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  • Some Western Perceptions Of Turkey

    SOME WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY
    Morton Abramowitz

    Century Foundation
    http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&amp ;pubid=2584
    March 2 2010

    Remarks February 25, 2010 at joint meeting of Istanbul Center of
    Atlanta and Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, George Tech

    I am always pleased to talk Turkey. It was a great diplomatic
    assignment and the country endlessly fascinates me. There is always
    something going on, Indeed sometimes I think Turkey changes by the
    day. I have tried hard to keep up with developments there including
    visiting almost every year, when I find someone to pay my way.

    Turkey has taken off since the end of the cold war: profound economic
    and social change and major strides in making the country more
    democratic. Nevertheless, it still has a long way to go to meet EU
    accession requirements. A good bit of Turkey remains third world. I
    have always believed, however simplistic, that as long as Turkey grows
    5-6 percent a year it will get into the EU by the end of this decade.

    Unfortunately, given Europe's reticence and Turkey's development,
    I think Turks increasingly wonder whether they really want to join
    the EU.

    The country is far more vibrant and open, and public discussion
    is light years ahead of my time in Ankara twenty years ago. Some
    subjects such as the question of Armenian genocide in World War I
    and Kurds remain touchy issues, but they are openly discussed now
    and in the case of Turkey's Kurds there is serious consideration of
    policy changes. Remarkably, the military, still the most respected
    institution in Turkey and the generator of four coups, is being
    seriously criticized, and many retired offices this past year have
    been arrested or questioned over plotting against the government. A
    small newspaper--Taraf-- repeatedly publishes the military's intimate
    secrets and gets away with it. Its editors would have been imprisoned
    for life a decade ago.

    Indeed this week produced even greater tensions. The government seems
    to be pushing the military against the wall by brining into custody
    some fifty retired officers but some of them remarkably former top
    commanders. This is a unique situation and all sorts of rumors are
    flying around like the top brass resigning en masse in reaction. The
    highest civilian and military officials have been urgently meeting
    in apparent efforts to contain the storm, raising questions whether
    the problem is justice or politics. From here it is unclear where
    all this is going, but it appears to be an extraordinary moment in
    modern Turkish history,

    In talking about Turkey today I will do it by responding to some
    current American discussion of Turkey and our bilateral relations
    and give you my take on that discussion.

    Even though Turkey is a long time ally, there is a growing perception,
    particularly among our conservative cognoscenti, that domestically
    the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is out to destroy
    the power of the military and make Turkey not an Islamic state but a
    more conservative, religiously oriented state with much greater public
    manifestations of Islam. Some fear more extreme internal religious
    developments and a very authoritarian government emerging if the
    military is completely defanged as the guardian of Turkish secularism.

    I can imagine what they are saying today. Many holding this view
    believe that on foreign policy the AKP is detaching Turkey from its
    Western moorings and focusing more on ties to the Muslim Middle East
    and Russia and showing less interest in joining the EU and maintaining
    close ties to the U.S.

    For the moment let me say briefly that while the AKP government, of
    course, has made changes in domestic and foreign policy that might
    lend support to those views, such basic judgments are, I believe,
    over done, and their concerns simply do not take into account the
    complexity of Turkey and its rapid development. I will focus on
    foreign policy, but a few more comments first on the domestic dimension

    The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is due to the
    failure of Turkey's main stream parties but more fundamentally to
    Turkey's structural changes: the growth of the economy, an enlarged
    non-Istanbul entrepreneurship, and the vast movement of poorer, more
    devout people from country to city. The AKP, which rose out of an older
    fundamentalist party, has given voice to these demographic elements
    that rarely had one, and in doing so has done much to make Turkey an
    open, more vibrant and democratic country. They have severely reduced
    the ability of the military, their main political enemy, to intervene
    in politics through coups. This ongoing effort, however, has polarized
    the country, particularly those who believe the army is essential to
    preserving Turkey's traditional secularism and providing balance in a
    conflicted society. The events this week will deepen the polarization,
    as the government and military seemingly scramble to contain it. AKP
    has gone far because it is a majority party, accelerating change,
    and intent on making Turkey a greater economic and political player
    in the world.

