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THOMAS AMBROSIO: "UNLESS ARMENIA SOFTENS ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION WITH AZERBAIJAN, ALL OF THE TALK OF PEACE BEING CONTAGIOUS IS LARGELY JUST TALK"
APA
Feb 17 2010
Azerbaijan
Washington. Isabel Levine - APA. APA's Washington correspondent's
interviewed famous American analyst on the ethnic conflicts and
international relations Thomas Ambrosio, director of the International
Studies Major of North Dakota State University.
- International moderators are still optimistic about the salvation
of Nagorno-Karabakh? What is the main reason why Karabakh and other
frozen conflicts are still not resolved?
- The current momentum of the frozen conflicts, based in large part
upon the pattern since the mid-1990s, is that the status quo is most
likely to prevail. This will be the case unless an outside force --
namely, Russia or the US -- changes things. The US is unlikely to do
anything except continue the pattern of "supporting the process".
Since there has been no real progress on this process -- largely
because the perspectives, interests, and solutions of the two sides
are so diametrically opposed -- this amounts largely to empty words
and a desire to appear 'engaged'. For Russia, the frozen nature of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suits its interests: Armenia is dependent
Russia since the threat of Russian intervention is likely enough to
stay the hand of Baku, which is wealthier, better-equipped, and more
populous; Azerbaijan's power in the region is weakened by the fact
that it has one-seventh of its territory under occupation.
Divide-and-conquer is an old, but effective, strategy of increasingly
one's relative power and Moscow plays this card well.
- It's more than one year since Barack Obama became a president. Many
experts say that the current administration differs from its
predessers, especially in terms of relationship with Russia and frozen
conflicts. How can you describe this difference between Obama and
Bush administrations?
- First of all, I would argue that the "reboot" or "reset" of bilateral
relations was a public relations stunt designed to make it appear as
if the Obama administration is the 'un-Bush'. By this, I mean that
the administration has sought in nearly every case to present itself
as fundamentally different than its predecessor.
Initially, this was demonstrated by an almost blind reversal of
Bush-era policies -- simply because the Bush administration supported
one position, the Obama administration felt that it had to reverse
course. This has calmed down a bit now, but it is still a noticeable
pattern in this administration. So, the attempt to reset with Russia
fits into this general trend -- engage all of those states with which
the US had rocky relations and downgrade ties with those that which
the Bush administration had a good relationship.
In terms of the specifics of the US-Russian relationship and its
implications for the former Soviet Union, my observation is that the
Obama administration has effectively acceded to a Russian sphere of
influence within the region. I feel that they are doing this because
they believe (wrongly, in my opinion), that if they "engage" Moscow
they will be able to get the Kremlin's help on a variety of other
issues (terrorism, Iran, etc.).
However, they fundamentally misunderstand two things. First, the
problems between the US and Russia during the second half of the Bush
administration were due primarily to difference of and clashes between
perceived interests. At its core, these differences/clashes stem
from the place of Russia within the international system generally
and within the region specifically. They were not simply due to the
particularities of the Bush administration's policies nor can they
be changed merely with a rhetorical reboot/reset.
Second, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin will respond positively
to the Obama administration's attempt to 'engage' them. This is not to
say that "the Russians only understand force." Instead, the more likely
outcome is that Moscow will see the administration's policies as a sign
of weakness and that they will continue to push the administration,
to strengthen their hold over the former Soviet Union, and, finally, to
be more obstructionist on policy issues outside of the region because
they know that they will not pay any price. This is consistent with
what we see as a general pattern as other countries react to this
new strategy: Obama is definitely someone the world can say 'no'
to and get away with it.
- Another tension in the region is the moralization between Turkey
and Armenia. Do you believe Turkish-Armenan agreement be will be
reliable if there is no peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
- I am not convinced that this agreement will actually come to
fruition. It appears that it is stuck in the Turkish parliament
which refuses to vote on it unless Armenia softens its negotiating
position vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and affects real change in the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since Yerevan is unlikely to do this, all of
the talk of peace being contagious is largely just that -- talk.
Granted, anything can happen. But just because the parties to a
conflict are talking does not mean that substantive progress is being
made, even if they are talking a lot. Before every Nagorno-Karabakh
meeting, going back at least as far as the "Key West Summit" during
the first six-months of the Bush administration, the optimists
were saying that 'a breakthrough is imminent. Every time they were
disappointed. This does not mean that progress on Nagorno-Karabakh is
impossible. However, history is with the pessimists on this one. Since
Ankara has seemingly linked its normalization with Armenia to
Nagorno-Karabakh, there are good reasons to be pessimistic about both.
