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TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS FACE ANOTHER TEST OVER THE ARMENIAN ISSUE
Saban Kardas
Georgian Daily
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=17604&Itemid=13 2
March 10 2010
Georgia
The United States House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee
narrowly passed a resolution, which calls on the president to refer
to the killing of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World
War I as "genocide."
Though it remains uncertain whether the resolution will be brought
before the full House, already, it has threatened to affect Turkey's
relations with the US and Armenia.
Ankara reacted to this development promptly. Turkish government
officials reiterated strongly Turkey's policy that any formal
recognition of "genocide" claims would jeopardize Turkish-American
strategic relations. They also repeated that this development would
unduly interfere with its own efforts to normalize relations with
Armenia, prematurely ending the current reconciliation process.
President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, attributed the vote to local
political considerations (www.tcbb.gov.tr, March 4).
In search of devising an appropriate response to the developments,
Ankara promptly recalled its Ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan. The
Turkish foreign ministry also summoned US Ambassador to Ankara,
James Jeffrey.
Outraged by the resolution, Turkish public and political actors
increasingly adopted nationalist rhetoric, arguing that Turkey could
not be dictated to from outside. A discussion on how Turkey might
"retaliate," if the resolution were to be adopted by the US Congress,
has already commenced. Speculation ranges from Turkey's exclusion
of US companies from defense contracts to shutting down the Incirlik
airbase or withdrawing Turkish troops from Afghanistan. In response to
one question, Davutoglu did not rule out any of these options, noting
that the cabinet would consider all possibilities (Aksam, March 5).
These developments raise questions about Ankara's relations with
Washington on many levels. In the days preceding the vote, Turkish
parliamentarians and government officials had flooded Washington in
an effort to block the resolution. Joined by Turkish interest groups
based in the US, they campaigned against the resolution. Also, several
US companies doing business with Turkey raised objections against the
resolution (Cihan, March 2). The passage of the resolution represents a
"defeat" for Turkish lobbying efforts. Nonetheless, Turks are seeking
refuge in the fact that the resolution only passed with a narrow
margin. Turkish lobbyists in Washington argue that the resolution
may never see the House floor, under pressure from the administration
(Hurriyet Daily News, March 8).
>>From the Turkish perspective, the real puzzle is how the Obama
administration will handle this issue. Administration officials
expressed objections to the House resolution. However, the Turkish
side found the administration's efforts half-hearted, as they came at
the last minute and failed to prevent an affirmative vote. Davutoglu
expressed concern that the administration did not throw its weight
against the vote, which, in his eyes, indicated that they did not
fully appreciate Turkey's strategic value. "This picture deeply
disturbed us," he added. Responding to criticism from the US,
Davutoglu rejected the assertion that Turkey had caused any "delays"
and warned that if Congress insisted on its course, it might "kill"
the entire normalization process with Armenia (Aksam, March 5).
In the coming days, therefore, Obama's position on the "genocide"
resolution is likely to be the greatest test of his new vision for a
"model partnership" with Turkey. When the Foreign Affairs Committee
adopted a similar resolution in 2007, the Bush administration prevented
it from being discussed before the House, arguing that it would harm
strategic ties with a geopolitically indispensable ally.
The Obama administration maintained the same presidential position
on this issue.
Although both Obama and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,
had pledged to support the Armenian theses during their 2008
election campaigns, once in office they prioritized United States'
strategic interests. Obama avoided uttering the word "genocide" in
his April 24, 2009 statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, though
condemning the killings in strong language. The administration
managed to avoid criticism from Armenian groups, arguing that the
United States should promote efforts by the Turkish and Armenian
leaders to seek reconciliation (EDM, April 28, 2009). Following
the Foreign Affairs Committee vote, Clinton again used the same
reasoning to prevent Congress' further involvement in the matter:
"[we] have made clear, both last year and again this year that we do
not believe any action by Congress is appropriate, and we oppose it,"
said Clinton (www.voanews.com, March 4).
The next test will be Obama's statement on April 24. The Turkish
side is again mobilizing all its assets to prevent Obama from using
the term "genocide," and sending signals that Turkey will not be the
one to lose if the US administration succumbs to pressures from the
Armenian lobby. The way out of this looming stalemate seems to hinge
on the conclusion of the Turkish-Armenian normalization.
However, Turkey and Armenia have proven unable to maintain their
initial momentum, and the prospects of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation
are weakening every day. Both Ankara and Yerevan refrained from sending
the protocols they signed last year for parliamentary approval,
expecting the other side to take the first step. Meanwhile, Ankara
objected to a ruling by the Armenian constitutional court, arguing
that it violated the spirit of the protocols (EDM, January 26). If the
parties fail to secure another breakthrough over the next few weeks,
Obama might run out of arguments to justify his failure to satisfy the
expectations of the Armenian lobby, coming under increasing pressure
as April 24 approaches.
Herein lies the dilemma, which highlights how Turkish-US relations are
entangled with Turkish-Armenian normalization. The US administration
believes that the overall progress so far has been satisfactory,
yet the Turkish government should take further steps, especially
forwarding the protocols for parliamentary ratification, to re-energize
the process. However, the Turkish government argues that as long as the
Armenian lobby pursues anti-Turkey decisions, Ankara will be unable to
proceed with the normalization. Thus, reportedly, Davutoglu decided
to wait until April 24 to take any further step on the parliamentary
ratification process, in order that the US may first take some positive
steps (Hurriyet, March 6). It will be interesting to follow how the
parties untie this knot.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/
Saban Kardas
Georgian Daily
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=17604&Itemid=13 2
March 10 2010
Georgia
The United States House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee
narrowly passed a resolution, which calls on the president to refer
to the killing of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World
War I as "genocide."
