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MILITARY'S POLITICAL STATUS NO LONGER SUSTAINABLE, SAYS LACINER
Today's Zaman
Jan 11 2010
Turkey
Omer Laciner, editor-in-chief of the socialist monthly Birikim, has
said some circles in the military realize that the military's current
political status is no longer sustainable and therefore support the
government-initiated probe into the system.
He said the military has lost credibility as there have been more
revelations about illegal connections within it.
"For example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon
network, and there were reports that security flaws played a large
role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun
attacks [by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)]," he told Today's
Zaman for our Monday Talk interview, referring to the ongoing probe
into the Ergenekon criminal network accused of plotting to overthrow
the government.
'The Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon network;
there were credible reports that security flaws played a large role in
the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun attacks. All
that did not give the military the upper hand; on the contrary,
it left big blemishes. Therefore, some forces in the military have
realized that its current political status is no longer sustainable'
The 2006 Council of State attack left a senior judge dead. Although it
was initially presented as an attack by a religious fundamentalist,
the gunman's links to Ergenekon were later confirmed during the
investigation. The PKK's attack on Daglıca in 2007 and on Aktutun
in 2008, in which dozens of soldiers died, raised serious questions
about how and why the respective military units were slow to act and
take the necessary precautions to prevent the attacks in time despite
the existence of intelligence reports warning of the terrorists' plans.
"These have left big blemishes on the military; therefore, some
forces in the military realize that its current political status is
not sustainable," he added. He was referring to the ongoing civilian
search of a Special Forces Command facility in Ankara where the
military's top-secret documents are archived.
The search started about two weeks ago as part of a probe into a
potential assassination plot against Deputy Prime Minister Bulent
Arınc allegedly devised by a group in the military.
Regarding repeated messages from the president and the prime minister
about harmony among state institutions, Laciner said it is impossible
not to have conflict.
"Indeed, conflict is required in this process," he said.
You wrote an article in mid-2008 saying the Turkish military acts
like a political party. Has this changed at all?
This is what I have been saying for years. A military force acting
like a political party does not occur easily, and it is hard to
maintain. Political parties in Turkey try to live with this fact. This
also goes for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party),
despite its apparent support for a legal investigation into the
strike forces of shady mechanisms inside the military such as the
Special Forces."
Are you referring to the Ergenekon investigation and the ongoing
search at the Special Forces Command?
The role of the Special Forces was clear even in the first Ergenekon
indictment. But the prosecutor was unable to move forward to further
investigate it. The fact is that this approach has been a part of
the policies of the government, which has a certain strategy. They
had to choose their fights.
Omer Laciner, editor-in-chief of socialist monthly Birikim
A graduate of the 1966 class of the Military Academy, he was arrested
in 1971 because of his connections with the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front (THKP/C). He was expelled from the military for political
reasons. Upon his release from prison in 1975, he was among the
founding members of Birikim, a socialist cultural periodical.
Following the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, he was in exile in France.
What fights do you think the government was able to undertake?
We have to go back in time to revisit the environment that brought
the AK Party to power. They saw an unprecedented rise from the ashes
of the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed for becoming a "focus of
anti-secular activities." AK Party politicians did not even know if
they could pass the 10 percent election barrier. But they received the
votes of the pious Muslims -- more than even the center-right, which
was fragmented. It had two goals: to alleviate or eliminate fears
(stemming centrally from the military in addition to other forces)
about the party's intentions toward secularism and to consolidate its
center-right votes. In order to consolidate its center-right votes, the
government left some issues out of its agenda, such as the headscarf
ban and religious education, after some initiatives in that regard,
but stepped back as those issues were not central to center-right
voters. The government also had knowledge of the military's role
in Turkey.
Please elaborate.
The military's social engineering plans were revealed on several
occasions. Examples include the "postmodern" Feb. 28, 1997 military
coup, the West Study Group (BCG) and others like "The Plan to Shape
Turkey." There were also a number of attacks, such as the one on the
Council of State [that left a senior judge dead and seriously injured
four others in 2006] and assassinations, such as that of Hrant Dink
[a Turkish-Armenian editor murdered by an ultranationalist youth in
January 2007], through which status quo forces intended to create an
impression that the government was unable to lead the country. When
did the government start to investigate these issues?
