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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Jan 7 2010
EU-Turkey: Edging back from the brink?
by HUGH POPE
Turkey's friends in Europe have won an important argument. The
governments of France and Germany have stopped advocating a
`privileged partnership' to replace the long-promised goal of European
Union membership for Turkey.
The concept was always a short-term pandering to Europeans' fears
about Islam, immigration and jobs. Now aware of the long-term damage
this has done to their own commercial interests, the EU's stature on
its southeastern flank and Turkey's own reform program, both countries
are trying to find ways to mend relations.
The result: On his return from an ice-breaking trip to France in
October, Turkish President Abdullah Gül was happy to state that the
French leadership did not mention `privileged partnership.' In fact,
although President Nicolas Sarkozy may not have changed his own mind,
his politicization of Turkey's EU membership during his election
victory in 2007 has unexpectedly mobilized Turkey's supporters in
France. Left-wing newspapers now debate the merits of the country,
whereas a decade ago they mainly picked apart Turkey's then poor human
rights record.
French businesses, anxious about what politician Pierre Lellouche
early on thought was the loss of 5 billion euros worth of business,
helped finance an ongoing nine months of 400 Turkish cultural events
in 70 French cities. These plays, debates and shows -- including
lighting up the Eiffel Tower in the red and white of the Turkish flag
-- have probably done more to showcase Turkey than decades of
diplomatic toil.
The change is more subtle in Germany, where the idea of `privileged
partnership' originated and was a key part of Christian Democrat
leaders' rhetoric during the last election in 2004. After the 2009
elections, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-Christian Social Union
of Bavaria (CSU)-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition agreement is
still stiff with suspicion of Turkey, underlining that the negotiating
process should be open-ended, include no date or automatic or
guaranteed right of entry and specify strict obligations to meet EU
criteria.
But it makes no mention of `privileged partnership,' saying that only
if membership negotiations fail for any future reason, the policy
should be to bind Turkey `as closely as possible to European
structures to develop her privileged relationship with the EU.' Beyond
the linguistic step back from confrontation, this official
postponement of any decision is an important change that keeps
Turkey's road open and no longer betrays decades of EU promises of
possible membership.
The efforts of key EU states like Germany and France to achieve a more
respectful relationship with Turkey gives some hope that the bleak
`down' cycle of EU-Turkey hostility between 2005-2008 is entering a
new `up' cycle -- just as the EU-Turkey near-death experiences of 1987
and 1997 were eventually overcome. With the Lisbon Treaty in place and
fears of economic meltdown receding, the EU is regaining
self-confidence.
For its part, Turkey slowly restarted its EU engines in 2009 --
enacting its national orogram for the adoption of the EU acquis,
appointing a chief EU negotiator, strengthening bureaucratic systems
to support EU convergence, sending leaders more frequently to European
capitals, signing the inter-governmental agreement for the potential
Nabucco natural gas pipeline, starting negotiations to join Europe's
Energy Community Treaty and saying that it wants to reopen discussion
on a readmission agreement for the tens of thousands of illegal
refugees who reach the EU every year through Turkey. Partly thanks to
the governments' efforts to solve the long-running Kurdish and
Armenian problems, this all secured a mildly positive EU progress
report for the year.
Still, 2010 remains full of challenges, given that many of the
initiatives that have improved the atmosphere with the EU are like
juggling balls that remain up in the air -- there is no clarity, for
instance, about the fate of the government's promise to normalize
relations with Armenia, its ability to follow through on its
democratic initiative to broaden Kurdish and other ethnic rights in
Turkey and what will happen on Cyprus. The appearance of three Turkish
ministers in Brussels with an entourage of 80 people to open the
environment chapter of the negotiations in December was a signal, but
smacked of showmanship as much as substance.
After all, the environment chapter is only the 12th negotiating
chapter to be opened in four years. The Cyprus issue now blocks most
of the 23 others. If nobody finds a way to settle Cyprus this year,
Turkey's relationship with the EU will slowly enter an indefinite ice
age. Over the years, expensive judgments are likely to pile up against
Turkey for its occupation of Greek Cypriot properties in northern
Cyprus in the European Court of Human Rights. The ultimate bill could
rise to many billions of euros and, if left unpaid, would compromise
not just the EU talks but cast a shadow over Turkey's membership in
the Council of Europe.
Both the EU and Turkey would therefore do well to keep finding ways to
build support for EU convergence, however it is defined. The EU takes
half of Turkey's exports and supplies more than three-quarters of its
foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkey's recent flirtation with the
Middle East is all very well, but trade with the Mideast has long been
only a quarter of Turkey's total.
Europeans worried about `absorption capacity' and `full implementation
of all criteria' should also remember that whatever happens, any final
decisions on Turkish EU membership are a decade or two away. EU
members may by then be more appreciative of an allied Turkey's bulk as
their bloc measures up against China, India, Russia or the US.
As President Gül said in a speech to businessmen in Paris in October:
`We want to be together with a big, powerful, large-capacity partner,
and this will bring both sides many benefits. To be honest, our
insistence on the European Union is all about this¦ We're just saying,
give us the chance to upgrade ourselves. If we complete the
negotiation process, at that point the French people, the Austrian
people can go to a referendum; at that time, if you like or don't like
the Turkey of that day, you can say `yes' or `no.' And maybe at that
time Turkey will say, `No, I'm going to go on as I am¦ Maybe I want to
be like Norway'.'
*Hugh Pope is the director of the International Crisis Group's
Turkey/Cyprus Project and the author of `Sons of the Conquerors: the
Rise of the Turkic World' (Overlook Duckworth, 2005). This article was
published by the International Crisis Group on Jan. 5.
07 January 2010, Thursday
Jan 7 2010
EU-Turkey: Edging back from the brink?
by HUGH POPE
Turkey's friends in Europe have won an important argument. The
governments of France and Germany have stopped advocating a
`privileged partnership' to replace the long-promised goal of European
Union membership for Turkey.
The concept was always a short-term pandering to Europeans' fears
about Islam, immigration and jobs. Now aware of the long-term damage
this has done to their own commercial interests, the EU's stature on
its southeastern flank and Turkey's own reform program, both countries
are trying to find ways to mend relations.
The result: On his return from an ice-breaking trip to France in
October, Turkish President Abdullah Gül was happy to state that the
French leadership did not mention `privileged partnership.' In fact,
although President Nicolas Sarkozy may not have changed his own mind,
his politicization of Turkey's EU membership during his election
victory in 2007 has unexpectedly mobilized Turkey's supporters in
France. Left-wing newspapers now debate the merits of the country,
whereas a decade ago they mainly picked apart Turkey's then poor human
rights record.
French businesses, anxious about what politician Pierre Lellouche
early on thought was the loss of 5 billion euros worth of business,
helped finance an ongoing nine months of 400 Turkish cultural events
in 70 French cities. These plays, debates and shows -- including
lighting up the Eiffel Tower in the red and white of the Turkish flag
-- have probably done more to showcase Turkey than decades of
diplomatic toil.
The change is more subtle in Germany, where the idea of `privileged
partnership' originated and was a key part of Christian Democrat
leaders' rhetoric during the last election in 2004. After the 2009
elections, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-Christian Social Union
of Bavaria (CSU)-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition agreement is
still stiff with suspicion of Turkey, underlining that the negotiating
process should be open-ended, include no date or automatic or
guaranteed right of entry and specify strict obligations to meet EU
criteria.
But it makes no mention of `privileged partnership,' saying that only
if membership negotiations fail for any future reason, the policy
should be to bind Turkey `as closely as possible to European
structures to develop her privileged relationship with the EU.' Beyond
the linguistic step back from confrontation, this official
postponement of any decision is an important change that keeps
Turkey's road open and no longer betrays decades of EU promises of
possible membership.
The efforts of key EU states like Germany and France to achieve a more
respectful relationship with Turkey gives some hope that the bleak
`down' cycle of EU-Turkey hostility between 2005-2008 is entering a
new `up' cycle -- just as the EU-Turkey near-death experiences of 1987
and 1997 were eventually overcome. With the Lisbon Treaty in place and
fears of economic meltdown receding, the EU is regaining
self-confidence.
For its part, Turkey slowly restarted its EU engines in 2009 --
enacting its national orogram for the adoption of the EU acquis,
appointing a chief EU negotiator, strengthening bureaucratic systems
to support EU convergence, sending leaders more frequently to European
capitals, signing the inter-governmental agreement for the potential
Nabucco natural gas pipeline, starting negotiations to join Europe's
Energy Community Treaty and saying that it wants to reopen discussion
on a readmission agreement for the tens of thousands of illegal
refugees who reach the EU every year through Turkey. Partly thanks to
the governments' efforts to solve the long-running Kurdish and
Armenian problems, this all secured a mildly positive EU progress
report for the year.
Still, 2010 remains full of challenges, given that many of the
initiatives that have improved the atmosphere with the EU are like
juggling balls that remain up in the air -- there is no clarity, for
instance, about the fate of the government's promise to normalize
relations with Armenia, its ability to follow through on its
democratic initiative to broaden Kurdish and other ethnic rights in
Turkey and what will happen on Cyprus. The appearance of three Turkish
ministers in Brussels with an entourage of 80 people to open the
environment chapter of the negotiations in December was a signal, but
smacked of showmanship as much as substance.
After all, the environment chapter is only the 12th negotiating
chapter to be opened in four years. The Cyprus issue now blocks most
of the 23 others. If nobody finds a way to settle Cyprus this year,
Turkey's relationship with the EU will slowly enter an indefinite ice
age. Over the years, expensive judgments are likely to pile up against
Turkey for its occupation of Greek Cypriot properties in northern
Cyprus in the European Court of Human Rights. The ultimate bill could
rise to many billions of euros and, if left unpaid, would compromise
not just the EU talks but cast a shadow over Turkey's membership in
the Council of Europe.
Both the EU and Turkey would therefore do well to keep finding ways to
build support for EU convergence, however it is defined. The EU takes
half of Turkey's exports and supplies more than three-quarters of its
foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkey's recent flirtation with the
Middle East is all very well, but trade with the Mideast has long been
only a quarter of Turkey's total.
Europeans worried about `absorption capacity' and `full implementation
of all criteria' should also remember that whatever happens, any final
decisions on Turkish EU membership are a decade or two away. EU
members may by then be more appreciative of an allied Turkey's bulk as
their bloc measures up against China, India, Russia or the US.
As President Gül said in a speech to businessmen in Paris in October:
`We want to be together with a big, powerful, large-capacity partner,
and this will bring both sides many benefits. To be honest, our
insistence on the European Union is all about this¦ We're just saying,
give us the chance to upgrade ourselves. If we complete the
negotiation process, at that point the French people, the Austrian
people can go to a referendum; at that time, if you like or don't like
the Turkey of that day, you can say `yes' or `no.' And maybe at that
time Turkey will say, `No, I'm going to go on as I am¦ Maybe I want to
be like Norway'.'
*Hugh Pope is the director of the International Crisis Group's
Turkey/Cyprus Project and the author of `Sons of the Conquerors: the
Rise of the Turkic World' (Overlook Duckworth, 2005). This article was
published by the International Crisis Group on Jan. 5.
07 January 2010, Thursday