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Center for Research on Globalization, Canada
Feb 28 2010
Destabilization: Caucasus Geopolitics Threatens Russia's Security
by Nikolai Dimlevitch
The analysis of the situation in the Caucasus and in Transcaucasia
shows that the outlook for the geopolitical entirety is going to be
shaped by the key Western countries' efforts aimed at debarring Russia
from the Caspian oil and gas projects.
The rivalry between various geopolitical centers of force leads to the
escalation of separatism and extremism, the intensification of the
activity of international terrorist groups, and the perpetuation of
conflicts in the region.
The main threats to Russia's security are bred by the instability in
Transcaucasia, Iraq, and, potentially, Iran.
Georgia can be expected to continue pursuing a propaganda campaign
aimed at convincing the international community that the zones of
conflict in the Caucasus and in Transcaucasia should be passed under
the UN, the EU, and NATO control. Terrorist provocations are likely to
follow and Russia will be charged with the failure to ensure the
security of local populations.
The persisting US military presence in Iraq and the buildup of its
infrastructures and centers of reconnaissance and control in the
country provides Washington with a broad range of operative and
tactical capabilities.
Given Tehran's current model of behavior in international politics,
the permanent pressure exerted by the US and the EU on Iran under the
pretext of nonproliferation can trigger escalation and spread of
instability over neighboring territories including the Caspian region
and Transcaucasia.
A serious challenge to Russia's security is posed by the extremist
groups' attempts to disseminate Muslim fundamentalist doctrines in its
regions with predominantly Muslim populations. The activity is
supported by the ruling circles and religious centers of Pakistan,
Turkey, the Saudi Arabia, and a number of other countries.
In 2009, the threat to Russia's security in Transcaucasia stemmed from
the instability generated by the Georgian aggression against South
Ossetia in August, 2008. While the full-scale political settlement is
still lacking, M. Saakashvili's regime is steering a course of intense
militarization accompanied by aggressive rhetoric targeting Russia,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
Though the EU (Tagliavini's Commission) report issued on September 30,
2009 stated clearly that Georgia was responsible for the aggression
and that the West's arms supplies to the country over several years
preceding the conflict had had a generally destabilizing effect,
several countries (the US, Ukraine, Israel, and Turkey) still plan to
resume military assistance to Georgia.
In the settings of the crisis caused by the August, 2008 hostilities,
the new US Administration is fostering Georgia's hostility towards
Russia and the tensions in the regions of the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts. The implementation of Washington's
plans concerning Georgia would result in the deployment of US military
bases and forward operating locations in the country and in the
strengthening of the American influence over the North Caucasus and
Transcaucasia.
Tbilisi is cultivating its partnership with the US and NATO. Currently
the Pentagon is preparing a draft agreement on the construction of
three US military bases in Georgia and the dispatch of up to 25,000 US
servicemen to the country by 2015.
The Georgian Administration refuses to recognize the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and makes political and military efforts
aimed at regaining control over the breakaway territories. Georgia's
foreign politics remains markedly anti-Russian and pursues the goal of
forming a negative perception of Russia by the international
community.
To ensure long-term stability along its southern frontier, Russia
entered into a number of bilateral political and military agreements
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia including the ones on joint border
guarding, military cooperation, and the creation of Russian military
bases. Thanks to the pro-active stance adopted by Moscow, at present
the security at the borders between South Ossetia and Georgia and
between Abkhazia and Georgia is maintained at an acceptable level and
the number of incidents is kept low. The agreements reached by Russian
President D. Medvedev and French President N. Sarkozy set a reasonable
`division of labor' in the sphere of the Transcaucasian security:
Russia is to safeguard South Ossetia and Abkhazia while the EU is
responsible for guaranteeing that Georgia does not resort to military
force. Russia's policy of strengthening the security and defense
potentials of South Ossetia and Abkhazia made Russia a stronger player
in Transcaucasia in 2009. The course aimed at reinforcing Moscow's
political and military position in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should
continue. The 2010 construction of Russian military bases and border
guard infrastructures in the two Republics will help to prevent the
recurrence of Georgian military revanchism in the region.
A precedent of withdrawal from the CIS was set in 2009 when Georgia
enacted the corresponding decision which had been announced a year
earlier. It is an indication of a purely political character of the
gesture that Georgia opted for preserving ` whenever the intentional
law affords ` its commitment to the international treaties signed in
the CIS framework.