Turks and Kurds: From marriage of love to marriage of interest
You wrote a book in 1991 on the Kurdish problem titled "Henuz Vakit
Varken" (When We Still Have Time). Do you think there is still time
to solve the Kurdish problem?
There is some emotional breaking off. Both sides are in their
nationalistic identity boxes now. Both sides lost a lot of energy in
efforts to fuse with each other. But neither side can take the risk
of a legal and physical break-off, though they feel that they should
stay in their own homes.
The government's initiative was hurt by the closure of the pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (DTP), but do you think the Kurdish initiative
will still continue?
It has to. The government will have no other opportunity. But the
initiative should have an element to prevent this emotional break-off
from going further. If not, there might be conflict that cannot be
prevented. We had an example recently in Mersin where Kurds and Turks
clashed. Tomorrow, such clashes might get out of hand. The government
should therefore change its approach.
What should the government do, exactly?
The government should not start initiatives as if it is granting some
rights to Kurds out of kindness. Before TRT-6 began broadcasting,
Kurds wanted to be included in the process. They have to have a say
in it. That's why they say the government should talk to them.
There should be talks on the basis of equality. Indeed, both sides
should be stripped of their nationalistic identities and uncompromising
positions. One side's loss should not be considered the other's
gain. At the end, the issue is about what kind of society they want
to be. Are we just trying to keep the Kurds inside the sovereign area
of Turks, or are we trying to consolidate the feeling of togetherness
that has been damaged among people from different ethnic backgrounds
in Turkey? Can we have the people say that they are first and foremost
"Turkiyeli" and then Turks, Kurds, etc?
Right now, the government steps back when nationalistic elements get
loud. The situation is so serious that when people joyfully celebrated
the arrival of Kurds from the Makhmour camp in northern Iraq, the
government became full of anxiety. If Kurds, who had suffered greatly
in the past, were celebrating, Turks should have been joyful, too.
When?
When the status quo forces tried to prevent the election of Abdullah
Gul to the presidency. It was then that the government started to
fight. During the Ergenekon investigation, the government realized
that standing firm against status quo forces, and especially the
military, works. The government was able to get even more votes from
supporters of center-right parties -- the True Path Party (DYP) and
the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), both of which had seen decreasing
support and were finally eliminated from the political arena --
because of its firm stance. As a result, the government had to face a
counter-attack: a closure case against it. This was a demonstration
of how the judiciary was used by status quo forces in that fierce
battle [the Constitutional Court declared the party a "focal point
of anti-secular activity" but fell short of closing it].
'There is conflict among institutions' With an investigation currently
going deeper into the military's secret files, what is the status of
military-civilian relations now?
The AK Party's recent operations are about having the military on
its side. I don't think the government is trying to make the military
conform with the standards of developed democracies where militaries
are silent on political issues.
Do you think the chief of General Staff supports these operations?
It is not something that the chief of General Staff can support
all alone. There is no doubt that the upper echelons of the military
support the Ergenekon operation. Some forces in the military are aware
of the fact that the military's politicization cannot go on like this.
In 2002, they were able to have some people believe the AK Party
had a "hidden agenda," that it was promoting radical Islamization in
Turkey, that Shariah was the end goal. But it has become harder for
the military to push for that view seven years after the AK Party
came to power. This argument no longer has much credibility.
What else? What makes the military more prone to lose its highly
respected status?
Additionally, the military lost more credibility as increased
revelations showed there were some illegal connections within it. For
example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon
network, and there were credible reports that security flaws played a
large role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun
attacks [by the PKK]. All that did not give the military the upper
hand. On the contrary, it left big blemishes on the military.
Therefore, some circles in the military realize that its current
political status is not sustainable. But even as those circles desire
to normalize the military, they do not want to give up all of their
financial privileges and status.
President Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan insistently say
that there is no conflict among state institutions. Is this possible?
How can this process of normalization be completed without conflict?
It is impossible not to have conflict. Indeed, conflict is required in
this process. The status quo -- pro-republican and staunch secularist
forces -- was clearly defeated in the 2007 elections. But it does not
want to leave the arena without putting up a fight. And one of the
fiercest battles is going on at the level of the high judiciary. There
are government operations at this level, too -- some through new
appointments. So at some point the judiciary will have to become
accountable. But we do not yet know if the judiciary will turn out
to be a pro-AK Party force or a clean, impartial one. The AK Party
is not very clear and straightforward in that regard.
