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CAUCASUS TO BRIDGE BETWEEN TURKEY, RUSSIA
Dr. Burcu Gultekin Punsmann
Hurriyet
Tuesday, January 26 2010 07:15 GMT+2
Turks and Russians have never had such amicable contacts, never
intermingled and cooperated so closely. The historical reconciliation
process between Turkey and Russia should generate the same degree of
enthusiasm as the French-German reconciliation process.
The main actors of the advanced many-faceted partnership promoted
by the Russian and Turkish governments are indeed civilians,
namely businessmen and tourists. The increasing interdependence and
interactions are rapidly eliminating many of the remaining traces of
enmity. The recent announcement that both countries can agree on a
visa-free regime by the spring is very good news.
Prime Minister Erdogan depicted, during his visit to Moscow on Jan. 12
and 13, the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation as exemplary. The deals
reached during Prime Minister Putin's visit to Ankara in August raised
the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation to a strategic level. Turkey
allowed Russia's Gazprom to use its sector of the Black Sea for
the South Stream pipeline to pump Russian and Central Asian gas to
Europe bypassing Ukraine. And Russia agreed to join a consortium
to build the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean supporting Turkey's drive to become a regional hub for
gas and oil transit.
Efforts underway aimed at strengthening transportation across the
Black Sea between the two countries. Turkey and Russia are planning to
build a logistics center in Krasnodar, located 1,500 kilometers south
of Moscow and close to the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Temruk,
Taman, Kavkaz, Gelendzhik and Tuapse. Turkey, which seeks to export
to Russia and other countries in the Black Sea and Caucasus region
more efficiently, began feasibility studies in 2008. The center is
expected to be a key base reaching all countries around the Black
Sea in addition to Russia. Some 98 percent of cargo from Russia to
Turkey is carried to Black Sea ports via railways.
Russia and Turkey are being linked across the Black Sea, whereas the
Caucasus has become a barrier between them. The situation arisen from
the conflicts of the South Caucasus are indeed less than optimal
from a Turkish and Russian perspectives. The communications links
through the Caucasus are severed. A major part of the infrastructure
connecting the Caucasus to eastern Anatolia and Turkey's Black Sea
region - valuable legacy from the Russian empire - is not operational.
Kars lost its traditional function of the key to the Trans-Caucasus.
Sochi cannot be Russia's southern gate and access to Vladikavkaz is
dependent on the Upper Lars crossing at Kazbegi.
The Black Sea-Caucasus region had historically suffered from being
a grey area of confrontation in the managed rivalry between Turkey
and Russia. The current Turkish-Russian rapprochement should affect
positively the region. Is there a possibility to transfer the model of
economic bilateral cooperation between Russia and Turkey that verges
on interdependence to the shared neighborhood, the Caucasus?
Turkish-Russian relations have been steadily developing throughout the
90s while, on a parallel track, Moscow and Ankara have been extremely
cautious to prevent a spill over of tension emanating from the Caucasus
into their bilateral relations.
Although neither Turkey nor Russia have any vital interest in the
South Caucasus, they are not given the option to forget about the
region. The Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia signed Nov. 16,
2001 by the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey, Igor Ivanov and
Ismail Cem, in New York during the U.N. General Assembly, created
new room for cooperation. In the post 9/11 context, both countries
expressed thereby their determination to carry their relations to a
level of enhanced constructive partnership, extending to Eurasia and
being based on "the shared belief that dialogue and cooperation in
Eurasia will positively contribute to bring about peaceful, just and
lasting political solutions to disputes in the region." In accordance
with the Eurasia Action Plan, a Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint
Working Group and a Caucasus Task Force were established, bringing
together high-level officials from the Russian and Turkish ministries
of foreign affairs.
The cost of the return of war to the South Caucasus in August 2008 has
been very high for the entire region. The initiative for a "Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform," or CSCP, was made public Aug. 13,
2008 by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Moscow.
Announced by Turkey in a context of increasing polarization and
harsh rhetoric, the CSCP maintained the channels of communication and
dialogue open with Russia and has been a good tactical move to overcome
tensions between Georgia and Russia. Furthermore, it helped Turkey to
develop at least at the discourse level a pro-active policy in the
Caucasus. Despite the fact that Russia dislikes encroachments into
its spheres of influence, it recognized the commonality of interests
with Turkey and welcomed the initiative by adopting a pragmatic
approach and accepting political dynamism on behalf of Turkey in the
Caucasus. The Caucasus Platform initiative has brought about a new
development: for the first time, good Turkish-Russian understanding
was being openly used to resolve problems in the common geographic
neighborhood. Contrary to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, or
BSEC, that has always avoided such issues, it was stated that the
CSCP would be orientated toward problem solving.
The CSCP revealed a Turkish-Russian shared desire to change the
regional context characterized by the state of neither peace nor war.
The explicit linkage between regional stability and conflict resolution
came as an innovation. The Caucasus platform aims at developing a
functional method of finding solutions to the problems within the
region and is based on the acknowledgement that tensions stem from
a profound lack of confidence among states of the region.
Furthermore it is a step forward in developing a sense of regional
accountability and ownership from insiders. Russia has the potential
to become a more active peace broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and Turkey can contribute more actively to the settlement of the
conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians.
The new momentum in the process of the normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations has been a major source of legitimacy
for the CSCP, which 1.5 years after its announcement has still not
been precisely formulated. At this stage, the interruption of the
Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations will dissipate the international
attention focused on the region and decrease the chances to reach in a
foreseeable future an agreement on the conflict over Karabakh. Russia
expressed openly its support for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations. The opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, the last
closed one of Europe, will bring new opportunities for Turkish and
Russian business sectors active on the Armenian side of the border
in infrastructure projects.
Prime Minister Vladimer Putin stated during his talks with Prime
Minister Erdogan in Moscow that "the sooner the two countries ratify
the protocols, the better for the region it will be" and that "Russia,
like no other country, is interested in the normalization of relations
in the region among all the countries, our neighbors."
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of the underlying root causes
of insecurity in the region. The term of "frozen conflict." The
term has been depicted as misleading and potentially dangerous:
actually the dispute is in a state of constant dynamic change. With
roughly 60,000 Armenian and Azerbaijani troops separated by a 175-km
self-regulating ceasefire line (Line of Contact), the situation
is inherently unstable. For the time being, the Line of Contact is
occasionally monitored by a very small team of five OSCE observers,
which means that the sides will always have the possibility to blame
each other for any serious violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.
There is a pressing need to try to change the status quo in a
predictable and controllable manner. It seems there is a possibility
that Russian President Dimitry Medvedev will host Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serge Sarkisian at a trilateral
meeting in Moscow in late January. A joint declaration of the sides'
full consent over the updated version of the Madrid Principles is
expected.
The resumption of the flight connection between Moscow and Tbilisi
and the announcement of the reopening in March of the Verkhny Lars
crossing between Russia and Georgia have been welcomed by Turkey.
Turkey can play a major role in overcoming the isolation of Abkhazia
and help to open up north-south transit routes between Turkey and
Russia.
There is a pressing need to transfer the unique economic
cooperation between Russia and Turkey - a cooperation that verges on
interdependence - to the South Caucasus. Foreign investments are still
being often associated with ownership, control and territorial gain.
There is a need to promote pragmatically oriented approaches based on
self-interest and business initiatives, and to stress the importance
of competition, rather than confrontation and domination. In this
regard, Turkey and Russia can set the example. The two traditional
foes found a political common ground. Economics and private sector
actors have been the driving force in this rapprochement.
The Caucasus has the potential to become a land bridge between Turkey
and Russia. Being perceived as a buffer zone has proved very harmful.
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan can be at the heart of an economically
attractive region enlarged to southern Russia (Rostov and Krasnodar
territories) and to eastern Turkey (East Anatolia and the eastern
Black Sea regions).
* Dr. Burcu Gultekin Punsmann is a Foreign Policy Analyst, TEPAV.
Dr. Burcu Gultekin Punsmann
Hurriyet
Tuesday, January 26 2010 07:15 GMT+2
Turks and Russians have never had such amicable contacts, never
intermingled and cooperated so closely. The historical reconciliation
process between Turkey and Russia should generate the same degree of
enthusiasm as the French-German reconciliation process.
The main actors of the advanced many-faceted partnership promoted
by the Russian and Turkish governments are indeed civilians,
namely businessmen and tourists. The increasing interdependence and
interactions are rapidly eliminating many of the remaining traces of
enmity. The recent announcement that both countries can agree on a
visa-free regime by the spring is very good news.
Prime Minister Erdogan depicted, during his visit to Moscow on Jan. 12
and 13, the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation as exemplary. The deals
reached during Prime Minister Putin's visit to Ankara in August raised
the Turkish-Russian energy cooperation to a strategic level. Turkey
allowed Russia's Gazprom to use its sector of the Black Sea for
the South Stream pipeline to pump Russian and Central Asian gas to
Europe bypassing Ukraine. And Russia agreed to join a consortium
to build the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean supporting Turkey's drive to become a regional hub for
gas and oil transit.
Efforts underway aimed at strengthening transportation across the
Black Sea between the two countries. Turkey and Russia are planning to
build a logistics center in Krasnodar, located 1,500 kilometers south
of Moscow and close to the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Temruk,
Taman, Kavkaz, Gelendzhik and Tuapse. Turkey, which seeks to export
to Russia and other countries in the Black Sea and Caucasus region
more efficiently, began feasibility studies in 2008. The center is
expected to be a key base reaching all countries around the Black
Sea in addition to Russia. Some 98 percent of cargo from Russia to
Turkey is carried to Black Sea ports via railways.
Russia and Turkey are being linked across the Black Sea, whereas the
Caucasus has become a barrier between them. The situation arisen from
the conflicts of the South Caucasus are indeed less than optimal
from a Turkish and Russian perspectives. The communications links
through the Caucasus are severed. A major part of the infrastructure
connecting the Caucasus to eastern Anatolia and Turkey's Black Sea
region - valuable legacy from the Russian empire - is not operational.
Kars lost its traditional function of the key to the Trans-Caucasus.
Sochi cannot be Russia's southern gate and access to Vladikavkaz is
dependent on the Upper Lars crossing at Kazbegi.
The Black Sea-Caucasus region had historically suffered from being
a grey area of confrontation in the managed rivalry between Turkey
and Russia. The current Turkish-Russian rapprochement should affect
positively the region. Is there a possibility to transfer the model of
economic bilateral cooperation between Russia and Turkey that verges
on interdependence to the shared neighborhood, the Caucasus?
Turkish-Russian relations have been steadily developing throughout the
90s while, on a parallel track, Moscow and Ankara have been extremely
cautious to prevent a spill over of tension emanating from the Caucasus
into their bilateral relations.
Although neither Turkey nor Russia have any vital interest in the
South Caucasus, they are not given the option to forget about the
region. The Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia signed Nov. 16,
2001 by the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey, Igor Ivanov and
Ismail Cem, in New York during the U.N. General Assembly, created
new room for cooperation. In the post 9/11 context, both countries
expressed thereby their determination to carry their relations to a
level of enhanced constructive partnership, extending to Eurasia and
being based on "the shared belief that dialogue and cooperation in
Eurasia will positively contribute to bring about peaceful, just and
lasting political solutions to disputes in the region." In accordance
with the Eurasia Action Plan, a Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint
Working Group and a Caucasus Task Force were established, bringing
together high-level officials from the Russian and Turkish ministries
of foreign affairs.
The cost of the return of war to the South Caucasus in August 2008 has
been very high for the entire region. The initiative for a "Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform," or CSCP, was made public Aug. 13,
2008 by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Moscow.
Announced by Turkey in a context of increasing polarization and
harsh rhetoric, the CSCP maintained the channels of communication and
dialogue open with Russia and has been a good tactical move to overcome
tensions between Georgia and Russia. Furthermore, it helped Turkey to
develop at least at the discourse level a pro-active policy in the
Caucasus. Despite the fact that Russia dislikes encroachments into
its spheres of influence, it recognized the commonality of interests
with Turkey and welcomed the initiative by adopting a pragmatic
approach and accepting political dynamism on behalf of Turkey in the
Caucasus. The Caucasus Platform initiative has brought about a new
development: for the first time, good Turkish-Russian understanding
was being openly used to resolve problems in the common geographic
neighborhood. Contrary to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, or
BSEC, that has always avoided such issues, it was stated that the
CSCP would be orientated toward problem solving.
The CSCP revealed a Turkish-Russian shared desire to change the
regional context characterized by the state of neither peace nor war.
The explicit linkage between regional stability and conflict resolution
came as an innovation. The Caucasus platform aims at developing a
functional method of finding solutions to the problems within the
region and is based on the acknowledgement that tensions stem from
a profound lack of confidence among states of the region.
Furthermore it is a step forward in developing a sense of regional
accountability and ownership from insiders. Russia has the potential
to become a more active peace broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan
and Turkey can contribute more actively to the settlement of the
conflict between Georgians and Abkhazians.
The new momentum in the process of the normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations has been a major source of legitimacy
for the CSCP, which 1.5 years after its announcement has still not
been precisely formulated. At this stage, the interruption of the
Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations will dissipate the international
attention focused on the region and decrease the chances to reach in a
foreseeable future an agreement on the conflict over Karabakh. Russia
expressed openly its support for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations. The opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, the last
closed one of Europe, will bring new opportunities for Turkish and
Russian business sectors active on the Armenian side of the border
in infrastructure projects.
Prime Minister Vladimer Putin stated during his talks with Prime
Minister Erdogan in Moscow that "the sooner the two countries ratify
the protocols, the better for the region it will be" and that "Russia,
like no other country, is interested in the normalization of relations
in the region among all the countries, our neighbors."
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is one of the underlying root causes
of insecurity in the region. The term of "frozen conflict." The
term has been depicted as misleading and potentially dangerous:
actually the dispute is in a state of constant dynamic change. With
roughly 60,000 Armenian and Azerbaijani troops separated by a 175-km
self-regulating ceasefire line (Line of Contact), the situation
is inherently unstable. For the time being, the Line of Contact is
occasionally monitored by a very small team of five OSCE observers,
which means that the sides will always have the possibility to blame
each other for any serious violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.
There is a pressing need to try to change the status quo in a
predictable and controllable manner. It seems there is a possibility
that Russian President Dimitry Medvedev will host Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serge Sarkisian at a trilateral
meeting in Moscow in late January. A joint declaration of the sides'
full consent over the updated version of the Madrid Principles is
expected.
The resumption of the flight connection between Moscow and Tbilisi
and the announcement of the reopening in March of the Verkhny Lars
crossing between Russia and Georgia have been welcomed by Turkey.
Turkey can play a major role in overcoming the isolation of Abkhazia
and help to open up north-south transit routes between Turkey and
Russia.
There is a pressing need to transfer the unique economic
cooperation between Russia and Turkey - a cooperation that verges on
interdependence - to the South Caucasus. Foreign investments are still
being often associated with ownership, control and territorial gain.
There is a need to promote pragmatically oriented approaches based on
self-interest and business initiatives, and to stress the importance
of competition, rather than confrontation and domination. In this
regard, Turkey and Russia can set the example. The two traditional
foes found a political common ground. Economics and private sector
actors have been the driving force in this rapprochement.
The Caucasus has the potential to become a land bridge between Turkey
and Russia. Being perceived as a buffer zone has proved very harmful.
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan can be at the heart of an economically
attractive region enlarged to southern Russia (Rostov and Krasnodar
territories) and to eastern Turkey (East Anatolia and the eastern
Black Sea regions).
* Dr. Burcu Gultekin Punsmann is a Foreign Policy Analyst, TEPAV.