back to Ataturk's single party
state) but have lost confidence in the party under its current leader,
Deniz Baykal. "After a lifetime of having publicly to defend all
the old taboos on Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurds, I revised my opinions,
and decided to speak out."
Turkey has always had a central geopolitical place, explained Iskit.
But because of its youth and struggle for independence, and then the
cold war, it was always on the defensive. "What has changed is that
Turkey has begun to democratise. That happened with agreement to fulfil
the Copenhagen criteria, engaged before the AKP came to power, and the
army's agreement to stop meddling in politics. This democratisation
has led to a new spirit of â~@¨co-operation and compromise."
Kadri Gursel, a columnist on the secularist daily Milliyet, thinks
that Turkey's present foreign policy stance would have come about
under any government. "Our foreign policy assets multiplied with the
economic boom in 2002-3, the process of EU accession, and the end of a
major security concern with the capture of [the PKK leader Abdullah]
Ocalan." Turkey is seeing a natural adjustment to new realities of
the post-cold war and globalisation, which have created a new dynamic.
"But a secular party could not have profited so well: the AKP feels
at home in the Middle East, especially with the Sunnis." Many in
and around the government speak Arabic. But that does not mean an
"eastern axis".
Insurance policy Gursel thinks it's about the economy. "Turkey is
condemned to economic growth based on export because there's no
domestic saving structure."
So it has to find new markets, and that means the Middle East.
"Overall, this has worked," he says. "The government has run the
economy properly and they're business minded, even if they behave in
a rather tribal way and keep the benefits for themselves. Indirectly
it helps their Anatolian base to form a new middle class and this is
an insurance policy towards a stable democracy."
Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Bilgi
University, said: "The eastern axis fuss is about the West's inability
to digest a Turkey that is calling its own shots." He pointed out that
the AKP has very good relations with the US. "Turkey wants stability,
a zone of prosperity, security aimed at peace. In contrast to Israel
and Iran." He, too, talked of the continuity in foreign policy:
"The AKP have conceptualised this better than others." He thinks the
question of Turkey's "Westness" is less about its strategic orientation
than about whether it will become a real western country.
"If the EU takes itself out of the equation through its inadequate
understanding of what Turkey does, even though this is in the West's
interest, then most of our foreign relations will be conducted
through the US." In that case, Ozel wonders, will Washington push
the EU harder to move ahead on Turkey's membership? "That would mean
that it rightly sees Turkey as a member of the western alliance with
particular strengths in the Middle East, rather than a Middle East
country allied to the West."
Turks hope that Barack Obama will be better able to do this than
George W Bush. On Obama himself, Yasemin Congar, managing editor of
the Istanbul daily Taraf (7) says: "There is a lot to be said for
his bi-racial, multi-cultural background and knowledge of the Muslim
world. His middle name is Hussein and Turks keep that in mind." The
Obama message of a new dialogue with the Muslim world and respect for
human rights is in tune with Turkey's efforts to democratise and to
find an equitable solution to its Kurdish problem. But his failure to
pressure Israel over the Palestinians, and particularly settlement
activity, and his decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, have
disappointed people. At the same time, they note that Turkey's own
outspoken stance on Israel has gone without criticism, and may not
be unwelcome given Obama's poor relations with the current Israeli
government. However, if Obama is to dispel the anti-Americanism of
recent years, he will need to secure real progress on the Palestinians.
There is deep bitterness about Europe that underlies all talk on
foreign policy. And the opposition's complaint that the government has
failed to pursue EU membership with sufficient enthusiasm has grown
unconvincing since President Sarkozy's rejection of Turkey. Rather,
Turks believe that the country's enhanced standing in the region
means that it will be able to deliver more to the EU party. And if
Turkey is not invited in? Its role in the world will in any case have
been boosted.
Zafar Yavan, secretary-general of Tusiad (Turkish Industrialists'
and Businessmen's Association), the association for big business,
traditionally in the hands of the old secular Istanbul families,
complains that the government has not moved fast enough on the EU,
especially on public procurement and other economic chapters, creating
doubts about its enthusiasm. But he admits that maybe the slowing down
of the pace of convergence is to do with Sarkozy, not Turkey. "The
direction is right, as long as they stay on track. Turkey will make
progress with or without this government. But the AKP's democratic
attempts will remain: it's a one-way process. And the pace of the AKP
and its perseverance is not to be compared with that of any previous
government."
Ayse Celikel, a former CHP minister of justice, has every reason to
oppose the government; she heads an association (Cagdas Yasam Dernegi)
that offers secular education to girls, now under pressure from the
government, with 14 employees detained without charges being made
known. She calls herself "a Kemalist, but an open-minded one". On
foreign policy she recognises that, "with EU adhesion on the back
burner, the government is engaged in a balancing act with openings
to the east and south. And as long as it doesn't go any further away
from Europe, or closer to Iran, okay".
Armagan Kuloglu, a retired general and adviser at a new Ankara
think-tank ORSAM (Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies), is a
self-proclaimed "Ataturkcu" (Ataturk devotee), "though not a Kemalist,
which means defending the Turkish nation as an ethnic base". He
defends the old taboos, and condemns the government initiatives on
Cyprus, the Kurds and Armenia. Yet he too agrees that there has been
no change of axis: "The government just wants good relations with
neighbouring countries, and this is the first opportunity for this."
(He doesn't criticise the government's EU policy either, since he
would be happy not to enter.)
Some Turks worry that the AKP government is juggling too much and
may drop something. And is it in danger of overstating Turkey's soft
power potential? Meliha Altunisik says the question is premature and
misses the point. "How foreign policy is conducted is as important as
the end results. We used to be peripheral to all our neighbours. Now
you can't discuss many regions without talking about Turkey."