A CONFIDENT TURKEY COULD NOT IGNORE ISRAEL'S KILLINGS
The Irish Times
Monday, June 7, 2010
A crowd gathers at the funeral in Istanbul of Turkish activist Cevdet
Kiliclar, killed when Israel seized a Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza
last week. Photograph: Murad Sezer/ReutersIn this section "
A DECADE AGO, Israel and Turkey seemed to be "the" best friends in
the Middle East. Today they are not only engaged in an unending war
of words, but there is even blood between them. How did we get here?
Turks have a pretty cordial history with the Jewish people. When
the latter were expelled from Catholic Spain in 1492, the Ottoman
Empire offered them a safe haven. The immigrant Sephardic communities
flourished in Ottoman lands, becoming the most loyal non-Muslim people
to the Sultanate until the latter's demise in the first World War.
When Israel was founded in 1948, Turkey was among the first countries
to recognise it. The two states soon became allies within the Cold War
context: they were both US allies threatened by the Soviet Union and
its proxies. Some strategists even spoke of a pro-American "trident"
in the region: Turkey, Israel and the Shah's Iran.
The Cold War context influenced not just Turkish policy-makers but
also society, including the devoutly Islamic camp. For the latter,
the main concern was "godless communism", and their natural sympathies
for the Muslim Palestinians were restrained by the fact that the
Palestinian resistance was then mainly a secular left-wing movement.
In the 1970s, only the Turkish communists would go to PLO bases to
fight against Israel, "the vanguard of American imperialism".
Things began to change in the 1990s, when Turkey started to approach
the region with a new vision. The war in the former Yugoslavia,
and particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims by the
Serbs, had a deep impact on Turkish society. The Serbs were calling
Bosnians "Turks", and this reminded the real Turks that they have
"Muslim brothers" in the surrounding region, whom they once protected
in the great Ottoman Empire, but who were now in harm's way.
The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
(IHH) - the Turkish aid body that spearheaded last week's Gaza
flotilla - was born out of this spirit. It was founded in 1992 to
support Bosnian Muslims. The 1990s also saw the rise of political
Islam in Turkey. The Welfare Party led by Necmeddin Erbakan came
to power in 1996 as the head of a coalition government, which soon
was forced out by the ultra-secularist generals through a process
called "the post-modern coup". Erbakan was clearly pro-Palestinian
and anti-Zionist, and at times even anti-Semitic, and the generals
who ousted him from power saw the Jewish state as their natural ally.
Hence the "post-modern coup years", 1997 to 1999, were also a climax in
Turkish-Israeli alliance, with new deals on military and intelligence
co-operation and a similarly tough stance against Iran and Syria.
But the night of the generals did not last long. In 2002, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), formed by the more liberal
wing in Erbakan's party with a moderate and pro-European message,
came to power. Under popular leader Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP truly
transformed Turkey, introducing many liberal reforms and initiating
accession negotiations with the EU. It also made Turkey more at peace
with its Muslim identity.
The AKP's regional foreign policy has been revolutionary. Under
foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the AKP initiated a "zero problem
with neighbours" policy, leading to rapprochements with Greece, Cyprus,
Russia, Armenia, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria and Iran. Turkey became
a prestigious negotiator in the region, cutting deals between Bosnians
and Serbs, Afghans and Pakistanis, and even the various factions in
Iraq and Lebanon.
The AKP wished to become a negotiator between Israel and her enemies
also. When Hamas came to power in 2006, its Syria-based leader, Khalid
Mishal, was welcomed in Ankara. This made the Israelis furious, but
Ankara advised Hamas to tone down its radical rhetoric and encouraged
it to join the peace process. A year later, Turkey announced that it
was brokering negotiations between the Israeli and Syrian governments.
But then came a deadly blow in December 2008: Israel's sudden war on
Gaza, which ended with nearly 1,400 dead Gazans. This had the same
effect on Turkish society as the Serbian onslaught on the Bosnians
in the 1990s. Politicians, opinion formers and media from across the
board denounced Israel's "state terrorism" and expressed solidarity
with their oppressed "brothers" in Palestine.
When Erdogan, the prime minister, famously stormed the stage at
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009, accusing the
Israelis of being "the killers of children", he was expressing the
predominant mood in Turkish society. His outbursts against Israel
after the killing by Israeli commandos of nine Turkish activists on
the Gaza flotilla also reflect the furious reaction in his country.
One should note that Erdogan is neither an anti-Semite - he has
denounced anti-Semitism many times - nor is he anti-Israeli. He accepts
Israel's right to exist in its pre-1967 borders. Yet he genuinely
cares about the suffering of the Palestinians, and sees Hamas not as
a terrorist body but a resistance movement and a political party with
popular support.
But even for purely politically purposes, he has to stay strong
vis-a-vis Israel. The old Islamist school he broke from - the one
which still clings to Erbakan's radical rhetoric - accuses him of not
being tough enough, and even of succumbing to "global Zionism". The
Saadet Party which represents this Islamist position, in opposition to
the AKP's post-Islamism, increased its votes from 2.5 to 5 per cent
in the past three years. This is one of the factors which Erdogan,
who will face elections in a year, must reckon with.
The main reason Turkey is more defiant against Israel than ever is
that it is a transformed country. It is much more proud of its Muslim
Ottoman identity than before. It is not ruled by ultra-secular generals
any more, so that identity, via democratic channels, influences its
foreign policy. Turkey is also a surging economic power, making it
an influential power broker in the whole region.
There was no way that such a New Turkey - democratic and peace-making,
yet proud and ambitious - would turn a blind eye to Israel's
decades-long oppression of the Palestinians.
The only thing that can mend relations will be the rise of a New
Israel as well, which will free Gaza, free all occupied territories,
and stop killing innocent civilians.
