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ARMENIA'S PLAN-B: TILTING TOWARDS TEHRAN
Anahit Shirinyan
http://hetq.am/en/politics/plan-b/
2010 /02/15 | 16:06
Can Yerevan Play the "Iran Card" to its Advantage?
Yerevan's official "shift" to Tehran clearly signified that Armenia
has decided to put Plan-B into action. Given the unlikelihood of
ratification in the current Armenian-Turkish deadlock, many in the
Armenian government are mulling over the possibility of putting
various back-up plans into effect.
At the end of January, former RoA President Robert Kocharyan visited
Tehran at the invitation of Iranian Prime Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
Mr. Kocharyan was received by Mottaki and Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. According to Iranian press reports, Mr. Kocharyan
discussed regional issues with his Iranian hosts. The Iranian press
especially picked up on Mr. Kocharyan's comment that the presence of
foreign military forces in the region disrupted the peace and security
of regional nations.
After Kocharyan's visit, it was the turn of Iranian Prime Minister
Mottaki to make an official visit to Yerevan. During his visit,
bilateral cooperation was discussed, including economic and energy
related projects. At the same time, there was a meeting in Yerevan of
the trilateral (Armenian, Iranian and Russian) working group dealing
with the construction of the Iran-Armenia railway. At the meeting,
Sergei Tugarinov, Deputy Director of Russian Transport Ministry's
Department for Railway Transportation, said that Russia considers the
possibility of including the Iran-Armenia railway within the existing
international transport corridors, particularly the North-South
corridor.
Moscow's stake in the Iran-Armenia railway
While true that the Russians will announce it final decision only
after completion of technical and economic feasibility studies, we
must remember that until recently it was the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia
railway project that had greater potential to be included in the
North-South transport corridor.
At the same meeting, it was also announced that The Asian Development
Bank had allocated $1 million for technical and economic studies
regarding the Iranian-Armenian railway. In addition to its economic
significance, this railway project has important political significance
as well. When we take into account regional developments, this
significance grows even larger. Due to the Armenian-Turkish deadlock,
the north-south (Moscow, Yerevan, Tehran) axis is again being set in
motion. Economic and energy projects constitute its external base.
Each of the three nations involved in the reactivation of the
Iran-Armenia-Russia axis has its reasons for this to happen. Moscow,
for example, despite encouraging Armenian-Turkish rapprochement,
is set on being included in any and all alternative regional projects.
Russia can only benefit from cooperation between Armenia and
Iran. The developing Russo-Turkish partnership (against the backdrop
of sharpening Turkish-U.S. relations), as well as Russian-Iranian
cooperation and greater participation in Armenia-Iranian projects,
only serves to strengthen Moscow's position in the region while at
the same time squeezing the West out.
Iran seeks status as regional player; once again
However, this new "move" between Yerevan and Tehran isn't merely
confined to economic projects having political significance. Recently,
Iran has proposed its mediation of the Karabakh conflict with more
frequency.
And, despite the fact that all concerned realize how unrealistic such
mediation is, by getting more active in the issue, Iran resolves some
of its own problems and those of Armenia. First, Iran is attempting
to get back into the "regional game" from which it was involuntarily
forced out as a result of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and subsequent
developments. At the same time, by taking this step, Tehran again
enters into competition with Ankara, which also is daily making
greater demands to be included in the Karabakh conflict settlement
process. Thus, Iran is declaring that it too is a regional superpower,
just as Turkey.
Iran's posturing to play a mediating role also works to the benefit
of Armenia, since it evidently cancels out any Turkish ambitions to
do the same regarding Karabakh. What results is the conclusion that
Turkey has the same potential for influencing a settlement to the
Karabakh issue as does Iran.
Reemergence of Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow Axis
The setting into motion of the Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow axis also affords
another dividend to Armenia vis-a-vis the West - presumably it coaxes
the West to exert pressure on Ankara designed to ensure the logical
outcome of the Armenia-Turkish reconciliation process.
It is clear that the future development of this axis will inexorably
lead to the regional status-quo that existed before the 2008
Russian-Georgian war, but with the difference that this time around
the traditional bloc in opposition (the Baku, Tbilisi, Ankara alliance)
will be all the more weaker. The reason is that Tbilisi can no longer
be considered a reliable ally and due to the cracks in the Baku-Ankara
alliance. All this is unacceptable to the West which daily become more
convinced that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is the only possible
way to avert such developments.
The other important aim of Armenia is to divert attention away from
the Karabakh conflict settlement process and to thus prevent pressure
being exerted on the negotiating parties to make concessions and
register progress.
Thus, it becomes evident, that official Yerevan is putting Plan-B into
action given the impasse in Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and the
Karabakh conflict negotiations. Plan-B involves deepening cooperation
with Iran and to thus make it clear which way Armenia will turn if
Turkish preconditions and pressure regarding Karabakh continue.
The question remains just how successful Yerevan will be with
activating Plan-B. Nevertheless, given the launch of the process, it's
an opportune opportunity to reassess Armenian-Iranian relations; to
convert them from a replacement strategy into a strategic partnership.
