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Ha'aretz, Israel
June 11 2010
Turkey's Strategic U-Turn, Israel's Tactical Mistakes
While it is Turkey that has been changing its strategy vis-Ã-vis
Israel by tilting toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, Israel has helped
push it in that direction with a number of egregious tactical
mistakes.
By Ofra Bengio
The Turkish-Israeli crisis touched off by the Gaza flotilla episode
encapsulates the evolution of the two countries' bilateral relations
in recent years. Though it is the Turkish government that has slowly
been changing its strategy vis-Ã-vis Israel by tilting more and more
toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, Israel has helped push it in that
direction with a number of egregious tactical mistakes.
Ankara's strategic shift began some years ago, when it aligned itself
with Israel's two implacable enemies, Hamas and Iran. These new
alliances could not be explained away as a mere humanitarian gesture
toward the Palestinians or an attempt to contain Iran through
engagement. Given Iran's and Hamas' unflinching opposition to Israel's
existence, Turkey's support for them cancels out, in effect, its
alignment with Israel.
Oddly, neither ordinary Turkish citizens nor members of the
intelligentsia seem to grasp the impact on Israel of Ankara's shift.
To illustrate the point, one can imagine the reaction in Turkey were
Israel to declare its support for Armenia against Turkey (to be sure,
the parallel with Iran breaks down over the fact that Armenia
possesses no nuclear weapons and has not declared its opposition to
Turkey's right to exist). Similarly, one may ask, how would Turkey
have responded to an Israeli invitation to Abdullah Ocalan, the head
of the Kurdish PKK opposition (the AKP government of Prime Minster
Tayyip Recep Erdogan has hosted Hamas leader Khalid Mash`al), or if
Israel had organized a flotilla to provide aid to the country's Kurds?
>From a historical perspective, this was not the first time that Turkey
had tilted toward the Arab world at Israel's expense. Nonetheless, the
current case differs from earlier ones in a number of important
respects. In previous instances, Turkey's attempt to curry favor with
Arab countries was in response to a concern over possible Arab moves
that could directly harm Turkish interests, for example, the Arab
threat not to sell oil to Turkey after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. In the latest incident, by contrast, Turkey's actions were
proactive, taken at its own initiative. Furthermore, although Turkish
leaders in the past occasionally employed harsh words against Israel,
never has Turkish rhetoric been as intense, inflammatory or sustained
as that employed by Erdogan, beginning with last year's confrontation
with Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos.
Erdogan's actions mark the first time that a Turkish prime minister
has taken the lead in posing as the savior of Palestinians facing
Israeli oppression. Similarly, while in the past Turkey's moves toward
Israel were motivated by considerations of realpolitik, Erdogan
appears to be guided by a quasi-messianic approach that eerily
resembles the actions of Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser during the 1950s
and '60s Lastly, although the sympathy of the Turkish people with the
Palestinians is of long standing, it has never appeared as deep-rooted
and all-encompassing as in the aftermath of the flotilla crisis.
The reasons underpinning Turkey's altered posture are manifold. One
important explanation is the quiet revolution transpiring under the
AKP government in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres.
Paradoxically, its new Islamic ideological and political orientation
turns the state into a friendly competitor with Iran over the
leadership role of the Islamist, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli
stance. This, together with the AKP government's success in cutting
the Turkish military's influence down to size, enabled the government
to deliver a severe blow to the strategic alignment with Israel.
Moreover, sacrificing this alignment for the sake of close relations
with the Arab and Muslim worlds was perceived as producing
considerable dividends for Turkey in general, and for the premier in
particular. With his recent moves, Erdogan has assumed the role of an
Islamic and Palestinian hero, while the Turkish state has catapulted
itself onto center stage as the rising tiger of the Middle East. Such
achievements can be expected to encourage even more assertive moves in
the same direction.
Israel's own flagrant errors played into the hands of the Turkish
government, while also feeding the Turkish street's antipathy toward
Israel. The deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations began gathering
force during the winter 2008-2009 Gaza conflict, when Israel failed to
notify Ankara of its intent to attack, though it had do so with Egypt.
Without entering here into Israel's considerations, Turkey's rivalry
with Egypt, Ankara's pro-Palestinian sentiments and Erdogan's
allegedly injured honor went a long way to explain the open negative
shift demonstrated at the Davos meeting that January. Other Israeli
"contributions" to the decline of the relationship included
declarations by some Israeli officials of their opposition to any
mediating role by Turkey between Syria and Israel. Especially
insulting, and ultimately embarrassing for Israel, was the
demonstratively humiliating way in which Turkey's ambassador to Israel
was treated by Israel's deputy foreign minister, this past January.
Hence, the ground was well prepared for a crisis, which the flotilla
affair provided in spades. Israel knew beforehand that the AKP was in
one way or another linked to the IHH organization (Insani Yardim
Vakfi), headed by Bulent Yildirim, which was the moving spirit behind
the flotilla. Israel's mistake was that it chose the greater of two
evils. By confronting the Marmara and causing the death of nine Turks
it inflamed both the Turkish public and the ruling elite against
Jerusalem. Huge street demonstrations encouraged Erdogan to further
sharpen his extreme stance on Israel, which in turn further incited
the public.
Up until that point, Turkey and Israel had no real problems on the
level of bilateral relations. Their disputes had to do with other
issues, particularly their differing outlooks on the Palestinian
issue. Now, with the death of Turkish citizens, people-to-people
relations between Turkey and Israel have been dealt a severe blow.
Governments come and go but the enmity that is developing between the
two nations will be very difficult to heal if a more sober and
level-headed approach is not adopted by the two countries.
Because of the inherently asymmetrical nature of Turkish-Israeli
relations, Israel appears to be the main loser from their
deterioration. Still, Turkey too stands to lose from the new
situation. As it increasingly assumes a more Iranian-like radical
stance, Ankara's credibility as a stability-promoting power in the
region is likely to be damaged. Second it has diminished its chances
for playing the role of a mediator between Syria and Israel, a task
that is strongly coveted by the architects of its newly activist
foreign policy. Lastly, the surge in popularity of the AKP government,
exemplified by the huge anti-Israeli demonstrations that Erdogan's
inflammatory speeches helped unleash, may boomerang against him in the
long run. Even now, concurrently with the anti-Israeli demonstrations,
similarly large ones have been taking place against the AKP, organized
by Kurds. Ultimately, Israel will not be able to serve indefinitely as
a diversion from the Turkish government's domestic and external
problems.
Prof. Ofra Bengio is a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, at Tel Aviv University,
which first published this piece as a "Tel Aviv Note.". She is author
of "The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern
Outsiders" (2nd edition, 2010).
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/ofra-bengio-turkey-s-strategic-u-turn-israel-s-tactical-mistakes-1.295578
From: A. Papazian
June 11 2010
Turkey's Strategic U-Turn, Israel's Tactical Mistakes
While it is Turkey that has been changing its strategy vis-Ã-vis
Israel by tilting toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, Israel has helped
push it in that direction with a number of egregious tactical
mistakes.
By Ofra Bengio
The Turkish-Israeli crisis touched off by the Gaza flotilla episode
encapsulates the evolution of the two countries' bilateral relations
in recent years. Though it is the Turkish government that has slowly
been changing its strategy vis-Ã-vis Israel by tilting more and more
toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, Israel has helped push it in that
direction with a number of egregious tactical mistakes.
Ankara's strategic shift began some years ago, when it aligned itself
with Israel's two implacable enemies, Hamas and Iran. These new
alliances could not be explained away as a mere humanitarian gesture
toward the Palestinians or an attempt to contain Iran through
engagement. Given Iran's and Hamas' unflinching opposition to Israel's
existence, Turkey's support for them cancels out, in effect, its
alignment with Israel.
Oddly, neither ordinary Turkish citizens nor members of the
intelligentsia seem to grasp the impact on Israel of Ankara's shift.
To illustrate the point, one can imagine the reaction in Turkey were
Israel to declare its support for Armenia against Turkey (to be sure,
the parallel with Iran breaks down over the fact that Armenia
possesses no nuclear weapons and has not declared its opposition to
Turkey's right to exist). Similarly, one may ask, how would Turkey
have responded to an Israeli invitation to Abdullah Ocalan, the head
of the Kurdish PKK opposition (the AKP government of Prime Minster
Tayyip Recep Erdogan has hosted Hamas leader Khalid Mash`al), or if
Israel had organized a flotilla to provide aid to the country's Kurds?
>From a historical perspective, this was not the first time that Turkey
had tilted toward the Arab world at Israel's expense. Nonetheless, the
current case differs from earlier ones in a number of important
respects. In previous instances, Turkey's attempt to curry favor with
Arab countries was in response to a concern over possible Arab moves
that could directly harm Turkish interests, for example, the Arab
threat not to sell oil to Turkey after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. In the latest incident, by contrast, Turkey's actions were
proactive, taken at its own initiative. Furthermore, although Turkish
leaders in the past occasionally employed harsh words against Israel,
never has Turkish rhetoric been as intense, inflammatory or sustained
as that employed by Erdogan, beginning with last year's confrontation
with Israeli President Shimon Peres at Davos.
Erdogan's actions mark the first time that a Turkish prime minister
has taken the lead in posing as the savior of Palestinians facing
Israeli oppression. Similarly, while in the past Turkey's moves toward
Israel were motivated by considerations of realpolitik, Erdogan
appears to be guided by a quasi-messianic approach that eerily
resembles the actions of Egypt's Gamal Abd al-Nasser during the 1950s
and '60s Lastly, although the sympathy of the Turkish people with the
Palestinians is of long standing, it has never appeared as deep-rooted
and all-encompassing as in the aftermath of the flotilla crisis.
The reasons underpinning Turkey's altered posture are manifold. One
important explanation is the quiet revolution transpiring under the
AKP government in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres.
Paradoxically, its new Islamic ideological and political orientation
turns the state into a friendly competitor with Iran over the
leadership role of the Islamist, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli
stance. This, together with the AKP government's success in cutting
the Turkish military's influence down to size, enabled the government
to deliver a severe blow to the strategic alignment with Israel.
Moreover, sacrificing this alignment for the sake of close relations
with the Arab and Muslim worlds was perceived as producing
considerable dividends for Turkey in general, and for the premier in
particular. With his recent moves, Erdogan has assumed the role of an
Islamic and Palestinian hero, while the Turkish state has catapulted
itself onto center stage as the rising tiger of the Middle East. Such
achievements can be expected to encourage even more assertive moves in
the same direction.
Israel's own flagrant errors played into the hands of the Turkish
government, while also feeding the Turkish street's antipathy toward
Israel. The deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations began gathering
force during the winter 2008-2009 Gaza conflict, when Israel failed to
notify Ankara of its intent to attack, though it had do so with Egypt.
Without entering here into Israel's considerations, Turkey's rivalry
with Egypt, Ankara's pro-Palestinian sentiments and Erdogan's
allegedly injured honor went a long way to explain the open negative
shift demonstrated at the Davos meeting that January. Other Israeli
"contributions" to the decline of the relationship included
declarations by some Israeli officials of their opposition to any
mediating role by Turkey between Syria and Israel. Especially
insulting, and ultimately embarrassing for Israel, was the
demonstratively humiliating way in which Turkey's ambassador to Israel
was treated by Israel's deputy foreign minister, this past January.
Hence, the ground was well prepared for a crisis, which the flotilla
affair provided in spades. Israel knew beforehand that the AKP was in
one way or another linked to the IHH organization (Insani Yardim
Vakfi), headed by Bulent Yildirim, which was the moving spirit behind
the flotilla. Israel's mistake was that it chose the greater of two
evils. By confronting the Marmara and causing the death of nine Turks
it inflamed both the Turkish public and the ruling elite against
Jerusalem. Huge street demonstrations encouraged Erdogan to further
sharpen his extreme stance on Israel, which in turn further incited
the public.
Up until that point, Turkey and Israel had no real problems on the
level of bilateral relations. Their disputes had to do with other
issues, particularly their differing outlooks on the Palestinian
issue. Now, with the death of Turkish citizens, people-to-people
relations between Turkey and Israel have been dealt a severe blow.
Governments come and go but the enmity that is developing between the
two nations will be very difficult to heal if a more sober and
level-headed approach is not adopted by the two countries.
Because of the inherently asymmetrical nature of Turkish-Israeli
relations, Israel appears to be the main loser from their
deterioration. Still, Turkey too stands to lose from the new
situation. As it increasingly assumes a more Iranian-like radical
stance, Ankara's credibility as a stability-promoting power in the
region is likely to be damaged. Second it has diminished its chances
for playing the role of a mediator between Syria and Israel, a task
that is strongly coveted by the architects of its newly activist
foreign policy. Lastly, the surge in popularity of the AKP government,
exemplified by the huge anti-Israeli demonstrations that Erdogan's
inflammatory speeches helped unleash, may boomerang against him in the
long run. Even now, concurrently with the anti-Israeli demonstrations,
similarly large ones have been taking place against the AKP, organized
by Kurds. Ultimately, Israel will not be able to serve indefinitely as
a diversion from the Turkish government's domestic and external
problems.
Prof. Ofra Bengio is a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, at Tel Aviv University,
which first published this piece as a "Tel Aviv Note.". She is author
of "The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern
Outsiders" (2nd edition, 2010).
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/ofra-bengio-turkey-s-strategic-u-turn-israel-s-tactical-mistakes-1.295578
From: A. Papazian