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TURKISH-ARMENIAN NORMALIZATION IN AZERBAIJAN'S INTERESTS
news.az
Feb 16 2010
Azerbaijan
Lawrence Scott Sheets News.Az interviews Lawrence Scott Sheets,
Caucasus Project director for the International Crisis Group.
Everyone is talking about the updated version of the Madrid principles,
although no-one actually knows the old version. What do you think
are the updated principles?
Since the talks are confidential, we do not know the full contents
of the Madrid proposals and, therefore, can only speculate about
the details.
But what is more important and certain is that the fundamental
pillars of the Madrid proposals remain unchanged. These, as you
know, include Armenian withdrawal from the occupied territories
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; the right to return to their homes
for all refugees and IDPs; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh,
which would provide internationally-backed guarantees for security and
self-governance to the whole of its population; a corridor linking
Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; and a legally binding popular vote,
the modalities of which have yet to be agreed, which would determine
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
These points have been repeatedly mentioned by the Minsk Group
mediators and also are included in the factsheet accompanying the
July 2009 L'Aquila statement of the presidents of the Minsk Group
co-chairing countries.
Analysts think that the attempts of Turkey and Armenia to end enmity
and open borders will probably be impossible because of the Karabakh
conflict. Do you think the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border
is possible without the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and
Azerbaijan's consent?
There is a general understanding that Turkish-Armenian normalization
and settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are parallel but
mutually reinforcing processes. There do exist implicit linkages
between the two; however, we should bear in mind that both these
processes are quite complex on their own and if we tie them too much
with each other, we may end up further complicating both, which is
in nobody's interests.
Making the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border conditional upon
the actual withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's occupied
territories is wrong and serves to undermine both processes. These
two issues have different levels of complexity: the opening of
the Turkish-Armenian border is a quickly implementable measure,
while Armenian withdrawal and agreement on the final status of
Nagorno-Karabakh is a more difficult and long-term process.
At the same time, we recognize that Turkey is not going to improve
relations with Armenia at the expense of deteriorating relations
with Azerbaijan.
A realistic and optimal solution for all regional stakeholders could
be an agreement on the basic principles in the coming few months
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would be equally acceptable
for both and would provide a solid basis for working out a subsequent
final peace deal. This development could also help move forward the
stalled Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
What is to be expected from the Karabakh talks process in 2010,
since Turkey is likely to become an active participant?
We extensively covered the developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks
in our last briefing on this topic published in October 2009. Last
year was unprecedented in terms of diplomatic efforts to achieve
a breakthrough in the talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both
presidents and international mediators were very active and showed
their genuine interest in getting to a solution.
What is important now is for both countries and the international
mediators alike to keep up the positive momentum at the talks. If
this momentum is sustained, I think, we can witness an agreement on
the basic principles already this year.
Do you think another participant in the OSCE negotiating process -
France - welcomes Russia's activeness in the Karabakh conflict? Do
the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs coordinate their actions in the
negotiating process on Nagorno-Karabakh?
The degree of cooperation and common commitment among the three Minsk
Group co-chairs to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
is quite good. There is a general understanding that the status quo
is not sustainable and is dangerous. All three co-chairs agree that
the status quo should be gradually changed in accordance with the
roadmap outlined in the basic principles document. This favourably
differentiates the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the conflicts
in neighbouring Georgia, where Russia, France and the US have more
disagreements than points of convergence.
What do you think will happen if the idea of opening the
Armenian-Turkish border fails? How will this influence the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict?
This would certainly have negative repercussions on the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. This possible development would make
Armenia more intransigent in the talks, the international community
would lose interest in both processes for a time and, cumulatively,
these factors would serve to further entrench the harmful and dangerous
status quo in the region.
Therefore, strange as it may sound to an Azerbaijani audience,
Azerbaijan, as a party which is deeply hurt by the regional status quo
and is interested in change, should be interested in Turkish-Armenian
normalization.
news.az
Feb 16 2010
Azerbaijan
Lawrence Scott Sheets News.Az interviews Lawrence Scott Sheets,
Caucasus Project director for the International Crisis Group.
Everyone is talking about the updated version of the Madrid principles,
although no-one actually knows the old version. What do you think
are the updated principles?
Since the talks are confidential, we do not know the full contents
of the Madrid proposals and, therefore, can only speculate about
the details.
But what is more important and certain is that the fundamental
pillars of the Madrid proposals remain unchanged. These, as you
know, include Armenian withdrawal from the occupied territories
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; the right to return to their homes
for all refugees and IDPs; an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh,
which would provide internationally-backed guarantees for security and
self-governance to the whole of its population; a corridor linking
Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; and a legally binding popular vote,
the modalities of which have yet to be agreed, which would determine
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
These points have been repeatedly mentioned by the Minsk Group
mediators and also are included in the factsheet accompanying the
July 2009 L'Aquila statement of the presidents of the Minsk Group
co-chairing countries.
Analysts think that the attempts of Turkey and Armenia to end enmity
and open borders will probably be impossible because of the Karabakh
conflict. Do you think the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border
is possible without the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and
Azerbaijan's consent?
There is a general understanding that Turkish-Armenian normalization
and settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are parallel but
mutually reinforcing processes. There do exist implicit linkages
between the two; however, we should bear in mind that both these
processes are quite complex on their own and if we tie them too much
with each other, we may end up further complicating both, which is
in nobody's interests.
Making the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border conditional upon
the actual withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's occupied
territories is wrong and serves to undermine both processes. These
two issues have different levels of complexity: the opening of
the Turkish-Armenian border is a quickly implementable measure,
while Armenian withdrawal and agreement on the final status of
Nagorno-Karabakh is a more difficult and long-term process.
At the same time, we recognize that Turkey is not going to improve
relations with Armenia at the expense of deteriorating relations
with Azerbaijan.
A realistic and optimal solution for all regional stakeholders could
be an agreement on the basic principles in the coming few months
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would be equally acceptable
for both and would provide a solid basis for working out a subsequent
final peace deal. This development could also help move forward the
stalled Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
What is to be expected from the Karabakh talks process in 2010,
since Turkey is likely to become an active participant?
We extensively covered the developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh talks
in our last briefing on this topic published in October 2009. Last
year was unprecedented in terms of diplomatic efforts to achieve
a breakthrough in the talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both
presidents and international mediators were very active and showed
their genuine interest in getting to a solution.
What is important now is for both countries and the international
mediators alike to keep up the positive momentum at the talks. If
this momentum is sustained, I think, we can witness an agreement on
the basic principles already this year.
Do you think another participant in the OSCE negotiating process -
France - welcomes Russia's activeness in the Karabakh conflict? Do
the three OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs coordinate their actions in the
negotiating process on Nagorno-Karabakh?
The degree of cooperation and common commitment among the three Minsk
Group co-chairs to bring an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
is quite good. There is a general understanding that the status quo
is not sustainable and is dangerous. All three co-chairs agree that
the status quo should be gradually changed in accordance with the
roadmap outlined in the basic principles document. This favourably
differentiates the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the conflicts
in neighbouring Georgia, where Russia, France and the US have more
disagreements than points of convergence.
What do you think will happen if the idea of opening the
Armenian-Turkish border fails? How will this influence the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict?
This would certainly have negative repercussions on the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. This possible development would make
Armenia more intransigent in the talks, the international community
would lose interest in both processes for a time and, cumulatively,
these factors would serve to further entrench the harmful and dangerous
status quo in the region.
Therefore, strange as it may sound to an Azerbaijani audience,
Azerbaijan, as a party which is deeply hurt by the regional status quo
and is interested in change, should be interested in Turkish-Armenian
normalization.