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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EFFORTS TO PROMOTE BREAKTHROUGH IN KARABAKH ISSUE-EXPERT
news.az
March 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Dmitri Polikanov News.Az interviews Dmitri Polikanov, vice president
of Center of Political Studies and editor of international edition
of Security Index magazine.
Can the resolution of the Caucasus problems be bound to the initiative
of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on European security. In addition,
is Russia interested in the settlement of the frozen conflicts in
the post-Soviet area in the light of this initiative?
The search of new approaches to the settlement of frozen conflicts
is one of the tracks that Russia offers during negotiations on the
new agreement. The problem is that neither Russia nor anyone else
have ready solutions for frozen conflicts. But it is possible to
put recepts for discussion and think over the collective settlement
mechanisms within the framework of the initiative of the European
Security Treaty and after its signing. The main difficulty of all
frozen conflicts lies with the absence of the political will for their
willing, that is, the absence of a kind of "forcing" the parties to a
compromise. Formation of the new negotiation area and the architecture
of the treaty will create conditions for mobilization of such a will,
including in the relation to the Caucasus.
Is Medvedev's new initiative connected with the changes in the
world center of powers or is it connected with the growing Russia's
participation in the European problems?
Certainly, the treaty envisions the changes that occur in the sphere
of international security. Most institutions today do not cope
with their duties. New actors appeared along with the integration
process in Europe. The post Soviet area has almost disappeared as a
phenomenon, while quite independent sovereign states appeared in its
place. Thus, the "post" stage (post-Soviet, post-bipolar and so on)
has been passed. There is a need for new mechanisms that would be
adequate to the modern state of development and coincide with the
prospects of the leading superpowers (the gradual weakening of the US
role as a world hegemon and delegation of these functions, European
and Chinese ambitions and so on). These mechanisms can be fixed in a
legally binding form. But this is not the most important thing. The
most important is to launch discussions and a dialogue. This is the key
function of the treaty. In addition, certainly, Russia which claims
for important positions in the world hyerarchu can and must propose
different global initiatives and its agenda. The treaty complies with
this logic of formation of Russia's image as one of the leaders of
the world.
Is the proposal of former defense minister of Germany Volker Ruet
about the need to involve Russia into NATO realistic under the current
conditions when the relations between Russia and the Alliance cooled
after the 2008 August war in the Caucasus?
The proposal of NATO membership is a remote perspective. Neither
alliance nor Russia is ready to this at least today or in the nearest
perspective. Nevertheless, the intensification of the expert and public
discussions on the issue in Russia and abroad proves the need for a
closer cooperation between Russia and NATO and in new approaches. This
cooperation is developing by the principle "one step forward and two
steps back". The steps are mostly taken in the sphere of rhetoric and
political statements. If Russia and NATO are planning to develop real
and constructive interaction, it is time to think of the practical
measures and definite at least modest joint projects and set strategic
cooperation as a long-term goal confirming this with actions. Russia
could limit the anti-NATO rhetoric and take measures to improve the
media background, expand its participation in Afghanistan with NATO,
raise the component of joint trainings and peacekeeping operations and
so on. NATO could have been more consistent and strict regarding its
potential candidates, support joint projects in the sphere of military
cooperation, reduce anti-Russia rhetoric, including open ignoring of
European Security Treaty, CSTO and so on. Meanwhile, the possbility
of launching the new NATO security strategy is possible in autumn,
while Russia will again be offended and say that the treaty has
been ignored by the European parners and Russia is being isolated by
division lines. It would rather be logical and constructive to work
out a certain framework document which would give a general vision
of security of NARO and Russia (a certain compromise between the NATO
Strategy and EST)
As you know, the United States still consider joint operation of the
Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Can this variant be used for the
closer cooperation between Russia and NATO in case Washington accepts
this proposal in the future?
