news.az, Azerbaijan
Jan 16 2010
Turkey more likely to ratify Armenian protocols after PM's Russia trip
Sat 16 January 2010 | 07:03 GMT Text size:
Artem Yerkanyan News.Az interviews Artem Yerkanyan, political
commentator on Armenia's Shant TV channel and Novoye Vremya newspaper.
The Constitutional Court of Armenia has recognized the
Armenian-Turkish protocols as compliant with the Armenian
Constitution, although the opposition is protesting at this decision.
Do you think the Armenian parliament will ratify the protocols in
these conditions?
I think the verdict of the Constitutional Court will not influence the
further ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols in the National
Assembly. The Constitutional Court has simply given a legal assessment
while parliament will base its decision on political expediency. The
political validity of the protocols can be disputed, but it is
difficult to see any contradictions to the Constitution in them. The
court could not have taken any other decision. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that the next barrier to the protocols' validation will be
removed so easily. By submitting the protocols for assessment at the
Constitutional Court and getting its approval, the Armenian political
leadership has shown consistency in implementing the agreements
reached. The path that Armenia could take alone has ended. Further
steps will depend fully on Ankara's political will. The protocols will
be included on the agenda of the National Assembly only after they
have been ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If this
happens, the opposition protests will not play a major role as the
parliamentary majority is positive on this issue. In addition, the
opposition arguments will be weakened by that time, because the
authorities will be able to describe the ratification of the protocols
by the Turks without preconditions as a success for Armenian
diplomacy.
How will the Turkish side respond?
I do not think the legal assessment of the protocols by the
Constitutional Court of Armenia will have an influence on the plans of
the Turkish leadership. No response to the decision of the court
should be expected. Turkey will have to respond not to the
Constitutional Court of Armenia but to the United States, which is a
specific guarantor of the implementation of the Zurich agreements. If
Erdogan does not sanction ratification of the protocols, he will not
only breach the agreements reached with Armenia but also face
Washington's pressure. This will significantly raise the chances of
the adoption of the so-called `Armenian resolution' [recognizing the
mass killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey as genocide] in the US
Congress.
How do you evaluate the Turkish prime minister's visit to Russia?
Erdogan has reiterated to Russia Turkey's position that the
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is impossible without the
Karabakh conflict settlement. How will events develop further?
I think the results of the visit were quite positive for Armenia, as
they showed the obvious fact that Ankara's attempts to speak to
Yerevan in the language of ultimatums are rejected by all the
superpowers. Russian Prime Minister Putin said openly that Moscow
considers it inadmissible to bind the process of Armenian-Turkish
normalization to the Karabakh issue. Armenia appreciates the Kremlin's
constructive, principled position. It is clear that the approaches of
Moscow and Washington are almost identical on this issue. Ankara feels
the strong pressure of the superpowers which, I think, will help
reconcile the Turkish leaders to the inevitability of giving up on
preconditions. I think the ratification of the protocols in the Grand
National Assembly has become more likely since Erdogan's visit to
Russia.
What do you think of reports that `Turkey and Russia are holding
private talks' and `they are cooking something up"? Does this mean
that the Karabakh problem may be settled soon?
I don't worry that this dish will be hazardous for Armenia's health.
Though it may seem paradoxical, I think that in this case Yerevan and
Ankara are tactical allies in a sense. The interests of Armenia and
Turkey demand the same: Azerbaijan should be reconciled with the
realities and make a reasonable compromise. This will allow Erdogan to
ratify the protocols with a clear conscience and save face. I think
the Turkish leadership's main problem lies in saving face. Erdogan
needs to justify his readiness to ratify the protocols at least with a
single document that would contain the signatures of the presidents of
Azerbaijan and Armenia. The content of this document is completely
unimportant to him. I think reports about the possible signing of a
new, purely declarative, document on an agreement on the renewed
Madrid principles at the next meeting of the presidents of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Russia is no accident. A declaration rather than a
framework agreement is being talked about. This less binding document
would be enough for Erdogan to say that he has kept his promise and
now has the right to ratify the protocols, but it would not mean that
the sides will be close to settling the Karabakh conflict.
Kamala Mammadova
News.Az
Jan 16 2010
Turkey more likely to ratify Armenian protocols after PM's Russia trip
Sat 16 January 2010 | 07:03 GMT Text size:
Artem Yerkanyan News.Az interviews Artem Yerkanyan, political
commentator on Armenia's Shant TV channel and Novoye Vremya newspaper.
The Constitutional Court of Armenia has recognized the
Armenian-Turkish protocols as compliant with the Armenian
Constitution, although the opposition is protesting at this decision.
Do you think the Armenian parliament will ratify the protocols in
these conditions?
I think the verdict of the Constitutional Court will not influence the
further ratification of the Armenian-Turkish protocols in the National
Assembly. The Constitutional Court has simply given a legal assessment
while parliament will base its decision on political expediency. The
political validity of the protocols can be disputed, but it is
difficult to see any contradictions to the Constitution in them. The
court could not have taken any other decision. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that the next barrier to the protocols' validation will be
removed so easily. By submitting the protocols for assessment at the
Constitutional Court and getting its approval, the Armenian political
leadership has shown consistency in implementing the agreements
reached. The path that Armenia could take alone has ended. Further
steps will depend fully on Ankara's political will. The protocols will
be included on the agenda of the National Assembly only after they
have been ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If this
happens, the opposition protests will not play a major role as the
parliamentary majority is positive on this issue. In addition, the
opposition arguments will be weakened by that time, because the
authorities will be able to describe the ratification of the protocols
by the Turks without preconditions as a success for Armenian
diplomacy.
How will the Turkish side respond?
I do not think the legal assessment of the protocols by the
Constitutional Court of Armenia will have an influence on the plans of
the Turkish leadership. No response to the decision of the court
should be expected. Turkey will have to respond not to the
Constitutional Court of Armenia but to the United States, which is a
specific guarantor of the implementation of the Zurich agreements. If
Erdogan does not sanction ratification of the protocols, he will not
only breach the agreements reached with Armenia but also face
Washington's pressure. This will significantly raise the chances of
the adoption of the so-called `Armenian resolution' [recognizing the
mass killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey as genocide] in the US
Congress.
How do you evaluate the Turkish prime minister's visit to Russia?
Erdogan has reiterated to Russia Turkey's position that the
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is impossible without the
Karabakh conflict settlement. How will events develop further?
I think the results of the visit were quite positive for Armenia, as
they showed the obvious fact that Ankara's attempts to speak to
Yerevan in the language of ultimatums are rejected by all the
superpowers. Russian Prime Minister Putin said openly that Moscow
considers it inadmissible to bind the process of Armenian-Turkish
normalization to the Karabakh issue. Armenia appreciates the Kremlin's
constructive, principled position. It is clear that the approaches of
Moscow and Washington are almost identical on this issue. Ankara feels
the strong pressure of the superpowers which, I think, will help
reconcile the Turkish leaders to the inevitability of giving up on
preconditions. I think the ratification of the protocols in the Grand
National Assembly has become more likely since Erdogan's visit to
Russia.
What do you think of reports that `Turkey and Russia are holding
private talks' and `they are cooking something up"? Does this mean
that the Karabakh problem may be settled soon?
I don't worry that this dish will be hazardous for Armenia's health.
Though it may seem paradoxical, I think that in this case Yerevan and
Ankara are tactical allies in a sense. The interests of Armenia and
Turkey demand the same: Azerbaijan should be reconciled with the
realities and make a reasonable compromise. This will allow Erdogan to
ratify the protocols with a clear conscience and save face. I think
the Turkish leadership's main problem lies in saving face. Erdogan
needs to justify his readiness to ratify the protocols at least with a
single document that would contain the signatures of the presidents of
Azerbaijan and Armenia. The content of this document is completely
unimportant to him. I think reports about the possible signing of a
new, purely declarative, document on an agreement on the renewed
Madrid principles at the next meeting of the presidents of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Russia is no accident. A declaration rather than a
framework agreement is being talked about. This less binding document
would be enough for Erdogan to say that he has kept his promise and
now has the right to ratify the protocols, but it would not mean that
the sides will be close to settling the Karabakh conflict.
Kamala Mammadova
News.Az