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Central Asia: 10 Major Developments in 2010

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  • Central Asia: 10 Major Developments in 2010

    Central Asia: 10 Major Developments in 2010

    en.fondsk.ruEurasia
    17.01.2010

    Aleksandr SHUSTOV

    In a number of regards, 2009 was a watershed year for the Central
    Asian republics which gained independence 18 years ago as the result
    of the disintegration of the USSR. No doubt, the key 2009 developments
    will be affecting the situation in the region in 2010 and beyond. Some
    of the political and economic decisions made last year are going to
    define the future of the Central Asian republics both in the nearest
    and more distant future.

    1. Escalation in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

    The return of some of the armed formations of the former united Tajic
    opposition, which were forced to leave Pakistan due to the
    intensification of fighting in the Swat valley, to Tajikistan's
    Tavildara Province became a prologue to a series of armed conflicts
    and terrorist outbreaks in Central Asian republics. The formations
    clashed with the government forces in July and the insurgents were
    largely routed by the end of August. An Uzbek border checkpoint came
    under fire in Hanabad in late May, and later several kamikaze attacks
    took place in Andijon. Two groups of insurgents were eliminated in the
    southern part of Kyrgyzstan in July. Several attempts on clerics and
    officers of law-enforcement agencies were reported in Uzbekistan, and
    a number of armed groups were eliminated in Tashkent in September. In
    October a group of 8 guerrillas managed to fight its way from
    Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan but was subsequently suppressed in the Vorukh
    enclave. The above range of events highlights the threat of further
    destabilization in Central Asia.

    2. The Creation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force in the
    Framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

    The decision to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force in the
    framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was
    made at the urgent session of the CSTO Council in February, 2009. The
    measure largely followed as a response to the growing instability in
    Central Asia. The agreement was signed in Moscow on June 14, 2009.
    Initially, Uzbekistan and Belarus refrained from joining, but Belarus
    eventually signed the deal in October. The Collective Rapid Reaction
    Force will comprise 20,000 troops including an air-born division and
    an air-born storm brigade from Russia, two air-born brigades from
    Kazakhstan and Belarus, and three battalions from Kyrgyzstan,
    Tajikistan, and Armenia. The first exercises of the Collective Rapid
    Reaction Force involving Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Armenian troops
    were carried out in Kazakhstan in October.

    3. June, 2009 Presidential Elections in Kyrgyzstan

    The incumbent K. Bakiyev's landslide victory crowned the June, 2009
    presidential race in Kyrgyzstan. As the result, southern clans
    dominating the republic's authority system are sure to retain their
    positions at least for the coming five years. The resignation of
    Kyrgyzstan's government led by I. Chudinov, the only ethnic Russian to
    serve as prime minister in Central Asia, was another consequence of
    the elections. Daniar Usenov was appointed as the new prime minister.
    The entire authority system was subjected to an overhaul: the
    president's administration was replaced with the presidency institute
    comprising the president's staff and secretariat, the central agency
    for development, investments, and innovations (with the president's
    son M. Bakiyev as its head), the presidential conference, the
    development council, the foreign minister, and the security adviser.
    An array of functions formerly exercised by the government have been
    transferred to the presidency institute.

    4. Kyrgyzstan's Decision to Let the US Keep the Military Base in Manas Airport.

    The decision was made on the eve of the presidential elections and
    proved to be a successful campaign move for the incumbent Bakiyev, who
    thus secured the US support for his candidacy. In March, 2009
    Kyrgyzstan was going to close the base. The plan was widely attributed
    to the pressure from Russia which promised Kyrgyzstan a credit in the
    amount of 41.5 bn - of which $300 mln had already been transferred -
    as the reward. However, on June 22 the US and Kyrgyzstan did renew the
    deal under new terms: the price to be paid by the US increased from
    $17.4 mln to $60 mln annually. At the same time, France and Spain,
    which also maintained contingents in Manas, had to withdraw them due
    to the failure to reach an agreement with Kyrgyzstan.

    5. The normalization of Uzbekistan's Relations with the US and the EU

    The process started to gain momentum in 2008 and took its final shape
    in 2009. In late 2008, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the
    Eurasian Economic Community, which it criticized for inefficiency and
    functional overlaps with the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
    In June, 2009 Uzbekistan refused to sign the agreement on the creation
    of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force and said it would limit
    its involvement to the operations in which it would be interested. In
    late October the EU lifted the sanctions (related to armaments import)
    imposed on Uzbekistan after the suppression of the 2005 coup attempt
    in Andijon. The key reason behind the normalization was the West's
    interest in Uzbekistan's transit potential, which could be used to
    supply the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Besides, Uzbekistan is
    Afghanistan's main energy supplier and provider of Internet access.

    6. Opening the Northern Supply Network for the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan

    The opening of the Northern Supply Network intended to serve the
    coalition forces in Afghanistan affected a number of countries in the
    region. The network spans parts of the territories of Russia,
    Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The involvement of Tajikistan and
    Kyrgyzstan is not as extensive despite the opportunities opened by
    their geographic locations. The coalition's need for a northern supply
    route is due to the growing insecurity of the southern one traversing
    Pakistan. The northern network opened in the summer of 2009, and its
    throughput is raising steadily. The transit across Central Asia,
    however, is also exposed to serious risks posed by terrorist activity
    and armed conflicts in the region.

    7. Gas Conflict Between Russia and Turkmenistan

    The conflict broke out in April, 2009 when a blast destroyed one of
    the Central Asia-Center pipeline legs and lingered almost till the end
    of the year. The contentious issues were the price and volumes of
    Russia's gas import from Turkmenistan. The contraction of gas demand
    in Europe rendered the terms of the corresponding import contract
    unprofitable from Russia's standpoint, but the idea of lower tariffs
    or import volumes predictably met with opposition from Turkmenistan.
    Settlement was achieved only during Russian President D. Medvedev's
    visit to Ashgabat in December, 2009. The new contract set the import
    volume at 50 bcm of natural gas annually vs. the former 30 bcm and the
    price - at the European level. Natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan
    to Russia resumed on January 9, 2010.

    8. Opening the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China Gas Pipeline

    The December, 2009 inauguration of the pipeline was attended by the
    leaders of the four countries, which highlighted the strengthening of
    China's political and economic positions in Central Asia. The pipeline
    target capacity of 40 bcm annually will be reached only by 2013, but
    it has already integrated the gas transit networks of Kazakhstan,
    Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan with those of not only Russia, but also
    of China. For the countries of the region, the latter is evolving into
    the second-largest partner in the energy sphere while the former found
    itself stripped of the status of a practically exclusive buyer of
    Central Asian gas.

    9. Uzbekistan's Decision to Withdraw from the Central Asian Unified
    Energy System

    The plan was announced in September, 2009. Its implementation is
    likely to stress the energy supply to the southern part of Kazakhstan,
    as well as to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The latter two republics
    already face painful electric power shortages every winter while their
    own generating capacities based on hydro-power are clearly
    insufficient. Efforts aimed at constructing additional power plants
    upstream the rivers traversing the borders between Central Asian
    republics strained Uzbekistan's relations with Tajikistan and
    Kyrgyzstan due to Tashkent's concern that water flow manipulation
    would be used as an instrument of political pressure against it. At
    the same time, Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the common grid would be
    tantamount to its disablement as - since the Soviet era - Tashkent
    hosts the unified energy system's control center.

    10. The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

    The Customs Union bracketing Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan is the
    first integration project in the post-Soviet space to reach the
    practical phase. The package of the corresponding agreements was
    endorsed by the Presidents of the three countries at the meeting of
    the Eurasian Economic Community's Inter-State Council in Mensk. A
    common customs tariff came into effect on January 2010. Starting on
    July 1, the Union will have a common customs territory with customs
    clearance shifted to its perimeter and no checkpoints on internal
    borders. Common economic space and currency are planned for 2012.
    Kyrgyzstan is the likeliest Central Asian candidate to integrate into
    the Union, while Tajikistan already has the observer status. The main
    risks confronting the project stem from the members' internal
    political dynamics which can translate into reorientations of their
    integration plans. If successfully implemented, the project would
    contribute 15% to the GDP growth of the member countries by 2015.
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