Tweet
THE NEVER-ENDING ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION
by Morton Abramowitz
The National Interest Online
March 19 2010
Over the last forty years, a resolution has frequently come up in one
or both houses of Congress declaring the killings of over a million
Armenians in present-day Turkey during World War I a genocide. The
resolution has always failed to pass. But each time it comes up
Armenian Americans, Turks and our politicians have acted in the same
way. It has become almost a ritual.
For Armenian-Americans it always entails an enormous effort,
and ends in political abandonment. Getting a resolution passed
is the principal purpose of leading Armenian organizations,
which ceaselessly raise awareness and funds to lobby Congress and
presidential administrations. Their effort is intense at election
time, when monies are given and commitments exacted from candidates
to support calling the events of 1915 a genocide. They always get
much sympathy from presidential contenders, and sometimes, as with
Mr. Obama, specific statements using the term genocide. Legislators
also often pay attention to Armenian groups, particularly where there
are large populations of Armenian descent, as in California.
But every time the resolution has come up, the results remind one
of the famous antics of the unforgettable, hard-nosed Lucy in the
comic strip Peanuts, who holds the football with her finger for the
believing Linus to kick. As he rushes to kick the ball, she invariably
pulls it aside and Linus bites the dust. So it is that the Armenians
find themselves with presidents forsaking their promises or reverting
to a low profile on the resolution and their subordinates taking
the lead in opposition, or legislators who similarly back down for
national-security reasons. Aggrieved Armenians resolutely reject the
assertion that American national interests regarding Turkey are so
compelling or so threatened that political leaders will always fear
the consequences of Turkish anger in expressing support or voting for
such a morally compelling resolution. They impressively join the fray,
year after year, despite repeated failure.
For Turkey, the Armenian genocide issue in America, its major ally,
has become increasingly contentious. The Turks vehemently deny
genocide occurred; it is a matter of national honor in a country
where nationalism remains very strong and politically potent. Ankara
acknowledges that the huge numbers of Armenians and Turks were
slaughtered, but as the result of a terrible war. Many fear passage
of such resolutions will somehow ultimately lead Armenians to seek
reparations from Turkey. They argue that the issue should be left
to historians to determine, not legislators--although Turkish and
Armenian historians agreeing on the matter seems far-fetched.
Turkish governments complain bitterly when resolutions are introduced
in other countries and threaten vague but serious consequences--yet
they rarely follow through with major measures, evidenced by the
passage of such a resolution in France. The rage of the Turkish
government and public is greatest when it gets congressional
attention in the United States, setting off fears in Washington that
the consequences could be very damaging in such important places
as Afghanistan and Iraq. In America, as in France, Turkey cannot
easily appeal to the public: there aren't many Americans of Turkish
descent around, and not much of the electorate is interested. Instead
they bring out all the heavy cannon they can to turn back the
resolution--numerous lobbyists, the large military contractors, the
American Jewish community (because, until recently, of the strong
Turkey-Israel relationship) and most important, the executive branch.
Passage of a resolution would be a huge domestic political blow for
any Turkish government. Turkey's efforts have always worked.
This year Turkish government anger seemed greater over the resolution
passing just the House Committee on International Relations, which
has happened before. The Turks felt that the administration (as well
as the American Jewish community, which they believe is monolithic)
was insufficiently active in opposing the resolution. They recalled
their ambassador and are considering other punitive measures. But
after the administration's indeed belated opposition, the resolution
appears not likely to even reach the floor. Things were much more
bitter than usual this year because Ankara came up with a creative
approach of proposing and working out agreements with neighboring
Armenia to normalize frozen relations, which it also hoped would help
postpone any genocide resolution in America indefinitely. But that
effort, desirable on its own, stalled politically in Turkey--the Obama
administration's expectation that the Turkish government would submit
the agreements for parliamentary approval contributed to its delay in
weighing in on the resolution. This year, on the commemorative date
of April 24, how Mr. Obama--who used the genocide word as a candidate,
but hasn't yet as president--speaks to the Armenian community will be
closely watched and another storm is possible. Turkish Prime Minister
Erdogan has remained very vocal on the whole issue.
