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A Little Long, But It Is Ok

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  • A Little Long, But It Is Ok

    A LITTLE LONG, BUT IT IS OK
    Hakob Badalyan

    Lragir.am
    26/01/10

    The Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents met in Sochi, negotiated in
    presence of the Russian president, then had a dinner, skied and after,
    met with the OSCE Minsk group co-chairs and left. The Russian Prime
    Minister Lavrov stated that in the course of the meeting in Sochi,
    the sides worked out the preamble of the principles of Madrid and the
    Russian co-chair of the Minsk group extended hope that the co-chairs
    will present their judgments on the principles of Madrid.

    What happened in Sochi seems to have happened in the process of the
    Karabakh settlement several times already. In different cities of
    the world, there seem to have already been such meetings within the
    frameworks of the conflict settlement. From this point, the impression
    is that Sochi is just a regular event and there are many other cities,
    villages which waiting to have the honor to host the Armenian and
    Azerbaijani presidents and the OSCE Minsk group co-chairs.

    All this creates grounds for many people to affirm that the negotiation
    process is just an imitation the aim of which is to secure the
    existence of negotiations which are an alternative to the war.

    There are many others who think that the Sochi meeting enhanced
    repressions on Armenia and the day of a disadvantageous agreement
    for Armenians approaches. Both can be affirmed. The truth, as usual,
    is somewhere in the middle.

    To say that the negotiation is fully an imitation of course would be
    exaggeration. The negotiation is negotiation in the course of which the
    mediators and the parties express their stances, try to defend them,
    and attempt to get the result they want or to diminish possibly the
    limit of concessions. It would be exaggeration to say that the sides
    are forced concessions, that the patience of the co-chairing countries
    is over and they need to settle the NKR issue as soon as possible so
    they force the parties to sign an agreement the principles of which
    are very bad for Armenia.

    Anyone who affirms that Armenia is being obliged to sign an agreement
    has not clarified yet the reason why right Armenia is forced
    it. For example, which is the reason why they force Armenians leave
    the released areas. They say they do that to deploy there peace
    forces since it is a border with Iran which has nuclear plans and
    the international society is going to hit it. But this argument,
    mildly speaking, is a bit childish. It is childish first from the
    point that the OSCE Minsk group co-chairs have different opinions
    of the NKR issue. Besides, peace forces are not those ones to carry
    out effective activities against Iran. Third, the precedents with
    Iran and Afghanistan showed that land actions against Iran will be
    a serious mistake. And judging by a different attitude of the Obama
    administration towards the Iranian issue, the U.S. has realized this
    circumstance. Besides, Azerbaijan will never agree to take back lands
    from Armenia and to give them to the West for the latter to use it
    against Iran for repressions and aggression. Azerbaijan, in this case,
    would become an enemy of Iran, which, mildly speaking, is not that
    pleasant even for a superpower, let alone a country like Azerbaijan.

    The international society is also said to wish to settle the Karabakh
    issue for the sake of security and peace in the region. This is a
    not less childish affirmation than the one about Iran. The point is
    that if the security and the stability of the region worry any of the
    superpowers, only after the latter will have solved the issue of its
    dominancy in the region. The same goes for the Armenian and Turkish
    relations. The problem is the fight for the Caucasus which has been
    lasting for already two decades and seems to be still lasting much
    because interests are various, involved countries-many.

    This of course means that the contradiction between interests can
    secure the preservation of a status quo in the Karabakh issue, even in
    case two of its bearers, Armenia and Karabakh, refuse it. The point
    is that refusing the status quo is little for changing it because an
    agreement on a new status quo is to be reached first. And the current
    one, as we know, has been achieved at the cost of a bloody war. In
    Caucasus any change of a status quo has happened and is happening
    through wars the bright example of which is the 2008 war. This is a
    contradiction to the affirmation that preserving the status quo will
    bring about a war. The opposite is more likely, in the Caucasus the
    status quo is changed through wars.

    But the preservation of the status quo on account of the contradiction
    of interests and clash seems to be favorable for Armenia, and there
    is no reason for panic and defeatism. There is really no reason
    for panic and defeatism, but there is no reason to be so sure of
    the benefits of the situation for Armenia either. The situation can
    become favorable for Armenia only if, in addition to its stake in
    the status quo, it will have something to offer the world. Over 20
    years of independence and 16 years of truce in Karabakh, Armenia was
    unable to create something to offer the world, and the image of the
    "island of democracy", which it acquired in early 1990, began to fade
    already by the middle of the decade. And now Armenia takes part in
    international processes, having in stock only the status quo and the
    willingness to renounce its share in it.

    Maybe if there was no hope for resisting and not yielding with the
    help of contradiction of interests, Armenia could devise a more
    effective foreign policy and create a valuable resource for engaging
    in international processes. And such a resource could be a policy
    aimed at making Armenia the most modern country in the region, with
    the most modern socio-political, economic qualities. But instead of
    creating such a state in order to absolve the burden of the status
    quo Armenia in every way uses the status quo not to assume the burden
    of reforming the country.
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