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DOES TURKEY WANT TO OPEN ITS COMMON BORDER WITH ARMENIA?
by Aline Ozinian
Today's Zaman
Feb 11 2010
Turkey
Just as we thought that the Armenian initiative was linked to the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue and that the Turkish side had shelved the
protocols until a "worthwhile" development, we found ourselves in
another mess with Armenia sending the protocols to its constitutional
court for approval.
Under Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, any international
treaty or protocol that the Armenian Parliament ratifies should be in
compliance with the Armenian Constitution, and it is the constitutional
court that decides on this compliance. The constitutional court
assessed the protocols based on the country's constitution and
decided that they comply with it. The procedure for sending the
protocols to parliament is being implemented, and the protocols are not
"annotated." The points that are viewed as "annotations" are detailed
explanations as to the court's decision on constitutional compliance.
That constitution is the same constitution which has been in
force since 1995, and it has not been amended "specifically" for
the protocols. The Declaration of Independence of Armenia was the
document signed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, who is loved by and known to
the Turkish press as "a friend of Turkey," on Aug. 23, 1990, before
Turkey recognized Armenia's independence in 1991. Well, what does
Article 5 of the Armenian constitutional court's decision say? "The
protocols cannot contradict the Armenian Constitution and Paragraph 11
of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia." Paragraph 11 provides
for the Republic of Armenia to lend support to the efforts for the
international recognition of the 1915 incidents in the Ottoman Empire
as genocide.
Turkey obviously does not like this article, but was it added
"secretly" to the Declaration of Independence after Oct. 10, or were
Turkish Foreign Ministry and government officials not aware of this
document when they went to Zurich? Or did they assume that after the
signing of the protocols, the "poor" Armenians would forget about
genocide or tear up the declaration since it is not liked by their
neighbors? Those who can read diplomacy correctly know well that
the process was not halted by the Armenian constitutional court's
decision on the protocol's conformity with the constitution but by
the Turkish government, which expects a "concrete" development with
respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Aside from the strangeness of
the negative perception of the constitutional conformity decision,
it is unfortunate for Turkey to try to gain time by ensuring its
"unofficial" prerequisite -- which is actually official, but was
not reflected in the protocols. Murat Mercan, a senior member
of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the head of
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, said: "It does not make any
difference technically or politically to keep the protocols pending
at a parliamentary commission or to withdraw them. We will continue
to act in compliance with our responsibilities toward our country and
the Azerbaijani people and with the prestige of Turkey." I wonder if
the protocols would not be kept pending at the commission if Armenia
had not made such a decision? Was it that Turkey was playing well,
but it was Armenia that first refused to play?
There are problems between the two countries, and this is the reason
why these protocols "which everyone can interpret according to his
or her own wishes" were signed under the supervision of "big brothers."
It was because the formula -- of opening the common border,
establishing diplomatic relations, thereby automatically recognizing
the common border and removing major concerns, preparing the general
public for peace and solving other issues slowly -- was readily
accepted.
If we ask why parliamentary approval was needed to open the
common border between Turkey and Armenia or to establish diplomatic
relations, we understand that it was needed just for this reason: to
introduce delays to the process or find an excuse for our failure --
such as saying that we did everything but parliament had the final
say. The Turkish side stresses their concern about the involvement of
intermediary institutions -- referring to the constitutional court --
but there is no "intermediary institution," and the court is part of
the process of obtaining parliamentary ratification. The Turkish prime
minister's statements give the impression that he is not addressing a
country with which dialogue has been started, but instead intends to
bring the entire process to a halt. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward
Nalbandian phoned his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu, asking:
"I could not quite understand how you assessed the decision this way.
Where is a prerequisite in this decision?" If only Nalbandian had made
the call when Davutoglu delivered a speech in Parliament in which he
said, "The territorial integrity of Nagorno-Karabakh is as precious
as our own land," and asked, "So you said 'There was no prerequisite'?"
Uneasy with the situation, Davutoglu spoke with US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton by phone, and while the exact wording of the call
is unknown, it appears that a request was made that some pressure be
applied to Armenia by the US. Philip H. Gordon, assistant secretary of
state for European and Eurasian affairs, on the other hand, said: "We
see the court decision as a positive step toward the ratification of
the protocols that seek reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. The
court decision does not give the impression it limits the protocols
or is legally binding."
As part of a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Armenian President
Serzh Sarksyan, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev recently came together in Sochi. In this
meeting, the first this year and the fourth held with the participation
of Medvedev, the current status of negotiations for the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and future plans were discussed. In this
respect, one wonders if the prerequisite that Turkey so loudly voices,
although it was not made part of the protocols, has already been
met with a bilateral preliminary agreement. The sides have concluded
negotiations for pulling out from five regions, but does Turkey still
not feel ready to open the common border with Armenia? Is it time
to voice new prerequisites? Will we wait for Turkey to throw in new
conditions such as "Armenia should stop demanding the international
recognition of the genocide" and "Armenia should declare that it
recognizes the Treaty of Kars"? Or were these protocols never intended
to solve these problems? Before Turkey ratifies these protocols in
Parliament -- and Turkey stresses that a similar point will not be
reached any time in the near future -- let us test our conscience. Does
Turkey really want the common border to be opened?
