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SOME WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY
Morton Abramowitz
Century Foundation
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC& ;pubid=2584
March 2 2010
Remarks February 25, 2010 at joint meeting of Istanbul Center of
Atlanta and Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, George Tech
I am always pleased to talk Turkey. It was a great diplomatic
assignment and the country endlessly fascinates me. There is always
something going on, Indeed sometimes I think Turkey changes by the
day. I have tried hard to keep up with developments there including
visiting almost every year, when I find someone to pay my way.
Turkey has taken off since the end of the cold war: profound economic
and social change and major strides in making the country more
democratic. Nevertheless, it still has a long way to go to meet EU
accession requirements. A good bit of Turkey remains third world. I
have always believed, however simplistic, that as long as Turkey grows
5-6 percent a year it will get into the EU by the end of this decade.
Unfortunately, given Europe's reticence and Turkey's development,
I think Turks increasingly wonder whether they really want to join
the EU.
The country is far more vibrant and open, and public discussion
is light years ahead of my time in Ankara twenty years ago. Some
subjects such as the question of Armenian genocide in World War I
and Kurds remain touchy issues, but they are openly discussed now
and in the case of Turkey's Kurds there is serious consideration of
policy changes. Remarkably, the military, still the most respected
institution in Turkey and the generator of four coups, is being
seriously criticized, and many retired offices this past year have
been arrested or questioned over plotting against the government. A
small newspaper--Taraf-- repeatedly publishes the military's intimate
secrets and gets away with it. Its editors would have been imprisoned
for life a decade ago.
Indeed this week produced even greater tensions. The government seems
to be pushing the military against the wall by brining into custody
some fifty retired officers but some of them remarkably former top
commanders. This is a unique situation and all sorts of rumors are
flying around like the top brass resigning en masse in reaction. The
highest civilian and military officials have been urgently meeting
in apparent efforts to contain the storm, raising questions whether
the problem is justice or politics. From here it is unclear where
all this is going, but it appears to be an extraordinary moment in
modern Turkish history,
In talking about Turkey today I will do it by responding to some
current American discussion of Turkey and our bilateral relations
and give you my take on that discussion.
Even though Turkey is a long time ally, there is a growing perception,
particularly among our conservative cognoscenti, that domestically
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is out to destroy
the power of the military and make Turkey not an Islamic state but a
more conservative, religiously oriented state with much greater public
manifestations of Islam. Some fear more extreme internal religious
developments and a very authoritarian government emerging if the
military is completely defanged as the guardian of Turkish secularism.
I can imagine what they are saying today. Many holding this view
believe that on foreign policy the AKP is detaching Turkey from its
Western moorings and focusing more on ties to the Muslim Middle East
and Russia and showing less interest in joining the EU and maintaining
close ties to the U.S.
For the moment let me say briefly that while the AKP government, of
course, has made changes in domestic and foreign policy that might
lend support to those views, such basic judgments are, I believe,
over done, and their concerns simply do not take into account the
complexity of Turkey and its rapid development. I will focus on
foreign policy, but a few more comments first on the domestic dimension
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is due to the
failure of Turkey's main stream parties but more fundamentally to
Turkey's structural changes: the growth of the economy, an enlarged
non-Istanbul entrepreneurship, and the vast movement of poorer, more
devout people from country to city. The AKP, which rose out of an older
fundamentalist party, has given voice to these demographic elements
that rarely had one, and in doing so has done much to make Turkey an
open, more vibrant and democratic country. They have severely reduced
the ability of the military, their main political enemy, to intervene
in politics through coups. This ongoing effort, however, has polarized
the country, particularly those who believe the army is essential to
preserving Turkey's traditional secularism and providing balance in a
conflicted society. The events this week will deepen the polarization,
as the government and military seemingly scramble to contain it. AKP
has gone far because it is a majority party, accelerating change,
and intent on making Turkey a greater economic and political player
in the world.
While surviving efforts so far by the military and the judiciary
to bring the government down, the AKP's dynamism has diminished the
past two years, partly because of world recession but also because
they have talked much but accomplished little on promised and most
difficult fundamental reforms like a new constitution to replace
the authoritarian military-bestowed constitution and real measures
to deal with its Kurds. Rather they have pulled back, fearing the
political fallout of their controversial reform efforts.
