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KARABAKH SOLUTION WOULD HELP TURKISH-ARMENIAN NORMALIZATION
Aliyah Fridman
news.az
Feb 22 2010
Azerbaijan
Nuh Yilmaz News.Az interviews Nuh Yilmaz, director of the Foundation
for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in Washington, DC.
What is the current state of the Turkish-Armenian negotiations on
the normalization of relations?
The tension caused by the signing of the protocol agreement is
gradually increasing as the date 24 April approaches [the day that
Armenia commemorates what it calls the genocide]. It is no secret that
the Turkish leadership does not feel positive about House Resolution
252 [on the Armenian genocide]. Even though the normalization process
and the resolution are indirectly connected, House Foreign Committee
Chairman Howard Berman's call for a vote on the resolution on 4 March
does not help solve any problem, on the contrary, it unnecessarily
complicates the already complex issue. If 4 March and 24 April are
taken as deadlines for the normalization process, I do not think this
will help normalization.
Do you expect the protocols on the normalization of relations to be
ratified by the Armenian and Turkish parliaments?
For the Armenians, after the decision made by the Constitutional Court,
ratifying the protocols is only a formality. However, for Turkey,
it is virtually impossible for any political party or leader to get
the protocols ratified by parliament under these circumstances.
To expect a move from the Turkish leadership would require a gesture
on two fronts: an improvement in the Armenian-Azeri negotiations
on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and a show of goodwill from the US
Administration on HR252. If these do not happen, the Turkish parliament
is not likely to ratify the protocols right now.
Is Turkey strong enough to overcome the pressure from the USA and EU
to open its borders with Armenia?
I do not agree with you that it is about strength. It could be
said that Turkey is under pressure from the different partners who
helped the protocols come into being, but this whole process requires
moves from all sides. As long as Turkey sees its counterparts doing
their part, Turkey certainly will be responsive. Turkey was expecting
certain gains from these protocols. However, now Turkish policymakers,
whether right or wrong, think that the gains they were expecting from
the protocols are nullified because of the Constitutional Court's
decision. If Turkey is assured that its gains will be guaranteed
somehow, then the process will continue.
Do you believe that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and
opening of the borders will expedite settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict?
I do not see these problems as separated and isolated issues.
Normalization certainly would help the whole region relax, take a
deep breath and work toward enrichment on the economic front, but
normalization is not an aim, rather it is an expected outcome; it is
more important how the frozen conflicts and century-old-rivalries will
end or at least become matters of the past. Presently, the reverse
can be said: improvement, if not a solution, on the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue will certainly help the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
Many experts think that settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
depends on Russia's good will. Do you agree? If so, what should
Azerbaijan do to ensure a fast resolution of the conflict, considering
that Armenia is Russia's closest strategic and military ally?
I do not think that any related country moves solely out of good will.
Moreover, I do think that all of the related parties can ruin the
process. Russia is not an exception in having such power. Therefore,
your analysis does partly reflect the situation. All related parties
have expectations. If those expectations are met, then the settlement
will come. For Russia, I think they want to see their strategic ally
breathe after the Georgian war. And also I do believe that they may
welcome the souring of relations between Azeris and Turks, which would
help them achieve their projects in the South Caucasus regarding the
market for energy pipelines. All countries have an interest in the
issue, but if they all agree that stability in the Caucasus helps
their cause, then they will all work for a peaceful settlement.
Aliyah Fridman
news.az
Feb 22 2010
Azerbaijan
Nuh Yilmaz News.Az interviews Nuh Yilmaz, director of the Foundation
for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) in Washington, DC.
What is the current state of the Turkish-Armenian negotiations on
the normalization of relations?
The tension caused by the signing of the protocol agreement is
gradually increasing as the date 24 April approaches [the day that
Armenia commemorates what it calls the genocide]. It is no secret that
the Turkish leadership does not feel positive about House Resolution
252 [on the Armenian genocide]. Even though the normalization process
and the resolution are indirectly connected, House Foreign Committee
Chairman Howard Berman's call for a vote on the resolution on 4 March
does not help solve any problem, on the contrary, it unnecessarily
complicates the already complex issue. If 4 March and 24 April are
taken as deadlines for the normalization process, I do not think this
will help normalization.
Do you expect the protocols on the normalization of relations to be
ratified by the Armenian and Turkish parliaments?
For the Armenians, after the decision made by the Constitutional Court,
ratifying the protocols is only a formality. However, for Turkey,
it is virtually impossible for any political party or leader to get
the protocols ratified by parliament under these circumstances.
To expect a move from the Turkish leadership would require a gesture
on two fronts: an improvement in the Armenian-Azeri negotiations
on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and a show of goodwill from the US
Administration on HR252. If these do not happen, the Turkish parliament
is not likely to ratify the protocols right now.
Is Turkey strong enough to overcome the pressure from the USA and EU
to open its borders with Armenia?
I do not agree with you that it is about strength. It could be
said that Turkey is under pressure from the different partners who
helped the protocols come into being, but this whole process requires
moves from all sides. As long as Turkey sees its counterparts doing
their part, Turkey certainly will be responsive. Turkey was expecting
certain gains from these protocols. However, now Turkish policymakers,
whether right or wrong, think that the gains they were expecting from
the protocols are nullified because of the Constitutional Court's
decision. If Turkey is assured that its gains will be guaranteed
somehow, then the process will continue.
Do you believe that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and
opening of the borders will expedite settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict?
I do not see these problems as separated and isolated issues.
Normalization certainly would help the whole region relax, take a
deep breath and work toward enrichment on the economic front, but
normalization is not an aim, rather it is an expected outcome; it is
more important how the frozen conflicts and century-old-rivalries will
end or at least become matters of the past. Presently, the reverse
can be said: improvement, if not a solution, on the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue will certainly help the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.
Many experts think that settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
depends on Russia's good will. Do you agree? If so, what should
Azerbaijan do to ensure a fast resolution of the conflict, considering
that Armenia is Russia's closest strategic and military ally?
I do not think that any related country moves solely out of good will.
Moreover, I do think that all of the related parties can ruin the
process. Russia is not an exception in having such power. Therefore,
your analysis does partly reflect the situation. All related parties
have expectations. If those expectations are met, then the settlement
will come. For Russia, I think they want to see their strategic ally
breathe after the Georgian war. And also I do believe that they may
welcome the souring of relations between Azeris and Turks, which would
help them achieve their projects in the South Caucasus regarding the
market for energy pipelines. All countries have an interest in the
issue, but if they all agree that stability in the Caucasus helps
their cause, then they will all work for a peaceful settlement.