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KARABAKH PROGRESS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH RUSSIA AS SOLE MEDIATORS - EXPERT
Aliyah Fridman
news.az
Jan 22 2010
Azerbaijan
Pavel Salin News.Az interviews Pavel Salin, a leading expert at the
thinktank the Russian Centre of Political Conjuncture.
Russia has intensified its peacekeeping efforts in an attempt to
settle the Karabakh conflict and the next round of negotiations
between presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan will be held in Sochi on 25
January. What do you expect from the meeting?
I don't have great hopes for this meeting. There have been many
rounds. On the other hand, the "football diplomacy" prepared the ground
well for negotiations between the presidents of the two countries. But
on the other hand, Azerbaijan's view has not changed and without
Armenia's readiness to discuss the status of Nagorno-Karabakh within
Azerbaijan, the negotiation process will not be helped. This will
happen only if Russia alone is mediating because Turkey has recently
declared its mediatory ambitions. Turkey has recently been claiming
for the role of a strong regional center. It has its own interest and
it will declare its influence through settling the Karabakh conflict
or at least through taking some steps on this settlement. Therefore,
I think both Russia and Turkey would benefit from this. I think some
progress can be gained when the conflict settlement is sponsored not
only by Russia but also by Turkey. As far as I understand Russia does
not mind this. It does not want to be a monopolist because in this
case the conflict will not be settled at all.
The prospect of Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied regions of
Nagorno Karabakh which is painful for Yerevan is currently being
discussed as a component of settlement. What is the possibility
of such a partial liberation of lands for improvement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations?
In fact, this step to normalization for Armenia will mean a step to
return Nagorno Karabakh under Azerbaijan's control as Armenians call
these lands that were inhabited by Azerbaijanis "a corridor of life"
because provisions to Nagorno Karabakh are supplied through it. If this
corridor disappears, the only way to maintain Nagorno Karabakh will
be by air. This is very expensive and on the other hand Azerbaijani
side may prohibit the flight of Armenian planes over its territory.
I would like to clarify an important moment. First of all, the
discussed is the liberation of seven Azerbaijani regions, while a
single road via one of the regions would be enough for communication
between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition, Baku has always
demonstrated readiness to present a land communication between Karabakh
and Armenia.
If so, this means that the very fact of the transfer of any regions
to Azerbaijan is inadmissible for the Armenian side as it would be
interpreted in the press of Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey and other
countries sympathizing Azerbaijani side as a start to return Nagorno
Karabakh to Azerbaijan.
If Azerbaijan agreed on return of these lands in exchange for
recognition of Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia would have agreed on it. But
as far as I understand, Azerbaijan insists on return of these regions
but independence is out of the question.
Yes, this issue is not set at all.
Well, I would like to note that the positions of Nagorno Karabakh and
Armenia are absolutely not identical. The situation is complicated
there. On the one hand, the Karabakh elite plays a great role in
Armenia, the former and current presidents are its representatives. On
the other hand, Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia are the same as Russia
and Abkhazia that is the positions are mostly identical but not by 100%
and Karabakh may play its own game.
I would argue the appropriateness of drawing analogies since
Azerbaijan held war with Armenia rather than Karabakh. But I would
like to return to Armenia's motivation for liberation of lands around
Nagorno Karabakh. Is it possible that such a motivation is Turkey's
statement that normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations is
possible only if Armenia liberates these regions?
Armenia is currently attempting to broaden the space for maneuvers.
But, again, the nationalistic part of the establishment is too
strong in Armenia. The positions of the Armenian state are not so
powerful in this country. If you remember, the things were near the
color revolution that could mostly have been held under nationalistic
slogans. Therefore, the reaction not only in Azerbaijan and Turkey but
also inside Armenia to some steps is important for the authorities
of this country. If today Armenian authorities make any concessions
(proposed by either Azerbaijan or Turkey) it will be criticized in
the local mass media and politicians. In this case, the shaky seat
of the Armenian authorities may fall in the result (a year ago it
was too shaky, now it is less shaky but the situation there is still
unstable). Therefore, I would view the internal situation in Armenia
as one of the factors influencing the settlement process.
Aliyah Fridman
news.az
Jan 22 2010
Azerbaijan
Pavel Salin News.Az interviews Pavel Salin, a leading expert at the
thinktank the Russian Centre of Political Conjuncture.
Russia has intensified its peacekeeping efforts in an attempt to
settle the Karabakh conflict and the next round of negotiations
between presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan will be held in Sochi on 25
January. What do you expect from the meeting?
I don't have great hopes for this meeting. There have been many
rounds. On the other hand, the "football diplomacy" prepared the ground
well for negotiations between the presidents of the two countries. But
on the other hand, Azerbaijan's view has not changed and without
Armenia's readiness to discuss the status of Nagorno-Karabakh within
Azerbaijan, the negotiation process will not be helped. This will
happen only if Russia alone is mediating because Turkey has recently
declared its mediatory ambitions. Turkey has recently been claiming
for the role of a strong regional center. It has its own interest and
it will declare its influence through settling the Karabakh conflict
or at least through taking some steps on this settlement. Therefore,
I think both Russia and Turkey would benefit from this. I think some
progress can be gained when the conflict settlement is sponsored not
only by Russia but also by Turkey. As far as I understand Russia does
not mind this. It does not want to be a monopolist because in this
case the conflict will not be settled at all.
The prospect of Armenia's withdrawal from the occupied regions of
Nagorno Karabakh which is painful for Yerevan is currently being
discussed as a component of settlement. What is the possibility
of such a partial liberation of lands for improvement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations?
In fact, this step to normalization for Armenia will mean a step to
return Nagorno Karabakh under Azerbaijan's control as Armenians call
these lands that were inhabited by Azerbaijanis "a corridor of life"
because provisions to Nagorno Karabakh are supplied through it. If this
corridor disappears, the only way to maintain Nagorno Karabakh will
be by air. This is very expensive and on the other hand Azerbaijani
side may prohibit the flight of Armenian planes over its territory.
I would like to clarify an important moment. First of all, the
discussed is the liberation of seven Azerbaijani regions, while a
single road via one of the regions would be enough for communication
between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. In addition, Baku has always
demonstrated readiness to present a land communication between Karabakh
and Armenia.
If so, this means that the very fact of the transfer of any regions
to Azerbaijan is inadmissible for the Armenian side as it would be
interpreted in the press of Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey and other
countries sympathizing Azerbaijani side as a start to return Nagorno
Karabakh to Azerbaijan.
If Azerbaijan agreed on return of these lands in exchange for
recognition of Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia would have agreed on it. But
as far as I understand, Azerbaijan insists on return of these regions
but independence is out of the question.
Yes, this issue is not set at all.
Well, I would like to note that the positions of Nagorno Karabakh and
Armenia are absolutely not identical. The situation is complicated
there. On the one hand, the Karabakh elite plays a great role in
Armenia, the former and current presidents are its representatives. On
the other hand, Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia are the same as Russia
and Abkhazia that is the positions are mostly identical but not by 100%
and Karabakh may play its own game.
I would argue the appropriateness of drawing analogies since
Azerbaijan held war with Armenia rather than Karabakh. But I would
like to return to Armenia's motivation for liberation of lands around
Nagorno Karabakh. Is it possible that such a motivation is Turkey's
statement that normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations is
possible only if Armenia liberates these regions?
Armenia is currently attempting to broaden the space for maneuvers.
But, again, the nationalistic part of the establishment is too
strong in Armenia. The positions of the Armenian state are not so
powerful in this country. If you remember, the things were near the
color revolution that could mostly have been held under nationalistic
slogans. Therefore, the reaction not only in Azerbaijan and Turkey but
also inside Armenia to some steps is important for the authorities
of this country. If today Armenian authorities make any concessions
(proposed by either Azerbaijan or Turkey) it will be criticized in
the local mass media and politicians. In this case, the shaky seat
of the Armenian authorities may fall in the result (a year ago it
was too shaky, now it is less shaky but the situation there is still
unstable). Therefore, I would view the internal situation in Armenia
as one of the factors influencing the settlement process.