Anahit Shirinyan
http://hetq.am/en/politics/plan-b/
2010 /02/15 | 16:06
Can Yerevan Play the "Iran Card" to its Advantage?
Yerevan's official "shift" to Tehran clearly signified that Armenia
has decided to put Plan-B into action. Given the unlikelihood of
ratification in the current Armenian-Turkish deadlock, many in the
Armenian government are mulling over the possibility of putting
various back-up plans into effect.
At the end of January, former RoA President Robert Kocharyan visited
Tehran at the invitation of Iranian Prime Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
Mr. Kocharyan was received by Mottaki and Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. According to Iranian press reports, Mr. Kocharyan
discussed regional issues with his Iranian hosts. The Iranian press
especially picked up on Mr. Kocharyan's comment that the presence of
foreign military forces in the region disrupted the peace and security
of regional nations.
After Kocharyan's visit, it was the turn of Iranian Prime Minister
Mottaki to make an official visit to Yerevan. During his visit,
bilateral cooperation was discussed, including economic and energy
related projects. At the same time, there was a meeting in Yerevan of
the trilateral (Armenian, Iranian and Russian) working group dealing
with the construction of the Iran-Armenia railway. At the meeting,
Sergei Tugarinov, Deputy Director of Russian Transport Ministry's
Department for Railway Transportation, said that Russia considers the
possibility of including the Iran-Armenia railway within the existing
international transport corridors, particularly the North-South
corridor.
Moscow's stake in the Iran-Armenia railway
While true that the Russians will announce it final decision only
after completion of technical and economic feasibility studies, we
must remember that until recently it was the Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia
railway project that had greater potential to be included in the
North-South transport corridor.
At the same meeting, it was also announced that The Asian Development
Bank had allocated $1 million for technical and economic studies
regarding the Iranian-Armenian railway. In addition to its economic
significance, this railway project has important political significance
as well. When we take into account regional developments, this
significance grows even larger. Due to the Armenian-Turkish deadlock,
the north-south (Moscow, Yerevan, Tehran) axis is again being set in
motion. Economic and energy projects constitute its external base.
Each of the three nations involved in the reactivation of the
Iran-Armenia-Russia axis has its reasons for this to happen. Moscow,
for example, despite encouraging Armenian-Turkish rapprochement,
is set on being included in any and all alternative regional projects.
Russia can only benefit from cooperation between Armenia and
Iran. The developing Russo-Turkish partnership (against the backdrop
of sharpening Turkish-U.S. relations), as well as Russian-Iranian
cooperation and greater participation in Armenia-Iranian projects,
only serves to strengthen Moscow's position in the region while at
the same time squeezing the West out.
Iran seeks status as regional player; once again
However, this new "move" between Yerevan and Tehran isn't merely
confined to economic projects having political significance. Recently,
Iran has proposed its mediation of the Karabakh conflict with more
frequency.
And, despite the fact that all concerned realize how unrealistic such
mediation is, by getting more active in the issue, Iran resolves some
of its own problems and those of Armenia. First, Iran is attempting
to get back into the "regional game" from which it was involuntarily
forced out as a result of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and subsequent
developments. At the same time, by taking this step, Tehran again
enters into competition with Ankara, which also is daily making
greater demands to be included in the Karabakh conflict settlement
process. Thus, Iran is declaring that it too is a regional superpower,
just as Turkey.
Iran's posturing to play a mediating role also works to the benefit
of Armenia, since it evidently cancels out any Turkish ambitions to
do the same regarding Karabakh. What results is the conclusion that
Turkey has the same potential for influencing a settlement to the
Karabakh issue as does Iran.
Reemergence of Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow Axis
The setting into motion of the Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow axis also affords
another dividend to Armenia vis-a-vis the West - presumably it coaxes
the West to exert pressure on Ankara designed to ensure the logical
outcome of the Armenia-Turkish reconciliation process.
It is clear that the future development of this axis will inexorably
lead to the regional status-quo that existed before the 2008
Russian-Georgian war, but with the difference that this time around
the traditional bloc in opposition (the Baku, Tbilisi, Ankara alliance)
will be all the more weaker. The reason is that Tbilisi can no longer
be considered a reliable ally and due to the cracks in the Baku-Ankara
alliance. All this is unacceptable to the West which daily become more
convinced that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is the only possible
way to avert such developments.
The other important aim of Armenia is to divert attention away from
the Karabakh conflict settlement process and to thus prevent pressure
being exerted on the negotiating parties to make concessions and
register progress.
Thus, it becomes evident, that official Yerevan is putting Plan-B into
action given the impasse in Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and the
Karabakh conflict negotiations. Plan-B involves deepening cooperation
with Iran and to thus make it clear which way Armenia will turn if
Turkish preconditions and pressure regarding Karabakh continue.
The question remains just how successful Yerevan will be with
activating Plan-B. Nevertheless, given the launch of the process, it's
an opportune opportunity to reassess Armenian-Iranian relations; to
convert them from a replacement strategy into a strategic partnership.