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THE BLOOMING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ISRAEL
BYLINE: By Anna Zamejc
Radio Free Europe
March 9, 2010
Czech Rep
When 13 years ago the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev received
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Baku, it was considered
a bold and politically risky decision. No red carpets were rolled out,
and the meeting was purposely kept low-key.
Today, however, no such precautions are needed, as visits of Israeli
leaders to Azerbaijan are no longer matters of domestic controversy.
However, the peculiar relationship of the two countries continues
to elude easy characterizations. Some external observers see it as a
typical marriage of convenience, while others tend to take it as an
alarming threat.
Although Azerbaijan is a predominantly Shi'ite Muslim country and a
majority of ethnic Azeris live in neighboring Iran (a ferocious enemy
of Israel), Baku routinely shares intelligence with the Jewish state,
buys its arms, and considers it trustworthy in security matters,
completely contradicting stereotypes about a "clash of civilizations."
Further, the informal alliance seems to undermine the geopolitical
game that the strongest actors -- Russia and Iran -- are determined
to play in the region.
Given how advanced bilateral relations are and how strong the mutual
trust appears, it might sound surprising that 18 years of diplomatic
contacts have not produced a single official treaty between Israel and
Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijani authorities remain vague to this day
about the widely anticipated potential opening of an embassy in Israel.
Why? The answer can be found in Iran.
Thorn In The Side
"Today, everyone understands why Iran wants to block the
Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement by any means," Baku-born former
Knesset member Josef Chagall, a major champion of Israeli-Azerbaijani
ties, said in an interview with RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service. "It
is one of the most important strategic priorities of the Islamic
republic. Tehran is perfectly aware of the following: the stronger the
connection between Baku and Jerusalem, the more weakened Iran will be."
Iran, which aspires to be a regional leader, would like to see
Azerbaijan play by its rules. But Azerbaijan, whose secular system is
a thorn in the side of the Islamic regime, not only refuses to conform
to Tehran's dictates but has also crossed a red line by befriending
the sworn enemy of Iran's president.
Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened
[by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of
view."Very characteristic in this regard is the reaction of Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the official visit of Israeli President
Shimon Peres to Azerbaijan in...2009. In hysterical tones, the Iranian
leader demanded that the leadership of Azerbaijan immediately cancel
the visit of 'the head of the Zionist entity' and 'the main enemy of
Muslims,'" Shagal recalls, adding that all Tehran's efforts proved
counterproductive as Peres was received in Azerbaijan with the
highest honors.
"It is worth noting the dignity and tact with which Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev recommended that his Iranian counterpart
refrain from giving advice to a leader of a sovereign state on to
whom to show hospitality and to whom to refuse it," he added.
Although Iran may not be in a position to keep Israel and Azerbaijan
completely apart, it has been successful in one respect: Despite
numerous calls from the Jewish state, Azerbaijan has still not opened
an embassy in Israel because of pressure from Tehran.
This creates a sort of diplomatic asymmetry as it has been 16 years
since Israel established its embassy in Azerbaijan. However, Baku has
thus far been reluctant to reciprocate. The advanced contacts with
Israel have already put a grave chill on Baku's relations with Tehran,
and provoking Iran with an embassy in Israel could prove too costly
for Azerbaijan, even triggering a backlash from other Muslim states.
"Repeated efforts by Baku to find out how its southern neighbor
would react to opening an Azerbaijani Embassy in Israel have always
encountered Iranian ultimatums," Shagal says, stressing that it would
not only be Iranian-Azerbaijani relations that would suffer a massive
blow, but Baku would eventually have to pay the price in the area that
is of vital importance for the Caucasus republic: Nagorno-Karabakh.
"If Azerbaijan opens an embassy in Israel, then Iran will declare on
behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) a refusal
to support Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, and would also
disavow all the efforts of Azerbaijan and its supporters in the OIC
for the restoration of its territorial integrity and the return of
Nagorno-Karabakh," Shagal says.
Influence Stability
Alexander Murinson, an independent researcher and academic writer who
follows developments in Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, is also afraid
that Baku could face difficulties once it decides to open the embassy.
"Iran can cause trouble for authorities in Azerbaijan and influence
the stability of the country. So obviously that's another way of Iran
trying to influence the diplomatic relationship between Israel and
Azerbaijan," Murinson says.
"Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened
[by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of
view. Iran obviously has a religious network in Azerbaijan that could
undermine the secular nature of the current regime in Azerbaijan,"
Murinson adds.
Despite those dangers, the IzRus portal reported last month, quoting
Israel's ambassador to Azerbaijan, Michael Lavon-Lotem, that Baku will
soon open an embassy in Tel Aviv. Murinson warns that this might be
mere posturing, like a similar announcement in 2006. But he believes
that this time it could be for real.
"That development has been expected for many years, because the
relationship is thriving both in terms of economic trade ties and also
in the military field," Murinson says. "It might be an indication that
some agreement has been reached on very deep strategic cooperation
between the two parties that may not have been publicized."