What makes you say that?
One example in that regard is how the media sector operates. Instead
of having rules to make the sector a diverse, free, independent
and reliable one, the AK Party uses its power to bring the media in
line with the government. There is no effort by the government to
make the media fall in line with the media ethics standards of the
European Union.
If we go back to our former discussion about civilian-military
relations, do you think the period of military coups is over in Turkey?
In Turkey, the military and judiciary are still state institutions.
The majority of society still has the mentality that these institutions
should protect the state. On the other hand, it would be hard for
the military to stage coups because it has lost some prestige. If the
military stages a coup at this time, it would not have the support it
had in the past. But society unfortunately still has a pro-military
mindset rather than a democratic approach. And this mindset will be
seen clearly if society is in chaos. People would say the military
should come and correct the situation.
'Feelings of jealousy and degradation toward new bourgeoisie' Where
does the Republican People's Party (CHP) stand in this debate?
The CHP is in a position to protect the military's political role,
which became institutionalized in the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s,
the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), which played the role of
the CHP at the time, had a leading role in the democratization of
society. It was a party of change until shortly before the rise of
the RP. When the AK Party became a party of change, the CHP became
resistant to change. The CHP could have chosen to become more radical
in its stance and said that the AK Party's democratization moves were
not enough. But it did not.
In your opinion, why did it not do so?
Apparently, its traditional middle-class urban supporters in western
Anatolia have felt jealous and degraded by the new bourgeoisie class
represented by the AK Party. The CHP gave in to that. Today's debate of
secularism versus anti-secularism is indeed a class conflict between
the two middle-class segments of society.
Do you believe the Turkish left will have a say in society any
time soon?
The main problem is about finding an answer to society's demand
for equality. Socialism should be remade. I don't think people who
accept the old definitions of socialism would be able to play a role
on the left. There needs to be a new approach taking into account all
inequalities in the lives of humans, not only in the area of profit
sharing. Right now, the left does not have anything new or exciting to
say in that regard. But I am hopeful that it will in the near future.
Today's Zaman
Jan 11 2010
Turkey
Omer Laciner, editor-in-chief of the socialist monthly Birikim, has
said some circles in the military realize that the military's current
political status is no longer sustainable and therefore support the
government-initiated probe into the system.
He said the military has lost credibility as there have been more
revelations about illegal connections within it.
"For example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon
network, and there were reports that security flaws played a large
role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun
attacks [by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)]," he told Today's
Zaman for our Monday Talk interview, referring to the ongoing probe
into the Ergenekon criminal network accused of plotting to overthrow
the government.
'The Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon network;
there were credible reports that security flaws played a large role in
the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun attacks. All
that did not give the military the upper hand; on the contrary,
it left big blemishes. Therefore, some forces in the military have
realized that its current political status is no longer sustainable'
The 2006 Council of State attack left a senior judge dead. Although it
was initially presented as an attack by a religious fundamentalist,
the gunman's links to Ergenekon were later confirmed during the
investigation. The PKK's attack on Daglıca in 2007 and on Aktutun
in 2008, in which dozens of soldiers died, raised serious questions
about how and why the respective military units were slow to act and
take the necessary precautions to prevent the attacks in time despite
the existence of intelligence reports warning of the terrorists' plans.
"These have left big blemishes on the military; therefore, some
forces in the military realize that its current political status is
not sustainable," he added. He was referring to the ongoing civilian
search of a Special Forces Command facility in Ankara where the
military's top-secret documents are archived.
The search started about two weeks ago as part of a probe into a
potential assassination plot against Deputy Prime Minister Bulent
Arınc allegedly devised by a group in the military.
Regarding repeated messages from the president and the prime minister
about harmony among state institutions, Laciner said it is impossible
not to have conflict.
"Indeed, conflict is required in this process," he said.
You wrote an article in mid-2008 saying the Turkish military acts
like a political party. Has this changed at all?
This is what I have been saying for years. A military force acting
like a political party does not occur easily, and it is hard to
maintain. Political parties in Turkey try to live with this fact. This
also goes for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party),
despite its apparent support for a legal investigation into the
strike forces of shady mechanisms inside the military such as the
Special Forces."
