TURKEY IS UNDERVALUING THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUES
By Victor Makarov and Eldar Mamedov
European Voice
Feb 11 2010
Ankara is understandably, but mistakenly, relying on geostrategic
arguments to make its case for EU membership.
A string of high-ranking Turkish officials and politicians have
in recent months toured Western capitals to make the case for the
geostrategic benefits that Turkey's membership of the EU would
bring Europe. But it is not good enough simply to recycle strategic
arguments when a clear majority of the population in many EU member
states oppose Turkey's accession.
For sure, the widespread fear of Turkey is based on historical and
cultural prejudice, as well as ignorance. Faced with such fear,
arguments based on geopolitics may seem the only way forward. But,
if Turkey is to make the reforms needed to become a member, it needs
to accept that the EU is a union genuinely based on values.
If anything, the Turkish government's willingness to appreciate that
is declining. There have, undeniably, been some positive developments
under the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Many
sensitive issues, including the massacres of Armenians in 1915, the
state's treatment of Kurds and the army's involvement in politics,
can be discussed more freely in public.
However, in other ways, Turkey seems to be diverging from the
liberal values fundamental to the EU. The closure of the Democratic
Society Party (DTP) is a case in point. It is unfortunate that
the DTP has not distanced itself clearly from the terror committed
by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), but the ongoing arrests of
hundreds of DTP mayors, members and sympathisers on flimsy charges
ensures that the government's 'democratic opening' initiative sounds
hollow. It is ironic that the AKP, which barely escaped closure in
2008, has not used its overwhelming parliamentary majority to loosen
the notoriously restrictive laws on political parties. Nor has it
lowered an electoral threshold that is so high (10%) that it prevents
parliamentary pluralism.
There is also an alarming lack of pluralism in the media. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's earlier calls to boycott the Dogan
media group's newspapers only fuelled suspicions that the draconian
fine imposed on Dog?an last autumn was of a political nature. What
is more, the Turkish authorities have blocked some 3,700 internet
sites, including major information sources such as Google, YouTube
and GeoCities.
Such steps owe more to a prevailing authoritarian political culture
than to the AKP's Islamist leanings. But its religiously based
conservatism does hinder Turkey's progress towards the EU. For example,
in a country where 19% live below the poverty line, the government does
not seem interested in providing effective social protection. Instead,
the AKP favours the notion of Islamic charities providing assistance;
the result is erratic, non-transparent delivery of benefits and
services. This is politically expedient, but it harms Turkey's EU
aspirations, since social policy is part of the harmonisation package
needed to join the Union.
Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental to the EU; in this
area, the AKP is failing. There are still no legal provisions against
direct and indirect discrimination. No government body is in charge
of equality and anti-discrimination. And when the Directorate for
Religious Affairs, a public entity, recommends that homosexuality
be combated as a "perversion", it is elevating discrimination and
exclusion to the level of state policy.
The AKP approaches civil liberties in a manner informed more by its
religious outlook than European values. For example, while the AKP has
been very receptive to the demands of its conservative grassroots,
such as the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities, it has
done nothing to meet the most basic demands of the Alevi religious
minority, like allowing their children to opt out of compulsory
religious education, which, in practice, is education in Sunni Islam.
Turkey will not overcome all the prejudice against it in the EU, but,
if it is to gain membership, the idea must gain the acceptance of a
critical mass of Europe's citizens. That, surely, will only happen
when Turkey's politicians demonstrate that they are narrowing the
value gap. That would make it harder for EU governments to resist
the logic of geostrategic arguments.
Victor Makarov is director of the Riga-based policy centre
EuroCivitas. Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists
and Democrats group in the European Parliament, but is writing in a
personal capacity.
By Victor Makarov and Eldar Mamedov
European Voice
Feb 11 2010
Ankara is understandably, but mistakenly, relying on geostrategic
arguments to make its case for EU membership.
A string of high-ranking Turkish officials and politicians have
in recent months toured Western capitals to make the case for the
geostrategic benefits that Turkey's membership of the EU would
bring Europe. But it is not good enough simply to recycle strategic
arguments when a clear majority of the population in many EU member
states oppose Turkey's accession.
For sure, the widespread fear of Turkey is based on historical and
cultural prejudice, as well as ignorance. Faced with such fear,
arguments based on geopolitics may seem the only way forward. But,
if Turkey is to make the reforms needed to become a member, it needs
to accept that the EU is a union genuinely based on values.
If anything, the Turkish government's willingness to appreciate that
is declining. There have, undeniably, been some positive developments
under the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Many
sensitive issues, including the massacres of Armenians in 1915, the
state's treatment of Kurds and the army's involvement in politics,
can be discussed more freely in public.
However, in other ways, Turkey seems to be diverging from the
liberal values fundamental to the EU. The closure of the Democratic
Society Party (DTP) is a case in point. It is unfortunate that
the DTP has not distanced itself clearly from the terror committed
by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), but the ongoing arrests of
hundreds of DTP mayors, members and sympathisers on flimsy charges
ensures that the government's 'democratic opening' initiative sounds
hollow. It is ironic that the AKP, which barely escaped closure in
2008, has not used its overwhelming parliamentary majority to loosen
the notoriously restrictive laws on political parties. Nor has it
lowered an electoral threshold that is so high (10%) that it prevents
parliamentary pluralism.
There is also an alarming lack of pluralism in the media. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's earlier calls to boycott the Dogan
media group's newspapers only fuelled suspicions that the draconian
fine imposed on Dog?an last autumn was of a political nature. What
is more, the Turkish authorities have blocked some 3,700 internet
sites, including major information sources such as Google, YouTube
and GeoCities.
Such steps owe more to a prevailing authoritarian political culture
than to the AKP's Islamist leanings. But its religiously based
conservatism does hinder Turkey's progress towards the EU. For example,
in a country where 19% live below the poverty line, the government does
not seem interested in providing effective social protection. Instead,
the AKP favours the notion of Islamic charities providing assistance;
the result is erratic, non-transparent delivery of benefits and
services. This is politically expedient, but it harms Turkey's EU
aspirations, since social policy is part of the harmonisation package
needed to join the Union.
Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental to the EU; in this
area, the AKP is failing. There are still no legal provisions against
direct and indirect discrimination. No government body is in charge
of equality and anti-discrimination. And when the Directorate for
Religious Affairs, a public entity, recommends that homosexuality
be combated as a "perversion", it is elevating discrimination and
exclusion to the level of state policy.
The AKP approaches civil liberties in a manner informed more by its
religious outlook than European values. For example, while the AKP has
been very receptive to the demands of its conservative grassroots,
such as the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities, it has
done nothing to meet the most basic demands of the Alevi religious
minority, like allowing their children to opt out of compulsory
religious education, which, in practice, is education in Sunni Islam.
Turkey will not overcome all the prejudice against it in the EU, but,
if it is to gain membership, the idea must gain the acceptance of a
critical mass of Europe's citizens. That, surely, will only happen
when Turkey's politicians demonstrate that they are narrowing the
value gap. That would make it harder for EU governments to resist
the logic of geostrategic arguments.
Victor Makarov is director of the Riga-based policy centre
EuroCivitas. Eldar Mamedov is a political adviser to the Socialists
and Democrats group in the European Parliament, but is writing in a
personal capacity.