A potential embassy would certainly be a culmination of Israel's
long-term efforts to persuade Baku to formalize relations and could
boost Israel's position abroad.
"For Israel, which is now faced by tremendous diplomatic pressure
around the globe for many reasons, when a Muslim country, especially
a Shi'ite country, makes this kind of announcement, it indicates for
Israel that it has a friend in the region. In such an environment,
Azerbaijan making this diplomatic move [would] create a very important,
positive dynamic for the state of Israel," Murinson says.
What's In It For Baku?
Aran Amnon, an expert on the Middle East who lectures at City
University in London, adds that Israel might be now particularly
interested in strengthening ties with Baku as the threat of Iranian
nuclear capacity takes center stage in Israeli foreign policy.
"Israel has an interest in trying to improve its standing with as many
countries as possible, especially those who may be directly affected
by Iran and might by persuaded to be supportive of Israeli efforts,"
Amnon says.
But in international relations, every nation acts on its own
interests. The gains seem obvious for Israel, but why should Baku be
willing to take the risk? Murinson links the potential switch to the
new dynamics that were created by Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and
the deteriorating relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
In fact, Baku has a lot of other reasons for being interested
in deepening ties with Israel. Israel is an important source of
military equipment, and reportedly it was Israel who helped Baku
rebuild its army after the heavy losses it suffered during the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh. The military aspect of the relationship has
been present ever since.
"During the visit of Simon Peres, a very important contract was
signed which included construction of a plant in Azerbaijan that would
produce unmanned aerial vehicles. By doing so, Azerbaijan would become
an important producer of very advanced systems in the region -- even
Russia doesn't have advanced unmanned aerial vehicles," Murinson says,
stressing that the lack of such systems proved problematic during
the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
Israel plays an important role in Azerbaijani security arrangements.
The electronic fence around Baku's international airport was built by
Israeli companies. Reportedly, Israeli firms are supplying equipment
to ensure the safety of Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, and there
were also rumors that Israelis provide security for Azerbaijan's
president on his foreign visits.
Last but not least, Azerbaijan is the home of an ancient Jewish
community, which remains an important aspect in mutual contacts.
"We estimate that there are approximately 25,000 Jews living
in Azerbaijan," Mark Levin, the executive director of National
Conference of the Soviet Jewry says. "Azeri Jews have lived side
by side with their non-Jewish neighbors for centuries, and they are
treated very well."
Anna Zamejc is a correspondent for RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service. The
views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL
BYLINE: By Anna Zamejc
Radio Free Europe
March 9, 2010
Czech Rep
When 13 years ago the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev received
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Baku, it was considered
a bold and politically risky decision. No red carpets were rolled out,
and the meeting was purposely kept low-key.
Today, however, no such precautions are needed, as visits of Israeli
leaders to Azerbaijan are no longer matters of domestic controversy.
However, the peculiar relationship of the two countries continues
to elude easy characterizations. Some external observers see it as a
typical marriage of convenience, while others tend to take it as an
alarming threat.
Although Azerbaijan is a predominantly Shi'ite Muslim country and a
majority of ethnic Azeris live in neighboring Iran (a ferocious enemy
of Israel), Baku routinely shares intelligence with the Jewish state,
buys its arms, and considers it trustworthy in security matters,
completely contradicting stereotypes about a "clash of civilizations."
Further, the informal alliance seems to undermine the geopolitical
game that the strongest actors -- Russia and Iran -- are determined
to play in the region.
Given how advanced bilateral relations are and how strong the mutual
trust appears, it might sound surprising that 18 years of diplomatic
contacts have not produced a single official treaty between Israel and
Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijani authorities remain vague to this day
about the widely anticipated potential opening of an embassy in Israel.
Why? The answer can be found in Iran.
Thorn In The Side
"Today, everyone understands why Iran wants to block the
Azerbaijani-Israeli rapprochement by any means," Baku-born former
Knesset member Josef Chagall, a major champion of Israeli-Azerbaijani
ties, said in an interview with RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service. "It
is one of the most important strategic priorities of the Islamic
republic. Tehran is perfectly aware of the following: the stronger the
connection between Baku and Jerusalem, the more weakened Iran will be."
Iran, which aspires to be a regional leader, would like to see
Azerbaijan play by its rules. But Azerbaijan, whose secular system is
a thorn in the side of the Islamic regime, not only refuses to conform
to Tehran's dictates but has also crossed a red line by befriending
the sworn enemy of Iran's president.
Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened
[by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of
view."Very characteristic in this regard is the reaction of Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to the official visit of Israeli President
Shimon Peres to Azerbaijan in...2009. In hysterical tones, the Iranian
leader demanded that the leadership of Azerbaijan immediately cancel
the visit of 'the head of the Zionist entity' and 'the main enemy of
Muslims,'" Shagal recalls, adding that all Tehran's efforts proved
counterproductive as Peres was received in Azerbaijan with the
highest honors.