When Gabala station is discussed, mostly strategic missile defense
system is implied. NATO and Russia have a successful experience
of working with missile defense system on hostilities area. Anyway,
lifting Moscow's concerns on missile defense system and improvement of
the climate in the Russian-American relations will promote Russia-NATO
cooperation. Moscow's proposal on creation of a joint system of
early warning is more than reasonable and it could be a reasonable
compromise on the issue of missile defense deployment.
Can NATO's movement to the East, in particular, inclusion of Ukraine
and Georgia into the sphere of its influence lead to possible
membership of Azerbaijan and Armenia in this bloc?
It is early to speak of the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia and
it is early to speak of Armenia and Azerbaijan's membership. It is
highly unlikely that NATO will admit the countries with the unsettled
territorial conflicts since it would require serious investments from
the Alliance to stabilize the situation. It is possible to speak of
the cooperation with NATO in the nearest perspective (five years).
Meanwhile, membership requires serious transformation, both political
and military one, while the aforementioned countries are currently
not prepared for this. The process of such transformation may take
at leasr 7-10 years (considering more "advanced" Eastern European
countries that have not yet completed this process)
Moscow is attempting to maintain certain neutrality in the relations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh conflict. Can this
policy be considered substantiated taking into account Baku and
Yerevan's official expectation of definite position from Moscow?
It is difficult for Moscow to take a definite positions and avoid
accusations of any party of "betrayal", "imperialistic intentions"
and so on. Therefore, Russia should take a multilateral approach
that would imply the principle of collective responsibility. The
internationalization of efforts on the resolution of the conflict may
promote a breakthrough since there will be a conscious will of the
international community that can be hardly resisted by those who would
prefer a unilateral solution in favor of either Armenia or Azerbaijan.
The issue of Karabakh is an issue of flexibility of the sides. The
situation cannot go back to 20 years ago despite the respect to
the principle of territorial integrity! This is the life of one
generation! This means that the elites should find courage to agree
and start working with public opinion, while the mediators-Moscow-
will control the fair and complete execution of these decisions.
news.az
March 12 2010
Azerbaijan
Dmitri Polikanov News.Az interviews Dmitri Polikanov, vice president
of Center of Political Studies and editor of international edition
of Security Index magazine.
Can the resolution of the Caucasus problems be bound to the initiative
of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on European security. In addition,
is Russia interested in the settlement of the frozen conflicts in
the post-Soviet area in the light of this initiative?
The search of new approaches to the settlement of frozen conflicts
is one of the tracks that Russia offers during negotiations on the
new agreement. The problem is that neither Russia nor anyone else
have ready solutions for frozen conflicts. But it is possible to
put recepts for discussion and think over the collective settlement
mechanisms within the framework of the initiative of the European
Security Treaty and after its signing. The main difficulty of all
frozen conflicts lies with the absence of the political will for their
willing, that is, the absence of a kind of "forcing" the parties to a
compromise. Formation of the new negotiation area and the architecture
of the treaty will create conditions for mobilization of such a will,
including in the relation to the Caucasus.
Is Medvedev's new initiative connected with the changes in the
world center of powers or is it connected with the growing Russia's
participation in the European problems?
Certainly, the treaty envisions the changes that occur in the sphere
of international security. Most institutions today do not cope
with their duties. New actors appeared along with the integration
process in Europe. The post Soviet area has almost disappeared as a
phenomenon, while quite independent sovereign states appeared in its
place. Thus, the "post" stage (post-Soviet, post-bipolar and so on)
has been passed. There is a need for new mechanisms that would be
adequate to the modern state of development and coincide with the
prospects of the leading superpowers (the gradual weakening of the US
role as a world hegemon and delegation of these functions, European
and Chinese ambitions and so on). These mechanisms can be fixed in a
legally binding form. But this is not the most important thing. The
most important is to launch discussions and a dialogue. This is the key
function of the treaty. In addition, certainly, Russia which claims
for important positions in the world hyerarchu can and must propose
different global initiatives and its agenda. The treaty complies with
this logic of formation of Russia's image as one of the leaders of
the world.