    While surviving efforts so far by the military and the judiciary
    to bring the government down, the AKP's dynamism has diminished the
    past two years, partly because of world recession but also because
    they have talked much but accomplished little on promised and most
    difficult fundamental reforms like a new constitution to replace
    the authoritarian military-bestowed constitution and real measures
    to deal with its Kurds. Rather they have pulled back, fearing the
    political fallout of their controversial reform efforts.

    One last point. Life changes. So do politics in Turkey, however
    ineffective Turkey's opposition parties have been. Yes, PM Erdogan
    dominates the scene like a colossus, he is an extraordinary dynamic
    politician, but he is also viewed as increasingly authoritarian and
    destructive of a free media, polemical, and prone to risk-taking
    including now his defense establishment. The AKP's political position
    remains strong, but its popularity is diminishing. Conceivably this
    week's event could spur Mr. Erdogan to early parliamentary elections,
    although he has denied it. Should he wait till the present parliament's
    time is up economics will likely play a bigger part in determining the
    outcome of the next elections. The free ride opposition parties have
    given AKP, particularly on economic matters, is likely to end. The
    country is increasingly at war with itself and the public tone is
    acrimonious. Dominant as they now are, the AKP could well continue
    its drift downward, setting the stage for an election producing a
    coalition government. Political life in Turkey can turn fickle--not
    unlike what we see in the US today.

    Foreign policy under the AKP is vastly different and very lively,
    a far cry from the stagnancy of the cold war. Both Erdogan and his
    Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, are enormously active, incessantly
    travelling, and trying to convey to the Turkish public and the world
    Turkey's new dynamism and importance. Turkish involvement and influence
    extends far these days--NATO, and over the last decade to the Caucasus,
    the Middle East, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan. Ankara's ambitions
    are limited by Turkey's internal weaknesses. But it remains the
    strongest power in the area.

    Let me briefly discuss a few specifics of that diplomatic revolution
    that have caused heartburn here. They are in the Middle East Iran,
    Syria, and Israel, and in Russia. On the issue currently most
    important to both countriesIraqTurkey has made radical changes in
    policy helpful to our interests. Somehow that development seems to
    get little attention from conservatives, who remain still deeply
    interested in Iraq. So let me start with Iraq, which since the first
    Gulf War has been the most acrimonious issue in US-Turkey relations.

    The second Gulf war generated the vast decline in American popularity
    in Turkey.

    The two wars produced a nightmare for Turkey--the possibly huge impact
    on Kurdish nationalism and Turkey's own Kurds from the growth of a
    self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq and the possibility it
    could become independent if Iraq descended into chaos. This has been
    a fear of every Turkish government since the allies established a safe
    haven area in Iraq for Kurds after the first Gulf War. Turkey's worse
    fears seemed to come true after Saddam's fall and the inability to
    create an effective Iraq government. For seven years the Turks made
    believe Iraqi Kurdistan did not exist except for trade, but over the
    past year they changed course and developed a serious relationship. To
    a great extent that came from the realization that the Americans were
    leaving Iraq and Turkey would be better served by a good relationship
    with the Kurds in helping preserve Iraq's unity. The U.S. works
    closely with Turkey to preserve Iraq's unity.

    It is Turkey's greater involvement in the rest of the Middle East that
    has caused the biggest unhappiness here. Ankara has mounted a sustained
    and vigorous effort to improve relations with its neighbors (usually
    described as "zero problems" with neighbors) and, importantly, deepen
    economic ties with all Arab countries, the latter a focus of the Prime
    Minister's personal efforts. They built on Turkey's Muslim character
    to help advance relations with often unfriendly neighbors. Turkey has
    especially deepened economic and political relations with Assad's
    Syria, including a free visa regime, and tried but failed to carry
    on indirect peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. The U.S.,
    it might be noted, this past week in a far smaller but similar vein
    sent an ambassador back to Syria after five years and eliminated some
    trade sanctions against Syria. Throughout the Arab world Turkish leader
    have showed the flag and encouraged Arab investment in Turkey. They
    are having some success in reversing the Arabs' historical animosity
    to the Turks.