APA
Feb 17 2010
Azerbaijan
Washington. Isabel Levine - APA. APA's Washington correspondent's
interviewed famous American analyst on the ethnic conflicts and
international relations Thomas Ambrosio, director of the International
Studies Major of North Dakota State University.
- International moderators are still optimistic about the salvation
of Nagorno-Karabakh? What is the main reason why Karabakh and other
frozen conflicts are still not resolved?
- The current momentum of the frozen conflicts, based in large part
upon the pattern since the mid-1990s, is that the status quo is most
likely to prevail. This will be the case unless an outside force --
namely, Russia or the US -- changes things. The US is unlikely to do
anything except continue the pattern of "supporting the process".
Since there has been no real progress on this process -- largely
because the perspectives, interests, and solutions of the two sides
are so diametrically opposed -- this amounts largely to empty words
and a desire to appear 'engaged'. For Russia, the frozen nature of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suits its interests: Armenia is dependent
Russia since the threat of Russian intervention is likely enough to
stay the hand of Baku, which is wealthier, better-equipped, and more
populous; Azerbaijan's power in the region is weakened by the fact
that it has one-seventh of its territory under occupation.
Divide-and-conquer is an old, but effective, strategy of increasingly
one's relative power and Moscow plays this card well.
- It's more than one year since Barack Obama became a president. Many
experts say that the current administration differs from its
predessers, especially in terms of relationship with Russia and frozen
conflicts. How can you describe this difference between Obama and
Bush administrations?
- First of all, I would argue that the "reboot" or "reset" of bilateral
relations was a public relations stunt designed to make it appear as
if the Obama administration is the 'un-Bush'. By this, I mean that
the administration has sought in nearly every case to present itself
as fundamentally different than its predecessor.
Initially, this was demonstrated by an almost blind reversal of
Bush-era policies -- simply because the Bush administration supported
one position, the Obama administration felt that it had to reverse
course. This has calmed down a bit now, but it is still a noticeable
pattern in this administration. So, the attempt to reset with Russia
fits into this general trend -- engage all of those states with which
the US had rocky relations and downgrade ties with those that which
the Bush administration had a good relationship.
In terms of the specifics of the US-Russian relationship and its
implications for the former Soviet Union, my observation is that the
Obama administration has effectively acceded to a Russian sphere of
influence within the region. I feel that they are doing this because
they believe (wrongly, in my opinion), that if they "engage" Moscow
they will be able to get the Kremlin's help on a variety of other
issues (terrorism, Iran, etc.).
However, they fundamentally misunderstand two things. First, the
problems between the US and Russia during the second half of the Bush
administration were due primarily to difference of and clashes between
perceived interests. At its core, these differences/clashes stem
from the place of Russia within the international system generally
and within the region specifically. They were not simply due to the
particularities of the Bush administration's policies nor can they
be changed merely with a rhetorical reboot/reset.
Second, it is highly unlikely that the Kremlin will respond positively
to the Obama administration's attempt to 'engage' them. This is not to
say that "the Russians only understand force." Instead, the more likely
outcome is that Moscow will see the administration's policies as a sign
of weakness and that they will continue to push the administration,
to strengthen their hold over the former Soviet Union, and, finally, to
be more obstructionist on policy issues outside of the region because
they know that they will not pay any price. This is consistent with
what we see as a general pattern as other countries react to this
new strategy: Obama is definitely someone the world can say 'no'
to and get away with it.
- Another tension in the region is the moralization between Turkey
and Armenia. Do you believe Turkish-Armenan agreement be will be
reliable if there is no peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
- I am not convinced that this agreement will actually come to
fruition. It appears that it is stuck in the Turkish parliament
which refuses to vote on it unless Armenia softens its negotiating
position vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and affects real change in the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since Yerevan is unlikely to do this, all of
the talk of peace being contagious is largely just that -- talk.
Granted, anything can happen. But just because the parties to a
conflict are talking does not mean that substantive progress is being
made, even if they are talking a lot. Before every Nagorno-Karabakh
meeting, going back at least as far as the "Key West Summit" during
the first six-months of the Bush administration, the optimists
were saying that 'a breakthrough is imminent. Every time they were
disappointed. This does not mean that progress on Nagorno-Karabakh is
impossible. However, history is with the pessimists on this one. Since
Ankara has seemingly linked its normalization with Armenia to
Nagorno-Karabakh, there are good reasons to be pessimistic about both.