From: A. Papazian
The Irish Times
Monday, June 7, 2010
A crowd gathers at the funeral in Istanbul of Turkish activist Cevdet
Kiliclar, killed when Israel seized a Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza
last week. Photograph: Murad Sezer/ReutersIn this section "
A DECADE AGO, Israel and Turkey seemed to be "the" best friends in
the Middle East. Today they are not only engaged in an unending war
of words, but there is even blood between them. How did we get here?
Turks have a pretty cordial history with the Jewish people. When
the latter were expelled from Catholic Spain in 1492, the Ottoman
Empire offered them a safe haven. The immigrant Sephardic communities
flourished in Ottoman lands, becoming the most loyal non-Muslim people
to the Sultanate until the latter's demise in the first World War.
When Israel was founded in 1948, Turkey was among the first countries
to recognise it. The two states soon became allies within the Cold War
context: they were both US allies threatened by the Soviet Union and
its proxies. Some strategists even spoke of a pro-American "trident"
in the region: Turkey, Israel and the Shah's Iran.
The Cold War context influenced not just Turkish policy-makers but
also society, including the devoutly Islamic camp. For the latter,
the main concern was "godless communism", and their natural sympathies
for the Muslim Palestinians were restrained by the fact that the
Palestinian resistance was then mainly a secular left-wing movement.
In the 1970s, only the Turkish communists would go to PLO bases to
fight against Israel, "the vanguard of American imperialism".
Things began to change in the 1990s, when Turkey started to approach
the region with a new vision. The war in the former Yugoslavia,
and particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims by the
Serbs, had a deep impact on Turkish society. The Serbs were calling
Bosnians "Turks", and this reminded the real Turks that they have
"Muslim brothers" in the surrounding region, whom they once protected
in the great Ottoman Empire, but who were now in harm's way.
The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
(IHH) - the Turkish aid body that spearheaded last week's Gaza
flotilla - was born out of this spirit. It was founded in 1992 to
support Bosnian Muslims. The 1990s also saw the rise of political
Islam in Turkey. The Welfare Party led by Necmeddin Erbakan came
to power in 1996 as the head of a coalition government, which soon
was forced out by the ultra-secularist generals through a process
called "the post-modern coup". Erbakan was clearly pro-Palestinian
and anti-Zionist, and at times even anti-Semitic, and the generals
who ousted him from power saw the Jewish state as their natural ally.
Hence the "post-modern coup years", 1997 to 1999, were also a climax in
Turkish-Israeli alliance, with new deals on military and intelligence
co-operation and a similarly tough stance against Iran and Syria.
But the night of the generals did not last long. In 2002, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), formed by the more liberal
wing in Erbakan's party with a moderate and pro-European message,
came to power. Under popular leader Tayyip Erdogan, the AKP truly
transformed Turkey, introducing many liberal reforms and initiating
accession negotiations with the EU. It also made Turkey more at peace
with its Muslim identity.
The AKP's regional foreign policy has been revolutionary. Under
foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the AKP initiated a "zero problem
with neighbours" policy, leading to rapprochements with Greece, Cyprus,
Russia, Armenia, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria and Iran. Turkey became
a prestigious negotiator in the region, cutting deals between Bosnians
and Serbs, Afghans and Pakistanis, and even the various factions in
Iraq and Lebanon.
The AKP wished to become a negotiator between Israel and her enemies
also. When Hamas came to power in 2006, its Syria-based leader, Khalid
Mishal, was welcomed in Ankara. This made the Israelis furious, but
Ankara advised Hamas to tone down its radical rhetoric and encouraged
it to join the peace process. A year later, Turkey announced that it
was brokering negotiations between the Israeli and Syrian governments.
But then came a deadly blow in December 2008: Israel's sudden war on
Gaza, which ended with nearly 1,400 dead Gazans. This had the same
effect on Turkish society as the Serbian onslaught on the Bosnians
in the 1990s. Politicians, opinion formers and media from across the
board denounced Israel's "state terrorism" and expressed solidarity
with their oppressed "brothers" in Palestine.
When Erdogan, the prime minister, famously stormed the stage at
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009, accusing the
Israelis of being "the killers of children", he was expressing the
predominant mood in Turkish society. His outbursts against Israel
after the killing by Israeli commandos of nine Turkish activists on
the Gaza flotilla also reflect the furious reaction in his country.
One should note that Erdogan is neither an anti-Semite - he has
denounced anti-Semitism many times - nor is he anti-Israeli. He accepts
Israel's right to exist in its pre-1967 borders. Yet he genuinely
cares about the suffering of the Palestinians, and sees Hamas not as
a terrorist body but a resistance movement and a political party with
popular support.
But even for purely politically purposes, he has to stay strong
vis-a-vis Israel. The old Islamist school he broke from - the one
which still clings to Erbakan's radical rhetoric - accuses him of not
being tough enough, and even of succumbing to "global Zionism". The
Saadet Party which represents this Islamist position, in opposition to
the AKP's post-Islamism, increased its votes from 2.5 to 5 per cent
in the past three years. This is one of the factors which Erdogan,
who will face elections in a year, must reckon with.
The main reason Turkey is more defiant against Israel than ever is
that it is a transformed country. It is much more proud of its Muslim
Ottoman identity than before. It is not ruled by ultra-secular generals
any more, so that identity, via democratic channels, influences its
foreign policy. Turkey is also a surging economic power, making it
an influential power broker in the whole region.
There was no way that such a New Turkey - democratic and peace-making,
yet proud and ambitious - would turn a blind eye to Israel's
decades-long oppression of the Palestinians.
The only thing that can mend relations will be the rise of a New
Israel as well, which will free Gaza, free all occupied territories,
and stop killing innocent civilians.
From: A. Papazian