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ISRAEL-TURKEY AXIS TURNED ON ITS HEAD
By Chris Zambelis
Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LG20Ak01.html
July 19 2010
HongKong
For many observers, the long-term implications of Israel's deadly
May 31 assault against the MV Mavi Marmara, the Turkish flagship that
was part of the Gaza Freedom flotilla, on Israeli-Turkish relations
are unclear.
The attack left eight Turks and one Turkish-American dead and scores
more wounded. The flotilla set off to break Israel's illegal blockade
of Gaza and to raise global awareness of the suffering endured by
the 1.5 million Palestinians living in what is widely described as
the world's largest open-air prison.
While acknowledging the growing rift between Israel and Turkey that
began amid Israel's December 2008 invasion of Gaza, as
evidenced by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's clash with
Israeli President Shimon Peres during a dialogue about Gaza at the
World Economic Forum summit in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2009,
many point to the tradition of strong ties enjoyed by Israel and
Turkey as proof that the current crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations
represents a temporary setback as opposed to a permanent realignment
of the regional order.
Business as usual?
Based on the track record of Israeli-Turkish relations, it would
seem logical to conclude that the confluence of mutual interests will
transcend the bilateral crisis. Israel and Turkey have cultivated a
strategic partnership over the years spanning the political, economic
and military realms.
Although Turkey has announced that it will review its military
relationship with Israel, including current and future arms purchases
of Israeli weapons platforms and other forms of cooperation, the
ongoing spat has not precluded the scheduled delivery of Israeli-made
Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and supporting technology as
part of a US$190 million deal.
A Turkish military delegation arrived in Israel in late June to test
the UAVs following Israel's decision to recall its military personnel
from Turkey following the diplomatic row. On the trade front, consumer
boycotts by Israelis targeting the Turkish economy and similar moves
by Turks to single out the Israeli economy have already contributed
to a decline in the bilateral trade volume that normally totals around
$3 billion annually.
Thousands of Israeli tourists, for instance, heeded the advice of
their government and canceled planned vacations to Turkey in 2010.
Many Israeli stores have also emptied their shelves of Turkish
products. Likewise, a number of Turkish firms have dropped out of
plans to enter into joint ventures with Israeli companies. A host
of construction and energy projects involving Turkish firms dealing
with Israelis, for instance, have been suspended until further review
or cancelled outright. Despite these actions, there are signs that
business dealings overall between Israel and Turkey will, for the
most part, remain largely unaffected.
Leaked reports of secret talks between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu and Israeli Industry, Trade, and Labor Minister Benjamin
Ben-Eliezer in Brussels in late June were also interpreted as a sign
that national interests and pragmatism would win out over a continued
deterioration of relations.
Looks can be deceiving Tangible signs of a looming reconciliation
between Israel and Turkey aside, there are also indications that
tensions will continue to degenerate.
Turkey's recall of its ambassador to Israel and its threat to sever
relations over its refusal to apologize for the deadly raid against
the flotilla and accept an independent international inquiry into the
incident, reflect the extent to which relations have deteriorated,
as do Israeli threats to recognize the Armenian Genocide of 1915
perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks and ramped up efforts among Israel's
supporters in the US to do the same in Washington - a red line that
cannot be crossed as far as Turkey is concerned. Turkish military and
government officials have also accused Israel of providing support
to militants from Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers'
Party - PKK) , including during a May 31 attack against a naval base
in Iskandirun that left seven servicemen dead and six more wounded.
The PKK attack occurred just hours before Israel's assault against
the flotilla. In this context, Israeli support for the PKK would
appear to represent a form of retaliation for Turkish support for the
Palestinians. No evidence has emerged to substantiate Turkish claims
of an Israeli hand behind the PKK attack at Iskandirun. Israel does
maintain close contacts with various factions in Iraqi Kurdistan -
a launching pad for PKK operations against Turkey - where it is known
to have an intelligence presence. Israeli companies also have extensive
business interests in the Iraqi province.
There are also indications that future crises revolving around
flotillas are in the offing, and it is likely that Turks will once
again figure prominently in such efforts. Meanwhile, the Israelis have
called for the formation of an Israeli-led flotilla that would embark
for Turkey to protest over the plight of its ethnic Kurdish community
as well as Ankara's positions on the Armenian genocide and Northern
Cyprus. The organizers of the Gaza Freedom flotilla are also planning
additional missions to break the siege and deliver humanitarian aid
in the coming months. A number of independent activist groups have
also set off on their own missions to Gaza.
Demise of Israel's 'periphery strategy' Important shifts in the
respective strategic outlooks and societies in Israel and Turkey
also suggest that hostilities in Israeli-Turkish relations will not
go away anytime soon.
A consideration of Israel's "periphery strategy" is critical to
understanding the current state of Israeli-Turkish ties. The strategy
has served as a guiding principle of Israeli foreign policy since
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.
Israel sought to cultivate formal as well as covert alliances with
non-Arab countries and ethnic and sectarian minorities around its
periphery to outflank the surrounding Arab states hostile to it - in
particular Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan and the Palestinian
national movement - and to counter the influence of pan-Arab
nationalism.
As the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel in 1949, Turkey was an
essential part of the periphery strategy, along with Iran under Reza
Shah Pahlavi, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, Kurdish nationalists in
Iraq, Maronite Christians and Druze in Lebanon, Christians in southern
Sudan, and Jewish communities across the region.
Given its traditionally pro-Western and staunchly secular orientation,
its status as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and aspirations of gaining entry into the European Union
(EU), Israel's ties with Turkey developed into one of the region's
most dynamic relationships.
The significance of Israeli-Turkish relations increased dramatically
after the Iranian revolution of 1979 toppled the shah. Therein lies
the significance of the rift in Israeli-Turkish relations; Israel's
attack against the flotilla signaled its abandonment of its strategic
alliance with Turkey. Israel also seemingly went to great lengths to
humiliate Turkey in the process, a reality that will surely not be
forgotten in Ankara anytime soon.
Turkey's star is rising Much has been said of Turkey's rise as
a regional power and its improved standing in the greater Islamic
world. Turkey is indeed relishing its position as a symbol resistance
and advocate for the Palestinians in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims
across the Middle East.
Long excluded from the EU and having felt betrayed by its ally
the United States for its backing of Kurdish political aspirations
in Iraqi Kurdistan - a development it saw as setting a dangerous
precedent to be emulated by Kurdish nationalists on its own soil -
an increasingly confident and assertive Turkey has set off on a new
foreign policy course that departs from its prior role as a reliable
and predictable friend of Washington and Brussels.
Elements of political theater are certainly at play in Turkey's attempt
to fashion itself as a regional leader and champion of the Palestinian
cause. Moreover, despite the noticeable shift in Ankara's rhetoric
and actions, Turkey remains a valuable and close ally of the United
States and NATO, as well as a committed EU aspirant.
At the same time, buoyed by an increasingly stable domestic political
scene and an expanding economy that continues to trend upward even amid
the global economic downturn, the transformation of Turkish foreign
policy under the leadership of Erdogan's moderate Islamist-oriented
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party - AKP)
in recent years reflects a fundamental shift in Turkey's outlook.
Turkey is also asserting itself amid a decline of American power in
the Middle East and beyond and the appearance of a new multi-polarity
characterized by the ascent of regional powers capable of projecting
their influence on the global stage. While it preserves its Western
orientation, Turkey today also openly embraces its Islamic heritage
and Muslim neighbors, including former enemies such as Syria that it
now counts as a strategic partner.
Driven by its philosophy of "zero problems with neighbors", Turkey,
in essence, sees no contradiction with maintaining a firm foothold in
the West while re-establishing close economic, diplomatic, cultural and
increasingly, military ties, with the countries situated in its former
sphere of imperial influence around its southern and eastern frontiers.
Changes in Turkish society characterized by the growing sense of
collective Muslim identity have also impacted the recalibration of
Turkish foreign policy. The rise of the AKP is a key aspect of this
trend. Popular opinion among Turks tends to reflect a deep-seated
sensitivity to the suffering of the Palestinians living under Israeli
military occupation. As a result, Ankara's stance on the flotilla
attack and evolving approach to its dealings with Israel and the
Palestinians must also be considered as a product of public opinion;
an important point that should not be discarded considering Turkey's
democratic landscape.
In contrast to the sclerotic authoritarian regimes such as those in
Egypt and Jordan that meet popular expressions of support for the
Palestinians and other forms of activism with oppression, Turkish
democracy, for all of its flaws, must cater to public opinion. Israel
- increasingly isolated in the Middle East and in the international
arena - may come to rue the day it dumped Turkey. In the strategic
realm, Israel today (and down the line) needs Turkey far more than
the other way around.
Conclusion The crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations is not over. In
fact, it may have just begun. Bilateral ties will continue on multiple
levels, especially in the economic sphere. The United States will
also devote a great deal of effort to help both countries reconcile.
At the same time, the strategic military aspect of the Israeli-Turkish
axis - the most crucial facet of the relationship - has suffered
irreparable damage. As the relationship between the US and China
demonstrates, strong trade ties and other critical links can coexist
alongside serious rifts and disagreements over a host of strategic
military issues.
A regional force in its own right that enjoys seemingly unconditional
support from Washington, Israel has grown accustomed to dealing with
weak and generally compliant neighbors that have allowed it to shape
events in its environment to its advantage. Turkey now appears capable
and intent to steadily challenge this status quo.
Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a
risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. He specializes
in Middle East politics. The views expressed here are the author's
alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Helios Global, Inc.
From: A. Papazian
By Chris Zambelis
Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LG20Ak01.html
July 19 2010
HongKong
For many observers, the long-term implications of Israel's deadly
May 31 assault against the MV Mavi Marmara, the Turkish flagship that
was part of the Gaza Freedom flotilla, on Israeli-Turkish relations
are unclear.
The attack left eight Turks and one Turkish-American dead and scores
more wounded. The flotilla set off to break Israel's illegal blockade
of Gaza and to raise global awareness of the suffering endured by
the 1.5 million Palestinians living in what is widely described as
the world's largest open-air prison.
While acknowledging the growing rift between Israel and Turkey that
began amid Israel's December 2008 invasion of Gaza, as
evidenced by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's clash with
Israeli President Shimon Peres during a dialogue about Gaza at the
World Economic Forum summit in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2009,
many point to the tradition of strong ties enjoyed by Israel and
Turkey as proof that the current crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations
represents a temporary setback as opposed to a permanent realignment
of the regional order.
Business as usual?
Based on the track record of Israeli-Turkish relations, it would
seem logical to conclude that the confluence of mutual interests will
transcend the bilateral crisis. Israel and Turkey have cultivated a
strategic partnership over the years spanning the political, economic
and military realms.
Although Turkey has announced that it will review its military
relationship with Israel, including current and future arms purchases
of Israeli weapons platforms and other forms of cooperation, the
ongoing spat has not precluded the scheduled delivery of Israeli-made
Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and supporting technology as
part of a US$190 million deal.
A Turkish military delegation arrived in Israel in late June to test
the UAVs following Israel's decision to recall its military personnel
from Turkey following the diplomatic row. On the trade front, consumer
boycotts by Israelis targeting the Turkish economy and similar moves
by Turks to single out the Israeli economy have already contributed
to a decline in the bilateral trade volume that normally totals around
$3 billion annually.
Thousands of Israeli tourists, for instance, heeded the advice of
their government and canceled planned vacations to Turkey in 2010.
Many Israeli stores have also emptied their shelves of Turkish
products. Likewise, a number of Turkish firms have dropped out of
plans to enter into joint ventures with Israeli companies. A host
of construction and energy projects involving Turkish firms dealing
with Israelis, for instance, have been suspended until further review
or cancelled outright. Despite these actions, there are signs that
business dealings overall between Israel and Turkey will, for the
most part, remain largely unaffected.
Leaked reports of secret talks between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu and Israeli Industry, Trade, and Labor Minister Benjamin
Ben-Eliezer in Brussels in late June were also interpreted as a sign
that national interests and pragmatism would win out over a continued
deterioration of relations.
Looks can be deceiving Tangible signs of a looming reconciliation
between Israel and Turkey aside, there are also indications that
tensions will continue to degenerate.
Turkey's recall of its ambassador to Israel and its threat to sever
relations over its refusal to apologize for the deadly raid against
the flotilla and accept an independent international inquiry into the
incident, reflect the extent to which relations have deteriorated,
as do Israeli threats to recognize the Armenian Genocide of 1915
perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks and ramped up efforts among Israel's
supporters in the US to do the same in Washington - a red line that
cannot be crossed as far as Turkey is concerned. Turkish military and
government officials have also accused Israel of providing support
to militants from Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers'
Party - PKK) , including during a May 31 attack against a naval base
in Iskandirun that left seven servicemen dead and six more wounded.
The PKK attack occurred just hours before Israel's assault against
the flotilla. In this context, Israeli support for the PKK would
appear to represent a form of retaliation for Turkish support for the
Palestinians. No evidence has emerged to substantiate Turkish claims
of an Israeli hand behind the PKK attack at Iskandirun. Israel does
maintain close contacts with various factions in Iraqi Kurdistan -
a launching pad for PKK operations against Turkey - where it is known
to have an intelligence presence. Israeli companies also have extensive
business interests in the Iraqi province.
There are also indications that future crises revolving around
flotillas are in the offing, and it is likely that Turks will once
again figure prominently in such efforts. Meanwhile, the Israelis have
called for the formation of an Israeli-led flotilla that would embark
for Turkey to protest over the plight of its ethnic Kurdish community
as well as Ankara's positions on the Armenian genocide and Northern
Cyprus. The organizers of the Gaza Freedom flotilla are also planning
additional missions to break the siege and deliver humanitarian aid
in the coming months. A number of independent activist groups have
also set off on their own missions to Gaza.
Demise of Israel's 'periphery strategy' Important shifts in the
respective strategic outlooks and societies in Israel and Turkey
also suggest that hostilities in Israeli-Turkish relations will not
go away anytime soon.
A consideration of Israel's "periphery strategy" is critical to
understanding the current state of Israeli-Turkish ties. The strategy
has served as a guiding principle of Israeli foreign policy since
the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.
Israel sought to cultivate formal as well as covert alliances with
non-Arab countries and ethnic and sectarian minorities around its
periphery to outflank the surrounding Arab states hostile to it - in
particular Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan and the Palestinian
national movement - and to counter the influence of pan-Arab
nationalism.
As the first Muslim nation to recognize Israel in 1949, Turkey was an
essential part of the periphery strategy, along with Iran under Reza
Shah Pahlavi, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, Kurdish nationalists in
Iraq, Maronite Christians and Druze in Lebanon, Christians in southern
Sudan, and Jewish communities across the region.
Given its traditionally pro-Western and staunchly secular orientation,
its status as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and aspirations of gaining entry into the European Union
(EU), Israel's ties with Turkey developed into one of the region's
most dynamic relationships.
The significance of Israeli-Turkish relations increased dramatically
after the Iranian revolution of 1979 toppled the shah. Therein lies
the significance of the rift in Israeli-Turkish relations; Israel's
attack against the flotilla signaled its abandonment of its strategic
alliance with Turkey. Israel also seemingly went to great lengths to
humiliate Turkey in the process, a reality that will surely not be
forgotten in Ankara anytime soon.
Turkey's star is rising Much has been said of Turkey's rise as
a regional power and its improved standing in the greater Islamic
world. Turkey is indeed relishing its position as a symbol resistance
and advocate for the Palestinians in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims
across the Middle East.
Long excluded from the EU and having felt betrayed by its ally
the United States for its backing of Kurdish political aspirations
in Iraqi Kurdistan - a development it saw as setting a dangerous
precedent to be emulated by Kurdish nationalists on its own soil -
an increasingly confident and assertive Turkey has set off on a new
foreign policy course that departs from its prior role as a reliable
and predictable friend of Washington and Brussels.
Elements of political theater are certainly at play in Turkey's attempt
to fashion itself as a regional leader and champion of the Palestinian
cause. Moreover, despite the noticeable shift in Ankara's rhetoric
and actions, Turkey remains a valuable and close ally of the United
States and NATO, as well as a committed EU aspirant.
At the same time, buoyed by an increasingly stable domestic political
scene and an expanding economy that continues to trend upward even amid
the global economic downturn, the transformation of Turkish foreign
policy under the leadership of Erdogan's moderate Islamist-oriented
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party - AKP)
in recent years reflects a fundamental shift in Turkey's outlook.
Turkey is also asserting itself amid a decline of American power in
the Middle East and beyond and the appearance of a new multi-polarity
characterized by the ascent of regional powers capable of projecting
their influence on the global stage. While it preserves its Western
orientation, Turkey today also openly embraces its Islamic heritage
and Muslim neighbors, including former enemies such as Syria that it
now counts as a strategic partner.
Driven by its philosophy of "zero problems with neighbors", Turkey,
in essence, sees no contradiction with maintaining a firm foothold in
the West while re-establishing close economic, diplomatic, cultural and
increasingly, military ties, with the countries situated in its former
sphere of imperial influence around its southern and eastern frontiers.
Changes in Turkish society characterized by the growing sense of
collective Muslim identity have also impacted the recalibration of
Turkish foreign policy. The rise of the AKP is a key aspect of this
trend. Popular opinion among Turks tends to reflect a deep-seated
sensitivity to the suffering of the Palestinians living under Israeli
military occupation. As a result, Ankara's stance on the flotilla
attack and evolving approach to its dealings with Israel and the
Palestinians must also be considered as a product of public opinion;
an important point that should not be discarded considering Turkey's
democratic landscape.
In contrast to the sclerotic authoritarian regimes such as those in
Egypt and Jordan that meet popular expressions of support for the
Palestinians and other forms of activism with oppression, Turkish
democracy, for all of its flaws, must cater to public opinion. Israel
- increasingly isolated in the Middle East and in the international
arena - may come to rue the day it dumped Turkey. In the strategic
realm, Israel today (and down the line) needs Turkey far more than
the other way around.
Conclusion The crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations is not over. In
fact, it may have just begun. Bilateral ties will continue on multiple
levels, especially in the economic sphere. The United States will
also devote a great deal of effort to help both countries reconcile.
At the same time, the strategic military aspect of the Israeli-Turkish
axis - the most crucial facet of the relationship - has suffered
irreparable damage. As the relationship between the US and China
demonstrates, strong trade ties and other critical links can coexist
alongside serious rifts and disagreements over a host of strategic
military issues.
A regional force in its own right that enjoys seemingly unconditional
support from Washington, Israel has grown accustomed to dealing with
weak and generally compliant neighbors that have allowed it to shape
events in its environment to its advantage. Turkey now appears capable
and intent to steadily challenge this status quo.
Chris Zambelis is an author and researcher with Helios Global, Inc, a
risk management group based in the Washington, DC area. He specializes
in Middle East politics. The views expressed here are the author's
alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Helios Global, Inc.
From: A. Papazian