The result of the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia in August,
2008 and of its termination of the CIS membership is the practically
complete freeze of Tbilisi's relations with Russia.
Joint mechanisms of incident prevention in the regions adjacent to
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were launched in accord with the February
17-18 Geneva Conventions by the two Republics, Georgia, Russia, the
UN, the OCSE, and the EU. The result should be serious ease of
tensions and an improved security climate along the borders of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia implemented the policy of strengthening its positions in the
Black Sea and the Caspian regions in the framework of such
organizations as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black
Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLAKCSEAFOR), the Black Sea Harmony
and sustained dialog with its neighbors on the basis of the Turkish
initiative of a platform of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus.
The Karabakh conflict remains unsettled. It puts obstacles in the way
of rebuilding the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, impedes
the recovery between Armenia and Turkey, and contributes to the
overall instability in Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijani leadership
continues to threaten Armenia with military actions. In 2009 Russia
was actively involved in resolving the Karabakh problem both in the
framework of the activities of the Co-Chairmen of the OCSE Minsk Group
and on the bilateral basis in dealing with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia's active position in Transcaucasia is reflected by its efforts
to strengthen the partnerships with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
cooperation with Baku and Yerevan developed steadily in international
organizations (mainly the UN and the OCSE) and on the regional level
via the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the
Eurasian Economic Community. It will be important for Moscow to
continue seeking maximal involvement in the settlement of the Karabakh
problem parallel to the activity of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk
Group.
In 2010 Moscow should deepen its ties with Armenia including those in
the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, thus
reinforcing Russia's status of a political and military leader in
Transcaucasia. The cooperation with Yerevan, particularly in the
military sphere, should continue to broaden.
As a parallel process, Russia should cultivate its strategic
partnership with Azerbaijan, the country which is a major energy
resources producer, an important regional player, and Russia's
potential ally in the Black and Caspian Sea regions.
Certain Muslim groups are disseminating doctrines of politicized Islam
across Russia which are untraditional for the country's Muslim
population. The activity reached particularly high levels in Dagestan,
Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia. Foreign Muslim centers
are implementing programs of training Muslim clergy to preach in
Russia. At the same time, a number of Western countries tend to exert
political pressure on Russia in connection with the theme.
The Muslim indoctrination in the training centers of Algeria, Turkey,
Syria, the Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan is the key avenue of
influencing Russia's Muslim population. Certain religious and
political circles of these and other countries use student exchanges
as an instrument of forming new political elites in the post-Soviet
space that would wrestle over power and be oriented towards foreign
Islamist centers. For example, the Saudi Arabia is allocating
considerable financial resources to the cause.
A reasonable option for Russia in 2010 in the light of the objective
to train moderate and traditionally oriented Muslim clergy would be to
select Muslim young people to study in foreign Muslim schools of a
moderate variety. The corresponding agreements can be signed, for
example, with such renown centers as Al-Azhar University in Cairo.
Currently the US is putting into practice in the North Caucasus the
key element of its novel military strategy ` that of network wars.
North Caucasus ` the Destabilization Factors
There are reasons to believe that the US and other Western countries
started preparing the conditions for the realization of the Color
Revolution scenario in Russia during the 2011-2012 electoral cycle.
The US President suggested a 25% increase in the number of US
Department of State and USAID employees by 2013. A budget amendment
envisages the creation of 1,226 new jobs in the institutions by 2010.
In the future, the number of US Department of State employees is to
increase by 25%, and the number of USAID employees ` to double.
The US and other Western countries use NGOs as instruments in the
network war to collect information and to influence political
developments. Over 100 foreign NGOs and monitoring networks of various
types are operating in Russia's Southern Federal District.
In Russia's southern part, the implementation of the network war
concept is exemplified by the activity of the American Soros
Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. McArthur
Foundation, the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad Adenauer
Foundation, and Heinrich Boll Foundation, the Unrepresented Nations
and Peoples Organization, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the Gringo Caucasian Refugee and IDP Network, the
International Youth Human Rights Movement, etc. The ideologies,
objectives, and tactic of the organizations are defined by their
sponsors and are subject to the centralized coordination from a single
center in the US.
Propaganda efforts are made in the framework of NGO activities to
influence the peoples of the Caucasus so as to overcome the cultural
integration of the Caucasus into Russia, to banish the pro-Russia
orientation from the Caucasian societies, and to implant the ideology
of hating Russia as the foundation of a new Caucasian identity.