    The most troublesome issue, as American skeptics point out, is Iran,
    a state rarely trusted by Turks. Living next to a powerful neighbor
    and historical antagonist but interested in trade and investment
    Turkey has recently developed a different perspective than the U.S.,
    and the Obama administration has not discouraged Ankara from pursuing
    it, Turkey certainly does not want Iran to acquire nukes, which would
    raise major security concerns. However, in pursuing better relations it
    has apparently accepted Iran's denial that it seeks a nuclear weapons
    capability, and even sort of out loud allowed for Iran to have such
    a weapon since Israel has one. Recently, top Turkish leaders have
    pursued a mediating role between Iran and the West and they assert
    that Iran wants to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations..

    Turkey is presently a Security Council member and will have to vote
    on any sanctions measure. It is quite possible depending on its nature
    that Turkey will abstain on any UN resolutions for sanctions on Iran.

    In short trouble looms ahead between us. Iran is clearly a case of
    conflicting interests and different perceptions. I tend to believe,
    hopefully wrongly, that Iran is using Turkey to muddy the waters and
    perpetuate nuclear negotiations.

    The issue that has inflamed many conservatives and Turkey's strong
    supporters in the American Jewish community has been its handling of
    Israel. While Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel,
    relations were not close and there has been little public support of
    Israel in Turkey. In the nineties Turkish-Israeli relations expanded
    in all fieldsdefense and intelligence, economics, tourism and others--
    led in great part by the military, who then saw Syria and Iran as the
    threats to Turkey, but that did not change popular perspectives. The
    relationship has been diminishing with Turkish activism in the
    Middle East under the AKP.. Acrimony took over last year with the
    Prime Minister's rage over Israel's invasion of Gaza, Mr. Erdogan's
    continuing public denunciations and the sudden disinviting of Israel
    to a military exercise were popular in Turkey, fanned anti -Israel
    sentiments and generated considerable expressions of anti-Semitism.

    Israel was dismayed by the loss of support of its main Muslim
    friend and there were some harsh reactions. However, Israel quickly
    recognized the importance of its relations with Turkey and sought to
    limit damage. Turkish tempers also have cooled. We are not likely to
    see relations return to the level of the nineties, but both countries
    pragmatically want to sustain the present level of economic and
    diplomatic relations. Unhappiness with Israel over Gaza, however,
    could explode again.

    One aspect of Turkish behavior on these issues raises questions
    of hypocrisy and could hurt Turkey's standing in the West. While
    characterizing Israel behavior in Gaza as genocide, Mr. Erdogan has
    publicly embraced Sudanese leader Bashir, an indicted war criminal,
    and denied mass atrocities in Darfur, stating Muslims don't commit
    genocide. Nor has his quick embrace of the Iranian elections and his
    silence over the subsequent crackdown won him admiration in the West.

    Erdogan is no proponent of democracy and human right in his
    diplomacy and that is duly noted. On the other hand he seeks to be an
    intermediary between Iran and the West and does not want to endanger
    that effort.

    Lastly and briefly is Russia where eyebrows have also been raised
    here. Turkey's relations with Russia are of course different than
    during the cold war. Turkey has no love for Putin's Russia and
    remains a dedicated NATO member. But today economics rules: the
    major development in Turkish-Russian relations has been the enormous
    dependence on Russia for energy. That has made Russia Turkey's major
    trading partner, far exceeding Turkey's trade with the U.S. In its
    efforts to become an energy hub, Turkey tries to satisfy both Russia
    and its Western partners by seeking pipelines that use Russian energy
    but also helping develop ones not involving Russian participation.

    Turkey has also been circumspect in its political relations with
    Russia. It was no champion of Georgia and was cautious about Ukranian
    membership in NATO, not the only country in NATO to show caution,

    The bottom line: Turkey has redefined its interests and with the
    exception of Iran much of it makes sense. Why should Turkey stay the
    same when their world is changing and not pursue changing interests?

