ARMENIA HAS GOT MIXED UP IN 'FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY'
Aram Araratyan
ArmInfo
2010-06-03 15:22:00
Interview of Director of Political Economy Research Center Andranik
Tevanyan with ArmInfo news agency
What is the key reason of "freezing" of the Armenian-Turkish process?
What factors disturbed Yerevan and Ankara to normalize bilateral
relations and gain opening of the border?
I suppose the Armenian authorities had no expectations from the very
beginning of the Armenian-Turkish "football diplomacy". I think
the Armenian diplomacy supposed that if it satisfied two Turkish
preconditions, particularly, if it gave its consent to creation of
a commission of historians and solved the problem of the bilateral
border, i.e. confirmed the Treaty of Kars, Turks would abstain from
linking the Armenian-Turkish normalization process with the Karabakh
problem. To recall, before the meeting with Gul in Yerevan, Serzh
Sargsyan said that only an insane can refuse support, and when the
matter concerned the fact that Turkey may contribute to the Karabakh
conflict settlement, he came out "for" that".
Why do you think so? Official Yerevan has repeatedly come out "against"
it at various levels, hasn't it?
It is now said that Turkey should by no means interfere in the Karabakh
peace process. But I'll recall that when Serzh Sargsyan said in Moscow
that he was inviting Gul to the football match in Yerevan, he also
came out for creation of the commission of historians, via which
Turkey pursued the goal to stop the Armenian Genocide international
recognition process. He wanted to use this initiative to shift the
international community's attention from some domestic and external
processes to the Armenian-Turkish process. One should also keep in
mind for what reason this "football diplomacy" was initiated.
After the presidential election of 2008 the republic faced big domestic
tension. The main oppositionist, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, said that unlike
the other candidates, he would conduct initiative policy with both
Turkey and Azerbaijan in case of victory in the election.
Serzh Sargsyan took over this flag from Ter-Petrosyan and started
an indirect dialogue with the opposition of that time. It is not
accidental that Ter-Petrosyan welcomed this step of Sargsyan.
Has the Armenian-Turkish process got any prospects for rehabilitation
today?
As regards the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish process, I predicted
many times, including in the course of the hearings in the National
Assembly, that the Protocols will not be ratified and Ankara will try
to use them just for its joining the Karabakh settlement process. The
border will not be opened by means of such a dialogue. But taking
into consideration the fact that the process moved far away and the
authorities of the country could not step back, the statement dated
22 April on "freezing" of the ratification process was adopted. Now,
speaking on the language of the football terminology, Serzh Sargsyan
has turned into a spectator on a grandstand. From his "wet thumb" the
football diplomacy has led to the situation that the relations between
Armenia and Turkey have become even more tense and the situation
in the Karabakh issue has worsened. At present the parties to the
conflict have been offered the renewed option of the Madrid document,
which is acceptable for Azerbaijan, but not lucrative to Yerevan,
because it is an obviously anti-Armenian document.
Serzh Sargyan's statement dated 22 April 2010 has changed nothing,
as after signing the Protocols in Zurich the Armenian-Turkish
process was in fact frozen. In this context, shouldn't the Armenian
authorities have gone up to the end and directed the whole pressure
of the international community to Ankara, having been the first to
ratify the Protocols?
To begin with, the Armenian-Turkish Protocols run counter to
the national interests of Armenia, and ratifying them would mean
documentarily fixing everything we come against. Secondly, even if
Armenia were the first to ratify the Protocols, nothing would be
changed. I often hear the opinion that after the April 22 statement
the international community saw how consistent Armenia can be and how
unprincipled Turkey can be. But the same international community saw
in 1915 that Turks committed genocide against Armenians. And so what?
It is clear that all the parties pursue their national interests. I
have already mentioned that the present authorities cannot refuse
these documents, but the new authorities, whose formation is badly
needed, should recall Armenia's signature from the Protocols and offer
Turkey to pass directly to opening of the border. At the same time,
they will have to enhance the process of international recognition
of the Armenian Genocide and exert all efforts to prevent Ankara
from playing the role of intermediary in the Karabakh peace process,
in which it is already involved de facto.
Do you mean anybody when speaking of the need in new configuration of
authorities? Are their any forces on the political horizon of Armenia
to assume this role? Do you mean the second president of Armenia Robert
Kocharyan, whose possible returning is spoken about more and more?
I think, at present Robert Kocharyan has no formal opportunity to
return to the great politics. As regards the conversations about his
returning as Armenian prime minister, there are two legal ways for it.
Either the National Assembly is to file a vote of non-confidence
against the government and advance Kocharyan's nominee for the vacant
seat, or the president will appoint him prime minister by his own
decree. I think neither parliament nor president will do that now. All
these conversations about the second president's returning are just an
element of political technologies. It is another matter that Robert
Kocharyan himself would like to return to the great politics; we
remember his statement that he doesn't want to be "a young pensioner".
But I do not yet see any options for his returning. The only option may
be a force-major situation in the Karabakh problem, but the authorities
will make no concessions. Nobody has forgotten the lessons of 1998.
As regards new configuration of the authorities, such a necessity
has ripen long ago, since there is a real demand for an alternative
in many issues. In such an important issue, as national security of
the country, Levon Ter-Petrosyan's team, which is allegedly the only
alternative to the present authorities, does not at all differ from
Serzh Sargsyan's team. Moreover, it has more dangerous views than the
present power. If Serzh Sargsyan says one should not link normalization
of the Armenian-Turkish relations with the Karabakh settlement, Levon
Ter-Petrosyan sees nothing negative in it and thinks both problems
may be resolved simultaneously. If these two political forces are in
fact similar, and the opposition has even more dangerous ideas than
the authorities, it is obvious, we need an alternative, and first of
all, we need new ideology.
What is going on in the Karabakh conflict settlement process? Do you
see any dangerous trends related to the renewed Madrid documents?
Serzh Sargsyan will conduct no "initiative policy" in this direction,
as it is fraught with unpredictable consequences. To all appearances,
the Armenian party has said "no" to the renewed Madrid Principles. For
this reason I do not think there will be any serious developments
before 2012.
In fact, both Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh processes are frozen at
present, aren't they?
Yes, they are. In this case, one can suppose that the threat of war is
growing because Aliyev has already declared that if Armenia rejects
the renewed principles, a new stage will begin, i.e. war, by means
of which Baku hopes to restore its so-called territorial integrity.
Nevertheless, I think there is 50/50 possibility of war. If Baku were
absolutely confident of its victory through a blitzkrieg, it would
unleash the war neglecting the world community. I'd like to stress
also that I am surprised to see that Armenia is rushing to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. We have nowhere to hurry. The Armenian
authorities should focus on domestic reforms: they should improve the
country's political and economic systems, ensure normal development,
populate and develop the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, strengthen the
country's internal resources. The talk about concessions is just an
empty talk. Aliyev has an appetite for our Syunik region. So, what
concessions are we talking about? What can we expect them to concede?
What do we mean by mutual concessions?
From: A. Papazian
Aram Araratyan
ArmInfo
2010-06-03 15:22:00
Interview of Director of Political Economy Research Center Andranik
Tevanyan with ArmInfo news agency
What is the key reason of "freezing" of the Armenian-Turkish process?
What factors disturbed Yerevan and Ankara to normalize bilateral
relations and gain opening of the border?
I suppose the Armenian authorities had no expectations from the very
beginning of the Armenian-Turkish "football diplomacy". I think
the Armenian diplomacy supposed that if it satisfied two Turkish
preconditions, particularly, if it gave its consent to creation of
a commission of historians and solved the problem of the bilateral
border, i.e. confirmed the Treaty of Kars, Turks would abstain from
linking the Armenian-Turkish normalization process with the Karabakh
problem. To recall, before the meeting with Gul in Yerevan, Serzh
Sargsyan said that only an insane can refuse support, and when the
matter concerned the fact that Turkey may contribute to the Karabakh
conflict settlement, he came out "for" that".
Why do you think so? Official Yerevan has repeatedly come out "against"
it at various levels, hasn't it?
It is now said that Turkey should by no means interfere in the Karabakh
peace process. But I'll recall that when Serzh Sargsyan said in Moscow
that he was inviting Gul to the football match in Yerevan, he also
came out for creation of the commission of historians, via which
Turkey pursued the goal to stop the Armenian Genocide international
recognition process. He wanted to use this initiative to shift the
international community's attention from some domestic and external
processes to the Armenian-Turkish process. One should also keep in
mind for what reason this "football diplomacy" was initiated.
After the presidential election of 2008 the republic faced big domestic
tension. The main oppositionist, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, said that unlike
the other candidates, he would conduct initiative policy with both
Turkey and Azerbaijan in case of victory in the election.
Serzh Sargsyan took over this flag from Ter-Petrosyan and started
an indirect dialogue with the opposition of that time. It is not
accidental that Ter-Petrosyan welcomed this step of Sargsyan.
Has the Armenian-Turkish process got any prospects for rehabilitation
today?
