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RUSSIAN ANALYST: U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE EFFORTS TO BLOCK "ARMENIAN GENOCIDE" RESOLUTION AT THE LEVEL OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
R. Mehdiyev
Today
http://www.today.az/news/politics/ 63905.html
March 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov.
What are your comments on the decision by the U.S. Congress House
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations to recognize the
"Armenian genocide"?
This is not the first attempt by the House of Representatives Committee
on Foreign Relations to raise the Armenian issue. The latest attempt
to adopt similar draft resolution was made in October 2007.
If you take look at the history of Armenian issue inside the U.S.,
all kinds of resolutions on this matter have been adopted since 1916.
Until 1945 they had mostly civil character. But later they assumed a
political nature. There is constant debate in the U.S. how to label
these events - whether as "massacre", or "genocide".
I recall that during the election campaign, both President Obama and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed to recognize those events
as "genocide". So, there is nothing surprising about what has happened.
Worthy of note is that the discussions over the Armenian issue showed
presence of two vectors in American foreign policy which often balance
each other. There is a group of politicians who advocate rejection of
all such documents, resolutions and maintaining good relations with
Turkey while others call on the House of Representatives to adopt
the resolution discussed in the Committee on Foreign Relations.
I think that these two vectors will further exist in American
politics. Some of them will periodically reinforce some - weaken, and
vice versa. But now, I see no willingness in the U.S. administration
to go further than that done in the committees.
Can the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still be considered frozen
following the U.S. Congress committee's recent move and Turkey's
strong reaction? Do you think the risk of renewed hostilities between
Azerbaijan and Armenia has significantly increased?
I do not think that we should expect a serious break-down of relations
between the U.S. and Turkey. There are certain limits defined by the
red line beyond which the parties do not move. I think that the Turks,
of course, unhappy with U.S. policy not only on the Armenian issue,
but also on Iraq. However, this has not yet resulted in any dramatic
consequences such as, for example, withdrawal from NATO and closure
of Incirlik airbase through which bulk of goods is delivered to Iraq
from America.
Relations between the two countries could change radically if President
Obama personally admits this point and if the administration at
the federal level accedes to the position which even the House of
Representatives did not adhere. Even the Foreign Relations Committee
vote was difficult enough - 23 votes to 22.
As for the Karabakh conflict, I do not see prerequisite for its
military solution. To make such a solution possible, one side needs
to have sharp military superiority over another. In addition, modern
war is not a purely military action, this is also picture made of
information.
In the event of renewed hostilities in Karabakh, there will be no
"two-color" approach which we witnessed in the case of Russia and
Georgia. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan will be perceived as an agent
of the West. The views of different countries will be strongly divided
and their lobbyists will work with both sides. And Azerbaijan will
not have serious information advantage.
Unlike South Ossetia, it is not a closed space, but nearly
200-kilometer long front line. I think military escalation is less
to happen. Besides, war rhetoric will be used as an instrument of
pressure, for example, on Turkey to slow down the Armenian-Turkish
normalization.
Do you mean Turkey will make efforts towards rapprochement with Russia
following the recent move by the U.S.?
I would not dramatize what has happened in only one Committee. Of
course, this is important event, but not dramatic.
What will be the situation in the region? Will it be difficult for
Moscow to handle the mediation role in the region on its own in case
the U.S. leaves the region?
Azerbaijan has its great interests in the West. "Contract of the
Century" remains in force. Both Ankara and Baku can make some
friendly demonstrative steps for Russia. However, it does not mean
that things will change radically, for example, Turkey will leave
the North Atlantic Alliance and support the idea of a Eurasian Union.
In addition, Hillary Clinton has already stated unequivocally that
the U.S. administration would not support further advance of the
Armenian resolution. That is, the ruling forces of America will take
administrative effort to block such initiatives at the level of the
House of Representatives.
R. Mehdiyev
Today
http://www.today.az/news/politics/ 63905.html
March 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with Russian political analyst Sergey Markedonov.
What are your comments on the decision by the U.S. Congress House
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations to recognize the
"Armenian genocide"?
This is not the first attempt by the House of Representatives Committee
on Foreign Relations to raise the Armenian issue. The latest attempt
to adopt similar draft resolution was made in October 2007.
If you take look at the history of Armenian issue inside the U.S.,
all kinds of resolutions on this matter have been adopted since 1916.
Until 1945 they had mostly civil character. But later they assumed a
political nature. There is constant debate in the U.S. how to label
these events - whether as "massacre", or "genocide".
I recall that during the election campaign, both President Obama and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed to recognize those events
as "genocide". So, there is nothing surprising about what has happened.
Worthy of note is that the discussions over the Armenian issue showed
presence of two vectors in American foreign policy which often balance
each other. There is a group of politicians who advocate rejection of
all such documents, resolutions and maintaining good relations with
Turkey while others call on the House of Representatives to adopt
the resolution discussed in the Committee on Foreign Relations.
I think that these two vectors will further exist in American
politics. Some of them will periodically reinforce some - weaken, and
vice versa. But now, I see no willingness in the U.S. administration
to go further than that done in the committees.
Can the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still be considered frozen
following the U.S. Congress committee's recent move and Turkey's
strong reaction? Do you think the risk of renewed hostilities between
Azerbaijan and Armenia has significantly increased?
I do not think that we should expect a serious break-down of relations
between the U.S. and Turkey. There are certain limits defined by the
red line beyond which the parties do not move. I think that the Turks,
of course, unhappy with U.S. policy not only on the Armenian issue,
but also on Iraq. However, this has not yet resulted in any dramatic
consequences such as, for example, withdrawal from NATO and closure
of Incirlik airbase through which bulk of goods is delivered to Iraq
from America.
Relations between the two countries could change radically if President
Obama personally admits this point and if the administration at
the federal level accedes to the position which even the House of
Representatives did not adhere. Even the Foreign Relations Committee
vote was difficult enough - 23 votes to 22.
As for the Karabakh conflict, I do not see prerequisite for its
military solution. To make such a solution possible, one side needs
to have sharp military superiority over another. In addition, modern
war is not a purely military action, this is also picture made of
information.
In the event of renewed hostilities in Karabakh, there will be no
"two-color" approach which we witnessed in the case of Russia and
Georgia. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan will be perceived as an agent
of the West. The views of different countries will be strongly divided
and their lobbyists will work with both sides. And Azerbaijan will
not have serious information advantage.
Unlike South Ossetia, it is not a closed space, but nearly
200-kilometer long front line. I think military escalation is less
to happen. Besides, war rhetoric will be used as an instrument of
pressure, for example, on Turkey to slow down the Armenian-Turkish
normalization.
Do you mean Turkey will make efforts towards rapprochement with Russia
following the recent move by the U.S.?
I would not dramatize what has happened in only one Committee. Of
course, this is important event, but not dramatic.
What will be the situation in the region? Will it be difficult for
Moscow to handle the mediation role in the region on its own in case
the U.S. leaves the region?
Azerbaijan has its great interests in the West. "Contract of the
Century" remains in force. Both Ankara and Baku can make some
friendly demonstrative steps for Russia. However, it does not mean
that things will change radically, for example, Turkey will leave
the North Atlantic Alliance and support the idea of a Eurasian Union.
In addition, Hillary Clinton has already stated unequivocally that
the U.S. administration would not support further advance of the
Armenian resolution. That is, the ruling forces of America will take
administrative effort to block such initiatives at the level of the
House of Representatives.