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OBAMA'S POLICY TOWARD THE CAUCASUS AND U.S. CREDIBILITY
Global Politician
http://globalpolitician.com/26432-caucasus-obama
June 1 2010
The U.S. image in Azerbaijan has never been as bad as it is now and
anti-American rhetoric in this predominantly Muslim country bordering
Iran is unprecedented. President Obama's "reset" policies towards
Russia can have certain far-reaching implications for the U.S.
interests and credibility in new democracies of the ex-Soviet Union.
Azerbaijan is one example where President Obama's "reset" policies
with Russia can significantly damage U.S. interests in European Union
energy security, NATO ISAF supply routes and democracy.
The two conflicts are key and intrinsically linked with these issues:
Turkey-Armenia borders and Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict. Although
during the presidential campaign Obama mentioned self-determination
principles in NK conflict, he did not want to take an active part in
this conflict because Azerbaijan's prospective solution might not
be in line with Russia's interests and could damage the spirit of
"reset" policy. However, when Azerbaijan started actively objecting
to opening the borders, Turkish PM Erdogan had to visit Azerbaijan
in May 2009 to assure Baku that Turkey would not open the borders
until Armenia had withdrawn from the invaded lands.
The "reset" policy towards Russia was criticized because of its
conciliatory tone with regard democracy and human rights issues in
Russia. Obama administration's view of the region as well as the NK
problem through the prism of reset policy with Russia, which includes
softened tone on democracy problems, can severely affect the U.S.
credibility in the former Soviet space. Democracy is an important
dimension that can be threatened if the U.S. views Azerbaijan solely
from reset policy (with Russia) standpoint. Unlike Russia, where
positivism in bilateral U.S.- Russian relations has long been absent
and where "reset" policy is meant to mend tensed relations, Azerbaijan
presents a different case. Cooperation on a number of important
political, economic and military affairs has long been present in the
U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. Such dual-track approach as, supporting
and cooperating with Azerbaijan on a number of strategic issues on
the one hand and monitoring its democratic credentials on the other
hand, used to provide excellent avenues for preserving U.S. regional
interests. The U.S. needs to have a positive image in Azerbaijan,
which it clearly lacks now, in order to support Azerbaijan's democratic
transition and incentivize it through close cooperation.
Positive U.S. image would retain American legitimacy for helping
foster democratic culture for both government and grass roots
activities, which need to be inspired. Currently, Baku's increasing
interdependence with Moscow and apparent inactivity of the U.S. in
NK conflict could automatically place Azerbaijan in the same box with
Russia for Washington's foreign policy radars. Thus, there is a chance
that the elements of the U.S. policy of reset, such as tempered U.S.
tone with regard to democracy issues, can be applied to Azerbaijan
and affect its democracy at all levels.
Azerbaijan's further tilt towards Russia not only endangers democracy
but also threatens strategically important energy projects such as
NABUCCO gas pipeline. Azerbaijan as a supplier of oil and gas had
bargaining power over Turkey and EU members. President Ilham Aliyev
showed his firm reaction by signing natural gas deals with Russia
and Iran to demonstrate Azerbaijan's flexibility in terms of customer
selection. Azerbaijan is also an important military partner for the
U.S. It is the only potentially viable transit route for NATO ISAF
troops supply, except Russia and the unstable Khyber Pass in Pakistan.
As a sign of protest, Azerbaijan recently put-off joint military
exercise with the U.S. Washington's inactivity in NK conflict and
related fierce criticism of the U.S. in Azerbaijan can put these
projects in danger.
NK problem is the key for preserving U.S. interests in European energy
security, ensuring NATO supply routes and supporting democratic
transformation in secular Azerbaijan. The U.S. should use its new
closer relations with Russia to reach a solution in NK conflict through
updated Madrid principles offered by Minsk group co-chairs and mostly
accepted by Azerbaijan. A solution in NK will solve Turkish-Armenian
border problem, too; whereas, insisting to open the borders will solve
none and furthermore threaten the U.S. interests in the region of the
South Caucasus; the South Caucasus that combines problematic Iran,
major power Russia, threat of religious radicalism, authoritarianism
and energy hydrocarbons destined for the EU markets.
Tamerlan Vahabov, research fellow, International Management Institute -
Kyiv, holds MA from Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service
and MS from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Previously worked as
an analyst at the Interpol General Secretariat and as a U.S. desk
officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. Research
interests include energy, security and domestic politics in Ukraine,
Russia and the Caucasus. Dr. Fariz Huseynov, assistant professor,
North Dakota State University, holds PhD from Memphis University and
MBA from Ball State University.
From: A. Papazian
Global Politician
http://globalpolitician.com/26432-caucasus-obama
June 1 2010
The U.S. image in Azerbaijan has never been as bad as it is now and
anti-American rhetoric in this predominantly Muslim country bordering
Iran is unprecedented. President Obama's "reset" policies towards
Russia can have certain far-reaching implications for the U.S.
interests and credibility in new democracies of the ex-Soviet Union.
Azerbaijan is one example where President Obama's "reset" policies
with Russia can significantly damage U.S. interests in European Union
energy security, NATO ISAF supply routes and democracy.
The two conflicts are key and intrinsically linked with these issues:
Turkey-Armenia borders and Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict. Although
during the presidential campaign Obama mentioned self-determination
principles in NK conflict, he did not want to take an active part in
this conflict because Azerbaijan's prospective solution might not
be in line with Russia's interests and could damage the spirit of
"reset" policy. However, when Azerbaijan started actively objecting
to opening the borders, Turkish PM Erdogan had to visit Azerbaijan
in May 2009 to assure Baku that Turkey would not open the borders
until Armenia had withdrawn from the invaded lands.
The "reset" policy towards Russia was criticized because of its
conciliatory tone with regard democracy and human rights issues in
Russia. Obama administration's view of the region as well as the NK
problem through the prism of reset policy with Russia, which includes
softened tone on democracy problems, can severely affect the U.S.
credibility in the former Soviet space. Democracy is an important
dimension that can be threatened if the U.S. views Azerbaijan solely
from reset policy (with Russia) standpoint. Unlike Russia, where
positivism in bilateral U.S.- Russian relations has long been absent
and where "reset" policy is meant to mend tensed relations, Azerbaijan
presents a different case. Cooperation on a number of important
political, economic and military affairs has long been present in the
U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. Such dual-track approach as, supporting
and cooperating with Azerbaijan on a number of strategic issues on
the one hand and monitoring its democratic credentials on the other
hand, used to provide excellent avenues for preserving U.S. regional
interests. The U.S. needs to have a positive image in Azerbaijan,
which it clearly lacks now, in order to support Azerbaijan's democratic
transition and incentivize it through close cooperation.
Positive U.S. image would retain American legitimacy for helping
foster democratic culture for both government and grass roots
activities, which need to be inspired. Currently, Baku's increasing
interdependence with Moscow and apparent inactivity of the U.S. in
NK conflict could automatically place Azerbaijan in the same box with
Russia for Washington's foreign policy radars. Thus, there is a chance
that the elements of the U.S. policy of reset, such as tempered U.S.
tone with regard to democracy issues, can be applied to Azerbaijan
and affect its democracy at all levels.
Azerbaijan's further tilt towards Russia not only endangers democracy
but also threatens strategically important energy projects such as
NABUCCO gas pipeline. Azerbaijan as a supplier of oil and gas had
bargaining power over Turkey and EU members. President Ilham Aliyev
showed his firm reaction by signing natural gas deals with Russia
and Iran to demonstrate Azerbaijan's flexibility in terms of customer
selection. Azerbaijan is also an important military partner for the
U.S. It is the only potentially viable transit route for NATO ISAF
troops supply, except Russia and the unstable Khyber Pass in Pakistan.
As a sign of protest, Azerbaijan recently put-off joint military
exercise with the U.S. Washington's inactivity in NK conflict and
related fierce criticism of the U.S. in Azerbaijan can put these
projects in danger.
NK problem is the key for preserving U.S. interests in European energy
security, ensuring NATO supply routes and supporting democratic
transformation in secular Azerbaijan. The U.S. should use its new
closer relations with Russia to reach a solution in NK conflict through
updated Madrid principles offered by Minsk group co-chairs and mostly
accepted by Azerbaijan. A solution in NK will solve Turkish-Armenian
border problem, too; whereas, insisting to open the borders will solve
none and furthermore threaten the U.S. interests in the region of the
South Caucasus; the South Caucasus that combines problematic Iran,
major power Russia, threat of religious radicalism, authoritarianism
and energy hydrocarbons destined for the EU markets.
Tamerlan Vahabov, research fellow, International Management Institute -
Kyiv, holds MA from Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service
and MS from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Previously worked as
an analyst at the Interpol General Secretariat and as a U.S. desk
officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. Research
interests include energy, security and domestic politics in Ukraine,
Russia and the Caucasus. Dr. Fariz Huseynov, assistant professor,
North Dakota State University, holds PhD from Memphis University and
MBA from Ball State University.
From: A. Papazian