Though it remains uncertain whether the resolution will be brought
before the full House, already, it has threatened to affect Turkey's
relations with the US and Armenia.
Ankara reacted to this development promptly. Turkish government
officials reiterated strongly Turkey's policy that any formal
recognition of "genocide" claims would jeopardize Turkish-American
strategic relations. They also repeated that this development would
unduly interfere with its own efforts to normalize relations with
Armenia, prematurely ending the current reconciliation process.
President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, attributed the vote to local
political considerations (www.tcbb.gov.tr, March 4).
In search of devising an appropriate response to the developments,
Ankara promptly recalled its Ambassador to Washington, Namik Tan. The
Turkish foreign ministry also summoned US Ambassador to Ankara,
James Jeffrey.
Outraged by the resolution, Turkish public and political actors
increasingly adopted nationalist rhetoric, arguing that Turkey could
not be dictated to from outside. A discussion on how Turkey might
"retaliate," if the resolution were to be adopted by the US Congress,
has already commenced. Speculation ranges from Turkey's exclusion
of US companies from defense contracts to shutting down the Incirlik
airbase or withdrawing Turkish troops from Afghanistan. In response to
one question, Davutoglu did not rule out any of these options, noting
that the cabinet would consider all possibilities (Aksam, March 5).
These developments raise questions about Ankara's relations with
Washington on many levels. In the days preceding the vote, Turkish
parliamentarians and government officials had flooded Washington in
an effort to block the resolution. Joined by Turkish interest groups
based in the US, they campaigned against the resolution. Also, several
US companies doing business with Turkey raised objections against the
resolution (Cihan, March 2). The passage of the resolution represents a
"defeat" for Turkish lobbying efforts. Nonetheless, Turks are seeking
refuge in the fact that the resolution only passed with a narrow
margin. Turkish lobbyists in Washington argue that the resolution
may never see the House floor, under pressure from the administration
(Hurriyet Daily News, March 8).
>>From the Turkish perspective, the real puzzle is how the Obama
administration will handle this issue. Administration officials
expressed objections to the House resolution. However, the Turkish
side found the administration's efforts half-hearted, as they came at
the last minute and failed to prevent an affirmative vote. Davutoglu
expressed concern that the administration did not throw its weight
against the vote, which, in his eyes, indicated that they did not
fully appreciate Turkey's strategic value. "This picture deeply
disturbed us," he added. Responding to criticism from the US,
Davutoglu rejected the assertion that Turkey had caused any "delays"
and warned that if Congress insisted on its course, it might "kill"
the entire normalization process with Armenia (Aksam, March 5).
In the coming days, therefore, Obama's position on the "genocide"
resolution is likely to be the greatest test of his new vision for a
"model partnership" with Turkey. When the Foreign Affairs Committee
adopted a similar resolution in 2007, the Bush administration prevented
it from being discussed before the House, arguing that it would harm
strategic ties with a geopolitically indispensable ally.
The Obama administration maintained the same presidential position
on this issue.
Although both Obama and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,
had pledged to support the Armenian theses during their 2008
election campaigns, once in office they prioritized United States'
strategic interests. Obama avoided uttering the word "genocide" in
his April 24, 2009 statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, though
condemning the killings in strong language. The administration
managed to avoid criticism from Armenian groups, arguing that the
United States should promote efforts by the Turkish and Armenian
leaders to seek reconciliation (EDM, April 28, 2009). Following
the Foreign Affairs Committee vote, Clinton again used the same
reasoning to prevent Congress' further involvement in the matter:
"[we] have made clear, both last year and again this year that we do
not believe any action by Congress is appropriate, and we oppose it,"
said Clinton (www.voanews.com, March 4).
The next test will be Obama's statement on April 24. The Turkish
side is again mobilizing all its assets to prevent Obama from using
the term "genocide," and sending signals that Turkey will not be the
one to lose if the US administration succumbs to pressures from the
Armenian lobby. The way out of this looming stalemate seems to hinge
on the conclusion of the Turkish-Armenian normalization.
However, Turkey and Armenia have proven unable to maintain their
initial momentum, and the prospects of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation
are weakening every day. Both Ankara and Yerevan refrained from sending
the protocols they signed last year for parliamentary approval,
expecting the other side to take the first step. Meanwhile, Ankara
objected to a ruling by the Armenian constitutional court, arguing
that it violated the spirit of the protocols (EDM, January 26). If the
parties fail to secure another breakthrough over the next few weeks,
Obama might run out of arguments to justify his failure to satisfy the
expectations of the Armenian lobby, coming under increasing pressure
as April 24 approaches.
Herein lies the dilemma, which highlights how Turkish-US relations are
entangled with Turkish-Armenian normalization. The US administration
believes that the overall progress so far has been satisfactory,
yet the Turkish government should take further steps, especially
forwarding the protocols for parliamentary ratification, to re-energize
the process. However, the Turkish government argues that as long as the
Armenian lobby pursues anti-Turkey decisions, Ankara will be unable to
proceed with the normalization. Thus, reportedly, Davutoglu decided
to wait until April 24 to take any further step on the parliamentary
ratification process, in order that the US may first take some positive
steps (Hurriyet, March 6). It will be interesting to follow how the
parties untie this knot.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/