    Looking ahead, I think our relations will remain close. Certainly the
    US wants to work together with a rising Turkey and so does Turkey. But
    the next few years can also be difficult. US-Turkey relations will be
    tested in Iraq and whether it stays together. Profound Iraqi internal
    problems must be overcome and the end is not apparent. The manner
    of our leaving Iraq will be critical to Turkey. Iran may test our
    relations even sooner.

    The most immediate problem, however, is the Armenian genocide issue. A
    resolution invariably comes up in Congress in March declaring
    the killings of vast numbers of Armenians in 1915 a genocide. The
    Turkish government has bitterly resented this and has fought hard and
    successfully over many hears to prevent a resolution passing. Its
    passage in even one house, every Turkish government has declared,
    would enormously harm relations. It is not clear what the Turkish
    government will actually do. The executive branch has always fought
    the resolution on national security grounds. Congress is likely to
    pass it this year if the President does not get involved; he himself
    during the 2008 campaign declared the events of 1915 a genocide. The
    administration had strongly worked for reconciliation protocols between
    Armenia and Turkey to open the border and establish relations, in part
    with the expectation that would put off any genocide resolution. Bu
    Parliamentary approval in Turkey has stalled and that hope now appears
    dim before the resolution comes up in the Congress.

    Recent comments by Secretary Clinton indicate that the administration
    will resist the resolution on grounds that it will interfere with
    the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey

    Let me close with some personal reflections on bilateral relations.

    Both countries' leadership incessantly talk of our close relations,
    our common values, and our shared views, and they like to use the
    term "strategic relationship" to demonstrate the importance of our
    relations. Indeed there is much truth to that despite huge hiccups
    like Iraq. Turkey has been a real concern of the executive branch,
    which has worked hard to maintain strong ties and to facilitate
    Turkey's entrance into Europe. Turks also wants close relations. They
    are important politically even if most Turks dislike the U.S. A
    deterioration in relations with Washington would give any Turkish
    government domestic political headaches.

    The fact, however, is that our relationship remains close but its
    substance changing. The end of the Soviet Union has reduced Turkey's
    dependence on the U.S. for security and military ties--Iraq hardly
    constitutes a Soviet threat. Turkey still relies on the U.S. for
    defense modernization but it is broadening its sources of arms. Nor
    does the present American economic situation inspire the respect of
    yore. Turkey's increasing independence is reflected in the active
    diplomacy already described, where Turkey pursues its own interests,
    sometimes with political movements like Hamas or countries we dislike.

    The U.S. has begun to recognize that change, notably with the arrival
    of Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and is adjusting to it--there has been
    no serious division yet, although Iran is creeping close to it.

    Washington encourages Ankara where its activities are helpful and
    tries to mitigate differences.

    The atmosphere has also been strained for another reason: the huge
    Anti-Americanism in Turkey generated by the second Iraq war. According
    to recent polls attitudes toward the U.S. have been mired in the mid
    teens, the lowest for any American ally and most other nations. Not
    even the end of the Bush administration or Mr. Obama's early visit
    to Turkey has changed that much. Public attitudes do not override
    national interests, but bad ones are not a good sustainable basis for
    relations. The Turkish government has shown little interest in trying
    to change public attitudes for an understandable reason--it would
    not be politically popular. Further the economic underpinnings of
    our relations are weak and by and large that can not be changed much
    by governments in private enterprise countries, Both governments have
    their work carved out and hopefully they will step up to it. Turkey has
    a bright future, if it maintains internal stability and continues rapid
    growth. The growing democracy of an overwhelmingly Muslim country,
    one which can join the EU, is a fundamental benefit to all.

    Turkey's success will contribute to American interests and to world
    stability.

    Indeed the most crucial issues are very difficult internal ones,
    whether Turkey overcomes the polarization that now grips the country,
    allowing it to proceed with fundamental reforms and resume its rapid
    rate of growth. That will be crucial to determine whether Turkey
    becomes part of the EU, a major member of the West, and a far more
    influential player internationally.
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