*Aline Ozinian is a researcher in the field of Turkology.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Aline Ozinian
Today's Zaman
Feb 11 2010
Turkey
Just as we thought that the Armenian initiative was linked to the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue and that the Turkish side had shelved the
protocols until a "worthwhile" development, we found ourselves in
another mess with Armenia sending the protocols to its constitutional
court for approval.
Under Article 6 of the Armenian Constitution, any international
treaty or protocol that the Armenian Parliament ratifies should be in
compliance with the Armenian Constitution, and it is the constitutional
court that decides on this compliance. The constitutional court
assessed the protocols based on the country's constitution and
decided that they comply with it. The procedure for sending the
protocols to parliament is being implemented, and the protocols are not
"annotated." The points that are viewed as "annotations" are detailed
explanations as to the court's decision on constitutional compliance.
That constitution is the same constitution which has been in
force since 1995, and it has not been amended "specifically" for
the protocols. The Declaration of Independence of Armenia was the
document signed by Levon Ter-Petrossian, who is loved by and known to
the Turkish press as "a friend of Turkey," on Aug. 23, 1990, before
Turkey recognized Armenia's independence in 1991. Well, what does
Article 5 of the Armenian constitutional court's decision say? "The
protocols cannot contradict the Armenian Constitution and Paragraph 11
of the Declaration of Independence of Armenia." Paragraph 11 provides
for the Republic of Armenia to lend support to the efforts for the
international recognition of the 1915 incidents in the Ottoman Empire
as genocide.
Turkey obviously does not like this article, but was it added
"secretly" to the Declaration of Independence after Oct. 10, or were
Turkish Foreign Ministry and government officials not aware of this
document when they went to Zurich? Or did they assume that after the
signing of the protocols, the "poor" Armenians would forget about
genocide or tear up the declaration since it is not liked by their
neighbors? Those who can read diplomacy correctly know well that
the process was not halted by the Armenian constitutional court's
decision on the protocol's conformity with the constitution but by
the Turkish government, which expects a "concrete" development with
respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Aside from the strangeness of
the negative perception of the constitutional conformity decision,
it is unfortunate for Turkey to try to gain time by ensuring its
"unofficial" prerequisite -- which is actually official, but was
not reflected in the protocols. Murat Mercan, a senior member
of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the head of
Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, said: "It does not make any
difference technically or politically to keep the protocols pending
at a parliamentary commission or to withdraw them. We will continue
to act in compliance with our responsibilities toward our country and
the Azerbaijani people and with the prestige of Turkey." I wonder if
the protocols would not be kept pending at the commission if Armenia
had not made such a decision? Was it that Turkey was playing well,
but it was Armenia that first refused to play?
There are problems between the two countries, and this is the reason
why these protocols "which everyone can interpret according to his
or her own wishes" were signed under the supervision of "big brothers."
It was because the formula -- of opening the common border,
establishing diplomatic relations, thereby automatically recognizing
the common border and removing major concerns, preparing the general
public for peace and solving other issues slowly -- was readily
accepted.
If we ask why parliamentary approval was needed to open the
common border between Turkey and Armenia or to establish diplomatic
relations, we understand that it was needed just for this reason: to
introduce delays to the process or find an excuse for our failure --
such as saying that we did everything but parliament had the final
say. The Turkish side stresses their concern about the involvement of
intermediary institutions -- referring to the constitutional court --
but there is no "intermediary institution," and the court is part of
the process of obtaining parliamentary ratification. The Turkish prime
minister's statements give the impression that he is not addressing a
country with which dialogue has been started, but instead intends to
bring the entire process to a halt. Armenian Foreign Minister Edward
Nalbandian phoned his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Davutoglu, asking:
"I could not quite understand how you assessed the decision this way.
Where is a prerequisite in this decision?" If only Nalbandian had made
the call when Davutoglu delivered a speech in Parliament in which he
said, "The territorial integrity of Nagorno-Karabakh is as precious
as our own land," and asked, "So you said 'There was no prerequisite'?"
Uneasy with the situation, Davutoglu spoke with US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton by phone, and while the exact wording of the call
is unknown, it appears that a request was made that some pressure be
applied to Armenia by the US. Philip H. Gordon, assistant secretary of
state for European and Eurasian affairs, on the other hand, said: "We
see the court decision as a positive step toward the ratification of
the protocols that seek reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. The
court decision does not give the impression it limits the protocols
or is legally binding."
As part of a solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Armenian President
Serzh Sarksyan, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev recently came together in Sochi. In this
meeting, the first this year and the fourth held with the participation
of Medvedev, the current status of negotiations for the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and future plans were discussed. In this
respect, one wonders if the prerequisite that Turkey so loudly voices,
although it was not made part of the protocols, has already been
met with a bilateral preliminary agreement. The sides have concluded
negotiations for pulling out from five regions, but does Turkey still
not feel ready to open the common border with Armenia? Is it time
to voice new prerequisites? Will we wait for Turkey to throw in new
conditions such as "Armenia should stop demanding the international
recognition of the genocide" and "Armenia should declare that it
recognizes the Treaty of Kars"? Or were these protocols never intended
to solve these problems? Before Turkey ratifies these protocols in
Parliament -- and Turkey stresses that a similar point will not be
reached any time in the near future -- let us test our conscience. Does
Turkey really want the common border to be opened?
*Aline Ozinian is a researcher in the field of Turkology.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress