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DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD
Today's Zaman
May 31 2010
Turkey
In international relations perception is reality. The "true" intentions
of states seldom matter. It is how they are seen by others that really
defines the situation. This is why Turkey should pay attention to
how its nuclear deal with Iran is perceived in US government circles.
The way things are going in Turkish-American relations seem to be
rapidly reaching a new low point, potentially lower than the March 1,
2003 debacle, when Turkey denied American troops access to Iraq.
Things may not appear alarming at first sight, especially when you
read the commentary in newspapers and political journals. There are
many voices sympathetic to Turkey and no shortage of American scholars,
analysts and journalists who criticize Washington for short-sightedness
and arrogance. For one of the most perceptive and balanced voices
in that group you can look at James Traub's analysis of Brazil and
Turkey's diplomatic ascendency in the Foreign Policy magazine. Here
is a lengthy excerpt: "What are we to make of the fact that countries
the United States wishes would play a larger role in the world are
now doing so, but in a way that frustrates American goals?
Engagement, it turns out, is a weaker currency than Obama had thought.
His diplomatic investments have been too modest to win compliance
even from the major democratic states in the developing world that
would seem to have the most in common with the United States; and the
reason is that price of compliance has gone way up as those nations
have grown in self-confidence. US presidents will have to learn to
expect less. For Obama, the really important question is whether he
should reconcile himself to an unavoidable clash of interests with
rising powers, or try to win them over by offering a deeper and more
substantive kind of engagement - for example, by pushing for a greater
democratization of the institutions from which those states now feel
excluded. It may be that the only chance to get Brazil to act more
like a global citizen is to treat it like one."
Such an analysis may come as music to Turkish ears. But it
doesn't reflect officialdom in Washington. Another cardinal rule of
international relations is that diplomacy is made by states. At the
end of the day, what really matters is what states think, not what
analysts have to say. And when you listen to officials representing
the US government, the tone of the music is much less flattering to
Turkish ears. There are clear signs that the state department and the
White House are both increasingly irritated by Turkey. The analysis
in such circles is very clear: Ankara made a strategic choice and a
strategic mistake in its dealings with Iran. It decided to undermine
Washington's efforts at building an international consensus for
sanctions against Tehran and by doing so, Ankara has picked a fight
with Washington on one of the most critical issues that will define
the success or failure of President Obama's foreign policy.
It is also clear that the op-ed authored by Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu and his Brazilian counterpart for the New York Times
made things worse in terms of perception. The decision to take the
disagreement with Washington to such a public level with the argument
that the Turkish-Brazilian track is the last chance for diplomacy -
implication: The US track will take us to war - was not necessarily
the most "diplomatic" way of dealing with American foreign policy.
In short, it is once again time for damage control and crisis
management in Turkish-American relations. It is on such occasions that
one understands the hollow nature of concepts such as "strategic
allegiance" or "model partnership." Instead, Turkish-American
relations are rapidly evolving into a "transactional paradigm" of
clashing national interests and compromises built on quid pro quos.
This time, one should not be surprised if Washington decides to play
hardball with Ankara. And things will certainly go from bad to worse
if Ankara votes against sanctions on Iran in a UN Security Council whe
re Russia and China will be on board with Washington. The next time
Ankara calls Washington on crucial matters such as support against
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or the Armenian genocide there
may be no one to pick up the phone.
From: A. Papazian
Today's Zaman
May 31 2010
Turkey
In international relations perception is reality. The "true" intentions
of states seldom matter. It is how they are seen by others that really
defines the situation. This is why Turkey should pay attention to
how its nuclear deal with Iran is perceived in US government circles.
The way things are going in Turkish-American relations seem to be
rapidly reaching a new low point, potentially lower than the March 1,
2003 debacle, when Turkey denied American troops access to Iraq.
Things may not appear alarming at first sight, especially when you
read the commentary in newspapers and political journals. There are
many voices sympathetic to Turkey and no shortage of American scholars,
analysts and journalists who criticize Washington for short-sightedness
and arrogance. For one of the most perceptive and balanced voices
in that group you can look at James Traub's analysis of Brazil and
Turkey's diplomatic ascendency in the Foreign Policy magazine. Here
is a lengthy excerpt: "What are we to make of the fact that countries
the United States wishes would play a larger role in the world are
now doing so, but in a way that frustrates American goals?
Engagement, it turns out, is a weaker currency than Obama had thought.
His diplomatic investments have been too modest to win compliance
even from the major democratic states in the developing world that
would seem to have the most in common with the United States; and the
reason is that price of compliance has gone way up as those nations
have grown in self-confidence. US presidents will have to learn to
expect less. For Obama, the really important question is whether he
should reconcile himself to an unavoidable clash of interests with
rising powers, or try to win them over by offering a deeper and more
substantive kind of engagement - for example, by pushing for a greater
democratization of the institutions from which those states now feel
excluded. It may be that the only chance to get Brazil to act more
like a global citizen is to treat it like one."
Such an analysis may come as music to Turkish ears. But it
doesn't reflect officialdom in Washington. Another cardinal rule of
international relations is that diplomacy is made by states. At the
end of the day, what really matters is what states think, not what
analysts have to say. And when you listen to officials representing
the US government, the tone of the music is much less flattering to
Turkish ears. There are clear signs that the state department and the
White House are both increasingly irritated by Turkey. The analysis
in such circles is very clear: Ankara made a strategic choice and a
strategic mistake in its dealings with Iran. It decided to undermine
Washington's efforts at building an international consensus for
sanctions against Tehran and by doing so, Ankara has picked a fight
with Washington on one of the most critical issues that will define
the success or failure of President Obama's foreign policy.
It is also clear that the op-ed authored by Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu and his Brazilian counterpart for the New York Times
made things worse in terms of perception. The decision to take the
disagreement with Washington to such a public level with the argument
that the Turkish-Brazilian track is the last chance for diplomacy -
implication: The US track will take us to war - was not necessarily
the most "diplomatic" way of dealing with American foreign policy.
In short, it is once again time for damage control and crisis
management in Turkish-American relations. It is on such occasions that
one understands the hollow nature of concepts such as "strategic
allegiance" or "model partnership." Instead, Turkish-American
relations are rapidly evolving into a "transactional paradigm" of
clashing national interests and compromises built on quid pro quos.
This time, one should not be surprised if Washington decides to play
hardball with Ankara. And things will certainly go from bad to worse
if Ankara votes against sanctions on Iran in a UN Security Council whe
re Russia and China will be on board with Washington. The next time
Ankara calls Washington on crucial matters such as support against
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or the Armenian genocide there
may be no one to pick up the phone.
From: A. Papazian