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Russia Profile
Feb 9 2010
Parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh Negotiating Process Will Now Have to
Take Turkey's Opinion into Account
At first glance there have been no significant changes this year in
the process of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The framework
of this discussion is well-known: arguments over the timeframe in
which the five districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are to be
demilitarized; repatriating the refugees; the status of the disputed
territory and various possible mechanisms that would ensure the non-use
of force. However, a closer look at the dynamics of the peace process
in Nagorno-Karabakh reveals a number of important shifts, and these
should be noted in order to get a better picture of the prospects
of settling one of the oldest and most complex conflicts on former
Soviet territory.
Negotiations in the three-way format (the presidents of Russia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia) tested out back in 2008 also continue. On
January 25 the city of Sochi hosted the fifth meeting of the three
countries' leaders, which resulted in agreement over the preamble to
the renewed Madrid Principles. Meanwhile, the negotiations themselves
are held in an atmosphere of utter secrecy, since the text of the
preamble has not been made available to journalists and experts.
For a long time, the regulation of the Karabakh conflict developed
within the framework of the status quo that was established in
the Southern Caucasus after 1991. This time was characterized
by a "freezing" of conflicts and the creation of republics with
a questionable status and questionable borders. Yet neither the
instigators of the conflict nor the parties dragged into it possessed
the necessary resources to drastically change the status quo. The
"winds of change" began blowing in Georgia. Those same winds led to
the five-day war and a change in the old rules of the Caucasian game.
What did Yerevan and Baku derive from this war? Baku most likely
realized that the "Serbian Krajina" scenario cannot be applied to
the Caucasus. The West is too far away, and while the Caucasus does
matter, this region is not a territory of "vital interests" for the
EU and especially for the United States. Thus it was no accident
that following the five-day war, Azerbaijan abstained from conducting
militarist propaganda for a few months. In turn, Yerevan realized an
unfortunate fact: for Armenia, Russia's victory over Georgia created
many new problems (given the fact that all of the logistics between
the two allies were conducted through Georgia). Having realized that
the "Western factor" should not be overestimated (here Armenian and
Azerbaijani diplomacy intersect), Yerevan began looking for ways to
find compromises with neighboring Turkey, whose claims to involvement
not just in Azerbaijani affairs but in all of Caucasian geopolitics
became evident following the short-lived August war.
Thus shaping up a new status quo in the Caucasus is not limited to the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the severance of diplomatic
relations between Russia and Georgia, Ankara's increased role in the
region and the beginning of an Armenian-Turkish dialog. The latter
became a serious factor influencing the Karabakh settlement process.
The absolute majority of those who root for normal Armenian-Turkish
relations keep saying that the two problems, the peace process in the
Karabakh and the reconciliation between Yerevan and Ankara, should be
dealt with separately. But in reality, these two processes have merged.
With pressure coming from different directions (especially on behalf
of the United States) it was possible to convince Turkey to sign two
protocols on normalizing relations with Armenia without mentioning
Karabakh or the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in general. Professional
optimists have already called these protocols "historic" and
"revolutionary." Certainly, the two protocols establishing diplomatic
relations and opening a land border became the first legally binding
documents signed by Yerevan and Ankara simultaneously. However, if the
Parliaments don't ratify them, they will remain a formality. Realizing
this, the Turkish side once again broached the issue of grouping
together the reconciliation with the Armenian side and the "progress"
on the "Karabakh question." But this is not just an achievement of
Turkish diplomacy. We also have to acknowledge the effectiveness of
the Azerbaijani president (and his diplomatic ministry), who managed
not to let the Karabakh problem "drift away" from the process of the
Armenian-Turkish normalization. For this, Baku used militaristic
rhetoric as well (at the end of last year it even surpassed its
general level, with Ilham Aliyev threatening to launch a military
attack if the negotiations were delayed).
