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AZERBAIJAN SHOULD DECLARE PROGRAM OF KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN 2010
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
Jan 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Zahid Oruj News.Az interviews Zahid Oruj, member of the parliamentary
committee of defense and security of Azerbaijani parliament.
Are there prospects of Karabakh conflict settlement in 2010?
The war in the South Caucasus in August 2009 and the changes in the
regional political configuration, on the one hand, and the violation
of the political and military balance ,on the other hand, and the
counter-step of the West, especially of the United States, have created
conditions for promotion of frozen conflicts. The negotiations have
become more intensive than earlier and Russia itself has played an
active role in these negotiations. Different persons comment on
the reasons in a different way but the fact is that Russia whose
international image was spoiled probably on the background of events
in Georgia tried to neutralize this in the context of the Karabakh
conflict. In this sense, the West's steps in this direction were aimed
at improving the Armenian-Turkish relations. This was at least done
to change the political architecture, extrude Russia from the South
Caucasus. This, in turn, has not yet caused negative influence on
the Karabakh issue.
But it can be predicted that in case the issue of Afghanistan prevails
in the US policy in 2010, the "window of opportunities" in the Karabakh
conflict settlement will not be effective. Meanwhile, it is possible
that the US steps in Afghanistan will be fruitful and then we can
expect some advancement in our region. At least, the requirement is the
coordination of basic principles, signing of a framework agreement to
overcome the barriers in the diplomatic line, developed between Turkey
and Armenia. The West attempts to execute this plan while Russia does
not hamper this. It seems that the Russian official circles consider
this acceptable for them in terms of their strategic goals, therefore,
the agreement on some documents is possible in 2010.
Can the Armenian public hamper the agreement on Karabakh conflict
settlement in case of creation of favorable external factors, as you
have said?
Certainly, such hindrances are possible. Naturally, the overall
Armenian public is not ready for changes. On the other hand, we should
take into account that the platform taken by Levon Ter-Petrosyan during
the election process differed much from the traditionally pro-Russian
direction. This proves that the Armenian public understands the lack
of prospects of restricting ties with the West including enmity with
Turkey. They also realized that isolation causes a great damage to
the Armenian economy. Later Serzh Sargsyan (the Armenian president)
in fact, stolenthis platform from Ter-Petrosyan and launched its
execution, thus, ensuring stability to a certain extent. In fact,
Sargsyan came to power by force and continued reigning by force. But it
is not difficult to image the state of the Armenian society if Armenia
restores relations with Turkey on the one hand and takes serious
steps in the Karabakh conflict settlement, on the other hand. It may
pave way to different confrontations. There are many speculations
around this issue. Some consider that the Armenian-Turkish relations
are improving and definite possibilities open with Azerbaijan thus
forming an alliance against Russia.
Therefore, the coincidence of the external and internal factors may
worsen the internal crisis in Armenia which can hamper the Karabakh
conflict settlement.
Meanwhile, the Armenian parliament periodically voices demands about
the need to recognize "independence" of Karabakh as levers of pressure
on Azerbaijan. How can this end for Armenia and the overall region?
When thinking on this question, we should ponder over the reason
Armenia has not taken this step yet. In fact, Armenia has initially
chosen the way of annexing Nagorno Karabakh. When Karabakh separatists
adopted the "act on independence", it was clear that this step was
formal and perceived as a proof of Karabakh's annexation to Armenia.
But Yerevan further saw that this does not comply with their intentions
and plans as it would mean the recognition of Armenia's occupation
of a part of Azerbaijan's lands. Then, they have chosen a direction
of "Nagorno Karabakh's struggle" for its "independence" to further
execute a plan on "annexation" to Armenia.
Armenia knows that if it recognizes Nagorno Karabakh as a political
pressure, this will turn into an official act of occupation of
Azerbaijani lands. Armenia will now try to demonstrate that "Nagorno
Karabakh" has gained the "victory" independently. But in case of
recognition, it would be impossible to imagine Armenia beyond the
processes on occupation of Azerbaijani lands. This will be a great
damage to Armenia's policy. As is known, Armenia has not made the
recognition not because of Azerbaijan's interests but because it
is well aware of the risk. It is impossible to attain Azerbaijan's
disavowal of its positions by this blackmail.
In turn, in 2010 we should keep the war factor on the agenda and
also declare the program of the Karabakh conflict settlement. We
should say by granting autonomy to Karabakh that we must indicate
its borders and limits. In other words, we should indicate whether it
is a model of Tatarstan or any other model of another Russia's part,
or a model equal to the status of Nakhchivan, we should indicate the
rights to be ensured for the Armenians residing in Karabakh. How will
we ensure the coexistence of Armenians and Azerbaijanis? On the whole,
we should indicate the contours and details of the peaceful model. We
should preserve these two lines on the agenda, for the Armenian side
states in different international organizations that Azerbaijan is
just scaring Armenia threatening to its security. They also make
"Protect us from Azerbaijan!" appeals.
We should execute these two directions of our policy so that to
demonstrate that our attitude to Armenians who recognize Azerbaijani
laws will be the same as toward the rest of our citizens. We should
declare a policy on Karabakh similar to Moscow's policy on Chechnya.
By this program we are also neutralizing the statements of the Armenian
side that Yerevan is striving for peace in the region while Azerbaijan
poses a threat with its bellicose statements.
In this case, how should Azerbaijan define the status of Karabakh for
it to satisfy the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides within the framework
of this program?
Certainly, we must declare that this status can be even mediatory.
This issue will be fixed both in Madrid principles and in provisions
reflected within the framework of basic principles. As is known, one
of the weight centers in Azerbaijani diplomacy is aimed at returning
refugees and IDPs to the regions adjacent to Karabakh and ensuring
their safety. By declaring all our intentions on Karabakh and its
status, we will neutralize the statements of the Armenian side that
Azerbaijan uses the language of war when speaking to Karabakh and
its citizens there.
There have recently been voiced statements about possible resumption
of hostilities in Karabakh. Can the situation be developed in this
direction in the nearest future?
If Azerbaijan maintains 100,000 troops and concentrates a greater
part of its policy to ensure its security, signs an agreement on
military cooperation with fraternal Turkey, creates its military
industry and eliminates dependence on arms supplies from abroad,
it means that the country should be ready for war.
I do not share the opinion of those who voice anti-war position. Why
do we then need such large expenses for army? Certainly, we should not
take such steps without respect to the international situation as well
as the powers that may cause damage to the international positions of
Azerbaijan. During his visit to Geranboy, the Azerbaijani president
said in open that in case negotiations with Armenia are ineffective,
Azerbaijan will step to the path of war. This statement was made
before the meeting with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan due in
Munich. Some people noted that this statement was made to attain
certain constructive result during the upcoming negotiations and it
was a tactical step. But afterwards it became clear that this is not
like that. Therefore, definite international brain centers, mass
media and political institutions started to analyze this position
of Azerbaijan to understand the situation under which Azerbaijan
will decide to launch hostilities. Everyone knows that Azerbaijan's
positions in this issue are quite strong.
In this case Russia is unable to act the way it did in case of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan
not Armenia. Thus, Moscow will be unable to use the agreements
within the framework of CSTO or bilateral military agreements and
invade Karabakh. But some may say that Russia has never observed the
international law and, therefore, this cannot serve as an argument. But
the recently observed Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement is targeting
Armenia. The normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia
does not allow the Russian side providing open support to Armenian
aggression. In this case the decision of our supreme commander to
launch war in a definite day of 2010 may promote our positions in
the Karabakh conflict. But on the whole, it is difficult to predict
that the armed way will completely settle the problem. Anyway, this
will pave way to the return of a part of the occupied lands and after
that the negotiations will resume and the processes may proceed in
a different direction. I think that the Azerbaijani leader will use
the most favorable regional and international situation, mobilize
all economic, political and diplomatic resources inside the country
to take a step in military direction. As is seen, this is not done
for rhetoric.
