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MILITARY SOLUTION TO KARABAKH UNREALISTIC - FINNISH ANALYST
news.az
March 2 2010
Azerbaijan
Mikko Palonkorpi News.Az interviews Mikko Palonkorpi, a researcher at
the Graduate School for Russian and East European Studies, University
of Helsinki.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said before the November meeting
with his Armenian counterpart that if the Munich negotiations failed,
Azerbaijan would start a war to liberate the occupied lands. Do you
think the military scenario is a realistic way to resolve the conflict?
In my opinion, settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by
resorting to military force is unrealistic. This policy involves
serious military, political and economic risks that are very difficult
to calculate beforehand. All the unpredictable factors simply cannot
be simulated in war games and the outcome of a new war would be far
from certain.
>>From the military point of view, there are no guarantees that an
Azerbaijani military initiative would be successful or victorious,
especially since the Armenians have dug themselves into strong
defensive positions. Therefore, in order to succeed Azerbaijan
would need substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority in
troops and armaments and I don't see evidence of that yet. Moreover,
if the Azerbaijani side were to suffer substantial losses without
recapturing much territory, what would be the domestic political
backlash in Azerbaijan? Or what if the Armenians were able to capture
more territory as a result of renewed fighting?
One of the lessons to be learned from the Russo-Georgian war is that
Russia is not a passive bystander in attempts to change the status
quo in the South Caucasus by military means, especially if its
perceived vital interests in the region or those of its key allies
are threatened.
In the worst case scenario, fighting could seriously threaten
Azerbaijan's oil and gas exports via the South Caucasus energy corridor
and as a consequence threaten the backbone of the republics economy. At
the very least a new war would negatively affect investor confidence
in Azerbaijan (and Armenia) and hamper efforts to develop the South
Caucasus energy corridor including the Nabucco project.
Furthermore, if Azerbaijan were the initiator of a new war, this would
harm Azerbaijan's international image and reputation more broadly.
Just consider how much effort both Russia and Georgia took to prove
the other side guilty of starting the August conflict.
Even if an Azerbaijani offensive were successful in retaking the lost
territories in and around Karabakh, it would not completely solve
the political problem or the root cause of the conflict. It would
turn fortunes around for Azerbaijan for sure, but leave Armenia and
Karabakh Armenians preparing for another rematch.
What action would the United States and Russia take if Azerbaijan
initiated war to liberate its land?
First of all, it is hard to see how a new war in Karabakh could be
in the interests of either Russia or the United States. It is also
very difficult to predict the exact course of action they would take
in such an eventuality, so the answer to this question is highly
speculative. Naturally, the US and Russian response would depend
on actions taken by the other actors, in particular the regional
states: Turkey, Iran and Georgia. The US would not only observe
closely Russian reaction to the conflict, but also Iranian reaction,
fearing that Iran could use the war as an opportunity to increase
its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus region.
For the United States a new war in Karabakh and the proper response
to it, would be almost as problematic as the Russo-Georgian conflict
was, albeit for somewhat different reasons. It is highly unlikely
that the United States would intervene militarily in such a conflict,
not only because of it's military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan
and its key role in the relief operation in Haiti, but mainly because
of the fear that Russia could also be drawn into the conflict. The
only possible exception would be a multinational peace-keeping or
peace-enforcing force that would have a clear UN mandate combined
with Russian approval and support.
Moreover, it would be very difficult for the United States to choose
sides in such a conflict, regardless of Azerbaijan being seen as
an initiator of the war. The US would opt for neutrality as long as
possible and would use intensive diplomatic pressure on both Armenia
and Azerbaijan to bring about a ceasefire and end to hostilities. The
US would likely attempt to persuade Turkey to use its influence on
Azerbaijan, but the leverage of both the US and Turkey on Azerbaijan
is limited, despite interdependencies between Turkey and Azerbaijan
in energy transit, etc. The US administration itself would be under
strong pressure from both Armenia and the Armenian diaspora lobby in
the US to pass a UN Security Council resolution which would condemn
the Azeri actions.
Certainly the US reaction would also depend on the scale of the war
and in particular the number of civilian casualties and refugees
involved. I think the United States would try to restrain both sides
from escalating the conflict beyond Karabakh and the other regions
of Azerbaijan currently under Armenian control and ensure that the
energy export infrastructure of Azerbaijan were not targeted by the
Armenian forces.
What do you think of Azerbaijan's military potential at present? Is
Armenia able to hold an arms race with Azerbaijan without Russia's
military support and intervention?
Azerbaijan's military potential has certainly been boosted by
increased spending on the country's defence budget over the last
five years or so. As a result Azerbaijan is acquiring new and more
sophisticated weapons systems, has launched new initiatives for
domestic manufacturing of military equipment and ammunition and is
also negotiating with multiple foreign partners on joint ventures
in the military-industrial sector. However, these are all assets
for Azerbaijan's future military potential and power, since it
takes a while to train military personnel to operate new weapons
systems effectively and it would take a long time to acquire enough
state-of-the-art armaments to tilt the military balance of power
decisively in Azerbaijan's favour, especially considering that Armenia
has also updated its destructive capacity over the years.
By focusing only on the military budget figures, it appears that the
on-going arms race between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a process which
the latter can ill afford. For this year (2010) Armenia has budgeted
360 million dollars for defence expenditure, compared to Azerbaijan's
1.5 billion dollar military budget. Moreover, even though Azerbaijan's
defence budget is more than four times the size of Armenia's in
absolute terms, the relative burden of defence spending as a share
of the overall budget expenditure is still smaller for Azerbaijan
(10-11%) than for Armenia (15%).
However, one has to bear in mind, that stockpiles of Russian military
hardware and equipment were held at Russian military bases in Armenia
from the mid-90's onwards and just a few years ago (2007) in line with
the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Treaty commitments, Russia withdrew its troops
from the base(s) in Georgia proper (Akhalkalaki) and a significant
portion of the arms and equipment were transferred to its military
base in Gyumri.
In brief, since it is not exclusively a bilateral arms race between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as Russian military and other support for
Armenia plays an essential role in the equation, Azerbaijan is
faced with a difficult "dilemma". Any hike in oil and gas prices
will increase the oil and gas windfall received by Azerbaijan, which
among other things enables Azerbaijan to allocate more resources to
the military budget. But the same holds true for Armenia's key ally
Russia, which as a consequence of increase in energy export revenues,
can deliver more military support to Armenia, if it so chooses.
Therefore, Russian support is extremely important for Armenia,
especially considering the serious impact of global economic crises
on the Armenian economy.
Regarding the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the key
question that should be asked is: what are the prospects for
achieving a tangible "victory" in this arms race? Is there a real
chance of the type of victory gained by US President Ronald Reagan
when he challenged the Soviet Union into a space arms race with his
Star Wars project? Or is this arms race creating new security dilemmas
and heightening tensions in the already volatile South Caucasus region
and resulting in a lose-lose pattern where both sides waste resources
that are urgently needed in other sectors of society?
news.az
March 2 2010
Azerbaijan
Mikko Palonkorpi News.Az interviews Mikko Palonkorpi, a researcher at
the Graduate School for Russian and East European Studies, University
of Helsinki.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said before the November meeting
with his Armenian counterpart that if the Munich negotiations failed,
Azerbaijan would start a war to liberate the occupied lands. Do you
think the military scenario is a realistic way to resolve the conflict?
In my opinion, settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by
resorting to military force is unrealistic. This policy involves
serious military, political and economic risks that are very difficult
to calculate beforehand. All the unpredictable factors simply cannot
be simulated in war games and the outcome of a new war would be far
from certain.
>>From the military point of view, there are no guarantees that an
Azerbaijani military initiative would be successful or victorious,
especially since the Armenians have dug themselves into strong
defensive positions. Therefore, in order to succeed Azerbaijan
would need substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority in
troops and armaments and I don't see evidence of that yet. Moreover,
if the Azerbaijani side were to suffer substantial losses without
recapturing much territory, what would be the domestic political
backlash in Azerbaijan? Or what if the Armenians were able to capture
more territory as a result of renewed fighting?
One of the lessons to be learned from the Russo-Georgian war is that
Russia is not a passive bystander in attempts to change the status
quo in the South Caucasus by military means, especially if its
perceived vital interests in the region or those of its key allies
are threatened.
In the worst case scenario, fighting could seriously threaten
Azerbaijan's oil and gas exports via the South Caucasus energy corridor
and as a consequence threaten the backbone of the republics economy. At
the very least a new war would negatively affect investor confidence
in Azerbaijan (and Armenia) and hamper efforts to develop the South
Caucasus energy corridor including the Nabucco project.
Furthermore, if Azerbaijan were the initiator of a new war, this would
harm Azerbaijan's international image and reputation more broadly.
Just consider how much effort both Russia and Georgia took to prove
the other side guilty of starting the August conflict.
Even if an Azerbaijani offensive were successful in retaking the lost
territories in and around Karabakh, it would not completely solve
the political problem or the root cause of the conflict. It would
turn fortunes around for Azerbaijan for sure, but leave Armenia and
Karabakh Armenians preparing for another rematch.
What action would the United States and Russia take if Azerbaijan
initiated war to liberate its land?
First of all, it is hard to see how a new war in Karabakh could be
in the interests of either Russia or the United States. It is also
very difficult to predict the exact course of action they would take
in such an eventuality, so the answer to this question is highly
speculative. Naturally, the US and Russian response would depend
on actions taken by the other actors, in particular the regional
states: Turkey, Iran and Georgia. The US would not only observe
closely Russian reaction to the conflict, but also Iranian reaction,
fearing that Iran could use the war as an opportunity to increase
its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus region.
For the United States a new war in Karabakh and the proper response
to it, would be almost as problematic as the Russo-Georgian conflict
was, albeit for somewhat different reasons. It is highly unlikely
that the United States would intervene militarily in such a conflict,
not only because of it's military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan
and its key role in the relief operation in Haiti, but mainly because
of the fear that Russia could also be drawn into the conflict. The
only possible exception would be a multinational peace-keeping or
peace-enforcing force that would have a clear UN mandate combined
with Russian approval and support.
Moreover, it would be very difficult for the United States to choose
sides in such a conflict, regardless of Azerbaijan being seen as
an initiator of the war. The US would opt for neutrality as long as
possible and would use intensive diplomatic pressure on both Armenia
and Azerbaijan to bring about a ceasefire and end to hostilities. The
US would likely attempt to persuade Turkey to use its influence on
Azerbaijan, but the leverage of both the US and Turkey on Azerbaijan
is limited, despite interdependencies between Turkey and Azerbaijan
in energy transit, etc. The US administration itself would be under
strong pressure from both Armenia and the Armenian diaspora lobby in
the US to pass a UN Security Council resolution which would condemn
the Azeri actions.
Certainly the US reaction would also depend on the scale of the war
and in particular the number of civilian casualties and refugees
involved. I think the United States would try to restrain both sides
from escalating the conflict beyond Karabakh and the other regions
of Azerbaijan currently under Armenian control and ensure that the
energy export infrastructure of Azerbaijan were not targeted by the
Armenian forces.
What do you think of Azerbaijan's military potential at present? Is
Armenia able to hold an arms race with Azerbaijan without Russia's
military support and intervention?
Azerbaijan's military potential has certainly been boosted by
increased spending on the country's defence budget over the last
five years or so. As a result Azerbaijan is acquiring new and more
sophisticated weapons systems, has launched new initiatives for
domestic manufacturing of military equipment and ammunition and is
also negotiating with multiple foreign partners on joint ventures
in the military-industrial sector. However, these are all assets
for Azerbaijan's future military potential and power, since it
takes a while to train military personnel to operate new weapons
systems effectively and it would take a long time to acquire enough
state-of-the-art armaments to tilt the military balance of power
decisively in Azerbaijan's favour, especially considering that Armenia
has also updated its destructive capacity over the years.
By focusing only on the military budget figures, it appears that the
on-going arms race between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a process which
the latter can ill afford. For this year (2010) Armenia has budgeted
360 million dollars for defence expenditure, compared to Azerbaijan's
1.5 billion dollar military budget. Moreover, even though Azerbaijan's
defence budget is more than four times the size of Armenia's in
absolute terms, the relative burden of defence spending as a share
of the overall budget expenditure is still smaller for Azerbaijan
(10-11%) than for Armenia (15%).
However, one has to bear in mind, that stockpiles of Russian military
hardware and equipment were held at Russian military bases in Armenia
from the mid-90's onwards and just a few years ago (2007) in line with
the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Treaty commitments, Russia withdrew its troops
from the base(s) in Georgia proper (Akhalkalaki) and a significant
portion of the arms and equipment were transferred to its military
base in Gyumri.
In brief, since it is not exclusively a bilateral arms race between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as Russian military and other support for
Armenia plays an essential role in the equation, Azerbaijan is
faced with a difficult "dilemma". Any hike in oil and gas prices
will increase the oil and gas windfall received by Azerbaijan, which
among other things enables Azerbaijan to allocate more resources to
the military budget. But the same holds true for Armenia's key ally
Russia, which as a consequence of increase in energy export revenues,
can deliver more military support to Armenia, if it so chooses.
Therefore, Russian support is extremely important for Armenia,
especially considering the serious impact of global economic crises
on the Armenian economy.
Regarding the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the key
question that should be asked is: what are the prospects for
achieving a tangible "victory" in this arms race? Is there a real
chance of the type of victory gained by US President Ronald Reagan
when he challenged the Soviet Union into a space arms race with his
Star Wars project? Or is this arms race creating new security dilemmas
and heightening tensions in the already volatile South Caucasus region
and resulting in a lose-lose pattern where both sides waste resources
that are urgently needed in other sectors of society?