(To be continued)
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php ?context=va&aid=17843
Feb 28 2010
Destabilization: Caucasus Geopolitics Threatens Russia's Security
by Nikolai Dimlevitch
The analysis of the situation in the Caucasus and in Transcaucasia
shows that the outlook for the geopolitical entirety is going to be
shaped by the key Western countries' efforts aimed at debarring Russia
from the Caspian oil and gas projects.
The rivalry between various geopolitical centers of force leads to the
escalation of separatism and extremism, the intensification of the
activity of international terrorist groups, and the perpetuation of
conflicts in the region.
The main threats to Russia's security are bred by the instability in
Transcaucasia, Iraq, and, potentially, Iran.
Georgia can be expected to continue pursuing a propaganda campaign
aimed at convincing the international community that the zones of
conflict in the Caucasus and in Transcaucasia should be passed under
the UN, the EU, and NATO control. Terrorist provocations are likely to
follow and Russia will be charged with the failure to ensure the
security of local populations.
The persisting US military presence in Iraq and the buildup of its
infrastructures and centers of reconnaissance and control in the
country provides Washington with a broad range of operative and
tactical capabilities.
Given Tehran's current model of behavior in international politics,
the permanent pressure exerted by the US and the EU on Iran under the
pretext of nonproliferation can trigger escalation and spread of
instability over neighboring territories including the Caspian region
and Transcaucasia.
A serious challenge to Russia's security is posed by the extremist
groups' attempts to disseminate Muslim fundamentalist doctrines in its
regions with predominantly Muslim populations. The activity is
supported by the ruling circles and religious centers of Pakistan,
Turkey, the Saudi Arabia, and a number of other countries.
In 2009, the threat to Russia's security in Transcaucasia stemmed from
the instability generated by the Georgian aggression against South
Ossetia in August, 2008. While the full-scale political settlement is
still lacking, M. Saakashvili's regime is steering a course of intense
militarization accompanied by aggressive rhetoric targeting Russia,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
Though the EU (Tagliavini's Commission) report issued on September 30,
2009 stated clearly that Georgia was responsible for the aggression
and that the West's arms supplies to the country over several years
preceding the conflict had had a generally destabilizing effect,
several countries (the US, Ukraine, Israel, and Turkey) still plan to
resume military assistance to Georgia.
In the settings of the crisis caused by the August, 2008 hostilities,
the new US Administration is fostering Georgia's hostility towards
Russia and the tensions in the regions of the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts. The implementation of Washington's
plans concerning Georgia would result in the deployment of US military
bases and forward operating locations in the country and in the
strengthening of the American influence over the North Caucasus and
Transcaucasia.
Tbilisi is cultivating its partnership with the US and NATO. Currently
the Pentagon is preparing a draft agreement on the construction of
three US military bases in Georgia and the dispatch of up to 25,000 US
servicemen to the country by 2015.
The Georgian Administration refuses to recognize the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and makes political and military efforts
aimed at regaining control over the breakaway territories. Georgia's
foreign politics remains markedly anti-Russian and pursues the goal of
forming a negative perception of Russia by the international
community.
To ensure long-term stability along its southern frontier, Russia
entered into a number of bilateral political and military agreements
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia including the ones on joint border
guarding, military cooperation, and the creation of Russian military
bases. Thanks to the pro-active stance adopted by Moscow, at present
the security at the borders between South Ossetia and Georgia and
between Abkhazia and Georgia is maintained at an acceptable level and
the number of incidents is kept low. The agreements reached by Russian
President D. Medvedev and French President N. Sarkozy set a reasonable
`division of labor' in the sphere of the Transcaucasian security:
Russia is to safeguard South Ossetia and Abkhazia while the EU is
responsible for guaranteeing that Georgia does not resort to military
force. Russia's policy of strengthening the security and defense
potentials of South Ossetia and Abkhazia made Russia a stronger player
in Transcaucasia in 2009. The course aimed at reinforcing Moscow's
political and military position in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should
continue. The 2010 construction of Russian military bases and border
guard infrastructures in the two Republics will help to prevent the
recurrence of Georgian military revanchism in the region.
A precedent of withdrawal from the CIS was set in 2009 when Georgia
enacted the corresponding decision which had been announced a year
earlier. It is an indication of a purely political character of the
gesture that Georgia opted for preserving ` whenever the intentional
law affords ` its commitment to the international treaties signed in
the CIS framework.
The result of the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia in August,
2008 and of its termination of the CIS membership is the practically
complete freeze of Tbilisi's relations with Russia.