Thus during its negotiations with Washington and Moscow, Ankara can
refer to Baku's stance, as well as to the factor of Turkish unity,
which it would like to ignore but cannot. As for the United States
and Russia, both of these countries have their own reasons to take
Turkey's opinion into account. For the United States, Turkey's
military-political significance has not diminished, despite all over
their disagreements over Iraq in particular and over the Near East in
general (given the current administration's plans in Afghanistan, the
significance of the Indzherlik base should not be underestimated). For
Russia, Turkey is turning into a primary economic partner. Last year,
trade between the two countries grew by 49 percent and reached the
record high of $33.8 billion. Thus it is hardly accidental that the
"escalation" in peacekeeping activities in the Karabakh on behalf of
both Russian and American politicians came soon after their meetings
with the Turkish leaders (in December of 2009 for the Americans and
in January of 2010 for the Russians).
On the one hand, neither Russia nor the United States have an
obvious desire (as was the case with Georgia) to radically alter the
Karabakh game. Both Moscow and Washington are rather satisfied with
the negotiation process, with inevitably optimistic commentary about
the "coming peace." However, from now on the Turkish factor plays an
incomparably greater role. It is further amplified by the fact that
Turkey is simultaneously playing its own, independent game in the Near
East on the Israeli-Palestinian, Syrian and Iranian fields, as well
as in the Balkans. And although both Moscow and Washington insist on
sticking to the thesis that the Karabakh process and Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation cannot happen at the same time, they both quietly
acknowledge a simple fact: in order to speed up the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem should
be pushed forward as well.
In the end, there should be a negotiated document (this can be a
protocol or a communiqué that is legally binding for both sides),
which Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Abdullah Gul can present as a strategic
victory and as a result of establishing normal relations with Yerevan.
This document would also help in their dialogue with the opposition
and the political community of the country at large, because it would
state the fact that the "fraternal Azerbaijani people" remain in the
care of Ankara, while the reconciliation with Armenia did not come
at a high political price.
Thus, the diplomatic bargaining continues. The only difference is
that before it went on without an eye being kept on Ankara. In today's
expert circles, Turkey is already being called the fourth unofficial
"co-chair of the Minsk Group."
Sergey Markedonov is an independent political analyst and expert on
the Caucasus.
Russia Profile
Feb 9 2010
Parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh Negotiating Process Will Now Have to
Take Turkey's Opinion into Account
At first glance there have been no significant changes this year in
the process of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The framework
of this discussion is well-known: arguments over the timeframe in
which the five districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh are to be
demilitarized; repatriating the refugees; the status of the disputed
territory and various possible mechanisms that would ensure the non-use
of force. However, a closer look at the dynamics of the peace process
in Nagorno-Karabakh reveals a number of important shifts, and these
should be noted in order to get a better picture of the prospects
of settling one of the oldest and most complex conflicts on former
Soviet territory.
Negotiations in the three-way format (the presidents of Russia,
Azerbaijan and Armenia) tested out back in 2008 also continue. On
January 25 the city of Sochi hosted the fifth meeting of the three
countries' leaders, which resulted in agreement over the preamble to
the renewed Madrid Principles. Meanwhile, the negotiations themselves
are held in an atmosphere of utter secrecy, since the text of the
preamble has not been made available to journalists and experts.
For a long time, the regulation of the Karabakh conflict developed
within the framework of the status quo that was established in
the Southern Caucasus after 1991. This time was characterized
by a "freezing" of conflicts and the creation of republics with
a questionable status and questionable borders. Yet neither the
instigators of the conflict nor the parties dragged into it possessed
the necessary resources to drastically change the status quo. The
"winds of change" began blowing in Georgia. Those same winds led to
the five-day war and a change in the old rules of the Caucasian game.
What did Yerevan and Baku derive from this war? Baku most likely
realized that the "Serbian Krajina" scenario cannot be applied to
the Caucasus. The West is too far away, and while the Caucasus does
matter, this region is not a territory of "vital interests" for the
EU and especially for the United States. Thus it was no accident
that following the five-day war, Azerbaijan abstained from conducting
militarist propaganda for a few months. In turn, Yerevan realized an
unfortunate fact: for Armenia, Russia's victory over Georgia created
many new problems (given the fact that all of the logistics between
the two allies were conducted through Georgia). Having realized that
the "Western factor" should not be overestimated (here Armenian and
Azerbaijani diplomacy intersect), Yerevan began looking for ways to
find compromises with neighboring Turkey, whose claims to involvement
not just in Azerbaijani affairs but in all of Caucasian geopolitics
became evident following the short-lived August war.
