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APA, Azerbaijan
Jan 5 2010
The Caspian Region in 2010 - ANALYSIS
[ 05 Jan 2010 11:16 ]
Part II
Published in the framework of cooperation between APA and CRIA
By Alexander Jackson
Caucasus Update No. 60, Jan. 4, 2010
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA)
http://www.cria-online.org
The election of President Barack Obama, and the subsequent reshuffle
in the US foreign-policy establishment, left the US in search of a
Caspian policy in 2009. Philip H Gordon, the new Assistant Secretary
of State tasked with overseeing US regional strategy, was Mr. Obama's
senior foreign policy adviser during the election campaign but has
been unable to shift the region up the list of the new
administration's priorities.
This is unlikely to change in 2010. The Caspian region will be viewed
mostly through two prisms: containing Iran, and the need to supply the
intensified war in Afghanistan. Russia is critical for both. Any
policies in Eurasia which contradict these strategic priorities will
be sidelined.
As in 2009, the US will continue to keep Georgia at arm's length, a
sharp reversal from the ideological Bush era when President
Saakashvili's democratic credentials were eagerly supported in
Washington. The issue of Georgian (and Ukrainian) NATO membership has
been quietly put aside for now, the inevitable consequence of
attempting to reset relations with Russia.
`Attempting' is the right word: so far the reset has been largely
unsuccessful, with its main accomplishment being a single remark by
Russian President Medvedev that sanctions (against Iran) are
`sometimes inevitable'. His mentor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, was
far more cynical of the need for further sanctions. Mr Putin has also
been harshly dismissive of the US decision to restructure its
missile-defence shield in Eastern Europe to allay Russian security
concerns. Since Mr Putin remains the real power behind the throne,
seizing on President Medvedev's polite optimism will not bring results
in 2010.
Although Russia has been fairly helpful over Afghanistan ` providing
NATO states with a logistical corridor across its territory to the
warzone, and quietly accepting an increased NATO presence in Central
Asia ` this is because a stable Afghanistan is in Russia's own
national interest. Iran is different. The Kremlin either does not
quite understand the implications of a nuclear Iran, or simply does
not feel threatened by the possibility.
Whether or not the US can secure Russian help for tough new sanctions
against Iran will be a defining moment for President Obama's long-game
foreign policy style. At the moment, the signals are not encouraging.
And, in any case, China still needs to be brought on board - a far
more challenging task.
This year may be a critical year on Iran: there is only so much longer
that the cat-and-mouse game between Tehran and the international
community can drag on. Each year that passes without a resolution to
the stand-off increases the odds of an Israeli airstrike. In 2010 the
most visible difference is the Iran's rumbling opposition Green
Movement. Reports of the Islamic Republic's imminent demise are
greatly exaggerated: there is little indication that the security
forces are willing to defy the government, and despite divisions
amongst the clerics few are willing to openly side with the
demonstrators.
The Green Movement may not seriously affect the country's showdown
with the West in 2010, despite the links that are often made. Whilst
the regime remains in control of the security establishment, and
whilst even opposition leaders support the nuclear programme, the
impact of street protests on foreign policy shouldn't be
overestimated. It is hard to see Iran's leaders acting any differently
towards the international community over the past six months had the
opposition not erupted.
The progress of the Iranian nuclear programme will have significant
repercussions for Iran's Eurasian neighbours, particularly Azerbaijan.
The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iran would seriously
undermine Azerbaijan's national security, which has had unenviable
relations with its southern neighbour ever since the restoration of
independence in 1991.
However, Baku is unwilling to be forced into a choice of joining or
rejecting a sanctions regime, particularly if it affects the energy
sector, one of Azerbaijan's priorities in its relationship with Iran.
>From Baku's perspective, tighter sanctions could cause instability in
Iran, with its 25 million ethnic Azerbaijani population. The effects
of wide-scale civil unrest on the Iranian Azerbaijani autonomy
movement are unpredictable, but Baku would rather not find out.
