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ARMENIA-TURKEY PROTOCOLS ARE BEING ANNULLED: TURKEY-ARMENIA DIALOGUE FAILED
K. Guluzade
Today
http://www.today.az/news/analytics /61506.html
Feb 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently announced a de
facto cancellation of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. His statements
give reason to say that Ankara just yesterday lost faith in Yerevan's
sincerity and decided to no longer delay time. It is noteworthy that
Davutoglu spoke abut this issue twice - before the Armenian president's
flight over Turkey, when the latter had sent greetings to Ankara,
and after Serzh Sargsyan landed in London.
Sargsyan was flying to the West, so his move was twofold. On the one
hand, the Armenian president acted in a manner unusual for him and
on the other hand he called on Turkey to further dialogue in a civil
way harboring his grudge.
It is hard to blame Turkey for achieving real breakthroughs in foreign
policy, although the country's foreign policy line has underwent
substantial changes in recent years. Turkey has a kind of empirical
track record based on trial and error. The country has made efforts
to achieve a breakthrough in terms of international recognition of the
Northern Cyprus, EU accession and establishing a platform of stability
in the Caucasus, and starting a Iran-West dialogue before the war in
Iraq and at a time of a raging Middle East crisis. It is difficult
to say there is no success. But the same applies to failures. The
Armenian version in this context is by no means an isolated case.
In the meantime, Turkey wonders why the Turkish authorities signed
the Zurich protocols with Armenia. It lamented the fact that so far
no one has bothered to answer this seemingly elementary question.
Davutoglu announced his conclusion from the process. Some won and some
lost from another Armenian tricks. I propose to consider the positions
of the major players of the post-Zurich events, who are few - Turkey,
Armenia, the U.S., Russia and Azerbaijan.
What did Ankara gain? First and foremost, Armenia's denial of
territorial claims against Turkey. Second, Armenians refusal to stop
"recognize the genocide" campaign." Thirdly, a refusal to withdraw from
several regions of Azerbaijan with further opportunity of complete
settlement to the Karabakh conflict. The first two desires were
clearly reflected in the Zurich protocols whereas the third one was
voiced as no less binding for ratification in parliament following a
strong protest from Azerbaijan. Can we consider the third requirement
a precondition? In any case, it is so naive to believe it.
Situation in the region is far more obvious. Similarly, ikebana was
originally destined to become a mourning wreath without the third
component.
What did Ankara get? It got what Azerbaijan warned constantly.
Azerbaijan better knows to what degree Armenia is constructive and open
to dialogue and how this South Caucasus republic is anti-regional. It
knows better that Armenia has failed to emerge as a real state? Simply
put, Ankara got nothing. It demonstrated Armenia's failure to the
West. Admittedly, success is very dubious, even if it is a response
to the above question voiced by Ankara.
What did Armenia seek? Obviously, opening of borders with Turkey
so that to revive its almost dead economy. As an educated man and
homo sapiens, I find it hard to understand why Sargsyan instructed
the foreign minister sign the protocol if Turkey conditions were
originally known.
And what did Armenia get? Nothing. External assistance is not
available. Borders with the only possible new investor are closed.
"Genocide" is not recognized (even if it will be recognized by some
countries, the Republic of Turkey is not responsible for actual or
attributed acts of the Ottoman Empire in the format in 1915). Apart
from this, Yerevan disgraced itself with a game of "withdrawal of
signatures", calling into question its "honor."
What did the U.S. gain? I stopped believing in peace in 1988 when
I was 12 years old. The U.S. has never said "farewell" to arms. Of
course, here it was about the "second window" to the South Caucasus.
The first was opened with a great roar and shriek through Georgia.
They tried to open the second through Armenia. In my humble
understanding, Armenia cannot withdraw from a state of permanent
"outpost" even by the Turkish investments. However, a key to the
South Caucasus lies with Azerbaijan.
What did the U.S. achieve? A trick to push "genocidal resolution"
through the House of Representatives may result in shake-up situation
in the Middle East which may prove disastrous for Washington. Given
that Ankara nicely hobnobs with Tehran and is in a diplomatic
confrontation with Israel, so it can easily be directed towards
Russia. Do you think Turkish diplomats began talking about the
prospects of the Eurasian Union similar to the European Union
accidentally? The recent polls in Turkey have indicated population's
negative attitude towards the United States. Percentage of dissatisfied
will only grow while Turkey will remain a special country for the
region.
What is Russia's gain? The balance is known. The key to the region
lies with Azerbaijan. Armenia survives through subsidies. It is
finally high time to talk to Turkey. Hence the conclusion: satisfying
Azerbaijan's desires (to achieve a peace agreement, combining the
principle of territorial integrity (prevalent) with the right of
peoples to self-determination (maximum compromise by Baku) will not
offend Armenia and will not put Ankara at odds with Washington.
The third point is almost complete. But it will not do without
the first two, especially without the first. So, given the "gas
hospitality," everything is still to come in this respect. And the
second can be handled without the Zurich protocols. More profitable for
Moscow is to seize initiative from Washington. Russia is not so naive
to believe in the performance of the "good and bad investigator" which
Armenia is staging now. Sargsyan seems not to be against, but he may
be replaced. Who will dare in Armenia to be target of Russia's wrath?
What did Russia achieve? In such a situation, it holds all the cards.
Whether Russia will take advantage of its chance is another question.
For the first time in the past 20 years, its possibilities coincide
with its desires and ambitions - with economic potential.
So, I think Moscow will say "yes" rather "no."
And what did Azerbaijan seek? It tried to prevent the protocols'
realization, or influence them so they would be realized while taking
into account Azerbaijan's interests.
What did Baku get? Protocols did not take force and they will not
certainly not come into force.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
K. Guluzade
Today
http://www.today.az/news/analytics /61506.html
Feb 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently announced a de
facto cancellation of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. His statements
give reason to say that Ankara just yesterday lost faith in Yerevan's
sincerity and decided to no longer delay time. It is noteworthy that
Davutoglu spoke abut this issue twice - before the Armenian president's
flight over Turkey, when the latter had sent greetings to Ankara,
and after Serzh Sargsyan landed in London.
Sargsyan was flying to the West, so his move was twofold. On the one
hand, the Armenian president acted in a manner unusual for him and
on the other hand he called on Turkey to further dialogue in a civil
way harboring his grudge.
It is hard to blame Turkey for achieving real breakthroughs in foreign
policy, although the country's foreign policy line has underwent
substantial changes in recent years. Turkey has a kind of empirical
track record based on trial and error. The country has made efforts
to achieve a breakthrough in terms of international recognition of the
Northern Cyprus, EU accession and establishing a platform of stability
in the Caucasus, and starting a Iran-West dialogue before the war in
Iraq and at a time of a raging Middle East crisis. It is difficult
to say there is no success. But the same applies to failures. The
Armenian version in this context is by no means an isolated case.
In the meantime, Turkey wonders why the Turkish authorities signed
the Zurich protocols with Armenia. It lamented the fact that so far
no one has bothered to answer this seemingly elementary question.
Davutoglu announced his conclusion from the process. Some won and some
lost from another Armenian tricks. I propose to consider the positions
of the major players of the post-Zurich events, who are few - Turkey,
Armenia, the U.S., Russia and Azerbaijan.
What did Ankara gain? First and foremost, Armenia's denial of
territorial claims against Turkey. Second, Armenians refusal to stop
"recognize the genocide" campaign." Thirdly, a refusal to withdraw from
several regions of Azerbaijan with further opportunity of complete
settlement to the Karabakh conflict. The first two desires were
clearly reflected in the Zurich protocols whereas the third one was
voiced as no less binding for ratification in parliament following a
strong protest from Azerbaijan. Can we consider the third requirement
a precondition? In any case, it is so naive to believe it.
Situation in the region is far more obvious. Similarly, ikebana was
originally destined to become a mourning wreath without the third
component.
What did Ankara get? It got what Azerbaijan warned constantly.
Azerbaijan better knows to what degree Armenia is constructive and open
to dialogue and how this South Caucasus republic is anti-regional. It
knows better that Armenia has failed to emerge as a real state? Simply
put, Ankara got nothing. It demonstrated Armenia's failure to the
West. Admittedly, success is very dubious, even if it is a response
to the above question voiced by Ankara.
What did Armenia seek? Obviously, opening of borders with Turkey
so that to revive its almost dead economy. As an educated man and
homo sapiens, I find it hard to understand why Sargsyan instructed
the foreign minister sign the protocol if Turkey conditions were
originally known.
And what did Armenia get? Nothing. External assistance is not
available. Borders with the only possible new investor are closed.
"Genocide" is not recognized (even if it will be recognized by some
countries, the Republic of Turkey is not responsible for actual or
attributed acts of the Ottoman Empire in the format in 1915). Apart
from this, Yerevan disgraced itself with a game of "withdrawal of
signatures", calling into question its "honor."
What did the U.S. gain? I stopped believing in peace in 1988 when
I was 12 years old. The U.S. has never said "farewell" to arms. Of
course, here it was about the "second window" to the South Caucasus.
The first was opened with a great roar and shriek through Georgia.
They tried to open the second through Armenia. In my humble
understanding, Armenia cannot withdraw from a state of permanent
"outpost" even by the Turkish investments. However, a key to the
South Caucasus lies with Azerbaijan.
What did the U.S. achieve? A trick to push "genocidal resolution"
through the House of Representatives may result in shake-up situation
in the Middle East which may prove disastrous for Washington. Given
that Ankara nicely hobnobs with Tehran and is in a diplomatic
confrontation with Israel, so it can easily be directed towards
Russia. Do you think Turkish diplomats began talking about the
prospects of the Eurasian Union similar to the European Union
accidentally? The recent polls in Turkey have indicated population's
negative attitude towards the United States. Percentage of dissatisfied
will only grow while Turkey will remain a special country for the
region.
What is Russia's gain? The balance is known. The key to the region
lies with Azerbaijan. Armenia survives through subsidies. It is
finally high time to talk to Turkey. Hence the conclusion: satisfying
Azerbaijan's desires (to achieve a peace agreement, combining the
principle of territorial integrity (prevalent) with the right of
peoples to self-determination (maximum compromise by Baku) will not
offend Armenia and will not put Ankara at odds with Washington.
The third point is almost complete. But it will not do without
the first two, especially without the first. So, given the "gas
hospitality," everything is still to come in this respect. And the
second can be handled without the Zurich protocols. More profitable for
Moscow is to seize initiative from Washington. Russia is not so naive
to believe in the performance of the "good and bad investigator" which
Armenia is staging now. Sargsyan seems not to be against, but he may
be replaced. Who will dare in Armenia to be target of Russia's wrath?
What did Russia achieve? In such a situation, it holds all the cards.
Whether Russia will take advantage of its chance is another question.
For the first time in the past 20 years, its possibilities coincide
with its desires and ambitions - with economic potential.
So, I think Moscow will say "yes" rather "no."
And what did Azerbaijan seek? It tried to prevent the protocols'
realization, or influence them so they would be realized while taking
into account Azerbaijan's interests.
What did Baku get? Protocols did not take force and they will not
certainly not come into force.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress