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WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 20, 2010 Wednesday
THERE IS A STALEMATE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASIAN FRONTS, SO FAR
by Alexander Khramchikhin
NOT A SINGLE CAUCASIAN CONFLICT WILL BE RESOLVED BY A PEACEFUL WAY,
THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THEM IS MILITARY; At present, the Caucasus is
probably a unique region. Four countries - Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Georgia - belong to it. There are also two "partially recognized"
states (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and one "absolutely unrecognized"
state (Nagorno-Karabakh). All of them are in condition of "cold" war
among each other.
At present, the Caucasus is probably a unique region. Four countries -
Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia - belong to it. There are also
two "partially recognized" states (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and one
"absolutely unrecognized" state (Nagorno-Karabakh). All of them are in
condition of "cold" war among each other.
The matter of balance of forces in the region is very vital.
Acquisitions and losses
After breakup of the USSR Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
self-proclaimed Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh mostly
received "their own" share of the former Soviet army each.
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan received quotas for armament and military hardware under
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) having divided the
Soviet quota. Thus, each country of Transcaucasia was permitted to
have 220 tanks, 220 fighting armored vehicles (including 135 armored
infantry vehicles), 285 artillery systems, 100 combat airplanes and 50
strike helicopters.
In reality after breakup of the USSR Azerbaijan received 436 tanks,
558 fighting infantry vehicles, 389 armored personnel carriers, 388
artillery systems, 63 airplanes and eight helicopters. At the
beginning of 1993, Armenia had only 77 tanks, 150 fighting infantry
vehicles, 39 armored personnel carriers, 160 artillery systems, three
airplanes and 13 helicopters. Along with this, the armed forces of
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic became a "gray zone." Nagorno-Karabakh
received a certain part of military hardware of the Soviet army
(although a small one) in the form of the 366th mechanized infantry
regiment. Armenia handed a certain quantity of military hardware that
was not registered over to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Despite that the strength of the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh was
unknown for sure, there was no doubt that by the beginning of the
Nagorno-Karabakh war the army of Azerbaijan had a very significant
superiority over the armed forces of Armenia and the autonomous
republic that declared independence.
In any case, significant superiority did not help Azerbaijan and it
was seriously defeated in that war.
Armenia confessed that it lost 52 T-72 tanks, 54 fighting infantry
vehicles, six guns and mortars. Naturally, it remained unknown what
and how much Nagorno-Karabakh lost. Losses of Azerbaijan amounted to
186 tanks (160 T-72s and 26 T-55s), 111 fighting infantry vehicles,
eight armored personnel carriers, seven self-propelled artillery
mounts, 47 guns and mortars, five multiple rocket launcher systems,
14-16 airplanes, five or six helicopters. Azerbaijan also wrote off 43
tanks (including 18 T-72s), 83 fighting infantry vehicles, 31 armored
personnel carriers, one self-propelled artillery mount, 42 guns and
mortars and eight multiple rocket launcher systems.
Revanche is unlikely
Naturally, after the end of the war Armenia and Azerbaijan were
actively arming themselves.
Due to the oil revenues the military budget of Azerbaijan is threefold
bigger than the Armenian one.
Azerbaijan was the only of the 30 CFE participants that exceeded the
framework of the quotas very much in two classes of military hardware
at once: tanks (there were 381 of them as of January 1 of 2009) and
artillery systems (404). Baku also declares that its armed forces have
181 fighting armored vehicles, 75 combat airplanes and 15 strike
helicopters. Incidentally, the air force of Azerbaijan is growing very
rapidly: in 2003 it had 54 airplanes. For example, 14 MiG-29s were
bought in Ukraine recently, although one of them crashed.
With regard to Armenia, judging by the data that it provides in
accordance with the CFE its armed forces remain stable for many years.
As of January 1 of 2009, Yerevan reported that it had 110 tanks, 140
fighting armored vehicles, 239 artillery systems, 16 airplanes and
eight helicopters.
According to the Azerbaijan, the army of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has
316 tanks, 324 fighting armored vehicles and 332 artillery systems.
However, these figures look incredible.
Azerbaijan achieved almost 300% superiority over Armenia in tanks and
almost 400% superiority in combat airplanes. In any case, the armed
forces of Nagorno-Karabakh are not taken into account. Hence, if there
is an advantage of Azerbaijan on the ground it is very insignificant.
The quality of armament is similar: the armed forces of the parties
are armed almost exclusively with Soviet hardware. Hence, Azerbaijani
potential is absolutely insufficient for successful offensive.
In the air Azerbaijan has an indisputable superiority. Armenia has one
MiG-25 airplane. Azerbaijan has 32 MiG-25 airplanes. Along with this,
the benefit from them is only a little bigger than the benefit from
one Armenian airplane. MiG-25 is simply unsuitable for fulfillment of
tactical tasks.
Along with this, attack airplanes Su-25 act perfectly above the
battlefield. Azerbaijan and Armenia have 15 such airplanes each. For
attacking of ground targets Azerbaijan also has five frontline bombers
Su-24 and the same quantity of old but food attack airplanes Su-17.
Azerbaijan also has almost 100% superiority in strike helicopters: 15
helicopters against eight (naturally, these are Mi-24 in both
countries). Five MiG-21s, old but quite fit for this theater of combat
operations, as well as 13 new MiG-29s will be suitable for
maneuverable battles.
In any case, the might of Azerbaijani air force is not as big as to
change the course of war on the ground (it is possible to suspect that
the level of pilots training in Azerbaijan is not the best in the
world). Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh also have air defense systems
that can be very efficient in mountains.
That is why it is possible to say with assurance that chances of
Azerbaijan for military revanche are quite illusory now.
Before and after August of 2008
Recently, the center for analysis of strategies and technologies
released a collection of articles entitled "Tanks of August" and
describing the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 in detail.
The book denied the myth that before the war the Georgian army was
armed with American weapons and at expense of America that was very
popular in Russia. Specialists knew well and for a long time that
Georgia almost had no American weapons and had almost only Soviet
models of armament and military hardware. The foreign military aid
amounted to less than 1% of the military budget of the country.
By the beginning of the war, the ground forces of Georgia had 247
tanks (191 T-72, 56 T-55), 165 fighting infantry vehicles, 152 armored
personnel carriers (including 86 MTLB), 44 self-propelled artillery
systems, 123 towed guns, 55 antitank guns, up to 400 mortars, 28
multiple rocket launcher systems, 15 air defense systems Shilka, 45
air defense guns. The air force and air defense forces included 12
attack airplanes Su-25 (including two Su-25UBs), eight combat
helicopters Mi-24, 32 transport helicopters (18 Mi-8, 2 Mi-14, 6
UÃ?-1Ã?, 6 Bell-212), 10 training airplanes L-39Ã`, two battalions of air
defense missile systems S-125 and Buk-M1 each, 18 air defense systems
Osa-AKM, several Israeli air defense missile systems Spider. Just
compare: at the beginning of 1993 the former Soviet republic had 108
tanks, 121 fighting combat vehicles, 17 artillery systems, four
airplanes and the same quantity of helicopters.
During the combat operations proper (August 8-12, 2008) losses of
Georgia turned out to be small (about 20 tanks, about 10 fighting
infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers, up to 20 guns and
mortars and three helicopters). These figures were partially not big
because actions of the Russian armed forces (first of all, aviation)
left much to be desired. For example, the air force of Georgia did not
lose a single airplane (along with this, Russian air defense forces
downed three friendly airplanes). Naturally, the "maritime battle"
during which Russian small missile ship Mirazh allegedly sunk Georgian
missile boat Tbilisi turned out to be a pure myth.
Georgia bore the main losses in military hardware already after the
end of hostilities when Russian forces took Georgian military bases.
Thus, Russian paratroopers occupied the port of Poti where they blew
up six boats left by the "heroic" Georgian sailors including both
missile boats (including Tbilisi). As a result, Georgia had to disband
the navy completely. Tens of units of military hardware including 65
T-72s and approximately 20 fighting infantry vehicles were captured at
the bases in Gori and Senaki. Russian air force failed to kill any
Georgian air defense system, but ground forces captured five air
defense missile systems Osa, two launchers and launch and loading
vehicles of Buk-M1 system and one air defense missile system Spider.
Almost 18 months passed since then. During this time Georgia fully
restored and even increased its pre-war potential. However, it is not
quite clear in what.
According to CFE, as of January 1 of 2009 Georgian armed forces had
137 tanks, 128 fighting armored vehicles, 203 artillery systems, 12
combat airplanes and six strike helicopters. Thus, if the figures of
the pre-war military potential mentioned above are correct, its armed
forces decreased by 110 tanks and 189 fighting armored vehicles (or by
103 vehicles if MTLB is not taken into account). It is not quite clear
where the restoration is. Of course, a year passed since January 1 of
2009 but we did not hear anything about mass purchase of armored
vehicles by Tbilisi (as well as raillery, aviation and air defense
systems).
Personnel of the armed forces of Georgia is oriented at defensive
operations, for instance, combating of tanks. This will possible
hinder the task of a march at Tbilisi for the Russian forces but
offensive potential of the Georgian army is lost now. Georgian
aviation does not pose a serious threat too.
Result of reforming
The military political authorities of Russia drew very original
conclusions from the events of August of 2008 and started establishing
the armed forces for which even a Georgia became a problem now at an
accelerated speed. Brigades appeared instead of divisions in the
framework of the "military reform." As a result, firepower decreased
significantly but mobility did not grow bigger.
There is the fourth military base of the Russian armed forces on the
territory of South Ossetia. Its backbone is composed of the 693rd
mechanized infantry brigade (former 693rd mechanized infantry regiment
of the former 19th mechanized infantry division). It is armed with 41
T-72Bs and 150 BMP-2s. Units of the base are scattered all over the
republic and a part of them is located in North Ossetia.
There is the seventh military base of the Russian armed forces in
Abkhazia. Its backbone is composed of the 131st mechanized infantry
brigade. It has 41 T-90A tanks (there are approximately three hundred
of such tanks in entire Russia) and 150 BTR-80 armored personnel
carriers. Both bases also have two battalions of self-propelled
artillery systems 2S3, one battalion of multiple rocket launcher
systems Grad and air defense systems each. Even a regiment of air
defense missile systems S-300PS was moved from Moscow Region to
Abkhazia.
There are the following mechanized infantry formations remaining on
the territory of Russia within the North Caucasian Military District:
the 17th and the 18th brigades (both on the basis of the former 42nd
mechanized infantry division in Chechnya), the 19th brigade (on the
basis of the former 19th mechanized infantry division in North
Ossetia), the 20th (on the basis of the former 20th mechanized
infantry division in Volgograd; the 19th and 20th mechanized infantry
brigades also received T-90 tanks) and the 205th brigade (in
Budennovsk). There is also the 56th airborne attack brigade. The North
Caucasian Military District also has three mountain brigades: the 33rd
(Dagestan, the 34th (Karachay-Cherkessia) and the eighth (Chechnya).
The eighth brigade was established on the basis of the Tamanskaya
division in Moscow Region. There are also two brigades of special
forces, one missile brigade, one artillery brigade, one rocket
artillery brigade and one air defense missile brigade.
In comparison to the pre-reform situation the quantity of military
hardware in the North Caucasian Military District decreased
approximately by 33.33%. In any case, so far this group exceeds the
Georgian armed forces according to its combat potential yet because
Georgia has a long way to go to restore what it has had before the war
and contrary to the Kremlin propaganda NATO is not going to help
Tbilisi.
Moscow can hope only for this because in case of war we will have
practically nothing to reinforce the group of forces in the Caucasus
with. We already concentrated one-fourth of all combined-arms
brigades, 10 of 39, there. In August of 2008, the Russian armed forces
encountered a problem of mobility. It is very difficult to transport
the troops at our huge distances. This problem was solved to a
significant extent by now. No, mobility did not grow. There is simply
nothing to transport. The combined-arms brigades the nearest to the
Caucasus are located in Moscow Region (three) and in Samara Region
(two) now.
Even after the reform superiority of Russia in the air remains
overwhelming. In the North Caucasian Military District we have 76
Su-24s, 73 Su-25s, 42 MiG-29s, 42 Su-27s, 40 Mi-24s and three Mi-28
against 12 Georgian Su-25s and six Mi-24s. Along with this, during the
war in August the air force of Russia did not act very well.
In general, there is a stalemate situation in all Caucasian fronts
now. However, it will not remain such forever. Not a single local
conflict can be resolved by a peaceful way. Practice shows that
military way is the only way to resolve them.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 1, January 15-21, 2010, p. 1
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 20, 2010 Wednesday
THERE IS A STALEMATE SITUATION IN THE CAUCASIAN FRONTS, SO FAR
by Alexander Khramchikhin
NOT A SINGLE CAUCASIAN CONFLICT WILL BE RESOLVED BY A PEACEFUL WAY,
THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THEM IS MILITARY; At present, the Caucasus is
probably a unique region. Four countries - Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Georgia - belong to it. There are also two "partially recognized"
states (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and one "absolutely unrecognized"
state (Nagorno-Karabakh). All of them are in condition of "cold" war
among each other.
At present, the Caucasus is probably a unique region. Four countries -
Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia - belong to it. There are also
two "partially recognized" states (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and one
"absolutely unrecognized" state (Nagorno-Karabakh). All of them are in
condition of "cold" war among each other.
The matter of balance of forces in the region is very vital.
Acquisitions and losses
After breakup of the USSR Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
self-proclaimed Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh mostly
received "their own" share of the former Soviet army each.
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan received quotas for armament and military hardware under
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) having divided the
Soviet quota. Thus, each country of Transcaucasia was permitted to
have 220 tanks, 220 fighting armored vehicles (including 135 armored
infantry vehicles), 285 artillery systems, 100 combat airplanes and 50
strike helicopters.
In reality after breakup of the USSR Azerbaijan received 436 tanks,
558 fighting infantry vehicles, 389 armored personnel carriers, 388
artillery systems, 63 airplanes and eight helicopters. At the
beginning of 1993, Armenia had only 77 tanks, 150 fighting infantry
vehicles, 39 armored personnel carriers, 160 artillery systems, three
airplanes and 13 helicopters. Along with this, the armed forces of
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic became a "gray zone." Nagorno-Karabakh
received a certain part of military hardware of the Soviet army
(although a small one) in the form of the 366th mechanized infantry
regiment. Armenia handed a certain quantity of military hardware that
was not registered over to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Despite that the strength of the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh was
unknown for sure, there was no doubt that by the beginning of the
Nagorno-Karabakh war the army of Azerbaijan had a very significant
superiority over the armed forces of Armenia and the autonomous
republic that declared independence.
In any case, significant superiority did not help Azerbaijan and it
was seriously defeated in that war.
Armenia confessed that it lost 52 T-72 tanks, 54 fighting infantry
vehicles, six guns and mortars. Naturally, it remained unknown what
and how much Nagorno-Karabakh lost. Losses of Azerbaijan amounted to
186 tanks (160 T-72s and 26 T-55s), 111 fighting infantry vehicles,
eight armored personnel carriers, seven self-propelled artillery
mounts, 47 guns and mortars, five multiple rocket launcher systems,
14-16 airplanes, five or six helicopters. Azerbaijan also wrote off 43
tanks (including 18 T-72s), 83 fighting infantry vehicles, 31 armored
personnel carriers, one self-propelled artillery mount, 42 guns and
mortars and eight multiple rocket launcher systems.
Revanche is unlikely
Naturally, after the end of the war Armenia and Azerbaijan were
actively arming themselves.
Due to the oil revenues the military budget of Azerbaijan is threefold
bigger than the Armenian one.
Azerbaijan was the only of the 30 CFE participants that exceeded the
framework of the quotas very much in two classes of military hardware
at once: tanks (there were 381 of them as of January 1 of 2009) and
artillery systems (404). Baku also declares that its armed forces have
181 fighting armored vehicles, 75 combat airplanes and 15 strike
helicopters. Incidentally, the air force of Azerbaijan is growing very
rapidly: in 2003 it had 54 airplanes. For example, 14 MiG-29s were
bought in Ukraine recently, although one of them crashed.
With regard to Armenia, judging by the data that it provides in
accordance with the CFE its armed forces remain stable for many years.
As of January 1 of 2009, Yerevan reported that it had 110 tanks, 140
fighting armored vehicles, 239 artillery systems, 16 airplanes and
eight helicopters.
According to the Azerbaijan, the army of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has
316 tanks, 324 fighting armored vehicles and 332 artillery systems.
However, these figures look incredible.
Azerbaijan achieved almost 300% superiority over Armenia in tanks and
almost 400% superiority in combat airplanes. In any case, the armed
forces of Nagorno-Karabakh are not taken into account. Hence, if there
is an advantage of Azerbaijan on the ground it is very insignificant.
The quality of armament is similar: the armed forces of the parties
are armed almost exclusively with Soviet hardware. Hence, Azerbaijani
potential is absolutely insufficient for successful offensive.
In the air Azerbaijan has an indisputable superiority. Armenia has one
MiG-25 airplane. Azerbaijan has 32 MiG-25 airplanes. Along with this,
the benefit from them is only a little bigger than the benefit from
one Armenian airplane. MiG-25 is simply unsuitable for fulfillment of
tactical tasks.
Along with this, attack airplanes Su-25 act perfectly above the
battlefield. Azerbaijan and Armenia have 15 such airplanes each. For
attacking of ground targets Azerbaijan also has five frontline bombers
Su-24 and the same quantity of old but food attack airplanes Su-17.
Azerbaijan also has almost 100% superiority in strike helicopters: 15
helicopters against eight (naturally, these are Mi-24 in both
countries). Five MiG-21s, old but quite fit for this theater of combat
operations, as well as 13 new MiG-29s will be suitable for
maneuverable battles.
In any case, the might of Azerbaijani air force is not as big as to
change the course of war on the ground (it is possible to suspect that
the level of pilots training in Azerbaijan is not the best in the
world). Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh also have air defense systems
that can be very efficient in mountains.
That is why it is possible to say with assurance that chances of
Azerbaijan for military revanche are quite illusory now.
Before and after August of 2008
Recently, the center for analysis of strategies and technologies
released a collection of articles entitled "Tanks of August" and
describing the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 in detail.
The book denied the myth that before the war the Georgian army was
armed with American weapons and at expense of America that was very
popular in Russia. Specialists knew well and for a long time that
Georgia almost had no American weapons and had almost only Soviet
models of armament and military hardware. The foreign military aid
amounted to less than 1% of the military budget of the country.
By the beginning of the war, the ground forces of Georgia had 247
tanks (191 T-72, 56 T-55), 165 fighting infantry vehicles, 152 armored
personnel carriers (including 86 MTLB), 44 self-propelled artillery
systems, 123 towed guns, 55 antitank guns, up to 400 mortars, 28
multiple rocket launcher systems, 15 air defense systems Shilka, 45
air defense guns. The air force and air defense forces included 12
attack airplanes Su-25 (including two Su-25UBs), eight combat
helicopters Mi-24, 32 transport helicopters (18 Mi-8, 2 Mi-14, 6
UÃ?-1Ã?, 6 Bell-212), 10 training airplanes L-39Ã`, two battalions of air
defense missile systems S-125 and Buk-M1 each, 18 air defense systems
Osa-AKM, several Israeli air defense missile systems Spider. Just
compare: at the beginning of 1993 the former Soviet republic had 108
tanks, 121 fighting combat vehicles, 17 artillery systems, four
airplanes and the same quantity of helicopters.
During the combat operations proper (August 8-12, 2008) losses of
Georgia turned out to be small (about 20 tanks, about 10 fighting
infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers, up to 20 guns and
mortars and three helicopters). These figures were partially not big
because actions of the Russian armed forces (first of all, aviation)
left much to be desired. For example, the air force of Georgia did not
lose a single airplane (along with this, Russian air defense forces
downed three friendly airplanes). Naturally, the "maritime battle"
during which Russian small missile ship Mirazh allegedly sunk Georgian
missile boat Tbilisi turned out to be a pure myth.
Georgia bore the main losses in military hardware already after the
end of hostilities when Russian forces took Georgian military bases.
Thus, Russian paratroopers occupied the port of Poti where they blew
up six boats left by the "heroic" Georgian sailors including both
missile boats (including Tbilisi). As a result, Georgia had to disband
the navy completely. Tens of units of military hardware including 65
T-72s and approximately 20 fighting infantry vehicles were captured at
the bases in Gori and Senaki. Russian air force failed to kill any
Georgian air defense system, but ground forces captured five air
defense missile systems Osa, two launchers and launch and loading
vehicles of Buk-M1 system and one air defense missile system Spider.
Almost 18 months passed since then. During this time Georgia fully
restored and even increased its pre-war potential. However, it is not
quite clear in what.
According to CFE, as of January 1 of 2009 Georgian armed forces had
137 tanks, 128 fighting armored vehicles, 203 artillery systems, 12
combat airplanes and six strike helicopters. Thus, if the figures of
the pre-war military potential mentioned above are correct, its armed
forces decreased by 110 tanks and 189 fighting armored vehicles (or by
103 vehicles if MTLB is not taken into account). It is not quite clear
where the restoration is. Of course, a year passed since January 1 of
2009 but we did not hear anything about mass purchase of armored
vehicles by Tbilisi (as well as raillery, aviation and air defense
systems).
Personnel of the armed forces of Georgia is oriented at defensive
operations, for instance, combating of tanks. This will possible
hinder the task of a march at Tbilisi for the Russian forces but
offensive potential of the Georgian army is lost now. Georgian
aviation does not pose a serious threat too.
Result of reforming
The military political authorities of Russia drew very original
conclusions from the events of August of 2008 and started establishing
the armed forces for which even a Georgia became a problem now at an
accelerated speed. Brigades appeared instead of divisions in the
framework of the "military reform." As a result, firepower decreased
significantly but mobility did not grow bigger.
There is the fourth military base of the Russian armed forces on the
territory of South Ossetia. Its backbone is composed of the 693rd
mechanized infantry brigade (former 693rd mechanized infantry regiment
of the former 19th mechanized infantry division). It is armed with 41
T-72Bs and 150 BMP-2s. Units of the base are scattered all over the
republic and a part of them is located in North Ossetia.
There is the seventh military base of the Russian armed forces in
Abkhazia. Its backbone is composed of the 131st mechanized infantry
brigade. It has 41 T-90A tanks (there are approximately three hundred
of such tanks in entire Russia) and 150 BTR-80 armored personnel
carriers. Both bases also have two battalions of self-propelled
artillery systems 2S3, one battalion of multiple rocket launcher
systems Grad and air defense systems each. Even a regiment of air
defense missile systems S-300PS was moved from Moscow Region to
Abkhazia.
There are the following mechanized infantry formations remaining on
the territory of Russia within the North Caucasian Military District:
the 17th and the 18th brigades (both on the basis of the former 42nd
mechanized infantry division in Chechnya), the 19th brigade (on the
basis of the former 19th mechanized infantry division in North
Ossetia), the 20th (on the basis of the former 20th mechanized
infantry division in Volgograd; the 19th and 20th mechanized infantry
brigades also received T-90 tanks) and the 205th brigade (in
Budennovsk). There is also the 56th airborne attack brigade. The North
Caucasian Military District also has three mountain brigades: the 33rd
(Dagestan, the 34th (Karachay-Cherkessia) and the eighth (Chechnya).
The eighth brigade was established on the basis of the Tamanskaya
division in Moscow Region. There are also two brigades of special
forces, one missile brigade, one artillery brigade, one rocket
artillery brigade and one air defense missile brigade.
In comparison to the pre-reform situation the quantity of military
hardware in the North Caucasian Military District decreased
approximately by 33.33%. In any case, so far this group exceeds the
Georgian armed forces according to its combat potential yet because
Georgia has a long way to go to restore what it has had before the war
and contrary to the Kremlin propaganda NATO is not going to help
Tbilisi.
Moscow can hope only for this because in case of war we will have
practically nothing to reinforce the group of forces in the Caucasus
with. We already concentrated one-fourth of all combined-arms
brigades, 10 of 39, there. In August of 2008, the Russian armed forces
encountered a problem of mobility. It is very difficult to transport
the troops at our huge distances. This problem was solved to a
significant extent by now. No, mobility did not grow. There is simply
nothing to transport. The combined-arms brigades the nearest to the
Caucasus are located in Moscow Region (three) and in Samara Region
(two) now.
Even after the reform superiority of Russia in the air remains
overwhelming. In the North Caucasian Military District we have 76
Su-24s, 73 Su-25s, 42 MiG-29s, 42 Su-27s, 40 Mi-24s and three Mi-28
against 12 Georgian Su-25s and six Mi-24s. Along with this, during the
war in August the air force of Russia did not act very well.
In general, there is a stalemate situation in all Caucasian fronts
now. However, it will not remain such forever. Not a single local
conflict can be resolved by a peaceful way. Practice shows that
military way is the only way to resolve them.
Source: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 1, January 15-21, 2010, p. 1