US and European attention to the region's other issues is likely to be
patchy. The Nabucco pipeline to Europe made very limited progress in
2009. This was partly down to insufficient unity of effort by the EU,
but also due to a failure to fully acknowledge the project's political
dimensions. For instance, there seems to be a continuing inability by
the US to recognise that Nabucco's progress is tightly bound up with
the Turkish-Armenian thaw and the effect of this process on
Azerbaijan.
This reflects the general strategic drift of US regional policy, which
has continually insisted that the normalisation of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan is not linked to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process, which it evidently is. Nabucco cannot succeed without strong,
focused US leadership, which is still lacking, despite the presence of
Richard Morningstar - a longstanding Caspian expert - as the Special
Envoy for Eurasian Energy.
One factor that may refocus minds on the region is Kazakhstan's
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. Despite serious concerns about its
human-rights record, as the organisation's first post-Soviet chair
Astana has an opportunity to help make real progress on Caspian
security. In particular, it will have an opportunity to help create a
better atmosphere between Russia and Georgia.
Hopes have been expressed that Astana could perhaps also make progress
on Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, the
OSCE's new Chairman-in-Office, said in November that Kazakhstan would
`actively participate' in the peace process under the auspices of the
existing Minsk Group (Trend News, November 30). As a member of the
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation - a military bloc
which includes Armenia but not Azerbaijan ` but also a strategic
partner of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan may be able to act fraternally, but
impartially, towards Baku and Yerevan.
Ultimately, Astana's influence will be limited by factors outside of
its control. The Turkish-Armenian-Azerbaijani triangle, and the
relationship between Russia and Georgia, each have their own dynamics.
So, most obviously, does Iran's turbulent situation, internal and
external. But they are also influenced by outside trends,
predominantly the extent and form of American engagement. In 2010,
this will continue to be limited to, and framed by, the two biggest
issues facing the Obama Administration: Iran and Afghanistan.
Jan 5 2010
The Caspian Region in 2010 - ANALYSIS
[ 05 Jan 2010 11:16 ]
Part II
Published in the framework of cooperation between APA and CRIA
By Alexander Jackson
Caucasus Update No. 60, Jan. 4, 2010
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA)
http://www.cria-online.org
The election of President Barack Obama, and the subsequent reshuffle
in the US foreign-policy establishment, left the US in search of a
Caspian policy in 2009. Philip H Gordon, the new Assistant Secretary
of State tasked with overseeing US regional strategy, was Mr. Obama's
senior foreign policy adviser during the election campaign but has
been unable to shift the region up the list of the new
administration's priorities.
This is unlikely to change in 2010. The Caspian region will be viewed
mostly through two prisms: containing Iran, and the need to supply the
intensified war in Afghanistan. Russia is critical for both. Any
policies in Eurasia which contradict these strategic priorities will
be sidelined.
As in 2009, the US will continue to keep Georgia at arm's length, a
sharp reversal from the ideological Bush era when President
Saakashvili's democratic credentials were eagerly supported in
Washington. The issue of Georgian (and Ukrainian) NATO membership has
been quietly put aside for now, the inevitable consequence of
attempting to reset relations with Russia.
`Attempting' is the right word: so far the reset has been largely
unsuccessful, with its main accomplishment being a single remark by
Russian President Medvedev that sanctions (against Iran) are
`sometimes inevitable'. His mentor, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, was
far more cynical of the need for further sanctions. Mr Putin has also
been harshly dismissive of the US decision to restructure its
missile-defence shield in Eastern Europe to allay Russian security
concerns. Since Mr Putin remains the real power behind the throne,
seizing on President Medvedev's polite optimism will not bring results
in 2010.