For the American media, a genocide resolution is hardly an identifiable
issue. Usually it gets a few inches in the middle of the paper,
although this year's Turkish threats caught more press attention. In
1990, a quite extraordinary two-day debate took place in the Senate
over a genocide resolution between the two party leaders, Senator
Dole and Senator Byrd--and got barely a mention in the national
press. I remember it because as our ambassador in Turkey I spent
months lobbying some sixty senators to reject the resolution.
Most Americans who pay attention to the issue probably sympathize with
the Armenians and believe historical evidence supports their claim of
genocide. They tend to believe Turkey should come to grips with its
past. Others question, whatever the history, that it is bizarre for
the American Congress to express views of what happened one hundred
years ago in wartime in another country. But all that pales for many
congressmen and presidents, whatever their commitments in election
times, to compelling foreign-policy concerns with Turkey.
Can this dynamic be changed? Not likely in the short run. The
Armenian community will not give up. Moreover they believe that
despite Turkey's growing international importance, its position
on this issue is eroding. Some twenty countries have called events
genocide--including Sweden, a strong supporter of Turkey's bid for EU
membership, which only last week passed a genocide resolution by one
vote. Even with the issue so deeply felt and politically explosive
in Turkey, such governments aren't likely change their stance even
as they search for ways to fend off resolution battles.
Perhaps over time and because of increasing public discussion in Turkey
(a recent phenomenon) that will change. Conceivably our Congress may
grow tired of the endless battle, but the politics are hard to put
aside. Probably the best hope is the realization of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation, which will make it easier to proceed practically
to better deal with horrible history. Meanwhile, stay tuned for the
next episode.
Morton Abramowitz, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, was
American ambassador to Turkey 1989-1991.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Articl e.aspx?id=23070
by Morton Abramowitz
The National Interest Online
March 19 2010
Over the last forty years, a resolution has frequently come up in one
or both houses of Congress declaring the killings of over a million
Armenians in present-day Turkey during World War I a genocide. The
resolution has always failed to pass. But each time it comes up
Armenian Americans, Turks and our politicians have acted in the same
way. It has become almost a ritual.
For Armenian-Americans it always entails an enormous effort,
and ends in political abandonment. Getting a resolution passed
is the principal purpose of leading Armenian organizations,
which ceaselessly raise awareness and funds to lobby Congress and
presidential administrations. Their effort is intense at election
time, when monies are given and commitments exacted from candidates
to support calling the events of 1915 a genocide. They always get
much sympathy from presidential contenders, and sometimes, as with
Mr. Obama, specific statements using the term genocide. Legislators
also often pay attention to Armenian groups, particularly where there
are large populations of Armenian descent, as in California.
But every time the resolution has come up, the results remind one
of the famous antics of the unforgettable, hard-nosed Lucy in the
comic strip Peanuts, who holds the football with her finger for the
believing Linus to kick. As he rushes to kick the ball, she invariably
pulls it aside and Linus bites the dust. So it is that the Armenians
find themselves with presidents forsaking their promises or reverting
to a low profile on the resolution and their subordinates taking
the lead in opposition, or legislators who similarly back down for
national-security reasons. Aggrieved Armenians resolutely reject the
assertion that American national interests regarding Turkey are so
compelling or so threatened that political leaders will always fear
the consequences of Turkish anger in expressing support or voting for
such a morally compelling resolution. They impressively join the fray,
year after year, despite repeated failure.
