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EU'S INVOLVEMENT IN KARABAKH SETTLEMENT MAY FOSTER ARMENIAN-TURKISH RAPPROACHEMENT
ArmInfo
2010-03-19 17:52:00
Interview with MEP Frank Engel, member of the Europe-Armenia Advisory
Council.
What instruments may the EU use to urge Turkey to ratify the
Armenian-Turkish Protocols?
Pretty few if the EU does not decide to resort to rather extreme
measures. But this is precisely the crux of the matter: the EU
cannot accept indefinitely that Turkey does not establish normal
diplomatic and neighbourly relations with Armenia and Cyprus,
while accession negotiations continue. We should make it clear that
unless the normalisation process with Armenia goes ahead speedily,
the negotiations will be affected. Of course, every diplomatic move,
including highest-level insistence on Turkey in order to keep the
process on track, is preferable to harsher rhetoric and acts.
Rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey and reopening of the border
has never been a key issue in the process of Turkey's joining the EU.
Yet, don't you think the EU should clearly put such a precondition
in its own negotiation?
In my view the political accession criteria clearly encompass this.
No-one imagines that any of the existing member states could have
joined the Union without having normal relations - even though some of
them are and remain strained - with their neighbours. Turkey may be
a special case given its overarching strategic significance, but ten
years have now elapsed since it acquired candidate status. The time
has come for the EU to clearly indicate to Turkey that, no matter how
commendable all its previous efforts at fulfilling political accession
criteria are - and they indeed represent momentous changes in the
organising logic of the Turkish state and society - we now expect
normalisation with Armenia and Cyprus if the accession process is to
continue on the normal path.
Azerbaijan's position has become an obstacle to the Armenian-Turkish
rapproachement. How can this situation be improved?
This would be extremely desirable. Azerbaidjan would have to
recognise that it is actually hampering Turkish EU accession
prospects by insisting that the Karabagh issue has to be part and
parcel of any possible normalisation of relations between Turkey and
Armenia. Of course, Turkish and Azerbaidjani interests overlap in
a very significant way, but then again, Turkey is now compelled to
make a move on its own that Azerbaidjan will not be in agreement with.
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair in the Annual Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, stated that "Although
there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh".
There is no need for American "Threat Assessments" to know that the
situation between Armenia and Azerbaidjan remains extremely volatile.
I have also acknowledged that President Sarkissian, in an interview
to "Le Figaro" while on a visit to France, has stated that Armenia
remains prepared should hostilities become a realistic perspective
again. And I am aware that it would be strange for Azerbaidjan to beef
up its military budget and capabilities the way it does if it did not
still contemplate "retaking" Karabagh by force. Of course I hope that
the Karabagh issue can be solved differently and that eventually,
relations between Armenian and Azerbaidjan can also start normalising.
But this is a long road to travel.
The EU has always been inclined to play a certain role in
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. What kind of role it may be?
I am not a diplomat. Therefore I have always believed that a community
of the size and - at least theoretical - means that are those of the EU
should not stand aside while officially, it is the Minsk group that
mediates. Of course, there are enormous interests at stake here,
overall stability in the South Caucasus, energy routes etc. But
the EU should, in my view, try to increase its involvement in the
Karabagh settlement, as it could by making it clear to Turkey as an EU
accession candidate that there can be no further delay in normalising
its relations with Armenia because of an ongoing conflict between two
third countries, Armenia and Azerbaidjan, which are not accession
candidates. This could mirror to Azerbaidjan that the deadlock
generated by the linking of this issue with the Karabagh conflict
will not continue forever. At the same time, the new elements of EU
foreign and security policy should be used to weigh on both Armenia and
Azerbaidjan to progress with the Karabagh settlement - both countries
are, after all, part of the European Neighbourhood policy.
Oksana Musaelyan, Mar 19, 2010, ArmInfo
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
ArmInfo
2010-03-19 17:52:00
Interview with MEP Frank Engel, member of the Europe-Armenia Advisory
Council.
What instruments may the EU use to urge Turkey to ratify the
Armenian-Turkish Protocols?
Pretty few if the EU does not decide to resort to rather extreme
measures. But this is precisely the crux of the matter: the EU
cannot accept indefinitely that Turkey does not establish normal
diplomatic and neighbourly relations with Armenia and Cyprus,
while accession negotiations continue. We should make it clear that
unless the normalisation process with Armenia goes ahead speedily,
the negotiations will be affected. Of course, every diplomatic move,
including highest-level insistence on Turkey in order to keep the
process on track, is preferable to harsher rhetoric and acts.
Rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey and reopening of the border
has never been a key issue in the process of Turkey's joining the EU.
Yet, don't you think the EU should clearly put such a precondition
in its own negotiation?
In my view the political accession criteria clearly encompass this.
No-one imagines that any of the existing member states could have
joined the Union without having normal relations - even though some of
them are and remain strained - with their neighbours. Turkey may be
a special case given its overarching strategic significance, but ten
years have now elapsed since it acquired candidate status. The time
has come for the EU to clearly indicate to Turkey that, no matter how
commendable all its previous efforts at fulfilling political accession
criteria are - and they indeed represent momentous changes in the
organising logic of the Turkish state and society - we now expect
normalisation with Armenia and Cyprus if the accession process is to
continue on the normal path.
Azerbaijan's position has become an obstacle to the Armenian-Turkish
rapproachement. How can this situation be improved?
This would be extremely desirable. Azerbaidjan would have to
recognise that it is actually hampering Turkish EU accession
prospects by insisting that the Karabagh issue has to be part and
parcel of any possible normalisation of relations between Turkey and
Armenia. Of course, Turkish and Azerbaidjani interests overlap in
a very significant way, but then again, Turkey is now compelled to
make a move on its own that Azerbaidjan will not be in agreement with.
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair in the Annual Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, stated that "Although
there has been progress in the past year toward Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement, this has affected the delicate relationship between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and increases the risk of a renewed conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh".
There is no need for American "Threat Assessments" to know that the
situation between Armenia and Azerbaidjan remains extremely volatile.
I have also acknowledged that President Sarkissian, in an interview
to "Le Figaro" while on a visit to France, has stated that Armenia
remains prepared should hostilities become a realistic perspective
again. And I am aware that it would be strange for Azerbaidjan to beef
up its military budget and capabilities the way it does if it did not
still contemplate "retaking" Karabagh by force. Of course I hope that
the Karabagh issue can be solved differently and that eventually,
relations between Armenian and Azerbaidjan can also start normalising.
But this is a long road to travel.
The EU has always been inclined to play a certain role in
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. What kind of role it may be?
I am not a diplomat. Therefore I have always believed that a community
of the size and - at least theoretical - means that are those of the EU
should not stand aside while officially, it is the Minsk group that
mediates. Of course, there are enormous interests at stake here,
overall stability in the South Caucasus, energy routes etc. But
the EU should, in my view, try to increase its involvement in the
Karabagh settlement, as it could by making it clear to Turkey as an EU
accession candidate that there can be no further delay in normalising
its relations with Armenia because of an ongoing conflict between two
third countries, Armenia and Azerbaidjan, which are not accession
candidates. This could mirror to Azerbaidjan that the deadlock
generated by the linking of this issue with the Karabagh conflict
will not continue forever. At the same time, the new elements of EU
foreign and security policy should be used to weigh on both Armenia and
Azerbaidjan to progress with the Karabagh settlement - both countries
are, after all, part of the European Neighbourhood policy.
Oksana Musaelyan, Mar 19, 2010, ArmInfo
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress