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MOSCOW MAY DECIDE TO SHIFT ITS POLICY ON KARABAKH - ARMENIAN ANALYST
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Jan 19 2010
Azerbaijan
Richard Giragosian News.Az interviews Richard Giragosian, director
of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies.
The Armenian Constitutional Court took a positive decision on
the Armenian-Turkish protocols. Will ratification by the Armenian
parliament be the next step?
Clearly, the 12 January decision by the Armenian Constitutional Court
to certify that the two diplomatic protocols on the "normalization"
of Turkish-Armenian relations are in conformity with the Armenian
constitution was no surprise. The court decision follows the 23
November move by the Armenian government to formally request that
the Constitutional Court "certify the legality" of the protocols,
a requirement for all international treaties under the terms of the
Armenian constitution.
Although the protocols were widely expected to be approved by the
Constitutional Court, and are equally expected to be adopted by the
Armenian parliament, the timing of the next stage of Armenian action
on the protocols depends on Turkey. The status of the protocols has
now clearly been delayed, and is now hostage to domestic Turkish
politics. The fact that the fate of the protocols now depends on the
course of domestic politics within Turkey also means that no one -
not the Americans, not the EU, not Russia, nor even Armenia - can
influence the outcome. Nevertheless, the Armenian government remains
committed to adopting the protocols, but only after or at the same
time as Turkish parliamentary ratification.
Turkey's foreign minister has said that the Turkish parliament cannot
ratify the protocols until the Karabakh conflict has been settled. How
would you comment on this?
Aside from the Turkish rhetoric and demands for concessions form
Armenia over Karabakh, the Armenian position on the course of its
diplomacy with Turkey remains unchanged. The Armenian government
is committed to the terms outlined in the two diplomatic protocols
that were signed by Armenia and Turkey on 10 October 2009. There
was no reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the protocols
in any way and, at this stage it is not acceptable for any side to
try to re-connect the issue of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy with the
Karabakh issue. In fact, the decision to remove the Karabakh issue
as a precondition for the normalization of relations between Armenia
and Turkey was a Turkish decision, reflecting their need to pursue
a new foreign policy toward the region.
This Turkish decision also in part reflected Ankara's frustration
at having its foreign policy options limited by Baku's virtual "veto
power" over any new policy. Thus, Turkey was, and is, seeking to chart
its own course of engagement in the region based on its own national
interests and no longer simply to support or follow Azerbaijan's
strategic agenda. And this is why it may work this time -- because
Turkey's strategic plan is no longer simply to please the US or appease
the EU, but reflects its own goals and aims in the South Caucasus.
Turkey's prime minister has set that resolution of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from Karabakh as conditions for the normalization of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan. How will the Armenian government respond?
Turkey is in danger of triggering a "crisis of confidence", where
all great powers will only see Turkey as unreliable and insincere if
Ankara fails to meet its obligations to Yerevan.
Clearly, if Turkey fails this test with Armenia, it will not only make
any future efforts at "normalizing relations" much more difficult,
it may actually trigger a shift in Armenian policy, to one with
clear and strong preconditions, this time imposing new demands on
Turkey. In such a case, the international community will most likely
only support Armenia, in terms of genocide recognition and pushing
Turkey further to face the legacy of its genocidal past, with all
the legal and diplomatic implications this implies for Turkey.
But at the same time, this strong Armenian stance does not mean that
Armenia wants to challenge the protocols or its diplomacy with Turkey.
This is more about a "diplomatic test of wills" between Armenia and
Turkey, and that also involves Azerbaijan of course. But the real test
will be how Turkey responds and how it reacts, as Turkey clearly holds
the initiative, and both Armenia and Azerbaijan are equally awaiting
the Turkish response.
How great is the possibility of the start of war in the region,
if the sides will not compromise?
There is a danger of war in this region. And this is also evident in
recent statements from Baku. For example, in most countries, leaders
usually address their people with a traditional New Year's message
that seeks to convey a message of cooperation, peace and prosperity.
But in the case of Azerbaijan, this New Year's message for 2010 was one
of war. Sadly, the militant threats and aggressive rhetoric emanating
from Baku were a disturbing message for Yerevan. But it was also a
warning to the international community that peace and security in
the South Caucasus will not be a certainty for 2010.
In the words of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, his New Year's
message for the coming year was a stark warning that "Azerbaijan
is strengthening its military potential", which he vowed was
"increasing day by day" and was "being strengthened in terms of
weapons and equipment". Further explaining the deeper meaning behind
such threatening language, the Azerbaijani leader warned that Baku
has the "military effectiveness" and will "use all our means to solve
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh".
Such militant words of war are still empty threats, however, as the
exaggerated boasts of Azerbaijan's military strength remain remote from
the reality of the poor state of readiness and inferior capability of
the Azerbaijani armed forces. But the bellicose warnings and threats
by the Azerbaijani leadership only threaten regional security and
stability, an even more disturbing fact in the wake of the war in
Georgia in August 2008. Clearly, Azerbaijan has failed to learn the
primary lesson from the Georgia war -- that there is no military
solution to essentially political problems. And for Nagorno-Karabakh,
Azerbaijan's bluff and bluster only reaffirm the impossibility of
any return to Azerbaijani control.
Ironically, such threats from Azerbaijan only reveal their lack of
sincerity and questionable commitment to international mediation
efforts seeking a negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Such rhetoric also demonstrates the dubious and futile
nature of Turkey's demands for concessions from Armenia over Karabakh.
Thus, with the start of a new year, the South Caucasus deserves real
diplomacy rather than a reliance on a war of words in which Azerbaijan
only recycles the same threats of war over Karabakh. Sadly, for the
people of the South Caucasus, 2010 promises to be yet another year of
challenges and threats to lasting stability and security in the region.
What do you expect from the visit to the region of the co-chairs of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group
and the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia?
The international mediators handling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
the OSCE's Minsk Group, has accelerated diplomatic mediation in
recent months and is seeking to leverage the new momentum from
Armenian-Turkish diplomacy. Yet although the Minsk Group has now
reactivated and reinvigorated its efforts, any real breakthrough over
Karabakh seems unlikely, especially as the two sides are simply too
far apart. In addition, the Armenian-Turkish issue actually makes
any concession over Karabakh even more difficult, especially for the
Armenian side, which would be politically vulnerable if it attempts
to make any real concession on Karabakh too soon after the risky
diplomatic engagement with Turkey. But once Kazakhstan assumes the
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, there may be a new attempt to push
the mediation of Karabakh even faster and further.
The real key to resolving the Karabakh conflict may be something
that has not been addressed or emphasized enough -- the need for
true democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to any real peace deal
over Karabakh. Perhaps the Karabakh conflict should remain "frozen"
and efforts should focus on building durable and deeper democracy
in the states themselves first; only then perhaps can a true peace
deal be reached. For this reason, the Karabakh situation seems likely
to remain locked in the same status for the next five to ten years,
despite the best efforts of the OSCE mediators. But at the same time,
although Azerbaijani officials may not like to recognize the reality
of the situation, it is impossible and destabilizing for Karabakh
realistically to ever be returned to Azerbaijan. Any forcible attempt
to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan may actually trigger the war that
Azerbaijani leaders have been threatening for so long.
Again, the OSCE seeks to leverage the momentum in Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy, but also seeks to work with Russia in pressuring all sides
to make some sort of breakthrough. But a central obstacle remains
the absence of any negotiators from Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which
is also a fundamental problem.
For Russia, while the status quo (of an unresolved conflict) serves
its interests, Moscow may decide to shift its policy on Karabakh away
from its traditional pro-Armenian stance and adopt a more "neutral"
policy that will help improve Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Such
a shift may also be made in order to work closer with the West,
and the US, and demonstrate that one year after the war in Georgia,
Russia can contribute positively to regional security in some ways,
and it may help to make the region an "arena of cooperation" rather
than an "arena of competition". But "independence" for Karabakh is
not realistic for Russia, and Moscow does not seem ready to make any
move toward such recognition. Moscow may prefer to bolster its power
and influence from the last remaining "frozen conflict" in the region.
Kamala Mammadova
news.az
Jan 19 2010
Azerbaijan
Richard Giragosian News.Az interviews Richard Giragosian, director
of the Armenian Centre for National and International Studies.
The Armenian Constitutional Court took a positive decision on
the Armenian-Turkish protocols. Will ratification by the Armenian
parliament be the next step?
Clearly, the 12 January decision by the Armenian Constitutional Court
to certify that the two diplomatic protocols on the "normalization"
of Turkish-Armenian relations are in conformity with the Armenian
constitution was no surprise. The court decision follows the 23
November move by the Armenian government to formally request that
the Constitutional Court "certify the legality" of the protocols,
a requirement for all international treaties under the terms of the
Armenian constitution.
Although the protocols were widely expected to be approved by the
Constitutional Court, and are equally expected to be adopted by the
Armenian parliament, the timing of the next stage of Armenian action
on the protocols depends on Turkey. The status of the protocols has
now clearly been delayed, and is now hostage to domestic Turkish
politics. The fact that the fate of the protocols now depends on the
course of domestic politics within Turkey also means that no one -
not the Americans, not the EU, not Russia, nor even Armenia - can
influence the outcome. Nevertheless, the Armenian government remains
committed to adopting the protocols, but only after or at the same
time as Turkish parliamentary ratification.
Turkey's foreign minister has said that the Turkish parliament cannot
ratify the protocols until the Karabakh conflict has been settled. How
would you comment on this?
Aside from the Turkish rhetoric and demands for concessions form
Armenia over Karabakh, the Armenian position on the course of its
diplomacy with Turkey remains unchanged. The Armenian government
is committed to the terms outlined in the two diplomatic protocols
that were signed by Armenia and Turkey on 10 October 2009. There
was no reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the protocols
in any way and, at this stage it is not acceptable for any side to
try to re-connect the issue of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy with the
Karabakh issue. In fact, the decision to remove the Karabakh issue
as a precondition for the normalization of relations between Armenia
and Turkey was a Turkish decision, reflecting their need to pursue
a new foreign policy toward the region.
This Turkish decision also in part reflected Ankara's frustration
at having its foreign policy options limited by Baku's virtual "veto
power" over any new policy. Thus, Turkey was, and is, seeking to chart
its own course of engagement in the region based on its own national
interests and no longer simply to support or follow Azerbaijan's
strategic agenda. And this is why it may work this time -- because
Turkey's strategic plan is no longer simply to please the US or appease
the EU, but reflects its own goals and aims in the South Caucasus.
Turkey's prime minister has set that resolution of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from Karabakh as conditions for the normalization of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan. How will the Armenian government respond?
Turkey is in danger of triggering a "crisis of confidence", where
all great powers will only see Turkey as unreliable and insincere if
Ankara fails to meet its obligations to Yerevan.
Clearly, if Turkey fails this test with Armenia, it will not only make
any future efforts at "normalizing relations" much more difficult,
it may actually trigger a shift in Armenian policy, to one with
clear and strong preconditions, this time imposing new demands on
Turkey. In such a case, the international community will most likely
only support Armenia, in terms of genocide recognition and pushing
Turkey further to face the legacy of its genocidal past, with all
the legal and diplomatic implications this implies for Turkey.
But at the same time, this strong Armenian stance does not mean that
Armenia wants to challenge the protocols or its diplomacy with Turkey.
This is more about a "diplomatic test of wills" between Armenia and
Turkey, and that also involves Azerbaijan of course. But the real test
will be how Turkey responds and how it reacts, as Turkey clearly holds
the initiative, and both Armenia and Azerbaijan are equally awaiting
the Turkish response.
How great is the possibility of the start of war in the region,
if the sides will not compromise?
There is a danger of war in this region. And this is also evident in
recent statements from Baku. For example, in most countries, leaders
usually address their people with a traditional New Year's message
that seeks to convey a message of cooperation, peace and prosperity.
But in the case of Azerbaijan, this New Year's message for 2010 was one
of war. Sadly, the militant threats and aggressive rhetoric emanating
from Baku were a disturbing message for Yerevan. But it was also a
warning to the international community that peace and security in
the South Caucasus will not be a certainty for 2010.
