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A WAR FOR NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN YEREVAN AND BAKU
by Konstantin Chuprin
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 15, 2010 Monday
Russia
HOW CAN AZERBAIJAN SOLVE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROBLEM IN A MILITARY
WAY?; President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev frequently announced a
possible military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in case
of ruining of the negotiation process. There are no reasons to doubt
that the armed forces of Azerbaijan have a plan of operation for
taking of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories controlled by
Armenian armed forces.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev frequently announced a possible
military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in case of ruining
of the negotiation process.
There are no reasons to doubt that the armed forces of Azerbaijan
have a plan of operation for taking of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent
territories controlled by Armenian armed forces.
It is possible to presume with a big degree of probability
that operation of the armed forces of Azerbaijan for taking of
Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani territories outside of it controlled
by Armenian forces makes provisions for simultaneous offensive in
the following main directions:
- from Murovdag mountain ridge with a task to reach Kelbadzhar (by
airborne and mountain rifle units, provisions are definitely made
for operations of assault units from helicopters and most likely for
limited landing of special units on parachutes);
- towards Terter-Agdere and further along the Sarsang water reservoir,
Terter River and Murovdag ridge with reaching of the line of Tutkhun
and Bulandykhsu rivers and follow-up joining to the Azerbaijani forces
in the area of Kelbadzhar (strikes can be delivered in the joining
directions to the north and south of the Sarasang water reservoir);
- from the side of the Karabakh plain in the main direction of
Agdam-Khodzhaly-Khankendki (Stepanakert) along the Karkarchay River;
- from the side of the Milskaya plain in the directions of: Khodzhavend
- Shusha, Fizuli - Gadrut - Dzhebrail, Goradiz - Dzhebrail - Zangilan
(in the Geyanskaya steppe along the Araks River bordering Iran).
These strikes should split and fragment defense of the Armenian party
and be developed as fast as possible in depth to prevent delivery of
reserves from Armenia proper.
Further blows of Azerbaijani combined-arms groups should be directed
with equal speed in the directions of: Zangilan - Gubadly, Gubadly
- Lachin (along the Akera River) and Shusha-Lachin (joining blows
for the purpose of liquidation of the Lachin corridor vital for
Nagorno-Karabakh).
Cleaning up of the territory in the area of Gubadly-Lachin and
Istisu-Kelbadzhar between the Karabakh ridge and Karabakh highland
bordering Armenia will evidently be the final stage (after taking of
the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic proper).
There is no doubt that the offensive will be preceded by massive blows
of bomber and attack aviation, tactical missile systems Tochka-U
and long-range artillery at the most important nodes of the enemy
defense and its populated spots (including the blows for the purpose
of liquidation and expulsion of civilians, we should not have any
illusions about this).
It is obvious that the air force of Azerbaijan will try to "blind"
the air defense forces of the enemy using the anti-radar missiles
KH-58 purchased supposedly in Ukraine.
If the combat operations are confined to the internationally recognized
territory of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan will use the main forces of
the first (Yevlakhsky) army corps and a part of forces of the fourth
(Gyandzhinsky) and second (Bakinsky) army corps formations, special
forces (airborne forces, special-purpose forces and mountain rifle
forces), air force and air defense forces.
It is possible to presume that the third (Shamkirsky) army corps, a
part of forces of the fourth (Gyandzhinsky) and fifth (Nakhichevansky)
army corps formations will be in the operational reserve with the
tasks of:
- for the third corps - coverage of the northwestern border with
Armenia;
- for the fourth corps - coverage of the Mingechivirsky (Mingechaursky)
directions;
- for the fifth corps - coverage of the border of the Nakhichevan
autonomy with Armenia.
The second (Bakinsky) army corps a part of forces of which will
definitely take part in the combat operations (a tank brigade and
artillery units) is given mostly the role of the strategic reserve.
For combat operations Azerbaijan can use (taking into account the
reserves) not less than 60,000 servicemen, 250-300 tanks, up to
300 light combat armored vehicles, 250-300 field artillery guns and
multiple rocket launchers, up to 50 combat airplanes and the same
quantity of combat and transport combat helicopters of the armed
forces of Azerbaijan.
In case of beginning of a full-scale Armenian-Azerbaijani war the
Armenian party, despite the air superiority of the enemy in the air,
will most likely try to deliver a decisive blow in the direction
of Mingechevir (Mingechaur) and to block the northwestern group of
enemy forces (the third and fourth army corps formations) between the
Mingechivirskoe (Mingechaurskoe) water reservoir, Murovgdag ridge and
Azerbaijani-Georgian border (along the Iori River) and to defeat the
first army corps and to reach the line of the Kura and Araks rivers
through the Milskaya plain. It will also try to block attempts to
attack the Armenian territory by forces of the fifth army corps of
the Azerbaijani army (along with this, special attention will be paid
to defense of the Zangezurskoe direction).
If the Armenian party managed to bring these intentions into
life this will mean a military defeat of Azerbaijan and status of
Nagorno-Karabakh will be confirmed on the terms of Yerevan. However,
probability of such a turn of events is not quite obvious.
Of course, duration of hostilities and fate of the parties will be
determined by interference or non-interference (which is extremely
unlikely) of powerful third countries.
All this will lead to a very serious international crisis into which
Russia will definitely be involved.
It is also necessary to presume that this crisis may lead to
aggravation of the situation on the borders of Georgia with South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. In any case, threats of Baku to solve the problem
of Nagorno-Karabakh by the military way are voiced regularly and have
until recently been intended mostly for internal consumption.