As regards the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish process, I predicted
many times, including in the course of the hearings in the National
Assembly, that the Protocols will not be ratified and Ankara will try
to use them just for its joining the Karabakh settlement process. The
border will not be opened by means of such a dialogue. But taking
into consideration the fact that the process moved far away and the
authorities of the country could not step back, the statement dated
22 April on "freezing" of the ratification process was adopted. Now,
speaking on the language of the football terminology, Serzh Sargsyan
has turned into a spectator on a grandstand. From his "wet thumb" the
football diplomacy has led to the situation that the relations between
Armenia and Turkey have become even more tense and the situation
in the Karabakh issue has worsened. At present the parties to the
conflict have been offered the renewed option of the Madrid document,
which is acceptable for Azerbaijan, but not lucrative to Yerevan,
because it is an obviously anti-Armenian document.
Serzh Sargyan's statement dated 22 April 2010 has changed nothing,
as after signing the Protocols in Zurich the Armenian-Turkish
process was in fact frozen. In this context, shouldn't the Armenian
authorities have gone up to the end and directed the whole pressure
of the international community to Ankara, having been the first to
ratify the Protocols?
To begin with, the Armenian-Turkish Protocols run counter to
the national interests of Armenia, and ratifying them would mean
documentarily fixing everything we come against. Secondly, even if
Armenia were the first to ratify the Protocols, nothing would be
changed. I often hear the opinion that after the April 22 statement
the international community saw how consistent Armenia can be and how
unprincipled Turkey can be. But the same international community saw
in 1915 that Turks committed genocide against Armenians. And so what?
It is clear that all the parties pursue their national interests. I
have already mentioned that the present authorities cannot refuse
these documents, but the new authorities, whose formation is badly
needed, should recall Armenia's signature from the Protocols and offer
Turkey to pass directly to opening of the border. At the same time,
they will have to enhance the process of international recognition
of the Armenian Genocide and exert all efforts to prevent Ankara
from playing the role of intermediary in the Karabakh peace process,
in which it is already involved de facto.
Do you mean anybody when speaking of the need in new configuration of
authorities? Are their any forces on the political horizon of Armenia
to assume this role? Do you mean the second president of Armenia Robert
Kocharyan, whose possible returning is spoken about more and more?
I think, at present Robert Kocharyan has no formal opportunity to
return to the great politics. As regards the conversations about his
returning as Armenian prime minister, there are two legal ways for it.
Either the National Assembly is to file a vote of non-confidence
against the government and advance Kocharyan's nominee for the vacant
seat, or the president will appoint him prime minister by his own
decree. I think neither parliament nor president will do that now. All
these conversations about the second president's returning are just an
element of political technologies. It is another matter that Robert
Kocharyan himself would like to return to the great politics; we
remember his statement that he doesn't want to be "a young pensioner".
But I do not yet see any options for his returning. The only option may
be a force-major situation in the Karabakh problem, but the authorities
will make no concessions. Nobody has forgotten the lessons of 1998.
As regards new configuration of the authorities, such a necessity
has ripen long ago, since there is a real demand for an alternative
in many issues. In such an important issue, as national security of
the country, Levon Ter-Petrosyan's team, which is allegedly the only
alternative to the present authorities, does not at all differ from
Serzh Sargsyan's team. Moreover, it has more dangerous views than the
present power. If Serzh Sargsyan says one should not link normalization
of the Armenian-Turkish relations with the Karabakh settlement, Levon
Ter-Petrosyan sees nothing negative in it and thinks both problems
may be resolved simultaneously. If these two political forces are in
fact similar, and the opposition has even more dangerous ideas than
the authorities, it is obvious, we need an alternative, and first of
all, we need new ideology.
What is going on in the Karabakh conflict settlement process? Do you
see any dangerous trends related to the renewed Madrid documents?
Serzh Sargsyan will conduct no "initiative policy" in this direction,
as it is fraught with unpredictable consequences. To all appearances,
the Armenian party has said "no" to the renewed Madrid Principles. For
this reason I do not think there will be any serious developments
before 2012.
In fact, both Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh processes are frozen at
present, aren't they?
Yes, they are. In this case, one can suppose that the threat of war is
growing because Aliyev has already declared that if Armenia rejects
the renewed principles, a new stage will begin, i.e. war, by means
of which Baku hopes to restore its so-called territorial integrity.
Nevertheless, I think there is 50/50 possibility of war. If Baku were
absolutely confident of its victory through a blitzkrieg, it would
unleash the war neglecting the world community. I'd like to stress
also that I am surprised to see that Armenia is rushing to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. We have nowhere to hurry. The Armenian
authorities should focus on domestic reforms: they should improve the
country's political and economic systems, ensure normal development,
populate and develop the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, strengthen the
country's internal resources. The talk about concessions is just an
empty talk. Aliyev has an appetite for our Syunik region. So, what
concessions are we talking about? What can we expect them to concede?
What do we mean by mutual concessions?
From: A. Papazian