Joint mechanisms of incident prevention in the regions adjacent to
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were launched in accord with the February
17-18 Geneva Conventions by the two Republics, Georgia, Russia, the
UN, the OCSE, and the EU. The result should be serious ease of
tensions and an improved security climate along the borders of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia implemented the policy of strengthening its positions in the
Black Sea and the Caspian regions in the framework of such
organizations as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black
Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLAKCSEAFOR), the Black Sea Harmony
and sustained dialog with its neighbors on the basis of the Turkish
initiative of a platform of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus.
The Karabakh conflict remains unsettled. It puts obstacles in the way
of rebuilding the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, impedes
the recovery between Armenia and Turkey, and contributes to the
overall instability in Transcaucasia. The Azerbaijani leadership
continues to threaten Armenia with military actions. In 2009 Russia
was actively involved in resolving the Karabakh problem both in the
framework of the activities of the Co-Chairmen of the OCSE Minsk Group
and on the bilateral basis in dealing with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia's active position in Transcaucasia is reflected by its efforts
to strengthen the partnerships with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
cooperation with Baku and Yerevan developed steadily in international
organizations (mainly the UN and the OCSE) and on the regional level
via the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the
Eurasian Economic Community. It will be important for Moscow to
continue seeking maximal involvement in the settlement of the Karabakh
problem parallel to the activity of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk
Group.
In 2010 Moscow should deepen its ties with Armenia including those in
the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, thus
reinforcing Russia's status of a political and military leader in
Transcaucasia. The cooperation with Yerevan, particularly in the
military sphere, should continue to broaden.
As a parallel process, Russia should cultivate its strategic
partnership with Azerbaijan, the country which is a major energy
resources producer, an important regional player, and Russia's
potential ally in the Black and Caspian Sea regions.
Certain Muslim groups are disseminating doctrines of politicized Islam
across Russia which are untraditional for the country's Muslim
population. The activity reached particularly high levels in Dagestan,
Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Karachay-Cherkessia. Foreign Muslim centers
are implementing programs of training Muslim clergy to preach in
Russia. At the same time, a number of Western countries tend to exert
political pressure on Russia in connection with the theme.
The Muslim indoctrination in the training centers of Algeria, Turkey,
Syria, the Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan is the key avenue of
influencing Russia's Muslim population. Certain religious and
political circles of these and other countries use student exchanges
as an instrument of forming new political elites in the post-Soviet
space that would wrestle over power and be oriented towards foreign
Islamist centers. For example, the Saudi Arabia is allocating
considerable financial resources to the cause.
A reasonable option for Russia in 2010 in the light of the objective
to train moderate and traditionally oriented Muslim clergy would be to
select Muslim young people to study in foreign Muslim schools of a
moderate variety. The corresponding agreements can be signed, for
example, with such renown centers as Al-Azhar University in Cairo.
Currently the US is putting into practice in the North Caucasus the
key element of its novel military strategy ` that of network wars.
North Caucasus ` the Destabilization Factors
There are reasons to believe that the US and other Western countries
started preparing the conditions for the realization of the Color
Revolution scenario in Russia during the 2011-2012 electoral cycle.
The US President suggested a 25% increase in the number of US
Department of State and USAID employees by 2013. A budget amendment
envisages the creation of 1,226 new jobs in the institutions by 2010.
In the future, the number of US Department of State employees is to
increase by 25%, and the number of USAID employees ` to double.
The US and other Western countries use NGOs as instruments in the
network war to collect information and to influence political
developments. Over 100 foreign NGOs and monitoring networks of various
types are operating in Russia's Southern Federal District.
In Russia's southern part, the implementation of the network war
concept is exemplified by the activity of the American Soros
Foundation, Carnegie Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. McArthur
Foundation, the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Konrad Adenauer
Foundation, and Heinrich Boll Foundation, the Unrepresented Nations
and Peoples Organization, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, the Gringo Caucasian Refugee and IDP Network, the
International Youth Human Rights Movement, etc. The ideologies,
objectives, and tactic of the organizations are defined by their
sponsors and are subject to the centralized coordination from a single
center in the US.
Propaganda efforts are made in the framework of NGO activities to
influence the peoples of the Caucasus so as to overcome the cultural
integration of the Caucasus into Russia, to banish the pro-Russia
orientation from the Caucasian societies, and to implant the ideology
of hating Russia as the foundation of a new Caucasian identity.
(To be continued)
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php ?context=va&aid=17843