In the words of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, his New Year's
message for the coming year was a stark warning that "Azerbaijan
is strengthening its military potential", which he vowed was
"increasing day by day" and was "being strengthened in terms of
weapons and equipment". Further explaining the deeper meaning behind
such threatening language, the Azerbaijani leader warned that Baku
has the "military effectiveness" and will "use all our means to solve
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh".
Such militant words of war are still empty threats, however, as the
exaggerated boasts of Azerbaijan's military strength remain remote from
the reality of the poor state of readiness and inferior capability of
the Azerbaijani armed forces. But the bellicose warnings and threats
by the Azerbaijani leadership only threaten regional security and
stability, an even more disturbing fact in the wake of the war in
Georgia in August 2008. Clearly, Azerbaijan has failed to learn the
primary lesson from the Georgia war -- that there is no military
solution to essentially political problems. And for Nagorno-Karabakh,
Azerbaijan's bluff and bluster only reaffirm the impossibility of
any return to Azerbaijani control.
Ironically, such threats from Azerbaijan only reveal their lack of
sincerity and questionable commitment to international mediation
efforts seeking a negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Such rhetoric also demonstrates the dubious and futile
nature of Turkey's demands for concessions from Armenia over Karabakh.
Thus, with the start of a new year, the South Caucasus deserves real
diplomacy rather than a reliance on a war of words in which Azerbaijan
only recycles the same threats of war over Karabakh. Sadly, for the
people of the South Caucasus, 2010 promises to be yet another year of
challenges and threats to lasting stability and security in the region.
What do you expect from the visit to the region of the co-chairs of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group
and the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia?
The international mediators handling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
the OSCE's Minsk Group, has accelerated diplomatic mediation in
recent months and is seeking to leverage the new momentum from
Armenian-Turkish diplomacy. Yet although the Minsk Group has now
reactivated and reinvigorated its efforts, any real breakthrough over
Karabakh seems unlikely, especially as the two sides are simply too
far apart. In addition, the Armenian-Turkish issue actually makes
any concession over Karabakh even more difficult, especially for the
Armenian side, which would be politically vulnerable if it attempts
to make any real concession on Karabakh too soon after the risky
diplomatic engagement with Turkey. But once Kazakhstan assumes the
chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, there may be a new attempt to push
the mediation of Karabakh even faster and further.
The real key to resolving the Karabakh conflict may be something
that has not been addressed or emphasized enough -- the need for
true democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan prior to any real peace deal
over Karabakh. Perhaps the Karabakh conflict should remain "frozen"
and efforts should focus on building durable and deeper democracy
in the states themselves first; only then perhaps can a true peace
deal be reached. For this reason, the Karabakh situation seems likely
to remain locked in the same status for the next five to ten years,
despite the best efforts of the OSCE mediators. But at the same time,
although Azerbaijani officials may not like to recognize the reality
of the situation, it is impossible and destabilizing for Karabakh
realistically to ever be returned to Azerbaijan. Any forcible attempt
to return Karabakh to Azerbaijan may actually trigger the war that
Azerbaijani leaders have been threatening for so long.
Again, the OSCE seeks to leverage the momentum in Armenian-Turkish
diplomacy, but also seeks to work with Russia in pressuring all sides
to make some sort of breakthrough. But a central obstacle remains
the absence of any negotiators from Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which
is also a fundamental problem.
For Russia, while the status quo (of an unresolved conflict) serves
its interests, Moscow may decide to shift its policy on Karabakh away
from its traditional pro-Armenian stance and adopt a more "neutral"
policy that will help improve Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Such
a shift may also be made in order to work closer with the West,
and the US, and demonstrate that one year after the war in Georgia,
Russia can contribute positively to regional security in some ways,
and it may help to make the region an "arena of cooperation" rather
than an "arena of competition". But "independence" for Karabakh is
not realistic for Russia, and Moscow does not seem ready to make any
move toward such recognition. Moscow may prefer to bolster its power
and influence from the last remaining "frozen conflict" in the region.