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Iran and the Balkans: Russia Risks Making the Same Mistakes
en.fondsk.ru
ïrbis Terrarum
11.06.2010
Pyotr ISKENDEROV
The recent UN Security Council resolution slapping new sanctions on
Iran is likely to become the worst defeat suffered by the Russian
diplomacy over the past years. Its negative impact may be persistent
and more serious than that of the proclamation of Kosovo's
independence to which Russia continues objecting. What we are
witnessing seems to be an unexpected recurrence of the syndrome of
unilateral concessions to the West which eroded Russia's international
politics, especially its Balkan part, in the 1990ies. Following the
Western lead in dealing with Iran, Russia is risking to lose both its
positions in a region much more extensive than the Balkans and its
hard-earned key role in the raising multipolar world.
Commenting on the vote in the UN Security Council (where Russia's BRIC
peer Brazil and NATO member Turkey voted against the sanctions), the
influential Tehran Times wrote: "The fact that Turkey and Brazil, two
U.S. allies, voted against the resolution provides further proof that
the actions against Iran and the latest decision of the Security
Council are based on secret deals struck by the major powers. Thus,
those who say the U.S. abandoned its Eastern European missile shield
plan in order to win the support of Russia were probably correct".
In 2009, the Russian foreign ministry was on a number of occasions
forced to deny that -- as Western media kept suggesting -- there existed
a swap deal. Indeed, it probably did not
exist as a formalized agreement, but the truth is that at a certain
moment Russia adopted a much tougher stance on Iran and froze its arms
transactions with the country (suspending the supply of the S-300 air
defense systems), as well as that currently Moscow risks loosing its
strategic partner in the Middle East without any visible reasons for
such sacrifice. Can the invisible reason be an obscure deal with US
President B. Obama?
Recent developments signal a complicated array of shifts in the region
and outside of it. The mediation successfully undertaken by Turkey and
Brazil in the talks over the enrichment of Iran's uranium stockpile
outside of the country, the escalation in the Middle East, the
tensions between Turkey and Israel, new geopolitical maneuvers around
the Karabakh settlement and related energy projects (in which Turkey,
Iran, and Azerbaijan, the country with a special position, are to play
the key roles) altogether confront the US with the threat of isolation
and loss of leadership. As for Iran, it is no secret that the three
rounds of sanctions imposed on the country in 2006-2008 failed to
undermine its capability to implement a nuclear program, which has
become an element of the Iranian national identity. There are no
indications that the situation is going to change from Iran's
perspective this time.
The situation is going to change from Russia's perspective, though,
and certainly for the worse. Loosing Iran, demonstratively distancing
itself from the Turkish-Brazilian mediation (for which President
Medvedev expressed support previously), and siding with the US Moscow
put in jeopardy the political gains of the recent years such as
independence and assertiveness in international politics and the
clarity of geopolitical priorities. Voting for new sanctions and
constructing the nuclear power plant in Bushehr at the same time is an
example of the very double standards that Moscow justly rebelled
against whenever it encountered them in Western policies.
Russia evidently tried to recoup some of its geopolitical losses
immediately after the vote in the UN Security Council. Russia's
foreign ministry promptly posted an extensive comment saying:
"However, we can't ignore the signals indicating that some partners
intend, almost immediately after the decision in New York, to move to
considering additional sanctions against Iran, more stringent than
those provided by the UNSC resolution. We regard this as the
manifestation of a policy that runs counter to the principles of joint
work within the Six and the UNSC format. Unacceptable to us are
attempts in such a way to place oneself "above" the Security Council.
We also categorically reject any national decisions on the imposition
of "extraterritorial sanctions," i.e., restrictive measures under
one's own legislation with regard to individuals and legal entities in
third countries. Such decisions, should they affect Russian legal
entities or individuals, would entail retaliatory response by us.
The new resolution leaves extensive room for further cooperation with
Iran in the trade and economic field and on energy, transport and
peaceful space exploration. As applied to Russian-Iranian bilateral
ties, all of these areas have significant potential and growth
opportunities. Of fundamental importance for us is the further
development of cooperation with Iran in the construction of light
water reactors".
The arguments seem OK but still reek of an attempt to save face. It is
unlikely that the US and the EU, overwhelmed with gratitude to Russia,
will in the future show greater respect for its interests or adapt to
the Russian foreign ministry's position on Iran. The Russian
diplomacy's pledges to go on cooperating with Iran would have been
more credible if Russia at least abstained during the UN Security
Council vote, as, for example, did Lebanon.
