Tweet
PRESS RELEASE
The Civilitas Foundation
One Northern Ave. Suite 30
Yerevan, Armenia
Telephones: +37494.800754; +37410.500119
email: [email protected]
web: www.civilitasfoundation.org
This article was published by the Project Syndicate, which includes
430 newspapers in 150 countries.
A RESET IN THE CAUCASUS
By Vartan Oskanian
YEREVAN - Will Turkey's current turmoil between Prime Minister Recep
Tayip ErdoÄ?an and the country's powerful army complicate and delay the
country's boldest initiatives in years ` the moves to address
decades-old tensions with both Armenians and Kurds?
Restructuring the role of Turkey's army is vital, but if Turkey cannot
follow through with the Armenian and Kurdish openings, the country's
own domestic situation, its relations with the two peoples, as well as
tensions in the Caucasus, will undoubtedly worsen. Of the several
flashpoints in the region, including that between Georgia and Russia
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the tension between Armenians and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the most challenging.
As to Georgia and Russia, the disproportionate size, weight, and power
on one side are enough to deter any return to violence. Moreover,
there are no entangling alliances complicating the matter. Georgia is
not a NATO member, and the United States, it is clear, will not go to
war with Russia over Georgia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle is more precarious. It is no longer
a two-way tug-of-war between two small post-Soviet republics, but part
of an Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle. This triangle is the direct
consequence of the process of normalization between Armenia and
Turkey, which began when both countries' presidents met at a football
game.
That process now hinges on protocols for establishing diplomatic
relations that have been signed by both governments but unratified by
either parliament. Completing the process depends directly and
indirectly on how Armenians and Azerbaijan work to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This snarled three-way dispute, if not carefully untangled, holds many
dangers. Turkey, which for nearly two decades has proclaimed its
support for Azerbaijan, publicly conditioned rapprochement with
Armenia on Armenian concessions to Azerbaijan.
Turkey, a NATO member, is thus a party to this conflict now, and any
military flare-up between Armenians and Azerbaijanis might draw it in
` possibly triggering Russia's involvement, either through its
bilateral commitments to Armenia, or through the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, of which Armenia and Russia are members.
Given energy-security concerns, any Azerbaijani conflict would also
seriously affect Europe. Iran, too would be affected, since it is a
frontline state with interests in the region.
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have not clashed militarily for more than a
decade and a half. But this is only because there has been the
perception of a military balance and a hope that ongoing negotiations
would succeed.
Today, both factors have changed. The perception of military parity
has altered. With Azerbaijan having spent extravagantly on armaments
in recent years it may now have convinced itself that it now holds the
upper hand. At the same time, there is less hope in negotiations,
which appear to be stalled, largely because they have been linked to
the Armenia-Turkey process, which also seems to be in limbo.
The diplomatic protocols now awaiting ratification by the two
countries' parliaments have fallen victim to miscalculations on both
sides. The Armenians came to believe that Turkey would find a way to
reconcile Azerbaijan's interests with the Turkish opening to Armenia,
and would open the border with Armenia regardless of progress on
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The problem is that Turkey
initially closed the border precisely because of Nagorno-Karabakh,
rather than any bilateral issue.
Turkey believed that by signing protocols with Armenia and clearly
indicating its readiness to open the border, the Armenians could
somehow be cajoled or pressured into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem more quickly or cede territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.
But this has always been unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive
settlement that addresses Armenians' greatest fear ` security ` and
fulfils their basic political requirement, namely a definition of
Nagorno-Karabakh's status.
Both sides seem to be somewhat surprised by the other's expectations.
Indeed, there is a growing fear that a settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is more distant now, because Turkey's public
backing has raised Azerbaijan's expectations, while some Armenians
fear collusion between neighbors out to railroad them into an
unsustainable agreement.
This is Turkey's moment of truth. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic
process has stalled, and the Turkish government's effort at
reconciliation with the country's large Kurdish minority has soured.
Just as a loss of confidence among Kurds and Turks in eastern Turkey
will rock the shaky stability that they have recently enjoyed, a loss
of hope for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may end the
tentative military calm between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
But the situation is not irretrievable. Endless public sparring
between Turkish and Armenian officials through the media is not
helping. It is time for both countries' leaders to speak privately and
directly with each other, with an understanding of the instability
that could result from any failure to complete the diplomatic opening
that the two sides initiated.
So, even as Turkey is trying to deal with the consequences of its
history at home, and redefine the army's role in society, it must
reset its tortured relationship with Armenia. The recent resolution
passed by the US Congress Foreign Relations Committee calling upon the
President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States
reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning the
Armenian Genocide should serve as a wake-up call to both Turkish and
Armenian governments that Armenians are not about to question the
historical veracity of the genocide. After all, if France and Germany
can face their tortured history, Turkey should be able to do so as
well.
The two sides must step back, look at the situation dispassionately,
acknowledge the deficiencies in the protocols, address the other
side's minimum requirements, and bear in mind that a single document
will not heal all wounds or wipe out all fears.
The international community must support this effort. The problem
should not be dismissed as a mere settling of old scores. What is at
stake is the future of a region critical to Eurasia's peace.
The Civilitas Foundation
One Northern Ave. Suite 30
Yerevan, Armenia
Telephones: +37494.800754; +37410.500119
email: [email protected]
web: www.civilitasfoundation.org
This article was published by the Project Syndicate, which includes
430 newspapers in 150 countries.
A RESET IN THE CAUCASUS
By Vartan Oskanian
YEREVAN - Will Turkey's current turmoil between Prime Minister Recep
Tayip ErdoÄ?an and the country's powerful army complicate and delay the
country's boldest initiatives in years ` the moves to address
decades-old tensions with both Armenians and Kurds?
Restructuring the role of Turkey's army is vital, but if Turkey cannot
follow through with the Armenian and Kurdish openings, the country's
own domestic situation, its relations with the two peoples, as well as
tensions in the Caucasus, will undoubtedly worsen. Of the several
flashpoints in the region, including that between Georgia and Russia
over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the tension between Armenians and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the most challenging.
As to Georgia and Russia, the disproportionate size, weight, and power
on one side are enough to deter any return to violence. Moreover,
there are no entangling alliances complicating the matter. Georgia is
not a NATO member, and the United States, it is clear, will not go to
war with Russia over Georgia.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle is more precarious. It is no longer
a two-way tug-of-war between two small post-Soviet republics, but part
of an Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle. This triangle is the direct
consequence of the process of normalization between Armenia and
Turkey, which began when both countries' presidents met at a football
game.
That process now hinges on protocols for establishing diplomatic
relations that have been signed by both governments but unratified by
either parliament. Completing the process depends directly and
indirectly on how Armenians and Azerbaijan work to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
This snarled three-way dispute, if not carefully untangled, holds many
dangers. Turkey, which for nearly two decades has proclaimed its
support for Azerbaijan, publicly conditioned rapprochement with
Armenia on Armenian concessions to Azerbaijan.
Turkey, a NATO member, is thus a party to this conflict now, and any
military flare-up between Armenians and Azerbaijanis might draw it in
` possibly triggering Russia's involvement, either through its
bilateral commitments to Armenia, or through the Collective Security
Treaty Organization, of which Armenia and Russia are members.
Given energy-security concerns, any Azerbaijani conflict would also
seriously affect Europe. Iran, too would be affected, since it is a
frontline state with interests in the region.
Armenians and Azerbaijanis have not clashed militarily for more than a
decade and a half. But this is only because there has been the
perception of a military balance and a hope that ongoing negotiations
would succeed.
Today, both factors have changed. The perception of military parity
has altered. With Azerbaijan having spent extravagantly on armaments
in recent years it may now have convinced itself that it now holds the
upper hand. At the same time, there is less hope in negotiations,
which appear to be stalled, largely because they have been linked to
the Armenia-Turkey process, which also seems to be in limbo.
The diplomatic protocols now awaiting ratification by the two
countries' parliaments have fallen victim to miscalculations on both
sides. The Armenians came to believe that Turkey would find a way to
reconcile Azerbaijan's interests with the Turkish opening to Armenia,
and would open the border with Armenia regardless of progress on
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The problem is that Turkey
initially closed the border precisely because of Nagorno-Karabakh,
rather than any bilateral issue.
Turkey believed that by signing protocols with Armenia and clearly
indicating its readiness to open the border, the Armenians could
somehow be cajoled or pressured into resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem more quickly or cede territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.
But this has always been unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive
settlement that addresses Armenians' greatest fear ` security ` and
fulfils their basic political requirement, namely a definition of
Nagorno-Karabakh's status.
Both sides seem to be somewhat surprised by the other's expectations.
Indeed, there is a growing fear that a settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is more distant now, because Turkey's public
backing has raised Azerbaijan's expectations, while some Armenians
fear collusion between neighbors out to railroad them into an
unsustainable agreement.
This is Turkey's moment of truth. The Armenia-Turkey diplomatic
process has stalled, and the Turkish government's effort at
reconciliation with the country's large Kurdish minority has soured.
Just as a loss of confidence among Kurds and Turks in eastern Turkey
will rock the shaky stability that they have recently enjoyed, a loss
of hope for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may end the
tentative military calm between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
But the situation is not irretrievable. Endless public sparring
between Turkish and Armenian officials through the media is not
helping. It is time for both countries' leaders to speak privately and
directly with each other, with an understanding of the instability
that could result from any failure to complete the diplomatic opening
that the two sides initiated.
So, even as Turkey is trying to deal with the consequences of its
history at home, and redefine the army's role in society, it must
reset its tortured relationship with Armenia. The recent resolution
passed by the US Congress Foreign Relations Committee calling upon the
President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States
reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning the
Armenian Genocide should serve as a wake-up call to both Turkish and
Armenian governments that Armenians are not about to question the
historical veracity of the genocide. After all, if France and Germany
can face their tortured history, Turkey should be able to do so as
well.
The two sides must step back, look at the situation dispassionately,
acknowledge the deficiencies in the protocols, address the other
side's minimum requirements, and bear in mind that a single document
will not heal all wounds or wipe out all fears.
The international community must support this effort. The problem
should not be dismissed as a mere settling of old scores. What is at
stake is the future of a region critical to Eurasia's peace.