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
Jan 11 2010
Azerbaijan
Zahid Oruj News.Az interviews Zahid Oruj, member of the parliamentary
committee of defense and security of Azerbaijani parliament.
Are there prospects of Karabakh conflict settlement in 2010?
The war in the South Caucasus in August 2009 and the changes in the
regional political configuration, on the one hand, and the violation
of the political and military balance ,on the other hand, and the
counter-step of the West, especially of the United States, have created
conditions for promotion of frozen conflicts. The negotiations have
become more intensive than earlier and Russia itself has played an
active role in these negotiations. Different persons comment on
the reasons in a different way but the fact is that Russia whose
international image was spoiled probably on the background of events
in Georgia tried to neutralize this in the context of the Karabakh
conflict. In this sense, the West's steps in this direction were aimed
at improving the Armenian-Turkish relations. This was at least done
to change the political architecture, extrude Russia from the South
Caucasus. This, in turn, has not yet caused negative influence on
the Karabakh issue.
But it can be predicted that in case the issue of Afghanistan prevails
in the US policy in 2010, the "window of opportunities" in the Karabakh
conflict settlement will not be effective. Meanwhile, it is possible
that the US steps in Afghanistan will be fruitful and then we can
expect some advancement in our region. At least, the requirement is the
coordination of basic principles, signing of a framework agreement to
overcome the barriers in the diplomatic line, developed between Turkey
and Armenia. The West attempts to execute this plan while Russia does
not hamper this. It seems that the Russian official circles consider
this acceptable for them in terms of their strategic goals, therefore,
the agreement on some documents is possible in 2010.
Can the Armenian public hamper the agreement on Karabakh conflict
settlement in case of creation of favorable external factors, as you
have said?
Certainly, such hindrances are possible. Naturally, the overall
Armenian public is not ready for changes. On the other hand, we should
take into account that the platform taken by Levon Ter-Petrosyan during
the election process differed much from the traditionally pro-Russian
direction. This proves that the Armenian public understands the lack
of prospects of restricting ties with the West including enmity with
Turkey. They also realized that isolation causes a great damage to
the Armenian economy. Later Serzh Sargsyan (the Armenian president)
in fact, stolenthis platform from Ter-Petrosyan and launched its
execution, thus, ensuring stability to a certain extent. In fact,
Sargsyan came to power by force and continued reigning by force. But it
is not difficult to image the state of the Armenian society if Armenia
restores relations with Turkey on the one hand and takes serious
steps in the Karabakh conflict settlement, on the other hand. It may
pave way to different confrontations. There are many speculations
around this issue. Some consider that the Armenian-Turkish relations
are improving and definite possibilities open with Azerbaijan thus
forming an alliance against Russia.
Therefore, the coincidence of the external and internal factors may
worsen the internal crisis in Armenia which can hamper the Karabakh
conflict settlement.
Meanwhile, the Armenian parliament periodically voices demands about
the need to recognize "independence" of Karabakh as levers of pressure
on Azerbaijan. How can this end for Armenia and the overall region?
When thinking on this question, we should ponder over the reason
Armenia has not taken this step yet. In fact, Armenia has initially
chosen the way of annexing Nagorno Karabakh. When Karabakh separatists
adopted the "act on independence", it was clear that this step was
formal and perceived as a proof of Karabakh's annexation to Armenia.
But Yerevan further saw that this does not comply with their intentions
and plans as it would mean the recognition of Armenia's occupation
of a part of Azerbaijan's lands. Then, they have chosen a direction
of "Nagorno Karabakh's struggle" for its "independence" to further
execute a plan on "annexation" to Armenia.
Armenia knows that if it recognizes Nagorno Karabakh as a political
pressure, this will turn into an official act of occupation of
Azerbaijani lands. Armenia will now try to demonstrate that "Nagorno
Karabakh" has gained the "victory" independently. But in case of
recognition, it would be impossible to imagine Armenia beyond the
processes on occupation of Azerbaijani lands. This will be a great
damage to Armenia's policy. As is known, Armenia has not made the
recognition not because of Azerbaijan's interests but because it
is well aware of the risk. It is impossible to attain Azerbaijan's
disavowal of its positions by this blackmail.