For Turkey, the Armenian genocide issue in America, its major ally,
has become increasingly contentious. The Turks vehemently deny
genocide occurred; it is a matter of national honor in a country
where nationalism remains very strong and politically potent. Ankara
acknowledges that the huge numbers of Armenians and Turks were
slaughtered, but as the result of a terrible war. Many fear passage
of such resolutions will somehow ultimately lead Armenians to seek
reparations from Turkey. They argue that the issue should be left
to historians to determine, not legislators--although Turkish and
Armenian historians agreeing on the matter seems far-fetched.
Turkish governments complain bitterly when resolutions are introduced
in other countries and threaten vague but serious consequences--yet
they rarely follow through with major measures, evidenced by the
passage of such a resolution in France. The rage of the Turkish
government and public is greatest when it gets congressional
attention in the United States, setting off fears in Washington that
the consequences could be very damaging in such important places
as Afghanistan and Iraq. In America, as in France, Turkey cannot
easily appeal to the public: there aren't many Americans of Turkish
descent around, and not much of the electorate is interested. Instead
they bring out all the heavy cannon they can to turn back the
resolution--numerous lobbyists, the large military contractors, the
American Jewish community (because, until recently, of the strong
Turkey-Israel relationship) and most important, the executive branch.
Passage of a resolution would be a huge domestic political blow for
any Turkish government. Turkey's efforts have always worked.
This year Turkish government anger seemed greater over the resolution
passing just the House Committee on International Relations, which
has happened before. The Turks felt that the administration (as well
as the American Jewish community, which they believe is monolithic)
was insufficiently active in opposing the resolution. They recalled
their ambassador and are considering other punitive measures. But
after the administration's indeed belated opposition, the resolution
appears not likely to even reach the floor. Things were much more
bitter than usual this year because Ankara came up with a creative
approach of proposing and working out agreements with neighboring
Armenia to normalize frozen relations, which it also hoped would help
postpone any genocide resolution in America indefinitely. But that
effort, desirable on its own, stalled politically in Turkey--the Obama
administration's expectation that the Turkish government would submit
the agreements for parliamentary approval contributed to its delay in
weighing in on the resolution. This year, on the commemorative date
of April 24, how Mr. Obama--who used the genocide word as a candidate,
but hasn't yet as president--speaks to the Armenian community will be
closely watched and another storm is possible. Turkish Prime Minister
Erdogan has remained very vocal on the whole issue.
For the American media, a genocide resolution is hardly an identifiable
issue. Usually it gets a few inches in the middle of the paper,
although this year's Turkish threats caught more press attention. In
1990, a quite extraordinary two-day debate took place in the Senate
over a genocide resolution between the two party leaders, Senator
Dole and Senator Byrd--and got barely a mention in the national
press. I remember it because as our ambassador in Turkey I spent
months lobbying some sixty senators to reject the resolution.
Most Americans who pay attention to the issue probably sympathize with
the Armenians and believe historical evidence supports their claim of
genocide. They tend to believe Turkey should come to grips with its
past. Others question, whatever the history, that it is bizarre for
the American Congress to express views of what happened one hundred
years ago in wartime in another country. But all that pales for many
congressmen and presidents, whatever their commitments in election
times, to compelling foreign-policy concerns with Turkey.
Can this dynamic be changed? Not likely in the short run. The
Armenian community will not give up. Moreover they believe that
despite Turkey's growing international importance, its position
on this issue is eroding. Some twenty countries have called events
genocide--including Sweden, a strong supporter of Turkey's bid for EU
membership, which only last week passed a genocide resolution by one
vote. Even with the issue so deeply felt and politically explosive
in Turkey, such governments aren't likely change their stance even
as they search for ways to fend off resolution battles.
Perhaps over time and because of increasing public discussion in Turkey
(a recent phenomenon) that will change. Conceivably our Congress may
grow tired of the endless battle, but the politics are hard to put
aside. Probably the best hope is the realization of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation, which will make it easier to proceed practically
to better deal with horrible history. Meanwhile, stay tuned for the
next episode.
Morton Abramowitz, a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, was
American ambassador to Turkey 1989-1991.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Articl e.aspx?id=23070