"It is worth noting the dignity and tact with which Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev recommended that his Iranian counterpart
refrain from giving advice to a leader of a sovereign state on to
whom to show hospitality and to whom to refuse it," he added.
Although Iran may not be in a position to keep Israel and Azerbaijan
completely apart, it has been successful in one respect: Despite
numerous calls from the Jewish state, Azerbaijan has still not opened
an embassy in Israel because of pressure from Tehran.
This creates a sort of diplomatic asymmetry as it has been 16 years
since Israel established its embassy in Azerbaijan. However, Baku has
thus far been reluctant to reciprocate. The advanced contacts with
Israel have already put a grave chill on Baku's relations with Tehran,
and provoking Iran with an embassy in Israel could prove too costly
for Azerbaijan, even triggering a backlash from other Muslim states.
"Repeated efforts by Baku to find out how its southern neighbor
would react to opening an Azerbaijani Embassy in Israel have always
encountered Iranian ultimatums," Shagal says, stressing that it would
not only be Iranian-Azerbaijani relations that would suffer a massive
blow, but Baku would eventually have to pay the price in the area that
is of vital importance for the Caucasus republic: Nagorno-Karabakh.
"If Azerbaijan opens an embassy in Israel, then Iran will declare on
behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) a refusal
to support Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, and would also
disavow all the efforts of Azerbaijan and its supporters in the OIC
for the restoration of its territorial integrity and the return of
Nagorno-Karabakh," Shagal says.
Influence Stability
Alexander Murinson, an independent researcher and academic writer who
follows developments in Israeli-Azerbaijani relations, is also afraid
that Baku could face difficulties once it decides to open the embassy.
"Iran can cause trouble for authorities in Azerbaijan and influence
the stability of the country. So obviously that's another way of Iran
trying to influence the diplomatic relationship between Israel and
Azerbaijan," Murinson says.
"Azerbaijan has always felt threatened and continues to feel threatened
[by Iran] from an ideological, economic, and political point of
view. Iran obviously has a religious network in Azerbaijan that could
undermine the secular nature of the current regime in Azerbaijan,"
Murinson adds.
Despite those dangers, the IzRus portal reported last month, quoting
Israel's ambassador to Azerbaijan, Michael Lavon-Lotem, that Baku will
soon open an embassy in Tel Aviv. Murinson warns that this might be
mere posturing, like a similar announcement in 2006. But he believes
that this time it could be for real.
"That development has been expected for many years, because the
relationship is thriving both in terms of economic trade ties and also
in the military field," Murinson says. "It might be an indication that
some agreement has been reached on very deep strategic cooperation
between the two parties that may not have been publicized."
A potential embassy would certainly be a culmination of Israel's
long-term efforts to persuade Baku to formalize relations and could
boost Israel's position abroad.
"For Israel, which is now faced by tremendous diplomatic pressure
around the globe for many reasons, when a Muslim country, especially
a Shi'ite country, makes this kind of announcement, it indicates for
Israel that it has a friend in the region. In such an environment,
Azerbaijan making this diplomatic move [would] create a very important,
positive dynamic for the state of Israel," Murinson says.
What's In It For Baku?
Aran Amnon, an expert on the Middle East who lectures at City
University in London, adds that Israel might be now particularly
interested in strengthening ties with Baku as the threat of Iranian
nuclear capacity takes center stage in Israeli foreign policy.
"Israel has an interest in trying to improve its standing with as many
countries as possible, especially those who may be directly affected
by Iran and might by persuaded to be supportive of Israeli efforts,"
Amnon says.
But in international relations, every nation acts on its own
interests. The gains seem obvious for Israel, but why should Baku be
willing to take the risk? Murinson links the potential switch to the
new dynamics that were created by Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and
the deteriorating relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
In fact, Baku has a lot of other reasons for being interested
in deepening ties with Israel. Israel is an important source of
military equipment, and reportedly it was Israel who helped Baku
rebuild its army after the heavy losses it suffered during the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh. The military aspect of the relationship has
been present ever since.
"During the visit of Simon Peres, a very important contract was
signed which included construction of a plant in Azerbaijan that would
produce unmanned aerial vehicles. By doing so, Azerbaijan would become
an important producer of very advanced systems in the region -- even
Russia doesn't have advanced unmanned aerial vehicles," Murinson says,
stressing that the lack of such systems proved problematic during
the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
Israel plays an important role in Azerbaijani security arrangements.
The electronic fence around Baku's international airport was built by
Israeli companies. Reportedly, Israeli firms are supplying equipment
to ensure the safety of Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, and there
were also rumors that Israelis provide security for Azerbaijan's
president on his foreign visits.
Last but not least, Azerbaijan is the home of an ancient Jewish
community, which remains an important aspect in mutual contacts.
"We estimate that there are approximately 25,000 Jews living
in Azerbaijan," Mark Levin, the executive director of National
Conference of the Soviet Jewry says. "Azeri Jews have lived side
by side with their non-Jewish neighbors for centuries, and they are
treated very well."
Anna Zamejc is a correspondent for RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service. The
views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL