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DON'T LOSE SIGHT OF THE BIGGER PICTURE!
Hurriyet Daily News
March 9 2010
Turkey
Last week the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly
voted in favor of recognizing the mass killings of Armenians in
1915 as genocide. Ever since, the Turkish media has been full of
speculations on what might happen if the full House would support
such a resolution, which would make it extremely difficult for the
American president not to give in to the central demand: to use the
G-word in his annual speech on April 24.
How should Turkey react? What would it mean for relations between
Turkey and the U.S.? What would be the fall-out for the already
stalling process of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia?
The interesting thing is that in the international media, most
observers tend to believe a senior Obama administration official who
said, speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press,
"There was an understanding with the Democratic leadership in Congress
that the resolution would not go to a vote on the floor of the House
of Representatives." The Washington Post, well connected on Capitol
Hill, came to the same conclusion. But I am afraid these sobering
thoughts will not have a big impact in Turkey.
I wish they had. What will probably happen is that in the next six
weeks, until April 24, most pundits will be engaged in making up
all kind of scenarios based on "What if ...?" And although foreign
minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said Turkey is determined to press ahead
with efforts to normalize ties with Armenia, the net result of all
these hypothetical exercises will be that nothing positive will happen
in relations between Turkey and Armenia.
The protocols, signed by both governments, will not be approved by
the Turkish Parliament because the American resolution is the perfect
excuse to stop the ratification process. It comes on top of a decision
by the Armenian Constitutional Court some weeks ago to which many in
Turkey overreacted. According to most foreign specialists, the ruling
itself does not pose an obstacle for ratification but both government
and opposition politicians were quite happy to make it into one.
One would almost lose sight of the real reasons why the Justice
and Development Party, or AKP, does not want to use its majority in
Parliament to sanction the deal made by its own ministers. It's very
simple: it is because Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself has
repeatedly linked ratification to progress in finding a solution to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
When Davutoglu signed the protocols in late autumn he sounded very
confident that ratification would follow in the spring of this year. I
always thought that was because the foreign minister had received some
kind of guarantee from his American, French and, most importantly,
Russian colleagues present at the ceremony that this spring, Armenia,
pushed by these three countries, would move some of its troops out
of some occupied Azeri territories. In that scenario, Turkey would
get the best of both worlds: improved relations with Armenia and
something to show to the Azerbaijanis.
Until now Armenia has not moved one soldier. That could mean three
things: 1) I was wrong, there was no guarantee, in which case Davutoglu
was far too optimistic; 2) There was a deal but the Armenians could
not be pressured to give in; or 3) There was an agreement between
the big powers but the Russians are not willing to deliver.
Anyway, the result of these misjudgements could well be that Turkey,
Armenia and Azerbaijan all remain stuck in frozen conflicts. To
prevent such a disaster, after hopes were raised so high, the ruling
party should be clever enough to keep sight of the bigger picture,
rise above petty political squabbles in Washington and Ankara and
have the courage to ratify the agreements with Armenia.
Better to have an open border than a closed mind.
Hurriyet Daily News
March 9 2010
Turkey
Last week the United States House Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly
voted in favor of recognizing the mass killings of Armenians in
1915 as genocide. Ever since, the Turkish media has been full of
speculations on what might happen if the full House would support
such a resolution, which would make it extremely difficult for the
American president not to give in to the central demand: to use the
G-word in his annual speech on April 24.
How should Turkey react? What would it mean for relations between
Turkey and the U.S.? What would be the fall-out for the already
stalling process of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia?
The interesting thing is that in the international media, most
observers tend to believe a senior Obama administration official who
said, speaking on condition of anonymity to the Associated Press,
"There was an understanding with the Democratic leadership in Congress
that the resolution would not go to a vote on the floor of the House
of Representatives." The Washington Post, well connected on Capitol
Hill, came to the same conclusion. But I am afraid these sobering
thoughts will not have a big impact in Turkey.
I wish they had. What will probably happen is that in the next six
weeks, until April 24, most pundits will be engaged in making up
all kind of scenarios based on "What if ...?" And although foreign
minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said Turkey is determined to press ahead
with efforts to normalize ties with Armenia, the net result of all
these hypothetical exercises will be that nothing positive will happen
in relations between Turkey and Armenia.
The protocols, signed by both governments, will not be approved by
the Turkish Parliament because the American resolution is the perfect
excuse to stop the ratification process. It comes on top of a decision
by the Armenian Constitutional Court some weeks ago to which many in
Turkey overreacted. According to most foreign specialists, the ruling
itself does not pose an obstacle for ratification but both government
and opposition politicians were quite happy to make it into one.
One would almost lose sight of the real reasons why the Justice
and Development Party, or AKP, does not want to use its majority in
Parliament to sanction the deal made by its own ministers. It's very
simple: it is because Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself has
repeatedly linked ratification to progress in finding a solution to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
When Davutoglu signed the protocols in late autumn he sounded very
confident that ratification would follow in the spring of this year. I
always thought that was because the foreign minister had received some
kind of guarantee from his American, French and, most importantly,
Russian colleagues present at the ceremony that this spring, Armenia,
pushed by these three countries, would move some of its troops out
of some occupied Azeri territories. In that scenario, Turkey would
get the best of both worlds: improved relations with Armenia and
something to show to the Azerbaijanis.
Until now Armenia has not moved one soldier. That could mean three
things: 1) I was wrong, there was no guarantee, in which case Davutoglu
was far too optimistic; 2) There was a deal but the Armenians could
not be pressured to give in; or 3) There was an agreement between
the big powers but the Russians are not willing to deliver.
Anyway, the result of these misjudgements could well be that Turkey,
Armenia and Azerbaijan all remain stuck in frozen conflicts. To
prevent such a disaster, after hopes were raised so high, the ruling
party should be clever enough to keep sight of the bigger picture,
rise above petty political squabbles in Washington and Ankara and
have the courage to ratify the agreements with Armenia.
Better to have an open border than a closed mind.