Are you referring to the Ergenekon investigation and the ongoing
search at the Special Forces Command?
The role of the Special Forces was clear even in the first Ergenekon
indictment. But the prosecutor was unable to move forward to further
investigate it. The fact is that this approach has been a part of
the policies of the government, which has a certain strategy. They
had to choose their fights.
Omer Laciner, editor-in-chief of socialist monthly Birikim
A graduate of the 1966 class of the Military Academy, he was arrested
in 1971 because of his connections with the Turkish People's Liberation
Party/Front (THKP/C). He was expelled from the military for political
reasons. Upon his release from prison in 1975, he was among the
founding members of Birikim, a socialist cultural periodical.
Following the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, he was in exile in France.
What fights do you think the government was able to undertake?
We have to go back in time to revisit the environment that brought
the AK Party to power. They saw an unprecedented rise from the ashes
of the Welfare Party (RP), which was closed for becoming a "focus of
anti-secular activities." AK Party politicians did not even know if
they could pass the 10 percent election barrier. But they received the
votes of the pious Muslims -- more than even the center-right, which
was fragmented. It had two goals: to alleviate or eliminate fears
(stemming centrally from the military in addition to other forces)
about the party's intentions toward secularism and to consolidate its
center-right votes. In order to consolidate its center-right votes, the
government left some issues out of its agenda, such as the headscarf
ban and religious education, after some initiatives in that regard,
but stepped back as those issues were not central to center-right
voters. The government also had knowledge of the military's role
in Turkey.
Please elaborate.
The military's social engineering plans were revealed on several
occasions. Examples include the "postmodern" Feb. 28, 1997 military
coup, the West Study Group (BCG) and others like "The Plan to Shape
Turkey." There were also a number of attacks, such as the one on the
Council of State [that left a senior judge dead and seriously injured
four others in 2006] and assassinations, such as that of Hrant Dink
[a Turkish-Armenian editor murdered by an ultranationalist youth in
January 2007], through which status quo forces intended to create an
impression that the government was unable to lead the country. When
did the government start to investigate these issues?
Turks and Kurds: From marriage of love to marriage of interest
You wrote a book in 1991 on the Kurdish problem titled "Henuz Vakit
Varken" (When We Still Have Time). Do you think there is still time
to solve the Kurdish problem?
There is some emotional breaking off. Both sides are in their
nationalistic identity boxes now. Both sides lost a lot of energy in
efforts to fuse with each other. But neither side can take the risk
of a legal and physical break-off, though they feel that they should
stay in their own homes.
The government's initiative was hurt by the closure of the pro-Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (DTP), but do you think the Kurdish initiative
will still continue?
It has to. The government will have no other opportunity. But the
initiative should have an element to prevent this emotional break-off
from going further. If not, there might be conflict that cannot be
prevented. We had an example recently in Mersin where Kurds and Turks
clashed. Tomorrow, such clashes might get out of hand. The government
should therefore change its approach.
What should the government do, exactly?
The government should not start initiatives as if it is granting some
rights to Kurds out of kindness. Before TRT-6 began broadcasting,
Kurds wanted to be included in the process. They have to have a say
in it. That's why they say the government should talk to them.
There should be talks on the basis of equality. Indeed, both sides
should be stripped of their nationalistic identities and uncompromising
positions. One side's loss should not be considered the other's
gain. At the end, the issue is about what kind of society they want
to be. Are we just trying to keep the Kurds inside the sovereign area
of Turks, or are we trying to consolidate the feeling of togetherness
that has been damaged among people from different ethnic backgrounds
in Turkey? Can we have the people say that they are first and foremost
"Turkiyeli" and then Turks, Kurds, etc?
Right now, the government steps back when nationalistic elements get
loud. The situation is so serious that when people joyfully celebrated
the arrival of Kurds from the Makhmour camp in northern Iraq, the
government became full of anxiety. If Kurds, who had suffered greatly
in the past, were celebrating, Turks should have been joyful, too.
When?
When the status quo forces tried to prevent the election of Abdullah
Gul to the presidency. It was then that the government started to
fight. During the Ergenekon investigation, the government realized
that standing firm against status quo forces, and especially the
military, works. The government was able to get even more votes from
supporters of center-right parties -- the True Path Party (DYP) and
the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), both of which had seen decreasing
support and were finally eliminated from the political arena --
because of its firm stance. As a result, the government had to face a
counter-attack: a closure case against it. This was a demonstration
of how the judiciary was used by status quo forces in that fierce
battle [the Constitutional Court declared the party a "focal point
of anti-secular activity" but fell short of closing it].
