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Journal of Turkish Weekly
Jan 23 2010
[JTW Interview] The Future of Turkey-Russia Relations
Saturday, 23 January 2010
USAK Eurasia Expert Hasan Selim Ozertem commented on the recent
Erdogan-Putin meeting.
How does the history between Turkey and Russia play into the modern
day mentality of relations?
Turkish- Russian relations should be analyzed in a historical
perspective because with the interpretation of identities of Czarist
Russia and the Imperial era of the Ottoman Empire from the past, it is
hard to claim that they had good relations and in spite of some
periodical deviations, the character of the relations have not
dramatically changed since the Cold War either.
Turkey and Russia have always seen each other as rivals, especially in
regional issues like foreign policies in the Balkans, Central Asia,
the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. The Cold War identities of both
of these countries and opposing polarity created threat perceptions of
the two states against each other.
However, beginning in the 1980s, and with the 1984 gas agreements,
Turkey began selling consumption goods to Russia, buying gas from
Russia and paying in terms of commodities. A new era in
Turkish-Russian relations began; however, it was difficult to deepen
these relations with the dynamics of the Cold War. Yet, by 1991,
Turkey was fully engaged in the Russian economy. During that period,
it was the Turkish entrepreneurs taking the risk and going to Russia
to supply the necessary supplements, the services in the construction
sector. In that way, the Turkish businessmen's role in Russia's
transition to the liberal economy in the 1990s cannot be ignored. Yet
again, the relations have developed on a basis of bilateral interests.
The construction of identities and threat perceptions between the two
countries have not suddenly transformed into a peaceful character
because Turkey is still a NATO member and the legacies of Czarist and
Communist periods still have a critical part in Russian identity. Just
like the Soviet Union Russia tries to pursue hegemonic policies in
it's `near abroad'; Turkish and Russian policies have continued to
contradict on regional policies, even in the post Cold War period.
Looking at these facts, we may say that Turkey and Russia have much to
do in their bi-lateral relations but without changing or deviation of
their policies, it is hard to expect regional cooperation between the
two parties in the short and medium term. In fact, Erdogan's visit to
Moscow clearly draws from this kind of picture after his meetings with
President Dimitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This
meeting is actually the first gathering of coordination meetings that
was agreed upon during Putin's visit to Ankara in August of last year.
It was during that visit that Turkey and Russia signed 20 agreements
and memorandums of understandings to deepen their economic, military
and political relations in addition to cultural affairs; yet, these
agreements were not finalized during Putin's visit and in regular
meetings between the two parties they have agreed to negotiate the
terms of these agreements and directly engage with problems that are
seen as obstacles in front of the improvement of bilateral relations.
What were the main points of Prime Minister Erdogan's visit last week to Russia?
Last week was the beginning of coordination meetings between Russian
and Turkish policy makers and the most important headlines from this
meeting included overcoming the obstacles in front of economic
relations, debating on new cooperation areas and regional issues as
well.
In terms of economics, there are three important points. The first is
the use of domestic currencies between Turkey and Russia in economic
affairs; bypassing the US dollar's dominance in bilateral trade. In
doing so, exchange costs will be minimized and the advantage will be
maximized in bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia. These kinds of
relations have already begun after Putin's visit last year and
currently, one Turkish and a Russian bank have already begun
conducting business in Turkish lira and Russian ruble. The parties
have agreed to extend these kinds of trade relations between the two
countries.
Aside from this, there is the energy issue. The issue is debated in
terms of hydrocarbon, trade between Turkey and Russia and the
construction of a nuclear power plant on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
As known, Russia supplies almost 65 percent of Turkey's natural gas
and has an important share in terms of Turkey's oil consumption.
However, Russia wants to extend its position towards the Middle East
and wants to construct another pipeline under the Black Sea. This
project, known as Blue Stream 2, will pass through Turkish territory
and reach Israel. During Soviet times, it was Yevgeny Primakov, then
Prime Minister of the federation, who was the architect of the
Soviet's foreign policy in the Middle East. After the collapse
however, and due to some regional and domestic problems within Russia,
Russian influence in the Middle East became minimized. Now it seems
Russia would like to resurrect its foreign policy in the Middle East
in terms of politics and economics in this new period so that they can
diversify their consumers in the energy market and find new partners
in the international arena.
The second issue that should be mentioned is that Russia also pursues
an aggressive policy in terms of constructing another pipeline under
the Black Sea, which is known as the South Stream pipeline project.
With this policy, Russia aims to bypass Ukraine and reach European
energy markets with a new line. Even though this is not supported
enough by experts considering the energy security of the EU, it seems
that Greece and Italy support this project politically. Under these
circumstances, Russia needs to take permission from Turkey to
construct this pipeline through Turkey's economic zone in the Black
Sea to bypass Ukraine. By taking permission from Turkey in August, it
seems Russia is taking decisive steps to realize this project as soon
as possible. However, after the presidential elections in Ukraine, the
big picture can change. Nevertheless, by giving permission to Russia,
Turkey takes one step forward to build up trust measures between the
two countries and now it seems that Russia has a positive stance in
regards to being a partner in the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project. With
this project, Turkey aims to minimize the tension in the straights and
transmit Caspian and Siberian oil to Ceyhan. Up until now, Russia has
had a neutral stance on the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project; yet, it
was trying to construct alternative pipelines that would pass through
Bulgaria and reach Greece (the Burgas-Alexandropoulis pipeline). But
due to problems with Bulgaria, and Turkey's propositions of a
deepening partnership in different sectors, now Russia has a warmer
stance in terms of sending Siberian oil from the Novorossiysk port to
the Samsun-Ceyhan. In fact, this project will open new doors for
Turkey and Russia in the Middle East.
At present, there are two pipelines bringing oil to the Ceyhan ports,
and with the integration of Samsun-Ceyhan, the capacity of the ports
will reach nearly 5 million barrels per day. This makes Ceyhan an
important hub in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has also proposed
that foreign companies build up refineries for crude oil coming to
this port. This would mean integrating Middle Eastern oil to these
refineries and easily supplying the demand of refined oil in the
Middle East. Russia would also find the chance to invest within their
expertise in the hydrocarbon sector by being a part of the
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline and investing in the Ceyhan port.
Apart from the hydrocarbon issues, maybe the most important outcome of
this meeting is deciding to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey's
Mersin-Akkuyu district. The Russian and Turkish consortium won the
bids in terms of nuclear construction in 2009, but the Turkish Council
of State cancelled the bid due to a legal dispute. It seems now that
Turkey and Russia have signed governmental agreements to overcome this
legal problem. There will be no bidding process for the Russian and
Turkish consortium this time and consequently Russia will be able to
build up a nuclear power plant in Turkey as well as supply the fuel
for this power plant. This is regarded skeptically by Turkish experts
since this would mean being further dependent on Russia on energy and
not only at the hydrocarbon level, but in nuclear technology fuel too;
although Turkey is in the process of diversifying its energy sources,
it is not diversifying its suppliers. However, the government thinks
that building up a nuclear power plant should not be delayed due to
Turkey's energy deficit that will emerge in a couple of years time and
security concerns with Iran's nuclear ambitions in the Middle East.
Certainly, Iran having nuclear technology would negatively affect
Turkey's position in the region; this kind of initiative can be seen
as a balancing step to Iran's position.
What are some measures that will be implemented to narrow the trade
gap between Russian and Turkey?
Apart from the energy issue, another subject on Erdogan's agenda was
to close the gap between Russia and Turkey in foreign trade. In 2009,
trade volume was around $22 billion but Turkey's share of that was
only around $3 billion. This is because Turkey has had some problems
in selling its agricultural products to Russia and the negative
effects of the financial crisis have had an impact on Russian
consumption. It seems that Russia will soften the measures for Turkey
in terms of promoting trade since both countries signed an agreement
on plant quarantine so that Turkey's trucks and shipments will not
wait for too long at Russian borders and mobilization between the two
will increase. Second, Russia agreed to soften the measure in terms of
importing chicken from Turkey; Russia currently imports around 750,000
tons of poultry per year and they will open a quota of 50,000-60,000
tons from Turkey each year. According to Turkish authorities this
amount can increase up to 500,000 tons per year. However, the main
concern of the business sector in Turkey is the high costs of
production; Turkish entrepreneurs have asked for subsidies to ease the
situation in terms of taxes.
In addition to these measures to boost Turkey's position in its
foreign trade relations with Russia, the two parties have agreed to
increase trade volume to $100 billion in five years time. Even though
it can be interpreted as overly ambitious, providing these kinds of
numbers shows the dedication to take each and every step to promote
trade between Russia and Turkey. Taking into consideration the
financial crisis and the two countries potential, it will take more
than 5 years to reach this target; however, it seems that as each year
passes, the trade volume is expected to increase.
Can you weigh the importance of regionalism and the lifting of the
visa requirements between Turkey and Russia?
In international relations, even though globalization is the hottest
debate right now, it seems that regionalization policies are also
gaining impetus. Increasing transportation costs due to the high level
prices of oil and China's increasing dominance in the economy,
countries are choosing to enhance their economic relations with
neighboring countries. Russia and Turkey's relations can be
interpreted in these terms.
Since 2002, Turkey has been initiating its `zero problem policy' and
it seems that it is beginning to obtain some positive results when we
look back at 2009. The EU's share in Turkey's foreign trade was more
than 50 percent a decade ago, but today, we see it has now decreased
to nearly 40 percent. Turkey's foreign trade with the Middle East,
African states, Central Asia and Russia has increased dramatically
over time. Moreover, looking at Russia, it seems that due to the
reservations of countries like Poland, it has had troubles enhancing
its relations with the EU. Now, they have chosen to enhance their
relations with their `near abroad' and within the Middle East.
The Russian and Turkish economies can be seen as complimentary when we
think of Russia's advantageous position in hydrocarbons, nuclear
technology and military power, and Turkey's position in industrial and
consumption goods. These two countries have to increase their economic
relations and the areas in which they cooperate in. Increasing
economic relations also helps to overcome the threat perception and
the negative interpretation of `the other' both in Russia and Turkey.
It is hard to deny the Western position in terms of contributing to
the enhancement of this relationship. Russia and Turkey have now
started this process to eliminate the visa regime and pursue open
border diplomacy in the region which has the potential to open many
doors for these two. Up until now, Russia had some security concerns
regarding its Caucasian Republics and Turkish groups supporting
radical movements in the region; however, it seems that through
enhancing relations it is helping to deepen and legitimize those
relations to be constructed and this paves the way of creating trust
building measures between them. In this context, starting the process
of eliminating visas between the two countries to promote mobility can
be interpreted positively. Even though experts are not optimistic in
terms of fully eliminating the visa regime, at least they expect some
loosening of measures for this year. This would further help to
enhance tourism and business relations, especially for Turkey's
business relations because the Turkish entrepreneur would now have the
chance to solve problems first hand; he can simply hop on a plane and
fly to Moscow or St. Petersburg etc. Additionally, Russia can become a
popular tourism destination for Turkish citizens. This would help the
regionalization efforts of these two countries.
How do Russia and Turkey approach the Nagorno Karabakh issue differently?
Moscow and Ankara have different perspectives in terms of bringing
stability to the Caucasus and Turkey believes that the Nagorno
Karabakh (NK) issue should be solved within the terms of international
law and that the Minsk Group should pursue a proactive policy and put
pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even though the process began last
year, they have not come close to reaching a solution for the problem.
Turkey and Armenian signed two protocols on October 10th, 2009; Turkey
wants a long lasting solution in NK and to approve these protocols in
the Parliament. Yerevan however, does not seem to be interested in
solving the problem or in leaving the occupied territory of
Azerbaijan. Turkey closed its borders in 1993 due to this occupation
of the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan and since then, Yerevan and
Ankara have not had diplomatic relations. With these protocols, those
relations are expected to begin along with the opening of the border
between Armenia and Turkey. Russian Prime Minister Putin argues that
the solution to the NK issue and the start of bilateral relations with
Armenia should not be put into one package. He argues that these two
issues should be solved separately; this stance seems to support the
Armenian thesis and does not push Armenia to solve the problem within
the Minsk Group. At the end of the day, without the solution of the NK
issue, it will be hard to sustain long lasting stability in the
Caucasus but it seems that neither Russia nor the West is aware of
this fact. Although Turkey sees these issues as organically dependent
upon each other, Russia and the West want to solve the problems
separately and act as if they are independent. To sum up, it can be
said that even though the two countries have promising futures in
developing both bi-lateral and regional relations, it seems as though
Russia wants to limit this to something only in bilateral terms; just
until the trust issue is sustained between Turkey and the Russian
Federation.
Interview by Stacy Maruskin (JTW)
Saturday, 23 January 2010
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96359/-j tw-interview-the-future-of-turkey-russia-relations .html
Jan 23 2010
[JTW Interview] The Future of Turkey-Russia Relations
Saturday, 23 January 2010
USAK Eurasia Expert Hasan Selim Ozertem commented on the recent
Erdogan-Putin meeting.
How does the history between Turkey and Russia play into the modern
day mentality of relations?
Turkish- Russian relations should be analyzed in a historical
perspective because with the interpretation of identities of Czarist
Russia and the Imperial era of the Ottoman Empire from the past, it is
hard to claim that they had good relations and in spite of some
periodical deviations, the character of the relations have not
dramatically changed since the Cold War either.
Turkey and Russia have always seen each other as rivals, especially in
regional issues like foreign policies in the Balkans, Central Asia,
the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. The Cold War identities of both
of these countries and opposing polarity created threat perceptions of
the two states against each other.
However, beginning in the 1980s, and with the 1984 gas agreements,
Turkey began selling consumption goods to Russia, buying gas from
Russia and paying in terms of commodities. A new era in
Turkish-Russian relations began; however, it was difficult to deepen
these relations with the dynamics of the Cold War. Yet, by 1991,
Turkey was fully engaged in the Russian economy. During that period,
it was the Turkish entrepreneurs taking the risk and going to Russia
to supply the necessary supplements, the services in the construction
sector. In that way, the Turkish businessmen's role in Russia's
transition to the liberal economy in the 1990s cannot be ignored. Yet
again, the relations have developed on a basis of bilateral interests.
The construction of identities and threat perceptions between the two
countries have not suddenly transformed into a peaceful character
because Turkey is still a NATO member and the legacies of Czarist and
Communist periods still have a critical part in Russian identity. Just
like the Soviet Union Russia tries to pursue hegemonic policies in
it's `near abroad'; Turkish and Russian policies have continued to
contradict on regional policies, even in the post Cold War period.
Looking at these facts, we may say that Turkey and Russia have much to
do in their bi-lateral relations but without changing or deviation of
their policies, it is hard to expect regional cooperation between the
two parties in the short and medium term. In fact, Erdogan's visit to
Moscow clearly draws from this kind of picture after his meetings with
President Dimitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This
meeting is actually the first gathering of coordination meetings that
was agreed upon during Putin's visit to Ankara in August of last year.
It was during that visit that Turkey and Russia signed 20 agreements
and memorandums of understandings to deepen their economic, military
and political relations in addition to cultural affairs; yet, these
agreements were not finalized during Putin's visit and in regular
meetings between the two parties they have agreed to negotiate the
terms of these agreements and directly engage with problems that are
seen as obstacles in front of the improvement of bilateral relations.
What were the main points of Prime Minister Erdogan's visit last week to Russia?
Last week was the beginning of coordination meetings between Russian
and Turkish policy makers and the most important headlines from this
meeting included overcoming the obstacles in front of economic
relations, debating on new cooperation areas and regional issues as
well.
In terms of economics, there are three important points. The first is
the use of domestic currencies between Turkey and Russia in economic
affairs; bypassing the US dollar's dominance in bilateral trade. In
doing so, exchange costs will be minimized and the advantage will be
maximized in bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia. These kinds of
relations have already begun after Putin's visit last year and
currently, one Turkish and a Russian bank have already begun
conducting business in Turkish lira and Russian ruble. The parties
have agreed to extend these kinds of trade relations between the two
countries.
Aside from this, there is the energy issue. The issue is debated in
terms of hydrocarbon, trade between Turkey and Russia and the
construction of a nuclear power plant on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
As known, Russia supplies almost 65 percent of Turkey's natural gas
and has an important share in terms of Turkey's oil consumption.
However, Russia wants to extend its position towards the Middle East
and wants to construct another pipeline under the Black Sea. This
project, known as Blue Stream 2, will pass through Turkish territory
and reach Israel. During Soviet times, it was Yevgeny Primakov, then
Prime Minister of the federation, who was the architect of the
Soviet's foreign policy in the Middle East. After the collapse
however, and due to some regional and domestic problems within Russia,
Russian influence in the Middle East became minimized. Now it seems
Russia would like to resurrect its foreign policy in the Middle East
in terms of politics and economics in this new period so that they can
diversify their consumers in the energy market and find new partners
in the international arena.
The second issue that should be mentioned is that Russia also pursues
an aggressive policy in terms of constructing another pipeline under
the Black Sea, which is known as the South Stream pipeline project.
With this policy, Russia aims to bypass Ukraine and reach European
energy markets with a new line. Even though this is not supported
enough by experts considering the energy security of the EU, it seems
that Greece and Italy support this project politically. Under these
circumstances, Russia needs to take permission from Turkey to
construct this pipeline through Turkey's economic zone in the Black
Sea to bypass Ukraine. By taking permission from Turkey in August, it
seems Russia is taking decisive steps to realize this project as soon
as possible. However, after the presidential elections in Ukraine, the
big picture can change. Nevertheless, by giving permission to Russia,
Turkey takes one step forward to build up trust measures between the
two countries and now it seems that Russia has a positive stance in
regards to being a partner in the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project. With
this project, Turkey aims to minimize the tension in the straights and
transmit Caspian and Siberian oil to Ceyhan. Up until now, Russia has
had a neutral stance on the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project; yet, it
was trying to construct alternative pipelines that would pass through
Bulgaria and reach Greece (the Burgas-Alexandropoulis pipeline). But
due to problems with Bulgaria, and Turkey's propositions of a
deepening partnership in different sectors, now Russia has a warmer
stance in terms of sending Siberian oil from the Novorossiysk port to
the Samsun-Ceyhan. In fact, this project will open new doors for
Turkey and Russia in the Middle East.
At present, there are two pipelines bringing oil to the Ceyhan ports,
and with the integration of Samsun-Ceyhan, the capacity of the ports
will reach nearly 5 million barrels per day. This makes Ceyhan an
important hub in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has also proposed
that foreign companies build up refineries for crude oil coming to
this port. This would mean integrating Middle Eastern oil to these
refineries and easily supplying the demand of refined oil in the
Middle East. Russia would also find the chance to invest within their
expertise in the hydrocarbon sector by being a part of the
Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline and investing in the Ceyhan port.
Apart from the hydrocarbon issues, maybe the most important outcome of
this meeting is deciding to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey's
Mersin-Akkuyu district. The Russian and Turkish consortium won the
bids in terms of nuclear construction in 2009, but the Turkish Council
of State cancelled the bid due to a legal dispute. It seems now that
Turkey and Russia have signed governmental agreements to overcome this
legal problem. There will be no bidding process for the Russian and
Turkish consortium this time and consequently Russia will be able to
build up a nuclear power plant in Turkey as well as supply the fuel
for this power plant. This is regarded skeptically by Turkish experts
since this would mean being further dependent on Russia on energy and
not only at the hydrocarbon level, but in nuclear technology fuel too;
although Turkey is in the process of diversifying its energy sources,
it is not diversifying its suppliers. However, the government thinks
that building up a nuclear power plant should not be delayed due to
Turkey's energy deficit that will emerge in a couple of years time and
security concerns with Iran's nuclear ambitions in the Middle East.
Certainly, Iran having nuclear technology would negatively affect
Turkey's position in the region; this kind of initiative can be seen
as a balancing step to Iran's position.
What are some measures that will be implemented to narrow the trade
gap between Russian and Turkey?
Apart from the energy issue, another subject on Erdogan's agenda was
to close the gap between Russia and Turkey in foreign trade. In 2009,
trade volume was around $22 billion but Turkey's share of that was
only around $3 billion. This is because Turkey has had some problems
in selling its agricultural products to Russia and the negative
effects of the financial crisis have had an impact on Russian
consumption. It seems that Russia will soften the measures for Turkey
in terms of promoting trade since both countries signed an agreement
on plant quarantine so that Turkey's trucks and shipments will not
wait for too long at Russian borders and mobilization between the two
will increase. Second, Russia agreed to soften the measure in terms of
importing chicken from Turkey; Russia currently imports around 750,000
tons of poultry per year and they will open a quota of 50,000-60,000
tons from Turkey each year. According to Turkish authorities this
amount can increase up to 500,000 tons per year. However, the main
concern of the business sector in Turkey is the high costs of
production; Turkish entrepreneurs have asked for subsidies to ease the
situation in terms of taxes.
In addition to these measures to boost Turkey's position in its
foreign trade relations with Russia, the two parties have agreed to
increase trade volume to $100 billion in five years time. Even though
it can be interpreted as overly ambitious, providing these kinds of
numbers shows the dedication to take each and every step to promote
trade between Russia and Turkey. Taking into consideration the
financial crisis and the two countries potential, it will take more
than 5 years to reach this target; however, it seems that as each year
passes, the trade volume is expected to increase.
Can you weigh the importance of regionalism and the lifting of the
visa requirements between Turkey and Russia?
In international relations, even though globalization is the hottest
debate right now, it seems that regionalization policies are also
gaining impetus. Increasing transportation costs due to the high level
prices of oil and China's increasing dominance in the economy,
countries are choosing to enhance their economic relations with
neighboring countries. Russia and Turkey's relations can be
interpreted in these terms.
Since 2002, Turkey has been initiating its `zero problem policy' and
it seems that it is beginning to obtain some positive results when we
look back at 2009. The EU's share in Turkey's foreign trade was more
than 50 percent a decade ago, but today, we see it has now decreased
to nearly 40 percent. Turkey's foreign trade with the Middle East,
African states, Central Asia and Russia has increased dramatically
over time. Moreover, looking at Russia, it seems that due to the
reservations of countries like Poland, it has had troubles enhancing
its relations with the EU. Now, they have chosen to enhance their
relations with their `near abroad' and within the Middle East.
The Russian and Turkish economies can be seen as complimentary when we
think of Russia's advantageous position in hydrocarbons, nuclear
technology and military power, and Turkey's position in industrial and
consumption goods. These two countries have to increase their economic
relations and the areas in which they cooperate in. Increasing
economic relations also helps to overcome the threat perception and
the negative interpretation of `the other' both in Russia and Turkey.
It is hard to deny the Western position in terms of contributing to
the enhancement of this relationship. Russia and Turkey have now
started this process to eliminate the visa regime and pursue open
border diplomacy in the region which has the potential to open many
doors for these two. Up until now, Russia had some security concerns
regarding its Caucasian Republics and Turkish groups supporting
radical movements in the region; however, it seems that through
enhancing relations it is helping to deepen and legitimize those
relations to be constructed and this paves the way of creating trust
building measures between them. In this context, starting the process
of eliminating visas between the two countries to promote mobility can
be interpreted positively. Even though experts are not optimistic in
terms of fully eliminating the visa regime, at least they expect some
loosening of measures for this year. This would further help to
enhance tourism and business relations, especially for Turkey's
business relations because the Turkish entrepreneur would now have the
chance to solve problems first hand; he can simply hop on a plane and
fly to Moscow or St. Petersburg etc. Additionally, Russia can become a
popular tourism destination for Turkish citizens. This would help the
regionalization efforts of these two countries.
How do Russia and Turkey approach the Nagorno Karabakh issue differently?
Moscow and Ankara have different perspectives in terms of bringing
stability to the Caucasus and Turkey believes that the Nagorno
Karabakh (NK) issue should be solved within the terms of international
law and that the Minsk Group should pursue a proactive policy and put
pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even though the process began last
year, they have not come close to reaching a solution for the problem.
Turkey and Armenian signed two protocols on October 10th, 2009; Turkey
wants a long lasting solution in NK and to approve these protocols in
the Parliament. Yerevan however, does not seem to be interested in
solving the problem or in leaving the occupied territory of
Azerbaijan. Turkey closed its borders in 1993 due to this occupation
of the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan and since then, Yerevan and
Ankara have not had diplomatic relations. With these protocols, those
relations are expected to begin along with the opening of the border
between Armenia and Turkey. Russian Prime Minister Putin argues that
the solution to the NK issue and the start of bilateral relations with
Armenia should not be put into one package. He argues that these two
issues should be solved separately; this stance seems to support the
Armenian thesis and does not push Armenia to solve the problem within
the Minsk Group. At the end of the day, without the solution of the NK
issue, it will be hard to sustain long lasting stability in the
Caucasus but it seems that neither Russia nor the West is aware of
this fact. Although Turkey sees these issues as organically dependent
upon each other, Russia and the West want to solve the problems
separately and act as if they are independent. To sum up, it can be
said that even though the two countries have promising futures in
developing both bi-lateral and regional relations, it seems as though
Russia wants to limit this to something only in bilateral terms; just
until the trust issue is sustained between Turkey and the Russian
Federation.
Interview by Stacy Maruskin (JTW)
Saturday, 23 January 2010
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/96359/-j tw-interview-the-future-of-turkey-russia-relations .html