If these threats come true, unilateral unleashing of war will
inevitably place Azerbaijan into a position if not aggressor than
at least the party to blame for the new war with consequences
unpredictable for it.
by Konstantin Chuprin
WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 15, 2010 Monday
Russia
HOW CAN AZERBAIJAN SOLVE THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROBLEM IN A MILITARY
WAY?; President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev frequently announced a
possible military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in case
of ruining of the negotiation process. There are no reasons to doubt
that the armed forces of Azerbaijan have a plan of operation for
taking of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories controlled by
Armenian armed forces.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev frequently announced a possible
military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in case of ruining
of the negotiation process.
There are no reasons to doubt that the armed forces of Azerbaijan
have a plan of operation for taking of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent
territories controlled by Armenian armed forces.
It is possible to presume with a big degree of probability
that operation of the armed forces of Azerbaijan for taking of
Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani territories outside of it controlled
by Armenian forces makes provisions for simultaneous offensive in
the following main directions:
- from Murovdag mountain ridge with a task to reach Kelbadzhar (by
airborne and mountain rifle units, provisions are definitely made
for operations of assault units from helicopters and most likely for
limited landing of special units on parachutes);
- towards Terter-Agdere and further along the Sarsang water reservoir,
Terter River and Murovdag ridge with reaching of the line of Tutkhun
and Bulandykhsu rivers and follow-up joining to the Azerbaijani forces
in the area of Kelbadzhar (strikes can be delivered in the joining
directions to the north and south of the Sarasang water reservoir);
- from the side of the Karabakh plain in the main direction of
Agdam-Khodzhaly-Khankendki (Stepanakert) along the Karkarchay River;
- from the side of the Milskaya plain in the directions of: Khodzhavend
- Shusha, Fizuli - Gadrut - Dzhebrail, Goradiz - Dzhebrail - Zangilan
(in the Geyanskaya steppe along the Araks River bordering Iran).
These strikes should split and fragment defense of the Armenian party
and be developed as fast as possible in depth to prevent delivery of
reserves from Armenia proper.
Further blows of Azerbaijani combined-arms groups should be directed
with equal speed in the directions of: Zangilan - Gubadly, Gubadly
- Lachin (along the Akera River) and Shusha-Lachin (joining blows
for the purpose of liquidation of the Lachin corridor vital for
Nagorno-Karabakh).
Cleaning up of the territory in the area of Gubadly-Lachin and
Istisu-Kelbadzhar between the Karabakh ridge and Karabakh highland
bordering Armenia will evidently be the final stage (after taking of
the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic proper).
There is no doubt that the offensive will be preceded by massive blows
of bomber and attack aviation, tactical missile systems Tochka-U
and long-range artillery at the most important nodes of the enemy
defense and its populated spots (including the blows for the purpose
of liquidation and expulsion of civilians, we should not have any
illusions about this).
It is obvious that the air force of Azerbaijan will try to "blind"
the air defense forces of the enemy using the anti-radar missiles
KH-58 purchased supposedly in Ukraine.
If the combat operations are confined to the internationally recognized
territory of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan will use the main forces of
the first (Yevlakhsky) army corps and a part of forces of the fourth
(Gyandzhinsky) and second (Bakinsky) army corps formations, special
forces (airborne forces, special-purpose forces and mountain rifle
forces), air force and air defense forces.
It is possible to presume that the third (Shamkirsky) army corps, a
part of forces of the fourth (Gyandzhinsky) and fifth (Nakhichevansky)
army corps formations will be in the operational reserve with the
tasks of:
- for the third corps - coverage of the northwestern border with
Armenia;
- for the fourth corps - coverage of the Mingechivirsky (Mingechaursky)
directions;
- for the fifth corps - coverage of the border of the Nakhichevan
autonomy with Armenia.
The second (Bakinsky) army corps a part of forces of which will
definitely take part in the combat operations (a tank brigade and
artillery units) is given mostly the role of the strategic reserve.
For combat operations Azerbaijan can use (taking into account the
reserves) not less than 60,000 servicemen, 250-300 tanks, up to
300 light combat armored vehicles, 250-300 field artillery guns and
multiple rocket launchers, up to 50 combat airplanes and the same
quantity of combat and transport combat helicopters of the armed
forces of Azerbaijan.
In case of beginning of a full-scale Armenian-Azerbaijani war the
Armenian party, despite the air superiority of the enemy in the air,
will most likely try to deliver a decisive blow in the direction
of Mingechevir (Mingechaur) and to block the northwestern group of
enemy forces (the third and fourth army corps formations) between the
Mingechivirskoe (Mingechaurskoe) water reservoir, Murovgdag ridge and
Azerbaijani-Georgian border (along the Iori River) and to defeat the
first army corps and to reach the line of the Kura and Araks rivers
through the Milskaya plain. It will also try to block attempts to
attack the Armenian territory by forces of the fifth army corps of
the Azerbaijani army (along with this, special attention will be paid
to defense of the Zangezurskoe direction).
If the Armenian party managed to bring these intentions into
life this will mean a military defeat of Azerbaijan and status of
Nagorno-Karabakh will be confirmed on the terms of Yerevan. However,
probability of such a turn of events is not quite obvious.
Of course, duration of hostilities and fate of the parties will be
determined by interference or non-interference (which is extremely
unlikely) of powerful third countries.
All this will lead to a very serious international crisis into which
Russia will definitely be involved.
It is also necessary to presume that this crisis may lead to
aggravation of the situation on the borders of Georgia with South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. In any case, threats of Baku to solve the problem
of Nagorno-Karabakh by the military way are voiced regularly and have
until recently been intended mostly for internal consumption.
If these threats come true, unilateral unleashing of war will
inevitably place Azerbaijan into a position if not aggressor than
at least the party to blame for the new war with consequences
unpredictable for it.