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ON TURKEY'S DISCONTENT WITH ARMENIAN COURT
By Armen Gevorgyan
news.am
Jan 21 2010
Armenia
The Armenian public had for a long time been indignant at the fact
that the Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October
10 contained a point on a subcommittee of historians. The Armenian
Diaspora showed a particularly violent reaction by holding rallies in
Paris, Beirut and Los Angeles, the cities RA President Serzh Sargsyan
visited during his pan-Armenian tour.
Meanwhile, Turkey, which was an eyewitness to the problems its partner
in the protocols encountered on the way of pushing the documents
forward to ratification by the Armenian Parliament, was complicating
the situation day after day. Premier Recep Erdogan was adding to the
intolerance by linking the protocols to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who presented the
documents to the Turkish Parliament, confidently listed Turkey's
preconditions incorporated in the documents. The Armenian public
felt something of a shock. Were the Armenian authorities' positions
so weak that they were unable to respond? Frankly speaking, hardly
anyone believed that the subcommittee of historians would not discuss
the problems of Armenian Genocide. Even less people believed that the
Armenian-Turkish process had nothing to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process. Everyone believed it was just "putting a brave face
on a sorry business" or mere excuses.
Few people asked whether the Armenian representatives negotiating
with Turkey could at all discuss the Armenian Genocide, while the RA
Constitution and laws clearly read that the Armenian state must do its
best to contribute to the international recognition of the Armenian
Genocide. Or was not it dangerous for the Armenian authorities to
conduct a dialogue with Turkey in the context with the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem? Was it possible at all?
According to the RA Constitutional Court's verdict, the reopening
of the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of Armenian-Turkish
diplomatic relations, as well as any steps as part of implementation of
the protocols can by no means challenge or thwart Armenia's efforts
to get the Armenian Genocide recognized. Simply speaking, the RA
Constitutional Court only confirmed what the Armenian President and
Foreign Minister had repeatedly stated: the protocols do not contain
any preconditions concerning the Armenian Genocide. Henceforth,
discussing the Armenian Genocide will be in violation of the RA
Constitutional Court's verdict.
In this context Turkey's discontent is one more proof that Turks
themselves think otherwise. And they really believed that the
subcommittee of historians would disprove the Armenian Genocide,
which would mean the Armenian nation's historical collapse.
But the Turkish politicians disappointment over the RA Constitutional
Court's verdict is nothing compared with the blows Ankara received
from Washington and, later, from Moscow. Both the centers destroyed
Turkey's hopes for the Armenian side's defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh
process in the context of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. In fact,
Ankara planned to use the Armenian-Turkish border problem as a means
of pressure on Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. This
strategy is not a new one. Blockade was a means of pressure before,
whereas it is the possibility of its being removed in exchange for
concessions now. However, Turkish Premier Recep Erdogan's meeting with
his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow and, later, with U.S.
President Barack Obama in Washington showed that the "centers of power"
have different views of the problem. The Russian Premier plainly
stated that it would be strategically and tactically wrong to link
the two problems. President Barack Obama did not make any statement,
but events that took place in both the United States and Turkey might
be regarded as a similar response.
So Turkey received a clear and powerful signal that the reopening of
the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of bilateral diplomatic
relations were independent of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The
world capitals gave signals concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, while a signal
concerning the Armenian Genocide was received from Yerevan. The Turkish
side's reaction was quite predictable. They threatened to suspend
the dialogue, which meant that no one but they saw preconditions in
the protocols. So Ankara has to take a different view of the Zurich
documents if, of course, it is really seeking reconciliation with
Armenia, but not fishing in troubled waters - Turkish politicians'
favorite business. We can see proofs of this not only in the South
Caucasus, but also in the Middle East.
By Armen Gevorgyan
news.am
Jan 21 2010
Armenia
The Armenian public had for a long time been indignant at the fact
that the Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October
10 contained a point on a subcommittee of historians. The Armenian
Diaspora showed a particularly violent reaction by holding rallies in
Paris, Beirut and Los Angeles, the cities RA President Serzh Sargsyan
visited during his pan-Armenian tour.
Meanwhile, Turkey, which was an eyewitness to the problems its partner
in the protocols encountered on the way of pushing the documents
forward to ratification by the Armenian Parliament, was complicating
the situation day after day. Premier Recep Erdogan was adding to the
intolerance by linking the protocols to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who presented the
documents to the Turkish Parliament, confidently listed Turkey's
preconditions incorporated in the documents. The Armenian public
felt something of a shock. Were the Armenian authorities' positions
so weak that they were unable to respond? Frankly speaking, hardly
anyone believed that the subcommittee of historians would not discuss
the problems of Armenian Genocide. Even less people believed that the
Armenian-Turkish process had nothing to do with the Nagorno-Karabakh
peace process. Everyone believed it was just "putting a brave face
on a sorry business" or mere excuses.
Few people asked whether the Armenian representatives negotiating
with Turkey could at all discuss the Armenian Genocide, while the RA
Constitution and laws clearly read that the Armenian state must do its
best to contribute to the international recognition of the Armenian
Genocide. Or was not it dangerous for the Armenian authorities to
conduct a dialogue with Turkey in the context with the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem? Was it possible at all?
According to the RA Constitutional Court's verdict, the reopening
of the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of Armenian-Turkish
diplomatic relations, as well as any steps as part of implementation of
the protocols can by no means challenge or thwart Armenia's efforts
to get the Armenian Genocide recognized. Simply speaking, the RA
Constitutional Court only confirmed what the Armenian President and
Foreign Minister had repeatedly stated: the protocols do not contain
any preconditions concerning the Armenian Genocide. Henceforth,
discussing the Armenian Genocide will be in violation of the RA
Constitutional Court's verdict.
In this context Turkey's discontent is one more proof that Turks
themselves think otherwise. And they really believed that the
subcommittee of historians would disprove the Armenian Genocide,
which would mean the Armenian nation's historical collapse.
But the Turkish politicians disappointment over the RA Constitutional
Court's verdict is nothing compared with the blows Ankara received
from Washington and, later, from Moscow. Both the centers destroyed
Turkey's hopes for the Armenian side's defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh
process in the context of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. In fact,
Ankara planned to use the Armenian-Turkish border problem as a means
of pressure on Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. This
strategy is not a new one. Blockade was a means of pressure before,
whereas it is the possibility of its being removed in exchange for
concessions now. However, Turkish Premier Recep Erdogan's meeting with
his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow and, later, with U.S.
President Barack Obama in Washington showed that the "centers of power"
have different views of the problem. The Russian Premier plainly
stated that it would be strategically and tactically wrong to link
the two problems. President Barack Obama did not make any statement,
but events that took place in both the United States and Turkey might
be regarded as a similar response.
So Turkey received a clear and powerful signal that the reopening of
the Armenian-Turkish border and establishment of bilateral diplomatic
relations were independent of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The
world capitals gave signals concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, while a signal
concerning the Armenian Genocide was received from Yerevan. The Turkish
side's reaction was quite predictable. They threatened to suspend
the dialogue, which meant that no one but they saw preconditions in
the protocols. So Ankara has to take a different view of the Zurich
documents if, of course, it is really seeking reconciliation with
Armenia, but not fishing in troubled waters - Turkish politicians'
favorite business. We can see proofs of this not only in the South
Caucasus, but also in the Middle East.