'There is conflict among institutions' With an investigation currently
going deeper into the military's secret files, what is the status of
military-civilian relations now?
The AK Party's recent operations are about having the military on
its side. I don't think the government is trying to make the military
conform with the standards of developed democracies where militaries
are silent on political issues.
Do you think the chief of General Staff supports these operations?
It is not something that the chief of General Staff can support
all alone. There is no doubt that the upper echelons of the military
support the Ergenekon operation. Some forces in the military are aware
of the fact that the military's politicization cannot go on like this.
In 2002, they were able to have some people believe the AK Party
had a "hidden agenda," that it was promoting radical Islamization in
Turkey, that Shariah was the end goal. But it has become harder for
the military to push for that view seven years after the AK Party
came to power. This argument no longer has much credibility.
What else? What makes the military more prone to lose its highly
respected status?
Additionally, the military lost more credibility as increased
revelations showed there were some illegal connections within it. For
example, the Council of State attack was linked to the Ergenekon
network, and there were credible reports that security flaws played a
large role in the deaths of many soldiers in the Daglıca and Aktutun
attacks [by the PKK]. All that did not give the military the upper
hand. On the contrary, it left big blemishes on the military.
Therefore, some circles in the military realize that its current
political status is not sustainable. But even as those circles desire
to normalize the military, they do not want to give up all of their
financial privileges and status.
President Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan insistently say
that there is no conflict among state institutions. Is this possible?
How can this process of normalization be completed without conflict?
It is impossible not to have conflict. Indeed, conflict is required in
this process. The status quo -- pro-republican and staunch secularist
forces -- was clearly defeated in the 2007 elections. But it does not
want to leave the arena without putting up a fight. And one of the
fiercest battles is going on at the level of the high judiciary. There
are government operations at this level, too -- some through new
appointments. So at some point the judiciary will have to become
accountable. But we do not yet know if the judiciary will turn out
to be a pro-AK Party force or a clean, impartial one. The AK Party
is not very clear and straightforward in that regard.
What makes you say that?
One example in that regard is how the media sector operates. Instead
of having rules to make the sector a diverse, free, independent
and reliable one, the AK Party uses its power to bring the media in
line with the government. There is no effort by the government to
make the media fall in line with the media ethics standards of the
European Union.
If we go back to our former discussion about civilian-military
relations, do you think the period of military coups is over in Turkey?
In Turkey, the military and judiciary are still state institutions.
The majority of society still has the mentality that these institutions
should protect the state. On the other hand, it would be hard for
the military to stage coups because it has lost some prestige. If the
military stages a coup at this time, it would not have the support it
had in the past. But society unfortunately still has a pro-military
mindset rather than a democratic approach. And this mindset will be
seen clearly if society is in chaos. People would say the military
should come and correct the situation.
'Feelings of jealousy and degradation toward new bourgeoisie' Where
does the Republican People's Party (CHP) stand in this debate?
The CHP is in a position to protect the military's political role,
which became institutionalized in the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s,
the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), which played the role of
the CHP at the time, had a leading role in the democratization of
society. It was a party of change until shortly before the rise of
the RP. When the AK Party became a party of change, the CHP became
resistant to change. The CHP could have chosen to become more radical
in its stance and said that the AK Party's democratization moves were
not enough. But it did not.
In your opinion, why did it not do so?
Apparently, its traditional middle-class urban supporters in western
Anatolia have felt jealous and degraded by the new bourgeoisie class
represented by the AK Party. The CHP gave in to that. Today's debate of
secularism versus anti-secularism is indeed a class conflict between
the two middle-class segments of society.
Do you believe the Turkish left will have a say in society any
time soon?
The main problem is about finding an answer to society's demand
for equality. Socialism should be remade. I don't think people who
accept the old definitions of socialism would be able to play a role
on the left. There needs to be a new approach taking into account all
inequalities in the lives of humans, not only in the area of profit
sharing. Right now, the left does not have anything new or exciting to
say in that regard. But I am hopeful that it will in the near future.