Washington pursued its own interests without exceptions throughout the
Russian-US debates over Iran. Obama's decision against deploying
missile defense infrastructures in Poland and the Czech Republic was
predictable due to purely economic regards and did not take Russia's
consent to sanctions against Iran. In fact, the missile defense
program is still on but will employ more advanced technologies
ensuring radar surveillance over a greater area. In the foreseeable
future Russia will be confronted with an evasive network of mobile
systems instead of two undisguised stationary installations. The
Persian Gulf zone and the Black Sea region will be given key roles in
the framework of the initiative. It did not go unnoticed that the US
Administration carefully avoided linking any of the provisions of the
New Start treaty with the state of the US missile defense program.
The most alarming aspect of the current situation is the analogy it
invokes with the 1990-ies -- early 2000i-es Balkan developments. In
that epoch Russia also demanded on the formal level that all sides in
the Balkan conflicts equally abide by the international law, called
for compromises, and voted for sanctions in the UN Security Council,
holding that this was the only way to stop escalations. The overall
result was progressing imbalance in the Balkan and broader European
security architecture. The norms declared were supposed to be
mandatory for all nations, but the Serbs invariably ended up
disadvantaged. The format of the international contact group which
handled Balkan crises is frighteningly similar to that currently
employed in dealing with Iran (the six-party talks). Russia was
defeated in the five-party talks on Kosovo when it consented to the
so-called three principles, one of them being that the situation
should not revert to the 1999 condition. The provision was eventually
used by the proponents of Kosovo independence to justify its
unilateral declaration.
Now Russian envoys quite reasonably blame the UN and its Secretary
General for being either reluctant or unable to address the Kosovo
problem and charge the EU and the US with bias and unilateralism. But
isn't the West demonstrating bias and acting unilaterally when it
consents to the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan, shields Israel
from criticism over its nuclear program, but keeps pushing for ever
tighter sanctions to be imposed on Iran?
The Balkan settlement has shown the inadequacy of international
negotiating formats like five-party or six-party talks and the
pointless character of UN discussions. In practice, the West relies
entirely on its own mechanisms to promote its own geopolitical
interests. Russia chose to be on the side of the US and the EU instead
of strengthening its commercial ties with Iran (including the Caspian
Sea delimitation and the energy projects), involving countries with
unbiased positions in the talks over the Iranian nuclear dossier, and
supporting the independent and successful mediation contributed by
Turkey and Brazil. Will the US and the EU return the favor -- for
example, in the form of concessions in Kosovo, Caucasus, or energy
politics? Based on the Balkan experience, it is clear that they will
not.
Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for
Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international
commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia.
From: A. Papazian
en.fondsk.ru
ïrbis Terrarum
11.06.2010
Pyotr ISKENDEROV
The recent UN Security Council resolution slapping new sanctions on
Iran is likely to become the worst defeat suffered by the Russian
diplomacy over the past years. Its negative impact may be persistent
and more serious than that of the proclamation of Kosovo's
independence to which Russia continues objecting. What we are
witnessing seems to be an unexpected recurrence of the syndrome of
unilateral concessions to the West which eroded Russia's international
politics, especially its Balkan part, in the 1990ies. Following the
Western lead in dealing with Iran, Russia is risking to lose both its
positions in a region much more extensive than the Balkans and its
hard-earned key role in the raising multipolar world.
Commenting on the vote in the UN Security Council (where Russia's BRIC
peer Brazil and NATO member Turkey voted against the sanctions), the
influential Tehran Times wrote: "The fact that Turkey and Brazil, two
U.S. allies, voted against the resolution provides further proof that
the actions against Iran and the latest decision of the Security
Council are based on secret deals struck by the major powers. Thus,
those who say the U.S. abandoned its Eastern European missile shield
plan in order to win the support of Russia were probably correct".
In 2009, the Russian foreign ministry was on a number of occasions
forced to deny that -- as Western media kept suggesting -- there existed
a swap deal. Indeed, it probably did not
exist as a formalized agreement, but the truth is that at a certain
moment Russia adopted a much tougher stance on Iran and froze its arms
transactions with the country (suspending the supply of the S-300 air
defense systems), as well as that currently Moscow risks loosing its
strategic partner in the Middle East without any visible reasons for
such sacrifice. Can the invisible reason be an obscure deal with US
President B. Obama?
Recent developments signal a complicated array of shifts in the region
and outside of it. The mediation successfully undertaken by Turkey and
Brazil in the talks over the enrichment of Iran's uranium stockpile
outside of the country, the escalation in the Middle East, the
tensions between Turkey and Israel, new geopolitical maneuvers around
the Karabakh settlement and related energy projects (in which Turkey,
Iran, and Azerbaijan, the country with a special position, are to play
the key roles) altogether confront the US with the threat of isolation
and loss of leadership. As for Iran, it is no secret that the three
rounds of sanctions imposed on the country in 2006-2008 failed to
undermine its capability to implement a nuclear program, which has
become an element of the Iranian national identity. There are no
indications that the situation is going to change from Iran's
perspective this time.