In turn, in 2010 we should keep the war factor on the agenda and
also declare the program of the Karabakh conflict settlement. We
should say by granting autonomy to Karabakh that we must indicate
its borders and limits. In other words, we should indicate whether it
is a model of Tatarstan or any other model of another Russia's part,
or a model equal to the status of Nakhchivan, we should indicate the
rights to be ensured for the Armenians residing in Karabakh. How will
we ensure the coexistence of Armenians and Azerbaijanis? On the whole,
we should indicate the contours and details of the peaceful model. We
should preserve these two lines on the agenda, for the Armenian side
states in different international organizations that Azerbaijan is
just scaring Armenia threatening to its security. They also make
"Protect us from Azerbaijan!" appeals.
We should execute these two directions of our policy so that to
demonstrate that our attitude to Armenians who recognize Azerbaijani
laws will be the same as toward the rest of our citizens. We should
declare a policy on Karabakh similar to Moscow's policy on Chechnya.
By this program we are also neutralizing the statements of the Armenian
side that Yerevan is striving for peace in the region while Azerbaijan
poses a threat with its bellicose statements.
In this case, how should Azerbaijan define the status of Karabakh for
it to satisfy the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides within the framework
of this program?
Certainly, we must declare that this status can be even mediatory.
This issue will be fixed both in Madrid principles and in provisions
reflected within the framework of basic principles. As is known, one
of the weight centers in Azerbaijani diplomacy is aimed at returning
refugees and IDPs to the regions adjacent to Karabakh and ensuring
their safety. By declaring all our intentions on Karabakh and its
status, we will neutralize the statements of the Armenian side that
Azerbaijan uses the language of war when speaking to Karabakh and
its citizens there.
There have recently been voiced statements about possible resumption
of hostilities in Karabakh. Can the situation be developed in this
direction in the nearest future?
If Azerbaijan maintains 100,000 troops and concentrates a greater
part of its policy to ensure its security, signs an agreement on
military cooperation with fraternal Turkey, creates its military
industry and eliminates dependence on arms supplies from abroad,
it means that the country should be ready for war.
I do not share the opinion of those who voice anti-war position. Why
do we then need such large expenses for army? Certainly, we should not
take such steps without respect to the international situation as well
as the powers that may cause damage to the international positions of
Azerbaijan. During his visit to Geranboy, the Azerbaijani president
said in open that in case negotiations with Armenia are ineffective,
Azerbaijan will step to the path of war. This statement was made
before the meeting with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan due in
Munich. Some people noted that this statement was made to attain
certain constructive result during the upcoming negotiations and it
was a tactical step. But afterwards it became clear that this is not
like that. Therefore, definite international brain centers, mass
media and political institutions started to analyze this position
of Azerbaijan to understand the situation under which Azerbaijan
will decide to launch hostilities. Everyone knows that Azerbaijan's
positions in this issue are quite strong.
In this case Russia is unable to act the way it did in case of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan
not Armenia. Thus, Moscow will be unable to use the agreements
within the framework of CSTO or bilateral military agreements and
invade Karabakh. But some may say that Russia has never observed the
international law and, therefore, this cannot serve as an argument. But
the recently observed Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement is targeting
Armenia. The normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia
does not allow the Russian side providing open support to Armenian
aggression. In this case the decision of our supreme commander to
launch war in a definite day of 2010 may promote our positions in
the Karabakh conflict. But on the whole, it is difficult to predict
that the armed way will completely settle the problem. Anyway, this
will pave way to the return of a part of the occupied lands and after
that the negotiations will resume and the processes may proceed in
a different direction. I think that the Azerbaijani leader will use
the most favorable regional and international situation, mobilize
all economic, political and diplomatic resources inside the country
to take a step in military direction. As is seen, this is not done
for rhetoric.