One last point. Life changes. So do politics in Turkey, however
ineffective Turkey's opposition parties have been. Yes, PM Erdogan
dominates the scene like a colossus, he is an extraordinary dynamic
politician, but he is also viewed as increasingly authoritarian and
destructive of a free media, polemical, and prone to risk-taking
including now his defense establishment. The AKP's political position
remains strong, but its popularity is diminishing. Conceivably this
week's event could spur Mr. Erdogan to early parliamentary elections,
although he has denied it. Should he wait till the present parliament's
time is up economics will likely play a bigger part in determining the
outcome of the next elections. The free ride opposition parties have
given AKP, particularly on economic matters, is likely to end. The
country is increasingly at war with itself and the public tone is
acrimonious. Dominant as they now are, the AKP could well continue
its drift downward, setting the stage for an election producing a
coalition government. Political life in Turkey can turn fickle--not
unlike what we see in the US today.
Foreign policy under the AKP is vastly different and very lively,
a far cry from the stagnancy of the cold war. Both Erdogan and his
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, are enormously active, incessantly
travelling, and trying to convey to the Turkish public and the world
Turkey's new dynamism and importance. Turkish involvement and influence
extends far these days--NATO, and over the last decade to the Caucasus,
the Middle East, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan. Ankara's ambitions
are limited by Turkey's internal weaknesses. But it remains the
strongest power in the area.
Let me briefly discuss a few specifics of that diplomatic revolution
that have caused heartburn here. They are in the Middle East Iran,
Syria, and Israel, and in Russia. On the issue currently most
important to both countriesIraqTurkey has made radical changes in
policy helpful to our interests. Somehow that development seems to
get little attention from conservatives, who remain still deeply
interested in Iraq. So let me start with Iraq, which since the first
Gulf War has been the most acrimonious issue in US-Turkey relations.
The second Gulf war generated the vast decline in American popularity
in Turkey.
The two wars produced a nightmare for Turkey--the possibly huge impact
on Kurdish nationalism and Turkey's own Kurds from the growth of a
self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq and the possibility it
could become independent if Iraq descended into chaos. This has been
a fear of every Turkish government since the allies established a safe
haven area in Iraq for Kurds after the first Gulf War. Turkey's worse
fears seemed to come true after Saddam's fall and the inability to
create an effective Iraq government. For seven years the Turks made
believe Iraqi Kurdistan did not exist except for trade, but over the
past year they changed course and developed a serious relationship. To
a great extent that came from the realization that the Americans were
leaving Iraq and Turkey would be better served by a good relationship
with the Kurds in helping preserve Iraq's unity. The U.S. works
closely with Turkey to preserve Iraq's unity.
It is Turkey's greater involvement in the rest of the Middle East that
has caused the biggest unhappiness here. Ankara has mounted a sustained
and vigorous effort to improve relations with its neighbors (usually
described as "zero problems" with neighbors) and, importantly, deepen
economic ties with all Arab countries, the latter a focus of the Prime
Minister's personal efforts. They built on Turkey's Muslim character
to help advance relations with often unfriendly neighbors. Turkey has
especially deepened economic and political relations with Assad's
Syria, including a free visa regime, and tried but failed to carry
on indirect peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. The U.S.,
it might be noted, this past week in a far smaller but similar vein
sent an ambassador back to Syria after five years and eliminated some
trade sanctions against Syria. Throughout the Arab world Turkish leader
have showed the flag and encouraged Arab investment in Turkey. They
are having some success in reversing the Arabs' historical animosity
to the Turks.
The most troublesome issue, as American skeptics point out, is Iran,
a state rarely trusted by Turks. Living next to a powerful neighbor
and historical antagonist but interested in trade and investment
Turkey has recently developed a different perspective than the U.S.,
and the Obama administration has not discouraged Ankara from pursuing
it, Turkey certainly does not want Iran to acquire nukes, which would
raise major security concerns. However, in pursuing better relations it
has apparently accepted Iran's denial that it seeks a nuclear weapons
capability, and even sort of out loud allowed for Iran to have such
a weapon since Israel has one. Recently, top Turkish leaders have
pursued a mediating role between Iran and the West and they assert
that Iran wants to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations..
Turkey is presently a Security Council member and will have to vote
on any sanctions measure. It is quite possible depending on its nature
that Turkey will abstain on any UN resolutions for sanctions on Iran.
In short trouble looms ahead between us. Iran is clearly a case of
conflicting interests and different perceptions. I tend to believe,
hopefully wrongly, that Iran is using Turkey to muddy the waters and
perpetuate nuclear negotiations.
The issue that has inflamed many conservatives and Turkey's strong
supporters in the American Jewish community has been its handling of
Israel. While Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel,
relations were not close and there has been little public support of
Israel in Turkey. In the nineties Turkish-Israeli relations expanded
in all fieldsdefense and intelligence, economics, tourism and others--
led in great part by the military, who then saw Syria and Iran as the
threats to Turkey, but that did not change popular perspectives. The
relationship has been diminishing with Turkish activism in the
Middle East under the AKP.. Acrimony took over last year with the
Prime Minister's rage over Israel's invasion of Gaza, Mr. Erdogan's
continuing public denunciations and the sudden disinviting of Israel
to a military exercise were popular in Turkey, fanned anti -Israel
sentiments and generated considerable expressions of anti-Semitism.
Israel was dismayed by the loss of support of its main Muslim
friend and there were some harsh reactions. However, Israel quickly
recognized the importance of its relations with Turkey and sought to
limit damage. Turkish tempers also have cooled. We are not likely to
see relations return to the level of the nineties, but both countries
pragmatically want to sustain the present level of economic and
diplomatic relations. Unhappiness with Israel over Gaza, however,
could explode again.
One aspect of Turkish behavior on these issues raises questions
of hypocrisy and could hurt Turkey's standing in the West. While
characterizing Israel behavior in Gaza as genocide, Mr. Erdogan has
publicly embraced Sudanese leader Bashir, an indicted war criminal,
and denied mass atrocities in Darfur, stating Muslims don't commit
genocide. Nor has his quick embrace of the Iranian elections and his
silence over the subsequent crackdown won him admiration in the West.
Erdogan is no proponent of democracy and human right in his
diplomacy and that is duly noted. On the other hand he seeks to be an
intermediary between Iran and the West and does not want to endanger
that effort.
Lastly and briefly is Russia where eyebrows have also been raised
here. Turkey's relations with Russia are of course different than
during the cold war. Turkey has no love for Putin's Russia and
remains a dedicated NATO member. But today economics rules: the
major development in Turkish-Russian relations has been the enormous
dependence on Russia for energy. That has made Russia Turkey's major
trading partner, far exceeding Turkey's trade with the U.S. In its
efforts to become an energy hub, Turkey tries to satisfy both Russia
and its Western partners by seeking pipelines that use Russian energy
but also helping develop ones not involving Russian participation.
Turkey has also been circumspect in its political relations with
Russia. It was no champion of Georgia and was cautious about Ukranian
membership in NATO, not the only country in NATO to show caution,
The bottom line: Turkey has redefined its interests and with the
exception of Iran much of it makes sense. Why should Turkey stay the
same when their world is changing and not pursue changing interests?
Looking ahead, I think our relations will remain close. Certainly the
US wants to work together with a rising Turkey and so does Turkey. But
the next few years can also be difficult. US-Turkey relations will be
tested in Iraq and whether it stays together. Profound Iraqi internal
problems must be overcome and the end is not apparent. The manner
of our leaving Iraq will be critical to Turkey. Iran may test our
relations even sooner.
The most immediate problem, however, is the Armenian genocide issue. A
resolution invariably comes up in Congress in March declaring
the killings of vast numbers of Armenians in 1915 a genocide. The
Turkish government has bitterly resented this and has fought hard and
successfully over many hears to prevent a resolution passing. Its
passage in even one house, every Turkish government has declared,
would enormously harm relations. It is not clear what the Turkish
government will actually do. The executive branch has always fought
the resolution on national security grounds. Congress is likely to
pass it this year if the President does not get involved; he himself
during the 2008 campaign declared the events of 1915 a genocide. The
administration had strongly worked for reconciliation protocols between
Armenia and Turkey to open the border and establish relations, in part
with the expectation that would put off any genocide resolution. Bu
Parliamentary approval in Turkey has stalled and that hope now appears
dim before the resolution comes up in the Congress.
Recent comments by Secretary Clinton indicate that the administration
will resist the resolution on grounds that it will interfere with
the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey
Let me close with some personal reflections on bilateral relations.
Both countries' leadership incessantly talk of our close relations,
our common values, and our shared views, and they like to use the
term "strategic relationship" to demonstrate the importance of our
relations. Indeed there is much truth to that despite huge hiccups
like Iraq. Turkey has been a real concern of the executive branch,
which has worked hard to maintain strong ties and to facilitate
Turkey's entrance into Europe. Turks also wants close relations. They
are important politically even if most Turks dislike the U.S. A
deterioration in relations with Washington would give any Turkish
government domestic political headaches.
The fact, however, is that our relationship remains close but its
substance changing. The end of the Soviet Union has reduced Turkey's
dependence on the U.S. for security and military ties--Iraq hardly
constitutes a Soviet threat. Turkey still relies on the U.S. for
defense modernization but it is broadening its sources of arms. Nor
does the present American economic situation inspire the respect of
yore. Turkey's increasing independence is reflected in the active
diplomacy already described, where Turkey pursues its own interests,
sometimes with political movements like Hamas or countries we dislike.
The U.S. has begun to recognize that change, notably with the arrival
of Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and is adjusting to it--there has been
no serious division yet, although Iran is creeping close to it.
Washington encourages Ankara where its activities are helpful and
tries to mitigate differences.
The atmosphere has also been strained for another reason: the huge
Anti-Americanism in Turkey generated by the second Iraq war. According
to recent polls attitudes toward the U.S. have been mired in the mid
teens, the lowest for any American ally and most other nations. Not
even the end of the Bush administration or Mr. Obama's early visit
to Turkey has changed that much. Public attitudes do not override
national interests, but bad ones are not a good sustainable basis for
relations. The Turkish government has shown little interest in trying
to change public attitudes for an understandable reason--it would
not be politically popular. Further the economic underpinnings of
our relations are weak and by and large that can not be changed much
by governments in private enterprise countries, Both governments have
their work carved out and hopefully they will step up to it. Turkey has
a bright future, if it maintains internal stability and continues rapid
growth. The growing democracy of an overwhelmingly Muslim country,
one which can join the EU, is a fundamental benefit to all.
Turkey's success will contribute to American interests and to world
stability.
Indeed the most crucial issues are very difficult internal ones,
whether Turkey overcomes the polarization that now grips the country,
allowing it to proceed with fundamental reforms and resume its rapid
rate of growth. That will be crucial to determine whether Turkey
becomes part of the EU, a major member of the West, and a far more
influential player internationally.
Morton Abramowitz
Century Foundation
http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC& ;pubid=2584
March 2 2010
Remarks February 25, 2010 at joint meeting of Istanbul Center of
Atlanta and Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, George Tech
I am always pleased to talk Turkey. It was a great diplomatic
assignment and the country endlessly fascinates me. There is always
something going on, Indeed sometimes I think Turkey changes by the
day. I have tried hard to keep up with developments there including
visiting almost every year, when I find someone to pay my way.
Turkey has taken off since the end of the cold war: profound economic
and social change and major strides in making the country more
democratic. Nevertheless, it still has a long way to go to meet EU
accession requirements. A good bit of Turkey remains third world. I
have always believed, however simplistic, that as long as Turkey grows
5-6 percent a year it will get into the EU by the end of this decade.
Unfortunately, given Europe's reticence and Turkey's development,
I think Turks increasingly wonder whether they really want to join
the EU.
The country is far more vibrant and open, and public discussion
is light years ahead of my time in Ankara twenty years ago. Some
subjects such as the question of Armenian genocide in World War I
and Kurds remain touchy issues, but they are openly discussed now
and in the case of Turkey's Kurds there is serious consideration of
policy changes. Remarkably, the military, still the most respected
institution in Turkey and the generator of four coups, is being
seriously criticized, and many retired offices this past year have
been arrested or questioned over plotting against the government. A
small newspaper--Taraf-- repeatedly publishes the military's intimate
secrets and gets away with it. Its editors would have been imprisoned
for life a decade ago.
Indeed this week produced even greater tensions. The government seems
to be pushing the military against the wall by brining into custody
some fifty retired officers but some of them remarkably former top
commanders. This is a unique situation and all sorts of rumors are
flying around like the top brass resigning en masse in reaction. The
highest civilian and military officials have been urgently meeting
in apparent efforts to contain the storm, raising questions whether
the problem is justice or politics. From here it is unclear where
all this is going, but it appears to be an extraordinary moment in
modern Turkish history,
In talking about Turkey today I will do it by responding to some
current American discussion of Turkey and our bilateral relations
and give you my take on that discussion.
Even though Turkey is a long time ally, there is a growing perception,
particularly among our conservative cognoscenti, that domestically
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is out to destroy
the power of the military and make Turkey not an Islamic state but a
more conservative, religiously oriented state with much greater public
manifestations of Islam. Some fear more extreme internal religious
developments and a very authoritarian government emerging if the
military is completely defanged as the guardian of Turkish secularism.
I can imagine what they are saying today. Many holding this view
believe that on foreign policy the AKP is detaching Turkey from its
Western moorings and focusing more on ties to the Muslim Middle East
and Russia and showing less interest in joining the EU and maintaining
close ties to the U.S.
For the moment let me say briefly that while the AKP government, of
course, has made changes in domestic and foreign policy that might
lend support to those views, such basic judgments are, I believe,
over done, and their concerns simply do not take into account the
complexity of Turkey and its rapid development. I will focus on
foreign policy, but a few more comments first on the domestic dimension
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is due to the
failure of Turkey's main stream parties but more fundamentally to
Turkey's structural changes: the growth of the economy, an enlarged
non-Istanbul entrepreneurship, and the vast movement of poorer, more
devout people from country to city. The AKP, which rose out of an older
fundamentalist party, has given voice to these demographic elements
that rarely had one, and in doing so has done much to make Turkey an
open, more vibrant and democratic country. They have severely reduced
the ability of the military, their main political enemy, to intervene
in politics through coups. This ongoing effort, however, has polarized
the country, particularly those who believe the army is essential to
preserving Turkey's traditional secularism and providing balance in a
conflicted society. The events this week will deepen the polarization,
as the government and military seemingly scramble to contain it. AKP
has gone far because it is a majority party, accelerating change,
and intent on making Turkey a greater economic and political player
in the world.
While surviving efforts so far by the military and the judiciary
to bring the government down, the AKP's dynamism has diminished the
past two years, partly because of world recession but also because
they have talked much but accomplished little on promised and most
difficult fundamental reforms like a new constitution to replace
the authoritarian military-bestowed constitution and real measures
to deal with its Kurds. Rather they have pulled back, fearing the
political fallout of their controversial reform efforts.
One last point. Life changes. So do politics in Turkey, however
ineffective Turkey's opposition parties have been. Yes, PM Erdogan
dominates the scene like a colossus, he is an extraordinary dynamic
politician, but he is also viewed as increasingly authoritarian and
destructive of a free media, polemical, and prone to risk-taking
including now his defense establishment. The AKP's political position
remains strong, but its popularity is diminishing. Conceivably this
week's event could spur Mr. Erdogan to early parliamentary elections,
although he has denied it. Should he wait till the present parliament's
time is up economics will likely play a bigger part in determining the
outcome of the next elections. The free ride opposition parties have
given AKP, particularly on economic matters, is likely to end. The
country is increasingly at war with itself and the public tone is
acrimonious. Dominant as they now are, the AKP could well continue
its drift downward, setting the stage for an election producing a
coalition government. Political life in Turkey can turn fickle--not
unlike what we see in the US today.
Foreign policy under the AKP is vastly different and very lively,
a far cry from the stagnancy of the cold war. Both Erdogan and his
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, are enormously active, incessantly
travelling, and trying to convey to the Turkish public and the world
Turkey's new dynamism and importance. Turkish involvement and influence
extends far these days--NATO, and over the last decade to the Caucasus,
the Middle East, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan. Ankara's ambitions
are limited by Turkey's internal weaknesses. But it remains the
strongest power in the area.
Let me briefly discuss a few specifics of that diplomatic revolution
that have caused heartburn here. They are in the Middle East Iran,
Syria, and Israel, and in Russia. On the issue currently most
important to both countriesIraqTurkey has made radical changes in
policy helpful to our interests. Somehow that development seems to
get little attention from conservatives, who remain still deeply
interested in Iraq. So let me start with Iraq, which since the first
Gulf War has been the most acrimonious issue in US-Turkey relations.
The second Gulf war generated the vast decline in American popularity
in Turkey.
The two wars produced a nightmare for Turkey--the possibly huge impact
on Kurdish nationalism and Turkey's own Kurds from the growth of a
self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq and the possibility it
could become independent if Iraq descended into chaos. This has been
a fear of every Turkish government since the allies established a safe
haven area in Iraq for Kurds after the first Gulf War. Turkey's worse
fears seemed to come true after Saddam's fall and the inability to
create an effective Iraq government. For seven years the Turks made
believe Iraqi Kurdistan did not exist except for trade, but over the
past year they changed course and developed a serious relationship. To
a great extent that came from the realization that the Americans were
leaving Iraq and Turkey would be better served by a good relationship
with the Kurds in helping preserve Iraq's unity. The U.S. works
closely with Turkey to preserve Iraq's unity.
It is Turkey's greater involvement in the rest of the Middle East that
has caused the biggest unhappiness here. Ankara has mounted a sustained
and vigorous effort to improve relations with its neighbors (usually
described as "zero problems" with neighbors) and, importantly, deepen
economic ties with all Arab countries, the latter a focus of the Prime
Minister's personal efforts. They built on Turkey's Muslim character
to help advance relations with often unfriendly neighbors. Turkey has
especially deepened economic and political relations with Assad's
Syria, including a free visa regime, and tried but failed to carry
on indirect peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. The U.S.,
it might be noted, this past week in a far smaller but similar vein
sent an ambassador back to Syria after five years and eliminated some
trade sanctions against Syria. Throughout the Arab world Turkish leader
have showed the flag and encouraged Arab investment in Turkey. They
are having some success in reversing the Arabs' historical animosity
to the Turks.
The most troublesome issue, as American skeptics point out, is Iran,
a state rarely trusted by Turks. Living next to a powerful neighbor
and historical antagonist but interested in trade and investment
Turkey has recently developed a different perspective than the U.S.,
and the Obama administration has not discouraged Ankara from pursuing
it, Turkey certainly does not want Iran to acquire nukes, which would
raise major security concerns. However, in pursuing better relations it
has apparently accepted Iran's denial that it seeks a nuclear weapons
capability, and even sort of out loud allowed for Iran to have such
a weapon since Israel has one. Recently, top Turkish leaders have
pursued a mediating role between Iran and the West and they assert
that Iran wants to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations..
Turkey is presently a Security Council member and will have to vote
on any sanctions measure. It is quite possible depending on its nature
that Turkey will abstain on any UN resolutions for sanctions on Iran.
In short trouble looms ahead between us. Iran is clearly a case of
conflicting interests and different perceptions. I tend to believe,
hopefully wrongly, that Iran is using Turkey to muddy the waters and
perpetuate nuclear negotiations.
The issue that has inflamed many conservatives and Turkey's strong
supporters in the American Jewish community has been its handling of
Israel. While Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel,
relations were not close and there has been little public support of
Israel in Turkey. In the nineties Turkish-Israeli relations expanded
in all fieldsdefense and intelligence, economics, tourism and others--
led in great part by the military, who then saw Syria and Iran as the
threats to Turkey, but that did not change popular perspectives. The
relationship has been diminishing with Turkish activism in the
Middle East under the AKP.. Acrimony took over last year with the
Prime Minister's rage over Israel's invasion of Gaza, Mr. Erdogan's
continuing public denunciations and the sudden disinviting of Israel
to a military exercise were popular in Turkey, fanned anti -Israel
sentiments and generated considerable expressions of anti-Semitism.
Israel was dismayed by the loss of support of its main Muslim
friend and there were some harsh reactions. However, Israel quickly
recognized the importance of its relations with Turkey and sought to
limit damage. Turkish tempers also have cooled. We are not likely to
see relations return to the level of the nineties, but both countries
pragmatically want to sustain the present level of economic and
diplomatic relations. Unhappiness with Israel over Gaza, however,
could explode again.
One aspect of Turkish behavior on these issues raises questions
of hypocrisy and could hurt Turkey's standing in the West. While
characterizing Israel behavior in Gaza as genocide, Mr. Erdogan has
publicly embraced Sudanese leader Bashir, an indicted war criminal,
and denied mass atrocities in Darfur, stating Muslims don't commit
genocide. Nor has his quick embrace of the Iranian elections and his
silence over the subsequent crackdown won him admiration in the West.
Erdogan is no proponent of democracy and human right in his
diplomacy and that is duly noted. On the other hand he seeks to be an
intermediary between Iran and the West and does not want to endanger
that effort.
Lastly and briefly is Russia where eyebrows have also been raised
here. Turkey's relations with Russia are of course different than
during the cold war. Turkey has no love for Putin's Russia and
remains a dedicated NATO member. But today economics rules: the
major development in Turkish-Russian relations has been the enormous
dependence on Russia for energy. That has made Russia Turkey's major
trading partner, far exceeding Turkey's trade with the U.S. In its
efforts to become an energy hub, Turkey tries to satisfy both Russia
and its Western partners by seeking pipelines that use Russian energy
but also helping develop ones not involving Russian participation.
Turkey has also been circumspect in its political relations with
Russia. It was no champion of Georgia and was cautious about Ukranian
membership in NATO, not the only country in NATO to show caution,
The bottom line: Turkey has redefined its interests and with the
exception of Iran much of it makes sense. Why should Turkey stay the
same when their world is changing and not pursue changing interests?
Looking ahead, I think our relations will remain close. Certainly the
US wants to work together with a rising Turkey and so does Turkey. But
the next few years can also be difficult. US-Turkey relations will be
tested in Iraq and whether it stays together. Profound Iraqi internal
problems must be overcome and the end is not apparent. The manner
of our leaving Iraq will be critical to Turkey. Iran may test our
relations even sooner.
The most immediate problem, however, is the Armenian genocide issue. A
resolution invariably comes up in Congress in March declaring
the killings of vast numbers of Armenians in 1915 a genocide. The
Turkish government has bitterly resented this and has fought hard and
successfully over many hears to prevent a resolution passing. Its
passage in even one house, every Turkish government has declared,
would enormously harm relations. It is not clear what the Turkish
government will actually do. The executive branch has always fought
the resolution on national security grounds. Congress is likely to
pass it this year if the President does not get involved; he himself
during the 2008 campaign declared the events of 1915 a genocide. The
administration had strongly worked for reconciliation protocols between
Armenia and Turkey to open the border and establish relations, in part
with the expectation that would put off any genocide resolution. Bu
Parliamentary approval in Turkey has stalled and that hope now appears
dim before the resolution comes up in the Congress.
Recent comments by Secretary Clinton indicate that the administration
will resist the resolution on grounds that it will interfere with
the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey
Let me close with some personal reflections on bilateral relations.
Both countries' leadership incessantly talk of our close relations,
our common values, and our shared views, and they like to use the
term "strategic relationship" to demonstrate the importance of our
relations. Indeed there is much truth to that despite huge hiccups
like Iraq. Turkey has been a real concern of the executive branch,
which has worked hard to maintain strong ties and to facilitate
Turkey's entrance into Europe. Turks also wants close relations. They
are important politically even if most Turks dislike the U.S. A
deterioration in relations with Washington would give any Turkish
government domestic political headaches.
The fact, however, is that our relationship remains close but its
substance changing. The end of the Soviet Union has reduced Turkey's
dependence on the U.S. for security and military ties--Iraq hardly
constitutes a Soviet threat. Turkey still relies on the U.S. for
defense modernization but it is broadening its sources of arms. Nor
does the present American economic situation inspire the respect of
yore. Turkey's increasing independence is reflected in the active
diplomacy already described, where Turkey pursues its own interests,
sometimes with political movements like Hamas or countries we dislike.
The U.S. has begun to recognize that change, notably with the arrival
of Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and is adjusting to it--there has been
no serious division yet, although Iran is creeping close to it.
Washington encourages Ankara where its activities are helpful and
tries to mitigate differences.
The atmosphere has also been strained for another reason: the huge
Anti-Americanism in Turkey generated by the second Iraq war. According
to recent polls attitudes toward the U.S. have been mired in the mid
teens, the lowest for any American ally and most other nations. Not
even the end of the Bush administration or Mr. Obama's early visit
to Turkey has changed that much. Public attitudes do not override
national interests, but bad ones are not a good sustainable basis for
relations. The Turkish government has shown little interest in trying
to change public attitudes for an understandable reason--it would
not be politically popular. Further the economic underpinnings of
our relations are weak and by and large that can not be changed much
by governments in private enterprise countries, Both governments have
their work carved out and hopefully they will step up to it. Turkey has
a bright future, if it maintains internal stability and continues rapid
growth. The growing democracy of an overwhelmingly Muslim country,
one which can join the EU, is a fundamental benefit to all.
Turkey's success will contribute to American interests and to world
stability.
Indeed the most crucial issues are very difficult internal ones,
whether Turkey overcomes the polarization that now grips the country,
allowing it to proceed with fundamental reforms and resume its rapid
rate of growth. That will be crucial to determine whether Turkey
becomes part of the EU, a major member of the West, and a far more
influential player internationally.