Although Russia has been fairly helpful over Afghanistan ` providing
NATO states with a logistical corridor across its territory to the
warzone, and quietly accepting an increased NATO presence in Central
Asia ` this is because a stable Afghanistan is in Russia's own
national interest. Iran is different. The Kremlin either does not
quite understand the implications of a nuclear Iran, or simply does
not feel threatened by the possibility.
Whether or not the US can secure Russian help for tough new sanctions
against Iran will be a defining moment for President Obama's long-game
foreign policy style. At the moment, the signals are not encouraging.
And, in any case, China still needs to be brought on board - a far
more challenging task.
This year may be a critical year on Iran: there is only so much longer
that the cat-and-mouse game between Tehran and the international
community can drag on. Each year that passes without a resolution to
the stand-off increases the odds of an Israeli airstrike. In 2010 the
most visible difference is the Iran's rumbling opposition Green
Movement. Reports of the Islamic Republic's imminent demise are
greatly exaggerated: there is little indication that the security
forces are willing to defy the government, and despite divisions
amongst the clerics few are willing to openly side with the
demonstrators.
The Green Movement may not seriously affect the country's showdown
with the West in 2010, despite the links that are often made. Whilst
the regime remains in control of the security establishment, and
whilst even opposition leaders support the nuclear programme, the
impact of street protests on foreign policy shouldn't be
overestimated. It is hard to see Iran's leaders acting any differently
towards the international community over the past six months had the
opposition not erupted.
The progress of the Iranian nuclear programme will have significant
repercussions for Iran's Eurasian neighbours, particularly Azerbaijan.
The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iran would seriously
undermine Azerbaijan's national security, which has had unenviable
relations with its southern neighbour ever since the restoration of
independence in 1991.
However, Baku is unwilling to be forced into a choice of joining or
rejecting a sanctions regime, particularly if it affects the energy
sector, one of Azerbaijan's priorities in its relationship with Iran.
>From Baku's perspective, tighter sanctions could cause instability in
Iran, with its 25 million ethnic Azerbaijani population. The effects
of wide-scale civil unrest on the Iranian Azerbaijani autonomy
movement are unpredictable, but Baku would rather not find out.
US and European attention to the region's other issues is likely to be
patchy. The Nabucco pipeline to Europe made very limited progress in
2009. This was partly down to insufficient unity of effort by the EU,
but also due to a failure to fully acknowledge the project's political
dimensions. For instance, there seems to be a continuing inability by
the US to recognise that Nabucco's progress is tightly bound up with
the Turkish-Armenian thaw and the effect of this process on
Azerbaijan.
This reflects the general strategic drift of US regional policy, which
has continually insisted that the normalisation of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan is not linked to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process, which it evidently is. Nabucco cannot succeed without strong,
focused US leadership, which is still lacking, despite the presence of
Richard Morningstar - a longstanding Caspian expert - as the Special
Envoy for Eurasian Energy.
One factor that may refocus minds on the region is Kazakhstan's
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. Despite serious concerns about its
human-rights record, as the organisation's first post-Soviet chair
Astana has an opportunity to help make real progress on Caspian
security. In particular, it will have an opportunity to help create a
better atmosphere between Russia and Georgia.
Hopes have been expressed that Astana could perhaps also make progress
on Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, the
OSCE's new Chairman-in-Office, said in November that Kazakhstan would
`actively participate' in the peace process under the auspices of the
existing Minsk Group (Trend News, November 30). As a member of the
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation - a military bloc
which includes Armenia but not Azerbaijan ` but also a strategic
partner of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan may be able to act fraternally, but
impartially, towards Baku and Yerevan.
Ultimately, Astana's influence will be limited by factors outside of
its control. The Turkish-Armenian-Azerbaijani triangle, and the
relationship between Russia and Georgia, each have their own dynamics.
So, most obviously, does Iran's turbulent situation, internal and
external. But they are also influenced by outside trends,
predominantly the extent and form of American engagement. In 2010,
this will continue to be limited to, and framed by, the two biggest
issues facing the Obama Administration: Iran and Afghanistan.