Thus shaping up a new status quo in the Caucasus is not limited to the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the severance of diplomatic
relations between Russia and Georgia, Ankara's increased role in the
region and the beginning of an Armenian-Turkish dialog. The latter
became a serious factor influencing the Karabakh settlement process.
The absolute majority of those who root for normal Armenian-Turkish
relations keep saying that the two problems, the peace process in the
Karabakh and the reconciliation between Yerevan and Ankara, should be
dealt with separately. But in reality, these two processes have merged.
With pressure coming from different directions (especially on behalf
of the United States) it was possible to convince Turkey to sign two
protocols on normalizing relations with Armenia without mentioning
Karabakh or the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in general. Professional
optimists have already called these protocols "historic" and
"revolutionary." Certainly, the two protocols establishing diplomatic
relations and opening a land border became the first legally binding
documents signed by Yerevan and Ankara simultaneously. However, if the
Parliaments don't ratify them, they will remain a formality. Realizing
this, the Turkish side once again broached the issue of grouping
together the reconciliation with the Armenian side and the "progress"
on the "Karabakh question." But this is not just an achievement of
Turkish diplomacy. We also have to acknowledge the effectiveness of
the Azerbaijani president (and his diplomatic ministry), who managed
not to let the Karabakh problem "drift away" from the process of the
Armenian-Turkish normalization. For this, Baku used militaristic
rhetoric as well (at the end of last year it even surpassed its
general level, with Ilham Aliyev threatening to launch a military
attack if the negotiations were delayed).
Thus during its negotiations with Washington and Moscow, Ankara can
refer to Baku's stance, as well as to the factor of Turkish unity,
which it would like to ignore but cannot. As for the United States
and Russia, both of these countries have their own reasons to take
Turkey's opinion into account. For the United States, Turkey's
military-political significance has not diminished, despite all over
their disagreements over Iraq in particular and over the Near East in
general (given the current administration's plans in Afghanistan, the
significance of the Indzherlik base should not be underestimated). For
Russia, Turkey is turning into a primary economic partner. Last year,
trade between the two countries grew by 49 percent and reached the
record high of $33.8 billion. Thus it is hardly accidental that the
"escalation" in peacekeeping activities in the Karabakh on behalf of
both Russian and American politicians came soon after their meetings
with the Turkish leaders (in December of 2009 for the Americans and
in January of 2010 for the Russians).
On the one hand, neither Russia nor the United States have an
obvious desire (as was the case with Georgia) to radically alter the
Karabakh game. Both Moscow and Washington are rather satisfied with
the negotiation process, with inevitably optimistic commentary about
the "coming peace." However, from now on the Turkish factor plays an
incomparably greater role. It is further amplified by the fact that
Turkey is simultaneously playing its own, independent game in the Near
East on the Israeli-Palestinian, Syrian and Iranian fields, as well
as in the Balkans. And although both Moscow and Washington insist on
sticking to the thesis that the Karabakh process and Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation cannot happen at the same time, they both quietly
acknowledge a simple fact: in order to speed up the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem should
be pushed forward as well.
In the end, there should be a negotiated document (this can be a
protocol or a communiqué that is legally binding for both sides),
which Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Abdullah Gul can present as a strategic
victory and as a result of establishing normal relations with Yerevan.
This document would also help in their dialogue with the opposition
and the political community of the country at large, because it would
state the fact that the "fraternal Azerbaijani people" remain in the
care of Ankara, while the reconciliation with Armenia did not come
at a high political price.
Thus, the diplomatic bargaining continues. The only difference is
that before it went on without an eye being kept on Ankara. In today's
expert circles, Turkey is already being called the fourth unofficial
"co-chair of the Minsk Group."
Sergey Markedonov is an independent political analyst and expert on
the Caucasus.