Is the proposal of former defense minister of Germany Volker Ruet
about the need to involve Russia into NATO realistic under the current
conditions when the relations between Russia and the Alliance cooled
after the 2008 August war in the Caucasus?
The proposal of NATO membership is a remote perspective. Neither
alliance nor Russia is ready to this at least today or in the nearest
perspective. Nevertheless, the intensification of the expert and public
discussions on the issue in Russia and abroad proves the need for a
closer cooperation between Russia and NATO and in new approaches. This
cooperation is developing by the principle "one step forward and two
steps back". The steps are mostly taken in the sphere of rhetoric and
political statements. If Russia and NATO are planning to develop real
and constructive interaction, it is time to think of the practical
measures and definite at least modest joint projects and set strategic
cooperation as a long-term goal confirming this with actions. Russia
could limit the anti-NATO rhetoric and take measures to improve the
media background, expand its participation in Afghanistan with NATO,
raise the component of joint trainings and peacekeeping operations and
so on. NATO could have been more consistent and strict regarding its
potential candidates, support joint projects in the sphere of military
cooperation, reduce anti-Russia rhetoric, including open ignoring of
European Security Treaty, CSTO and so on. Meanwhile, the possbility
of launching the new NATO security strategy is possible in autumn,
while Russia will again be offended and say that the treaty has
been ignored by the European parners and Russia is being isolated by
division lines. It would rather be logical and constructive to work
out a certain framework document which would give a general vision
of security of NARO and Russia (a certain compromise between the NATO
Strategy and EST)
As you know, the United States still consider joint operation of the
Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Can this variant be used for the
closer cooperation between Russia and NATO in case Washington accepts
this proposal in the future?
When Gabala station is discussed, mostly strategic missile defense
system is implied. NATO and Russia have a successful experience
of working with missile defense system on hostilities area. Anyway,
lifting Moscow's concerns on missile defense system and improvement of
the climate in the Russian-American relations will promote Russia-NATO
cooperation. Moscow's proposal on creation of a joint system of
early warning is more than reasonable and it could be a reasonable
compromise on the issue of missile defense deployment.
Can NATO's movement to the East, in particular, inclusion of Ukraine
and Georgia into the sphere of its influence lead to possible
membership of Azerbaijan and Armenia in this bloc?
It is early to speak of the inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia and
it is early to speak of Armenia and Azerbaijan's membership. It is
highly unlikely that NATO will admit the countries with the unsettled
territorial conflicts since it would require serious investments from
the Alliance to stabilize the situation. It is possible to speak of
the cooperation with NATO in the nearest perspective (five years).
Meanwhile, membership requires serious transformation, both political
and military one, while the aforementioned countries are currently
not prepared for this. The process of such transformation may take
at leasr 7-10 years (considering more "advanced" Eastern European
countries that have not yet completed this process)
Moscow is attempting to maintain certain neutrality in the relations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh conflict. Can this
policy be considered substantiated taking into account Baku and
Yerevan's official expectation of definite position from Moscow?
It is difficult for Moscow to take a definite positions and avoid
accusations of any party of "betrayal", "imperialistic intentions"
and so on. Therefore, Russia should take a multilateral approach
that would imply the principle of collective responsibility. The
internationalization of efforts on the resolution of the conflict may
promote a breakthrough since there will be a conscious will of the
international community that can be hardly resisted by those who would
prefer a unilateral solution in favor of either Armenia or Azerbaijan.
The issue of Karabakh is an issue of flexibility of the sides. The
situation cannot go back to 20 years ago despite the respect to
the principle of territorial integrity! This is the life of one
generation! This means that the elites should find courage to agree
and start working with public opinion, while the mediators-Moscow-
will control the fair and complete execution of these decisions.