The situation is going to change from Russia's perspective, though,
and certainly for the worse. Loosing Iran, demonstratively distancing
itself from the Turkish-Brazilian mediation (for which President
Medvedev expressed support previously), and siding with the US Moscow
put in jeopardy the political gains of the recent years such as
independence and assertiveness in international politics and the
clarity of geopolitical priorities. Voting for new sanctions and
constructing the nuclear power plant in Bushehr at the same time is an
example of the very double standards that Moscow justly rebelled
against whenever it encountered them in Western policies.
Russia evidently tried to recoup some of its geopolitical losses
immediately after the vote in the UN Security Council. Russia's
foreign ministry promptly posted an extensive comment saying:
"However, we can't ignore the signals indicating that some partners
intend, almost immediately after the decision in New York, to move to
considering additional sanctions against Iran, more stringent than
those provided by the UNSC resolution. We regard this as the
manifestation of a policy that runs counter to the principles of joint
work within the Six and the UNSC format. Unacceptable to us are
attempts in such a way to place oneself "above" the Security Council.
We also categorically reject any national decisions on the imposition
of "extraterritorial sanctions," i.e., restrictive measures under
one's own legislation with regard to individuals and legal entities in
third countries. Such decisions, should they affect Russian legal
entities or individuals, would entail retaliatory response by us.
The new resolution leaves extensive room for further cooperation with
Iran in the trade and economic field and on energy, transport and
peaceful space exploration. As applied to Russian-Iranian bilateral
ties, all of these areas have significant potential and growth
opportunities. Of fundamental importance for us is the further
development of cooperation with Iran in the construction of light
water reactors".
The arguments seem OK but still reek of an attempt to save face. It is
unlikely that the US and the EU, overwhelmed with gratitude to Russia,
will in the future show greater respect for its interests or adapt to
the Russian foreign ministry's position on Iran. The Russian
diplomacy's pledges to go on cooperating with Iran would have been
more credible if Russia at least abstained during the UN Security
Council vote, as, for example, did Lebanon.
Washington pursued its own interests without exceptions throughout the
Russian-US debates over Iran. Obama's decision against deploying
missile defense infrastructures in Poland and the Czech Republic was
predictable due to purely economic regards and did not take Russia's
consent to sanctions against Iran. In fact, the missile defense
program is still on but will employ more advanced technologies
ensuring radar surveillance over a greater area. In the foreseeable
future Russia will be confronted with an evasive network of mobile
systems instead of two undisguised stationary installations. The
Persian Gulf zone and the Black Sea region will be given key roles in
the framework of the initiative. It did not go unnoticed that the US
Administration carefully avoided linking any of the provisions of the
New Start treaty with the state of the US missile defense program.
The most alarming aspect of the current situation is the analogy it
invokes with the 1990-ies -- early 2000i-es Balkan developments. In
that epoch Russia also demanded on the formal level that all sides in
the Balkan conflicts equally abide by the international law, called
for compromises, and voted for sanctions in the UN Security Council,
holding that this was the only way to stop escalations. The overall
result was progressing imbalance in the Balkan and broader European
security architecture. The norms declared were supposed to be
mandatory for all nations, but the Serbs invariably ended up
disadvantaged. The format of the international contact group which
handled Balkan crises is frighteningly similar to that currently
employed in dealing with Iran (the six-party talks). Russia was
defeated in the five-party talks on Kosovo when it consented to the
so-called three principles, one of them being that the situation
should not revert to the 1999 condition. The provision was eventually
used by the proponents of Kosovo independence to justify its
unilateral declaration.
Now Russian envoys quite reasonably blame the UN and its Secretary
General for being either reluctant or unable to address the Kosovo
problem and charge the EU and the US with bias and unilateralism. But
isn't the West demonstrating bias and acting unilaterally when it
consents to the nuclear statuses of India and Pakistan, shields Israel
from criticism over its nuclear program, but keeps pushing for ever
tighter sanctions to be imposed on Iran?
The Balkan settlement has shown the inadequacy of international
negotiating formats like five-party or six-party talks and the
pointless character of UN discussions. In practice, the West relies
entirely on its own mechanisms to promote its own geopolitical
interests. Russia chose to be on the side of the US and the EU instead
of strengthening its commercial ties with Iran (including the Caspian
Sea delimitation and the energy projects), involving countries with
unbiased positions in the talks over the Iranian nuclear dossier, and
supporting the independent and successful mediation contributed by
Turkey and Brazil. Will the US and the EU return the favor -- for
example, in the form of concessions in Kosovo, Caucasus, or energy
politics? Based on the Balkan experience, it is clear that they will
not.
Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for
Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international
commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia.
From: A. Papazian